SADISM AND MASOCHISM - A SYMPTOMATOLOGY OF ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY?

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There has recently been a plethora of attempts to understand the key differences that separate the analytic and continental traditions of philosophy\(^1\), often involving either painstaking descriptions of the divergent argumentative techniques and methodologies that concern them, or comparatively examining in detail the work of certain major theorists in both traditions (e.g. Rawls and Derrida, Lewis and Deleuze\(^2\)). While partly drawing on these two approaches, in this particular essay I instead propose a rather more speculative way of teasing out the differences between them, interpreting them through the lens of Gilles Deleuze’s non-oppositional typology of sadism and masochism, as it is expressed in *Difference and Repetition* and ‘Coldness and Cruelty’.

Although a counter-intuitive typology to advocate, in what follows I will argue that the analytic tradition evinces the more sadistic tendencies and the continental tradition the more masochistic tendencies. Of course, this is not to reductively suggest that each and every analytic philosopher literally suffers, ad hominem, a sadistic pathology, which is clearly not the case – there are plenty of individual philosophers who trouble or fall between the terms of this taxonomy. Equally, nor does it entail that philosophy itself is, by definition, pathological, despite the fact that Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, Louis Sass\(^3\), and Deleuze himself, among many others, have long associated philosophy with at least a certain experience of madness. Rather, congruent with Deleuze’s analysis of schizophrenia in *Anti-Oedipus* and elsewhere, sadism and masochism must not be understood merely according to the literal medico-pathological sense of these terms, but more broadly as intimating an affective and logical structure that makes possible the clinical instances that we know of and is not reducible to them (and, as will become clear, the originally quite specific use that
Deleuze makes of sadism and masochism in ‘Coldness and Cruelty’ is considerably widened in their deployment in *Difference and Repetition*. In that sense, it is important to note that all philosophy, including G. E. Moore’s, Gilbert Ryle’s or Hubert Dreyfus’ ‘common-sensisms’⁴, presupposes and implies at least an *attempted* break with law and custom as one of its preconditions, even if it is also clear that what Deleuze calls the subjective presuppositions of common sense are nevertheless likely to continue unrecognised on another level. It is my contention, then, that the heuristic device of Deleuze’s sadistic and masochistic typologies helps to make perspicuous the different ways in which these traditions generally go about trying to inaugurate this break from common-sense. While such an ad hoc modus operandi cannot be wholly justified, either as a prima facie proof or immanently in relation to Deleuze’s own oeuvre⁵, it will nevertheless be shown that his symptomatology offers a provocative and illuminative template for coming to grips with some of the most enduring and significant differences between these two traditions that have been mutually non-comprehending for much of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries⁶. Moreover, although this will not be able to be addressed in any detail, a secondary aim of this essay will be to suggest that these two affective tendencies, which cannot be thought of simply as pathological activities on the margin of normality, must be recognised by any political philosophy worth its salt, disrupting simplistic assumptions of rationally self-interested agents, hypothetical contracts (or thought experiments) that purport to be morally binding, and many of the basic assumptions and devices with which political philosophy has traditionally been concerned⁷. But let us consider what it is that Deleuze has to say about sadism and masochism before returning to these bigger questions.

The first and most important thing to ascertain from Deleuze’s analysis is that he resists the conflation that he terms ‘the sado-masochistic entity’. In fact, he tells us that the spurious linking of these two pathologies (which began with Krafft-Ebing, was developed by Freud, and is arguably still dominant in contemporary attitudes towards these phenomena) issues forth from a confusion of syndromes with the specific symptoms involved in the two kinds of behaviour (CC 40). Not only are they different modes of being with differing logics, but he also insists, contrary to Freud, that the existence of a person who is a masochist, for example (and the reverse also
applies), does not imply the existence of an antagonistic sadist who inflicts suffering upon the masochist (and perhaps this is why there has been relatively little sustained engagement between analytic and continental philosophers over the years: each is not quite giving the other what they want). Deleuze argues that a genuine sadist would never tolerate a willing masochist accomplice, and the whole point of masochism on his analysis is that any so-called punisher must first be educated and seduced into behaving in a manner that he terms ‘quasi-sadistic’, which he rigorously distinguishes from sadism proper. It is not just Freud who is being targeted here, but also the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, as well as Sartre’s reinvention of it, in which we are envisaged to be thrown back and forth between the attitudes of sadism and masochism in an ultimately impossible attempt to control how we are seen by others, and to eliminate the prospect of shame and alienation before the look of the other.

For Sartre, we can either constantly judge and objectify others and thereby seek to prevent the emergence of our social self (what he calls being-for-others), or we can try and induce others to see us exactly as we wish to be seen and thereby control their subjectivity. According to Deleuze’s analyses, however, sadism and masochism are much more stable and enduring than Sartre’s account suggests. They are more akin to separate ways of life that admit of no such clear-cut oppositionality, and the perceived failure of one of these two attitudes does not motivate us, as Sartre suggests, to adopt the alternative perspective. For Deleuze, the non-oppositional differences between these perspectives becomes incontrovertible once we employ a logic of symptoms, which he and Derrida both argue takes us further than any ethics of truthfulness.

Rather than this simply being a medical concern, this logic of symptoms requires paying attention to fictional work and, in particular, to the novels of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (the Dutch author and progenitor of the term masochism) and the Marquis de Sade (the more well-known French writer and progenitor of the term sadism, who was imprisoned for his literature, as well as for his advocaton of, and engagement in, various sadistic practices). Deleuze goes so far as to acclaim Masoch, in particular, as a “great clinician”, precisely because he manages to make clear how different and incommensurable sadism and masochism are.

