Nomadology or Ideology? Zizek’s Critique of Deleuze

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Slavoj Zizek’s recent book, *Organs without Bodies*, begins with a telling remark about Deleuze’s well-known antipathy towards dialogue. Philosophy, as Deleuze and Guattari observe, is never about dialogue, even less about “communication”; far from being a harmonious discussion aiming at rational consensus, philosophy is more akin to a violent encounter between heterogenous forces that might open up the possibility of thinking the New. From this Deleuzian perspective, the history of philosophy is less a story of the striving for truth or realisation of reason than a history of productive misreadings, of errant couplings, perverse conceptual encounters producing monstrous offspring. And Zizek’s *Organs without Bodies* certainly remains true to this Deleuzian insight. In this traumatic philosophical encounter, Zizek misunderstands Deleuze, who misunderstands Hegel, who is misunderstood by virtually everyone. For all that, the ‘truth’ of Deleuze’s anti-Hegelian thinking of difference, according to Zizek, will turn out to be Zizek’s heterodox Hegelio-Lacanianism. Deleuze’s non-dialectical thinking of the New will turn out to be an idiosyncratic dialectical repetition of the Same, which may surprise both Deleuzians and Lacanians, not to mention heterodox Hegelians.

Indeed, Zizek is remarkably candid about the philosophical eros driving his strange Hegelio-Lacanian encounter with Deleuze. Inspired by Deleuze’s notorious remarks about conceiving the history of philosophy as a kind of “buggery,” Zizek’s perverse rejoinder is, in true Deleuzian style, to ‘think the unthinkable’:

> why should we not risk the act of taking from behind Deleuze himself and engage in the practice of the Hegelian buggery of Deleuze? Therein resides the ultimate aim of the present booklet.
What monster would have emerged if we were to stage the ghastly scene of the spectre of Hegel taking Deleuze from behind? (OwB, 48)

What monster indeed! Leaving aside the psychoanalytic riches within Zizek’s homoerotic fantasy, I want to explore this perverse philosophical encounter from the perspective of one of Zizek’s more curious ‘speculative’ statements: “Deleuze equals Hegel” (OwB, 49). My thesis is that Zizek’s traumatic encounter with Deleuze misfires because of Zizek’s perverse attempt to domesticate by integrating Deleuzian difference within the framework of Hegelio-Lacanianism. Among other instances of conceptual forcing, there is an incommensurability, or at least serious incompatibility, between the Deleuzian concept of “difference in itself” and Zizek’s radicalised version of Hegelian “concrete universality”. Moreover, this incompatibility between Deleuzian difference and Zizekian radical universality has definite political implications, which become apparent in Zizek’s criticism of Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics as reflecting, rather than resisting, the deterritorialised flows of global capitalism. In the same way that Deleuze allegedly reverts to the Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of becoming in response to an intractable theoretical deadlock, Zizek too reverts to a reductive critique of Deleuzo-Guattarian politics in response to the more general political deadlock presented by global capitalism.
Deleuze and Zizek’s Traumatic Encounter

The Hegel-Deleuze relationship presents a fascinating philosophical problem that has been attracting growing interest in the critical literature. There are, I suggest, two discernible approaches to this ticklish subject: the ‘recidivist’ or ‘assimilationist’ reading, which maintains that despite his avowed anti-Hegelianism, Deleuze inadvertently relapses into dialectics at crucial points in his philosophical project, which can therefore be reconciled with Hegelianism (here one could include Judith Butler, Catherine Malabou, and Zizek himself). And the ‘incommensurabilist’ or ‘radical separatist’ reading, which holds that there is no possible compromise between Hegel and Deleuze; Deleuze’s thought marks a radical break with Hegelianism tout court (Deleuze’s own position, Hardt, Massumi, and most Deleuzian commentators). Not surprisingly, we could summarise this difference as that between the Hegelian claim that Deleuzian difference does not entirely escape the movement of dialectics, and the more Nietzschean claim that Deleuze’s thought remains irreducible to the movement of dialectical integration of difference into a more complex unity.