We will see the differences between these two typologies shortly, but first one important background question needs to be posed: why exactly is Deleuze interested
in these typologies? Without resorting to the speculation of ad hominem arguments, we can get the beginning of an answer to this question by recognising that ‘Coldness and Cruelty’ was written in 1967, a year before what is arguably his major philosophical work, *Difference and Repetition*, and in the later work he attempts to establish, contrary to much of the philosophical tradition, that repetition is, and never could be, the simple repetition of the same. Instead, he argues that all repetition involves the instantiation of difference, although not necessarily to the same extent, or in the same way. Deleuze insists that if the repetition of difference is possible (and this possibility is bracketed away in gesture only), it is as much opposed to moral law as it is to natural law (DR 5). He then briefly discusses what he considers to be the two major ways of overturning the kind of repetition of the same that he associates with the moral law – sadism and masochism. In sadism and masochism, repetition is said to run wild, of its own accord, and is no longer related to experience or to the pleasure that is gained or anticipated to be gained (cf. CC 120). Repetition is sought for its own sake and this can be problematic (i.e. it can lead to pathological fetishes), but, for Deleuze, again, the meaning of these terms cannot be confined to this. Rather, sadism and masochism are understood as the affective dimension of a certain transcendental structure and privileged synthesis of time that he calls repetition-for-itself (i.e. repetition that is not tied to identity). There are some important connections between his analysis of the *repetition-for-itself* evinced in sadism and masochism, and his understanding of the *difference-in-itself* at stake in the futural synthesis of time that he associates with the eternal return of difference, and what he terms the “apprenticeship of learning” (DR 164). This latter phrase is intended to evoke experiences where one is radically and traumatically disrupted, forced to instigate new ways of existing to cope with difference and adversity (difference hence comes first, rather than embodied coping techniques, etc.). In both of these affirmations we reach a difficult point in Deleuze’s work, where the empirical, the moral, and the transcendental, all coalesce. Is the repetition of sadism and masochism, which is freed from the moral law, akin to the repetition of difference-in-itself? If so, this might seem to constitute a warning about any uncritical adoption of the Deleuzian position, which, even if it doesn’t entail a pathological condition, certainly risks the experience of what he and Guattari call chaos in *Anti-Oedipus*. I address some of these critical
questions about Deleuze’s work in more detail elsewhere, but let us leave them aside in order to more concretely fill out this typology of sadism and masochism.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze both sums up and extends the more specific findings of ‘Coldness and Cruelty’. He tells us that sadism functions by ascending to principles, but principles understood as some kind of original force, whereas masochism descends towards consequences to which one submits with all-too-perfect attention to detail, and it tends to involve demonstration by absurdity and working to rule (DR 5). At first glance, such a description might seem to suggest that it would be more appropriate to label the continental camp sadistic and the analytic camp masochistic, rather than the reverse that I am trying to establish here. We should not rush too quickly to such a conclusion, however. In ‘Coldness and Cruelty’, where this difference is given more prolonged attention, sadism is said to focus on the institutions that render the law unnecessary and even obsolete. Replaced by a dynamic model of action and authority, sadism seeks the degradation of all laws and the establishment of a superior power. In the work of de Sade himself, it is important to note the ongoing conviction that it is the law (understood as norms, conventions, etc.) that enables tyrants to exist, and certainly various psychological experiments show that there is at least some empirical plausibility to this. But, for Deleuze and de Sade alike, the impetus behind sadism is not simply the desire for power over others. Rather, it seeks to suspend what Deleuze, in *Logic of Sense*, calls the entire other-structure itself (LS 353) and the key aspect of sadism consists in the idea that the law can be best transcended through a kind of institutional anarchy that ascends to reasoned principles, but reasons and principles that somehow exceed and promulgate themselves (this is perhaps what Deleuze endorses in his repeated invocations of “crowned anarchy” – DR 224, 265, 304). It is this manner in which sadism foregrounds an excess of reasons and principles, and uses them to question our everyday normativity, that we should take note of in relation to the attempt to thus characterise the analytic tradition.

Without being able to devote substantial attention to the analytic use of thought experiments here, it is perhaps sufficient to briefly consider the widely discussed
prisoner’s dilemma. It has been claimed that thousands of articles were written about the problem in the 1970s and 80s and philosophical engagements of the Anglo-American variety constituted a significant proportion of these. So, what is the dilemma? We are asked to imagine that two people have been arrested for some relatively serious crime, say robbing a bank, and both of the people involved are rationally self-interested and care more about their personal welfare than that of their colleague. The prosecutor offers each of them one of four possible outcomes that might eventuate depending upon whether they confess or remain silent, and depending upon what their accomplice does: 1. if Robber 1 confesses and their accomplice remains silent all charges against Robber 1 will be dropped and their testimony will be used to ensure that their accomplice does serious time; 2. if Robber 2 confesses while Robber 1 remains silent, Robber 2 will go free while Robber 1 does the prison time; 3. if both confess there will be two convictions on the serious robbery charge, but both will get early parole; 4. if both remain silent, it will result in minor sentences for each (say firearms possession charges). The basic dilemma here is that considered in terms of what their accomplice does, each prisoner is better off by confessing than remaining silent, but the outcome obtained when both confess is nevertheless worse for each than the outcome that would have been obtained had both remained silent. As Steven Kuhn suggests, “a common view is that the puzzle illustrates a conflict between individual and group rationality: a group whose members pursue rational self-interest may all end up worse off than a group whose members act contrary to rational self-interest”.10

Now, there is much to be said about the way in which different social pressures and desires are simplified into this grid of four possible outcomes.11 Perhaps the circumscribed conditions of this thought experiment invalidate conclusions extended from this process, especially in regard to the complexities of social and political problems. But without dwelling on this here, it needs to be pointed out that the prisoner’s dilemma is neither unusual, nor uncharacteristic, of the analytic tradition in employing logic and reasoned principles to suggest that perhaps something is amiss with our everyday norms. It arguably applies to most theories of rational choice, including utilitarianism, decision and game theory, as well as the use to which many thought experiments are made to serve. In the analytic tradition, problems are
frequently examined in this decontextualised and recontextualised manner that ensures that the principles involved take on a life of their own, far exceeding the pragmatic, just as Deleuze suggests is the case with sadism. Of course, it must be acknowledged that these analytic extensions of reason remain restricted largely to the realm of philosophical discourse alone, instead of becoming tantamount to a programmatic way of life as they did with de Sade. Moreover, unlike Sade (but perhaps more like sadism) these excesses of principle are not necessarily deliberately deployed in order to overturn the law and convention. In that sense there are some significant differences between the analytic tradition and Sade, but let me reaffirm that I want merely to illustrate a sadistic *tendency* in the analytic camp (which need not have anything to do with the inflicting of pain on Deleuze’s view), and a masochistic tendency in the continental camp. While neither are fully fledged versions of sadism and masochism (because there are individual philosophers who constitute borderline cases and exceptions), it is nevertheless the case that both tend in the one direction significantly moreso than the other.

By contrast with sadism, Deleuze tells us that masochism highlights the way in which it is the contract, or agreement, between parties and people that generates the law\(^1\), before then focusing in detail on the inevitability of the way in which the subsequent development of the law then ignores or contravenes the very declaration that brought it into being. For him, these are very different ways of treating and overturning the law. Rather than rely on the moral law of convention, sadism surges upwards to find rationality, living its own life, devoid of reference to custom, but masochism immanently shows the unjustifiable severity of law in the performative enaction of it. To put it more simply, masochism wants to expose that the law inevitably forgets it origins in a free contract and all too quickly becomes violent. As Deleuze says, “To imagine that a quasi-contract is at the origin of society is to invoke conditions that are necessarily invalidated as soon as the law comes into being” (CC 91). Without digressing unduly – or perhaps agreeing with Deleuze and Guattari that all philosophy is a digression, although some produce more interesting and useful concepts than others – it is worth observing that Derrida’s own many analyses of the law and constitutions tend to make very similar points\(^1\).
But we can draw this contrast more tightly by noting that Deleuze also intimates that there is an important difference between sadism and masochism in their relation to the calculable. Number, quantity, and quantitative evaluations and repetitions are the obsessions of sadism. There is a focus upon the calculable and the numerable (CC 70). It is a certain kind of rationality taken to the extreme, freed of its moorings. Arguably this focus on number is built into the general scientism that pervades Western culture, but it also seems reasonably uncontroversial to suggest that a focus on the calculable and the measurable are an important feature of analytic philosophy, especially when contrasted to the European tradition, both in regard to its ahistorical preoccupation with rationality and its continual flirtations with seeing philosophy’s raison d’être as being purely about clarifying the findings of science. Of course, this is a long and complicated story that cannot be adequately treated here. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that even in the apparently distantly related field of moral philosophy there is something close to an agreement that theories must at least be compatible with the latest scientific and social scientific analyses. In the realm of political philosophy, the analytic preoccupation with the calculable is evident in its synchronic focus on issues concerning distributive justice, rather than with issues to do with domination and oppression that have been the focus of Hegel, Marx, the existentialists, and, in fact, arguably all those working in the European tradition which is substantially indebted to the master-slave dialectic in its different guises and reinventions. Indeed, while Deleuze problematises the reified opposition at the basis of the Hegelian and Sartrean formulations of this dialectic of social life, he nevertheless agrees that a focus on the distribution of goods is fundamentally an activity of ressentiment that, “distributes morsels in order to separate out the modes of human existence” (DR 282). Suffice to say that this kind of treatment of the calculable is clearly vastly different from that holding sway in contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy.

Indeed, while objections can no doubt be raised to trouble this suggestion that the analytic tradition evinces a kind of sadism, it is nevertheless clear that the calculable and the numerable has been comparatively disparaged in the European tradition. The continental tradition has been heavily influenced by Marx, for whom any undue focus on the calculable and distributive justice would be a kind of commodity fetishism that
needs to pay more attention to the means of production, as well as by other figures like Kierkegaard, who railed against systematising rationality and insisted on the existential and the lived. For him, singularities aren’t susceptible to calculation, and responsibility likewise breaks with the calculable and the order of generality, much as Derrida also contends in *The Gift of Death*, his evocative ruminations on Kierkegaard’s *Fear and Trembling*. Skipping important intermediaries like Bergson and Nietzsche in order to provide merely the most basic of genealogies, moving into the twentieth century, Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, gave formative significance to moods and pre-rational attunements like *Angst* over the rational and the deliberative. He also prioritised the practical and ready-to-hand modes of coping with the world that are epistemologically and ontologically prior to calculable present-at-hand analyses of it, which might delve into considerations of size, shape, colour, configurations, molecular composition, etc.¹⁶ In the French existentialist tradition that took up aspects of Heidegger’s work, the calculable has continued to be decried in favour of according greater attention to phenomenological experience, whether it be in Sartre’s affirmations of our radical freedom and associated experiences like anguish, nausea, and shame, Camus’ diagnosis of the absurd and subsequent call for action (essentially to abandon the desire for calculating how best to achieve order), or in the ambiguity that Merleau-Ponty and de Beauvoir find to be constitutive of embodied existence. And this turn to the body is itself important. After all, both Freud and Deleuze share the conviction that the masochist focuses upon bodily experience and the way in which subjectivity emerges through embodied desire, and it is hence perhaps unsurprising that it is largely continental philosophers (both feminist and otherwise) who are concerned with the philosophy of the body, as opposed to the plethora of analytic philosophers of mind. These terminological differences can only begin to hint at the disparate treatment the body has received in these traditions.¹⁷