To evoke a Hegelian cliché, I would suggest that both perspectives are partially right, yet remain inadequate simply taken on their own: the ‘young’ Deleuze’s critique of Hegel does revert to, or at least remains compromised by, a residual dialectical aspect (particularly in Nietzsche and Philosophy), whereas the ‘mature’ Deleuze’s entire project (from Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition onwards) is an attempt to break free—via Nietzsche and Spinoza but also a multiplicity of other perspectives from structuralism to avant-garde art and literature—of the totalising character of Hegelian dialectics, above all its failure to think the advent of the New. And lest we think that Deleuze simply ignores Hegelian dialectic, we should remember his fascinating 1953 review of Jean Hyppolite’s Logic and Existence (one of Deleuze’s teachers); Deleuze’s critique of Hyppolite’s ‘Heideggerian’ reading of Hegel’s logic as a “logic of sense” already contains the seeds of Deleuze’s later project of a philosophy of difference as developed in the Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition. Although _i_ek confines his critique to the explicit relationship between Hegel and Deleuze, this conceptual
Zizek’s perverse Hegelian critique of Deleuze operates on two related levels: first, Zizek questions the plausibility of Deleuze’s violent rejection of Hegelian dialectic, and secondly, Zizek claims that this radical antipathy towards Hegel in fact conceals a secret complicity. As Catherine Malabou has argued, Deleuze’s ‘philosophically bearded’ Hegel is reductive and monological, foreclosing any possibility of a productive encounter between Hegelian dialectic and Deleuzian difference. Throughout Deleuze’s oeuvre, according to Malabou, “Hegelian philosophy is presented as perfectly expressing binary logic in all its heaviness: one plus one equals two, and two ends up reducing to one.” For Zizek, the ‘violence’ of Deleuze’s rejection of Hegel suggests an anxiety that points to the hidden proximity between them. Zizek thus assumes an ‘assimilationist’ position on the Hegel-Deleuze relationship, making the semi-serious claim that Deleuze’s refusal to ‘couple’ with Hegel suggests a kind of “incest prohibition” revealing the secret kinship between the two (OwB 48). For all his dazzling detours and striking non-sequiturs, I want to suggest that one can discern a more or less consistent argumentative trajectory in Zizek’s critical encounter with Deleuze, namely that what Deleuze presents as a radical philosophy of difference with a correlated politics of the multitude in fact is better comprehended through Zizek’s Hegelio-Lacanian theory of subjectivity and post-Marxist critique of ideology. Indeed, Zizek’s Hegelianised Deleuze is supposed to present a theoretical alternative to the Deleuzian philosophy of difference and politics of the multitude articulated in A Thousand Plateaus, and more explicitly, in Hardt and Negri’s Empire. It is this claim that I shall question in what follows.

Zizek’s critique of Deleuze begins by drawing attention to the well-known conceptual couples of virtual and actual, becoming and being, claiming that these repeat the instability of the traditional philosophical opposition between idealism and materialism. This opposition was definitively superseded by post-Kantian idealism, above all by Hegel; but Zizek also points to the relevance of the contemporary ‘virtualisation’ of matter in quantum physics as a sign of the overcoming of this traditional philosophical
Relying on Manuel de Landa’s account, Zizek draws attention to a central tension or even contradiction between Deleuze I (of the *Logic of Sense* and *Difference and Repetition*), and Deleuze II (the Deleuzo-Guattarian duo of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaux*). For Deleuze I, the virtuality of becoming as the sense-event is the passive, causally sterile *effect* of actual bodily-material causes and processes. For Deleuze II, the domain of virtual singularities and flux of pure becoming now becomes the productive *cause* of individuated bodies and subjects within diverse concrete assemblages. So it seems that the domain of virtuality, or pure flux of becoming, is on the one hand an *impassive effect*, and on the other a *generative process*, which suggests the need for some mediating figure or theoretical account to explain the precise relationship between these central aspects of Deleuze’s thought (OwB, 20-21 ff.).