While a concern with the body has continued in the work of the key poststructuralist thinkers (think of Deleuze, Foucault, and Derrida, at least in *On Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy*), for them the insistence on the priority of the incalculable sometimes also threatens to become a denigration of solutions and of calculability per se.¹⁸ Without being able to deal with all of those who are associated with this term, it can be shown that, in different ways, Derrida, Deleuze and Negri all insist on the priority of the
incalculable over the calculable\textsuperscript{19} (and problems over solutions), just as we have seen that the masochistic concern with repetition is averse to the purely quantitative. Indeed, there is often something close to an endorsement and privileging of masochism in Deleuze’s own oeuvre, and while it is true that he also speaks of a hyper-calculus, it is difficult to give any content to this calculus that he associates with the dice throw, chance, and the affirmation of them that is best captured in *Difference and Repetition*’s third, futural synthesis of time (which, we might add, is precisely about the incalculability of the future). Moreover, in *Logic of Sense* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze draws a radical distinction between the time of Aion and Chronos: Aion refers to the indefinite time of the event, which is always disrupting the time of the present by dividing into both the past and the future, whereas Chronos is the time of measure and the present (TP 262)\textsuperscript{20}. Deleuze subtly but persistently privileges the incalculable time of Aion (cf. LS 126, 151) and it is for related reasons that Paul Patton has commented that, “the politics of becoming minor asserts the power of the non-denumerable against that of the denumerable” (cf. TP 471)\textsuperscript{21}. We have already seen that such a perspective entails a rejection of the privileging of questions concerning distributive justice in the political realm, but to put Deleuze and Guattari’s position in more positive terms, this means that “the question of desire’s involvement in its own involuntary servitude is the fundamental problem of political philosophy” (TP 29). In fact, if sadism and masochism also have this transcendental import that Deleuze intimates, if they capture one aspect of the synthesis of time and experience that is at work in all of us, as seems to be his implication in *Difference and Repetition*, this installs time and affect at the heart of politics: there can be no politics that is not bound up in a lived response to the problem of repetition.

For our purposes, however, it needs to be emphasised that the relation to time involved in these two modalities is markedly distinct. Although both aim, according to Deleuze, to suspend the time of the living-present and open on to the time of Aion – i.e. the time of the eternal and the event (LS 188) – sadism and masochism do this very differently; they involve a respective acceleration and deceleration of time (cf. CC 71). Things speed up with the calculations of time and the sadistic expansion of principles beyond law; the living-present becomes so compressed and hurried as to be obliterated (it must be insisted here, however, that the analytic tradition constitutes
only an aborted sadism, temporally speaking, because it never quite takes the concern with the rational and calculable to their excessive limits, because of the methodological reliance on intuition that returns us to the realm of common sense and the living present\(^2\). On the other hand, masochism is about a certain experience of waiting that tries not to anticipate or circumscribe the future by weighing it down with the expectations that are built into the habitual present. As we see detailed in Sacher-Masoch’s novels, both the seduction and the rituals involved may be insidiously slow, allowing a relationship to slowly transmogrify and allowing the depth of one’s co-implication with their interlocutor, who can never be an unequivocal master, to build and build. In this respect, it is perhaps no coincidence that Deleuze is also very enamoured with the literature of Beckett and Proust, who, although very different, can both still be said to instantiate a different and more masochistic relation to time; the one prioritising waiting and the other a memorial ritualism. While it is not simply a contrast between active and passive that is being invoked here, we might sum up by suggesting that there is an essential impatience bound up with sadism (it wants to promulgate greater and greater numbers of repetitions, whether they be beatings or citations of journal articles!) and a kind of eternal patience at the heart of masochism (which is attentive to the manner and form of the unwinding of repetition, to that about repetition which is unrepresentable, rather than the quantitative perpetuation of more)\(^3\). As would be apparent, it is my contention that analytic philosophy is best characterised as a philosophy of sadistic impatience and continental philosophy is more aptly described as one of masochistic and eternal patience. Despite the perjorative connotations that are usually associated with the prefix im, however, we should not assume (in this context and perhaps any other) that patience is a virtue and its lack a vice. On the contrary, what I am designating as impatience is both necessary and important as we will see. But, beyond their already enumerated attitudes towards that which is calculable, there are at least three further ways of trying to justify this claim that I will pursue: 1. the empirical practice of these two groups in their shared relation to publication and research requirements; 2. the stylistic and methodological differences involved in their research; 3. their respective metaphysical and ontological commitments which are tightly linked in with their tacit philosophies of time.
First then, although quantitative repetitions are vital for all academics these days in the ‘publish or perish’ mentality that most governments and universities have successfully inculcated into their retinue, it is nevertheless the case that the form that this has assumed in the two fields has been divergent. We have already made the general observation that most analytic philosophers aren’t particularly concerned with the history of philosophy but instead pay more attention to the latest developments among their contemporaries in their specialised field. In terms of journal publications, this practice encourages a proliferation of more and more nuanced replies to prior articles in a given journal, often resulting in, ‘Reply to a reply by… (add the author’s name)’. This is something that rarely, if ever, happens in journals that are devoted to European philosophy. Moreover, while the analytic preoccupation is with publishing in the best journals (ranked against one another in terms of frequency of citation) and with the reading of such journals being indispensable, in European philosophy, on the other hand, there is more of a preoccupation with monographs and edited collections, and a correspondingly lesser interest in journals. Significantly, in regard to our concern with time and (im)patience, the European tradition also evinces far more of a concern with oeuvres (and epochs) and the relation that a philosopher bears to certain canonical figures in that lineage. Continental philosophers are frequently labelled a Heideggerian, a Derridean, a Levinasian, a Sartrean, a Husserlian, even a Deleuzian, but this naming process obscures the more significant point that it is based on, however, which is that continental philosophers tend to engage with the work of someone, say for example Heidegger (who has more than his share of acolytes), slowly and for a long period of time (an eternity), just as we have seen Deleuze describe masochistic relationships. Suffice to say that this practice is not so common in analytic philosophy. Not many ever become avowed Rawlsians, Putnamians, Lewisians, etc. They are, on the contrary, labelled epistemologists, philosophers of science, etc.

No doubt, however, there are other ways of accounting for these empirical differences, so let me try and develop my argument by showing how the different styles and methodologies of the two traditions link in with this contrast between speed (impatience) and waiting (eternal patience). Philosophers have, after all, commented upon the stylistic differences between analytic philosophy and European philosophy.
for years\textsuperscript{24}, and in this respect one need only briefly recollect Carnap’s engagement with Heidegger, or John Searle’s interaction with Derrida, to cite but two stark examples of this stylistic confrontation that cannot be reduced to difficulties concerning translation. We can begin to elaborate on these differences by observing that in European philosophy there is often a move to descend to the level of consequences and to a hermeneutics of textual interpretation and historical context (indeed, European journals are sometimes interested in publishing almost exclusively exegetical essays, something that only very infrequently happens in analytic journals). This attention to both textual interpretation and, perhaps more significantly, to matters concerning expressive style, is especially evident in poststructuralism and is perhaps exemplified by Derrida’s infamous remark, “there is nothing outside of the text”\textsuperscript{25}, as well as by the strategy of textual reading with which deconstruction has long been associated. In a manner much like Deleuze associates with masochism (with its agreements between parties that are subsequently breached), deconstruction begins with the assumption of something like the principle of charity and of respecting authorial intention, but then seeks to show at the level of consequences in the text (i.e. a patterned trace of incongruities where the metaphysical rubs up against the non-metaphysical; an undecidable word or concept that doesn’t quite fit the logic of the argument) how such a principle proceeds to undermine and contaminate itself, and thereby opens the text up to alternative reading(s) that do violence to the author’s avowed intentions. Indeed, deconstruction might even be said to proceed in a manner that is closely related to a reductio ad absurdum (which Deleuze also associates with masochism) in that it attends with greater and greater specificity to the aporias and tensions of a text in a manner that is designed to, if not reduce the arguments concerned to an absurdity, at least point to their contingency and lack of necessity. Rather than an excess of reasons and principles being seen to trouble everyday normativity from some transcendent place, however, as was the case with the prisoner’s dilemma and with the analytic philosopher’s attention to detail more generally, here the analysis proceeds immanently from the level of textual consequences and style. Sometimes this preoccupation with style and textuality, which is a major feature of continental philosophy generally and not just the work of Derrida, can be somewhat laboured. Who is not impatient with Derrida (or Heidegger, or Foucault, or Deleuze, or Irigaray, etc.), at least from time to time, wishing that they
would just tell us what they mean? Of course, this is not such a simple matter when one is attentive, as those working in the continental tradition almost invariably are, to the historical genealogy of concepts and ideas that persist in our manner of expression and contain all kinds of metaphysical assumptions. Equally though, who is not also impatient with Derrida’s sometimes incessant preambles to his talks, where apologies for the impossible are propounded and retracted for pages on end? There is a certain responsibility to it, but it also evinces a disposition that is characteristic of continental philosophy and its masochistic relation to time. And while we are considering the remarkable style(s) of Derrida, it is also worth briefly reinvoking the debate between Derrida and Searle that is captured in *Limited Inc*. Can we not crudely summarise that Searle demanded clarity and calculable answers and solutions, whereas Derrida compounded problem upon problem, such that the distinct became obscure and the obscure became distinct, and then proceeded to play with Searle’s name? For Derrida, as for Deleuze, problems expand indefinitely (to eternity) and one must be patient enough not to too quickly close the problem down by proffering a solution. Of course, while there is a necessity for urgency and decisions, it is clear that, for both Derrida and Deleuze, any such decisions are not appropriately understood as of the order of a rational solution. But to return to our concern with style, if Derrida, Deleuze and Foucault can all be said to endorse a politics of style, a style of *une grande politique* as Gregg Lambert has suggested, their grand politics has a distinctly masochistic edge to it. And what else, we might ask, could a politics of style consist in, attentive as it is to the way in which the form of expression is so loaded with significance and is so likely to undermine the literal content of the statement? This kind of thought that examines and picks at its own presuppositions and internal flaws, as well as the way they manifest themselves in the work of other philosophers, theorists and artists, is decidedly masochistic.

What might we say, by contrast, about the style of the analytic tradition? Stylistically it is generally minimalist: curt, clear, transparent, and often with a disavowal of the use of metaphors, as has been widely discussed by continental feminist philosophers. It believes that one can say what they mean, and, as is suggested by Deleuze’s explication of sadism, tacitly accepts that too much attention to style (and historical philology, etc.) can get in the way of the repetition and expansion of ideas. While we
have seen that the analytic tradition suspends the law and continually exceeds the pragmatic, it does not do it in the same slow and performative way as its continental counterparts. Its concern is not so much with focusing on how laws immanently break down and undermine themselves at the level of practice (whether that be in texts or in the wider social milieu), but with instantiating new principles. While the frequent discussions of rationality paradoxes often show how rationality can result in counter-intuitive consequences, we can nevertheless observe that they have very different interests in the phenomena of paradox to philosophers working in the European tradition. It is not, however, simply that analytic philosophers seeks to overcome or ameliorate paradoxes and the continental tradition seeks to perpetuate them (as Derrida has frequently been accused of by some of his more unkind analytic interlocutors). Rather, the important contrast to see is that those working in analytic philosophy tend to produce paradoxes in thought and then cast a transcendent gaze back upon the everyday world and its norms, but Deleuze, Derrida, and others, seek to show that paradoxes and problems are the conditions of thought. For them, we encounter paradoxes in the world, or in texts, and these provoke us to think and to respond. These are very different ways of engaging philosophically with paradoxes: the first being primarily concerned with the problems that can afflict reasons and principles; the second with the immanent conditions of thought.