This tension or unresolved opposition between virtual becoming and actual being recalls the way in which post-Kantian idealism sought to overcome the Kantian dualism between phenomenal and noumenal aspects of experience, notably through Schelling’s complementarity between philosophy of nature and philosophy of spirit, which was then taken over and transformed in Hegelian speculative idealism (OwB, 23-24). Deleuze I’s resolution of the apparent deadlock between virtual and actual or becoming and being is to posit a third mediating figure, the “quasi-cause” or “pure agency of transcendental causality” (OwB, 27)—that which remains excessive in the cause’s effect, the surplus otherness irreducible to precedent causal conditions. The quasi-cause designates the *advent of the New*, in the sense of the unforeseeable, the incalculable, the singular; it represents the “metacause of the very excess of the effect over its (corporeal) causes” (OwB, 27). The claim is that, over and above corporeal causes, which can never be complete, we must posit a transcendentental causality to account for the unforeseeable excess of the effect (the New) over its causal conditions and determinations.

Deleuze’s example, which in some ways raises more questions that it answers, is the emergence of Italian neo-realism after World War II—an instance of how the Event of the New outstrips the historical conditions that provide its context. We can’t explain neo-realism, Deleuze claims, just by reference to these attendant historical circumstances;
hence Deleuze posits the concept of “quasi-cause” as a ‘transcendental causality’ that might account for the unforeseeable excess of the effect over its antecedent causal conditions. One might object that the fact that the effect outstrips its apparent cause may point to multiple complex chains of causality, something that outstrips our knowledge of the causal network rather than the causal network itself. Be that as it may, Žižek takes Deleuze’s move here as an opportunity to neatly couple him with Lacan, noting triumphantly that the Deleuzian quasi-cause parallels the Lacanian objet petit a, the “pure, immaterial, spectral entity that serves as the object-cause of desire” (OwB, 27)—a point Deleuze and Guattari themselves acknowledge in Anti-Oedipus.11

The important issue, for Zizek, is that Deleuze’s unrepentant dualism generates a number of unfortunate consequences. The fundamental dualism between virtual and actual, becoming and being, is transposed into a multiplicity of further dualisms that repeat the essential good/bad dichotomy that Deleuze, as a good Nietzschean, is otherwise at pains to deconstruct: active versus reactive forces, nomadic versus sedentary distribution, molecular versus molar processes, body without organs versus organised body, deterritorialisation versus reterritorialisation, and so on. Moreover, Deleuze’s ontological dualism—the logic of pure becoming as sterile effect versus the logic of pure becoming as productive process—is then translated into two different political logics and practices. On the one hand, the ontology of productive becoming leads to a Leftist Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of “the self-organisation of the multitude of molecular groups that resist and undermine the molar, totalising systems of power” (OwB, 32). On the other hand, Zizek observes, Deleuze I’s ontology of the sterile sense-event appears to remain ‘apolitical’, without a corresponding political logic or practice. Here one is tempted to point to Alain Badiou’s attempt to construct precisely that kind of politics of universality based upon an ontology of pure multiplicity, of fidelity to the Event of the New, whether in art, thought, politics, or love.12 Zizek, however, while relying on Badiou’s critique of Deleuze, argues that the seemingly ‘apolitical’ Deleuzian ontology of the sterile sense-event harbours a more radical Deleuzian politics than the ‘vulgar’ Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of the molecular multitude (as developed further in Hardt and Negri’s Empire, the target of Zizek’s ‘political’ critique of Deleuze).
Zizek thus faces two challenges. First, to show that Deleuze’s ontology of pure becoming is in fact assimilable to a Hegelio-Lacanian paradigm, and moreover, to articulate what the theoretical or political virtues of such assimilation would be. And secondly, to show that the ‘vulgar’ Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of the molecular multitude really is ideologically compromised and politically sterile, which Zizek attempts to illustrate in the case of Hardt and Negri’s *Empire* (which is, in any case, more a Deleuzo-Foucaultian inflected *neo-Marxism*). My claim will be that Zizek fails to meet these challenges in any serious way, which prompts the following critical question: What is at stake in Zizek’s encounter with Deleuze, his anxious attempts to show that Deleuze’s thought could not be an Event, an irruption of the New, but only the ‘sterile’ repetition of Hegelian and Lacanian motifs? Why the desire to assimilate Deleuze within the Hegelian-Lacanian paradigm of subjectivity and politics? My suggestion will be that Deleuze and Guattari recognise precisely the problem that Zizek identifies as the most challenging problem for contemporary critical theory and social philosophy: how to practice revolutionary thinking and politics within an order that is inherently self-revolutionising? How to deterritorialise, through theory and practice, an already self-deterritorialising regime?