Linked in with the different styles of analytic and continental philosophy is their respective treatments of the artistic itself (and the scientific). Deleuze suggests that in the masochistic paradigm, the experience of the new (and the different) always has an artistic sense: the art work, or the ritual, is envisaged as helping to make possible a move from lower to higher nature (CC 76). Now it is, I think, uncontroversial to claim that virtually all of the major European philosophers have been heavily concerned with art, and with the relation of art to the creation of the new (in no particular order consider Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault, Heidegger, Bergson, etc.), even if they propound inaesthetics like Badiou and even if myriad Marxist traditions have been highly wary of certain forms of art. On the other hand, Deleuze’s typology tells us that sadism is indifferent and apathetic to works of art, and in this context it is worth reflecting on, and perhaps even endorsing, Richard Campbell’s suggestion that there is a tacit Platonism that persists in the analytic tradition. After
all, even if few analytic philosophers will explicitly proffer a Platonic rejection of art, and even if there are certainly plenty of such philosophers working in aesthetics and the philosophy of art, it seems clear that an engagement with art is not mandatory for the major systematic philosophers in the tradition and, furthermore, that as a group they are not preoccupied with art in the way that most continental philosophers generally are. When it comes to political philosophy, to give another example, few analytic philosophers devote any kind of sustained attention to the political value of art, but in What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari famously suggest that it is vital to the summoning forth of a new people and a new earth, thus breaching the boundaries between art and politics. In this respect, we should also reaffirm that it is the analytic tradition which has been more heavily engaged with the findings of science, whereas despite a certain philosophy of science reading of his work that has been promulgated in recent times, Deleuze has suggested that, “every time science, philosophy and good sense come together it is inevitable that good sense should take itself for a science and a philosophy (that is why such encounters must be avoided at all costs)” (DR 224)30.

However, as well as making perspicuous the divergent styles and methods of these two traditions, Deleuze’s sadistic and masochistic typology also enables us to prise apart some of the different metaphysical and ontological commitments of the two traditions. After all, as Deleuze succinctly observes, the masochist needs to believe that they are dreaming even when they are not, but sadism needs to be actual, to believe that they are not dreaming even when they are (CC 72). In this respect, might it not again be suggested that analytic philosophy falls into the sadistic paradigm, needing to believe that they are dealing with hard facts? Certainly a concern with the real and the actual are major features of the analytic tradition, dominated as it is by physicalism, naturalism, and materialism (and I won’t attempt the labyrinthine job of extricating them from one another here). Indeed, its concern with the actual and physical often results in a denunciation of not just idealism but any form of transcendental philosophy that is concerned with conditions of possibility31. While both the technique of argumentation and the causal role of the transcendental are not countenanced by many analytic philosophers, transcendental philosophy has had a far more sympathetic heritage in the European tradition since Kant, whether we consider
the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, or, more recently, the role that is still allocated to a reconceptualized understanding of the transcendental in Derrida and Deleuze (where the transcendental refers to the virtual conditions of real experience). And, of course, linked in with this privileging of the real and the actual is the epistemological concern with objectivity and impartiality that is far more characteristic of analytic philosophy (and sadistic apathy is arguably well-understood as the affective excess of impartiality). In this respect, potential examples proliferate. We might consider utilitarianism, acknowledged by Rawls to be the dominant moral philosophy of the twentieth century, and which in its act utilitarian version is explicitly committed to impartiality as a value and to the principle of choice for a society being the same as for an individual. We might also consider the philosophy of science, and, to pick out but one notable example, Huw Price’s attempts to reestablish an Archimedean point for knowledge outside of the relativism that seems to be a consequence of the special theory of relativity and our various anthropocentric biases, most particularly the fact that our philosophising and thinking about time is greatly effected by our own finite status as creatures in time. While Price might hence seem to agree with Heidegger, it is significant that he adopts the reverse procedure and attempts to dispel rather than dwell on this paradoxical temporal structure by reinstating an objective atemporality, a view from ‘nowhen’. Again, such a move is characteristic of the analytic tradition generally, even if few have taken its methodological assumptions of objectivity and impartiality to their logical extension in the manner that Price so rigorously does.

Of course, it can and should be observed that this concern with the real and the actual is not restricted to analytic philosophy. We have already seen a cultural move in this direction, and Derrida’s *Spectres of Marx* shows us that most Marxists have likewise tended to want to get rid of ghosts from the past and to establish that they were not dreaming, that things were real (concrete) and the revolution inevitable. Indeed, on Derrida’s enigmatic analyses, Marx himself seems to have repeatedly been visited by spectres. References to ghosts recur throughout all of Marx’s different texts and not just the famous opening line of *The Communist Manifesto*: “a spectre is haunting Europe”. Although the ghost is sometimes invoked positively in Marx’s work, as it is in this particular line, his revolutionary thrust is nevertheless still to
attempt to get rid of the ghost, in this case by advocating a scientific lineage (dialectical materialism) that will make socialism real and fully present, and finally put an end to ideology. Marxism will no longer need to be the ghost that haunts capitalism. In response to this tacit metaphysics of presence, this impatient time, Derrida poses some questions that may seem rather ethereal. Is anything fully present? Life itself? His answer seems to be no, and his long and patient analyses show that a certain conceptual violence (in addition to the empirical facts of Marxism’s history) is bequeathed to this privilege associated with being real, present, and actual.

But is it also plausible then, to suggest the opposite? That the continental tradition needs to believe, along with the masochist, that they are dreaming? We can begin to argue this case by observing, negatively, that there is, in poststructuralism at least, a strong denial of the conception of the philosopher as being the impartial and rational seeker of the truth – i.e. Rorty’s mirror of nature. Instead, the job of philosophers, at least on Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding, is to create concepts, we might say to dream, and then to knit the results of that dream into a package with internal consistency that links up with as many other modes of living and thinking as possible. To risk a few further generalisations, we can also note that poststructuralists often explicitly seek the impossible. Derrida, for example, has commented, “go there where you cannot go, to the impossible, it is indeed the only way of coming or going,” suggesting that it is only the thinking that negotiates with the impossible and which transgresses given boundaries that involves any real movement, sentiments that abound in continental philosophy from Nietzsche and Bergson through to Deleuze. Poststructuralists also often accord a certain privilege to the inactual (what Deleuze calls the virtual), although this should not be taken to commit them to idealism. To put it in Derrida’s terms from Spectres of Marx, there is a general concern, in this post-Heideggerian tradition, with the spectral and the ghostly – or, somewhat synonymously, différance – which is prior to, and the condition of, any ontology of that which is actual or present. Moreover, as I argue in more detail elsewhere, in Deleuze’s Logic of Sense there is a consistent valorisation of what he calls the perverse-structure over the normalising and pacifying tendencies of the other-structure; the former involves a play of surfaces and openness to the time of the event.
(Aion) that rejects any kind of embodied pragmatism that revolves around equilibria. Suffice to say, then, that I think that it is at least plausible to associate continental philosophy with the masochist’s need to feel that they are dreaming, notwithstanding, and perhaps even evidenced by, their consistently radical politics of the new and the different.

While I cannot presume to have definitively established that here, what is hopefully more clear is that there are certain risks associated with both of these tendencies, the sadistic and the masochistic, the impatient analytic philosopher and the eternally patient continental philosopher. To sum up, we might suggest that the risks involved with analytic philosophy are of an excessive preoccupation with reasoning and the calculable that ignores important background considerations and simplifies problems in order to attain solutions (or procedures for solutions) that remain at a distance from, or epiphenomenal to, the affective dimensions of the problem itself. On the other hand, the risks at the heart of continental philosophy are of degenerating into an eternally patient moral perfectionism, which eschews calculation in favour of stylised prophesies and dreams of the disruptions of the future that might, although this has not been established, never really get its hands dirty. This prompts an important question: how are we to better proceed, with an eye on the ethico-political excesses evinced by these two typologies that analytic and continental philosophers almost inevitably have at least some symptoms of? Acknowledging that different philosophers in both traditions will have different means for dealing with these problems than others (and some far more effectively than others), it nevertheless seems that a rapprochement that can bring these approaches together is called for. At the same time, though, if Deleuze is right in arguing that sadism and masochism have a transcendental significance, partaking differently in repetition-for-itself and the futural synthesis of time, we will not be able to simply ignore or overcome this movement towards the extreme. And there is certainly no throwing out of the desire to dream, or, for that matter, the desire to be real and concrete. These are omnipresent and must be negotiated with for any philosophy and politics that hopes to be more than ideal. Moreover, if my typological reading of analytic and continental philosophy is plausible, it is equally clear that no rapprochement of these traditions can simply reintroduce that spurious sado-masochistic entity. In other words, we cannot unify
these two traditions in a higher synthesis, even one that takes certain strengths from
each and casts aside the weaknesses. The traditions are too institutionally fortified
against one another for that, and, more importantly, they have too many temporal,
methodological and affective differences for such a procedure of distribution and
good sense to be coherent.

Nevertheless, our hands may not be tied for all that. We have seen that both the sadist
and the masochist differently seek to overturn the law (just as the respective
philosophies concerned also do), and to undermine the habitual movement towards an
equilibrium on which it is suggested the law is based (DR 5). Whether or not habitual
coping and the law are reducible to one another, however, hence becomes a key
question: perhaps such a conflation is problematic and illegitimately either passes
over, or casts aside, the complexities of the former (embodied coping) in tacitly
devaluing the latter (law, norms and convention). Moreover, even if one agrees with
the poststructuralist tradition that embodied coping is fundamental to the time of the
living-present (what Deleuze calls the time of Chronos), these repetitions do not
evince the problematic symptoms that we have seen in sadism’s accelerated
preoccupation with principles and the calculable, or in the decelerated time of
masochism’s affirmations of the incalculable (which Deleuze links to the time of
Aion). Do habitual and embodied coping techniques merely cover over these more
fundamental dimensions of time and repetition, as Deleuze’s own analyses in
*Difference and Repetition* suggest (and as Derrida also suggests in chapter one of
*Politics of Friendship*)? Or might sadism and masochism’s more excessive relations
to time and repetition be understood as important but not privileged dimensions of
social life and thought, with habit and embodied coping the ground for these
divergent responses? The latter view would make possible something tantamount to a
middle way, from which we could navigate between the different symptoms endemic
to analytic and continental philosophy, guarding against the various excesses that we
have delimited in this essay. What risks might be associated with such a move?
Would philosophy itself still be possible on such a view? Creativity? That remains to
be shown.
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4 It is true that analytic philosophy adheres to common sense more than European philosophy and avowedly so. As James Williams shows in his chapter on David Lewis, even Lewis’s philosophy of possible worlds is not prepared to leave this terrain behind. Moreover, one of the perennial laments from analytic philosophers is about the polysyllabic obscurity and lack of common sense of their continental counterparts. Even though the European philosophers are right in responding that common sense may not, in fact, be all that common, there are good arguments to be proffered on behalf of both sides of the debate and I’m not as sure as Deleuze is, for example, that common sense is antithetical to philosophy.

5 While my rather broad employment of the concepts of sadism and masochism in this essay can be contrasted with Deleuze’s quite specific treatment of them in ‘Coldness and Cruelty’, my main interest in using his categories is simply as a provocation for further thought on the analytic/continental relation. Reverting to more academic justifications for this apparent disparity, we can also emphasise the wider use that these same concepts are put to by Deleuze in *Difference and Repetition*, and recognise, following Alain Badiou in the chapter on method in *The Clamour of Being* (trans. L.
Burchill, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), that although Deleuze begins with certain specific and singular cases, there is usually also a more generalising and transcendental use to which these cases are made to serve. I think that is also the case here.

One merit of this manner of proceeding is that it puts time at the centre of the inquiry since, for Deleuze, there are vastly different temporalities involved in the respective repetitions of sadism and masochism. In the broader research project of which this essay is a part, I argue that many of the major differences between poststructuralism and Anglo-American political philosophy come down to their respective conceptions of, and concerns with, the temporal. In this respect, thanks are due to the Australian Research Council for their support of this project in the form of a Discovery Grant, 2005-7.

Of course, this manner of proceeding is often contested within Anglo-American political philosophy itself. There are, for example, various discussions of weakness of will, wantonness, and their political significance. Harry Frankfurt has famously discussed such issues, and T. Reiff has recently written a paper titled ‘The Politics of Masochism’ (see Inquiry, Vol. 46, p29-63), but one can nonetheless note a family resemblance in the concern with calculative reasoning and distributive justice, as well as, somewhat paradoxically, in an investment in the philosophical value of intuition. I take this up in more detail in my previously mentioned essay on Rawls and Derrida.


See Williams, J., The Transversal Thought of Gilles Deleuze, p138. Williams suggests that Deleuze rejects the analytic reliance upon thought experiments and counterfactuals because they involve simplifications that hide the complexity of problems and that thereby devalue the image of thought.

Consider, for example, the vast body of literature responding to Derek Parfit’s suggestion that if we take utilitarianism’s criterion of maximising welfare seriously it might entail sacrificing the happiness of the 6 billion people currently present for the many more who are to come. See Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, Part 4, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.

It is for this reason that Deleuze made the editorial decision to include in Masochism, along with his own essay ‘Coldness and Cruelty’ and Sacher-Masoch’s novella Venus in Furs, some of the actual contracts that Sacher-Masoch signed during his life with Wanda and others.


In his recent summary of the key achievements of contemporary moral and political philosophy, Gilbert Harman claims that there is a consensus in this regard. See Harman, G., ‘Three trends in moral and political philosophy’, http://www.princeton.edu/~harman/Papers/Trends.pdf.

The political significance of Heidegger’s ‘speaking against number’ (his argument that modern understandings of politics are over-determined through their relation to calculation), and the way in which this aspect of his work can offer a way of undermining his own Nazism, is well-documented by Stuart Elden in his book, Speaking Against Number: Heidegger, Language, and the Politics of Calculation, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006.

As a sometime philosopher of the body, I have had the odd analytic philosopher look at me with incredulity when I admit that I am interested in the body. Of course, there are counter-examples to this tendency, with borderline figures like Hubert Dreyfus, as well as other more avowed ‘analytics’, preoccupied with both perception and the body. It would take another essay to establish the analytic turn away from the body, but it is perhaps partly evinced in many of the most famous thought experiments, which often postulate or presuppose a divorce of mind and body, such as Hilary Putnam’s celebrated reflections on the brain in the vat.

See, for example, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, p159, 162, 211, and Derrida’s Aporias (trans. T. Dutoit, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993) p32.

While any such order of priority might seem to be antithetical to deconstruction, see my previously mentioned article, ‘Negotiating the non-negotiable’, which argues that despite his comments to the contrary, Derrida consistently privileges the incalculable. For Negri, in Time for the Revolution (trans. M. Mandrini, London: Continuum, 2003), time itself is explicitly understood as the incalculable that cannot be measured. He also talks of the priority of the to-come (p154) and the event (p140) and suggests that “resistance is action outside of measure” (p174), indebted as he is to Deleuze’s thematisation of a radically different mode of distribution that cannot be understood in terms of property, enclosure, or measure.
This emphasis upon the way in which time breaks itself open toward an irrecoverable past and an unreachable future is also what Levinas (and Derrida) privilege. While Levinas does not, to my knowledge, talk of 'eternity' as Deleuze labels this aspect of time, he does call it the time of infinity in contrast with the finite time of the present. See Levinas, E., Time and the Other, trans. R. Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987, p26, 76-7, 137.

This cannot be addressed in detail here, but intuition has a significant role in the analytic tradition in at least two ways: first, in the importance that it accords to one’s immediate feelings on a particular problem, even if this simple intuition requires moderation with considered reflection before it can form the basis for a ‘reflective equilibrium’ (see the work of Nelson Goodman, John Rawls, Brad Hooker, etc., but this conviction that our immediate intuitions need to be accommodated is scarcely challenged, except by the odd act-utilitarian); second, in the methodological reliance upon our intuitively ‘seeing’ the appropriateness of a particular thought experiment to stand in as a marker for the more complicated problem that is at issue.

Although his work cannot be dealt with in any length here, it is also worth noting that Levinas also exalts the pure patience of passivity, something that we can associate with masochism. See, for example, Time and the Other, p135.


Derrida, J., Of Grammatology, trans. G. Spivak, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976, p158. There are those who argue, with good reason, that the French il n’y a pas de hors-texte is more accurately translated as “there is no outside of the text”. Since he first coined this aphorism, Derrida has also spent a lot of time reformulating its meaning and has suggested that it is more accurately translated as “there is no outside of context” (cf. ‘Afterword’, Limited Inc. ed. G. Graff, trans. S. Weber, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998 edition, p136–7). Of course, engendering controversy may have been Derrida’s strategic intent in initially endorsing the “there is nothing outside of the text” translation, and if that was the case then he definitely succeeded.

Interestingly, Deleuze follows Leibniz and insists that the clear and distinct are, if not mutually exclusive, then certainly incapable of being simultaneously co-present (cf. DR 213). Distinctness depends upon the background obscurity from which it comes.


It must be admitted that Badiou is one continental philosopher who troubles this typology. Not only is his style comparatively sparse, but he also famously identifies mathematics with ontology, and thereby gives the calculable and the numerable a great weight than most. Nevertheless, it remains the case that the event, which retains a priority in his work, is incalculable. See Badiou, A., Being and Event, trans. O. Feltham, London: Continuum, 2005.

Campbell, R., as previously cited.

It seems to me that in What is Philosophy? such sentiments are tacitly reaffirmed. Despite the fact that Deleuze (with Guattari) theoretically puts science on an equal footing with art, it would not be particularly difficult to perform a symptomatological reading of this text which shows that the percepts and affects of the artwork attain a priority over the functives that Deleuze associates with science. On this point I am indebted to Jon Roffé.

In this respect, see Malpas, J., ‘Introduction’, From Kant to Davidson: Philosophy and the Idea of the Transcendental, London: Routledge, 2002. There are, again, exceptions to this attitude towards transcendental philosophy in the analytic tradition, notably in the work of Davidson and Strawson among others, but on the whole it is treated with some suspicion.


This is dealt with in detail in an as yet unpublished manuscript of mine titled, ‘Deleuze’s Other-structure: Beyond the Master-Slave Dialectic, But at What Cost?’, but Deleuze’s disdain for equilibria is also part of the work of Levinas, Derrida, Negri, and the poststructuralist tradition generally.