**“Deleuze equals Hegel”: Zizek’s Abortive Aufhebung of Deleuze**

Zizek takes as his point of departure the contemporary *doxa* concerning the radically *anti-Hegelian* character of Deleuze’s thought. Against the prevailing view that sees Hegel as the archenemy of difference and multiplicity, a view encouraged by Deleuze’s own tendentious criticisms of Hegel, Zizek argues that Deleuzian anti-dialectical thought conceals its secret affinity with Hegelianism, which is to be understood as a radical theory of subjectivity and universality. Far from being a philosophy of difference oriented towards the event of the New, Deleuze’s thought must be grasped as a repetition of the Same, not only the Nietzschean-Spinozist metaphysics of power but more surprisingly, as Zizek will argue, Hegelian speculative dialectics. As though demonstrating the practical impossibility of thinking the New, Zizek cites a number of examples of Deleuzian conceptual innovations that are supposed to repeat Hegelian
speculative concepts, not in the Heideggerian sense of a productive retrieval that opens up their unthought dimension, but in the more conventional sense of a ‘bald’ repetition of an archetype. Examples of such bald repetition include Hegel’s concept of the concrete universal, which Deleuze apparently adopts *holus-bolus* (OwB, 49-50); Hegel’s critique of abstract universality, repeated by Deleuze’s critique of the Platonic ideal universal types (OwB, 50); and the equivalence drawn between Hegel and Deleuze as philosophers of pure immanence, with the Hegelian immanence of reason proposed as analogous to Deleuze’s Spinozist plane of immanence. On this score, readers of Hegel will ask what has become, in Zizek’s parallel, of Hegel’s famous critique of Spinoza’s failure to articulate self-conscious subjectivity? As Zizek knows very well, Hegel ridiculed superficial affinities as a substitute for genuine thought; what philosophy demands, rather, is a conceptual struggle over the matter itself.

Instead of analysing whether or not Zizek’s claims of familial kinship are hermeneutically warranted, I want to focus on a crucial point where Zizek *does* acknowledge that Deleuze and Hegel differ profoundly: the difference between the Deleuzian immanent “flux” of pure becoming and the Hegelian “gap” or irreducible rupture within this pure becoming (the negativity of the subject). Zizek claims that the ‘ultimate fact’ of Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism is “the absolute immanence of the continuous flux of pure becoming” (OwB, 60). By contrast, Hegelian immanence is marked by an irreducible gap or rupture, namely the inherent negativity or inconsistency marking the immanence of phenomena, which gives rise to unavoidable illusions of transcendence. One should note that this in fact parallels Deleuze’s argumentation (from *Nietzsche and Philosophy* to *A Thousand Plateaus*) that the reactive forces defining consciousness are prey to the illusions of transcendence precisely because of the inherent ‘inconsistency’ or dynamic flux of (unconscious) active forces comprising the plane of immanence. So perhaps here, ironically, Deleuze and Zizek are really much closer than Zizek will admit!

Zizek then examines various examples of the Hegelian dialectical movement to show the operation of the Deleuzian ‘minimal difference’ in action:
1) We begin with the real as transcendent hard kernel, always perceived in a refracted way;

2) we then move through the ‘postmodern’ reversal in which we reject the transcendent Real, since the play of refracted appearances is all there is.

3) We conclude with the dialectical Aufhebung through which we return to the Real, but now as ‘desubstantialised Real,’ the Real reduced to a ‘minimal difference’ between appearances. The Real reveals itself as the cause of refraction, the difference in itself of appearances, not the inner core beyond refracted appearances (OwB, 62).

Zizek then attempts to show that Deleuzian difference in itself is in effect “the core of Hegelian dialectics” (OwB, 64), a startling claim given Deleuze’s explicit critique of Hegelian dialectic as an ‘orgiastic’ representation of difference, that is, conceptual difference rather than a concept of difference.¹³

The parallel with Hegelian dialectic, I suggest, runs presumably as follows:

1) We begin with difference as an inaccessible transcendent real, unthinkable and unrepresentable in itself.

2) We then move through a rejection of this inaccessible difference, reversing difference such that it is now revealed in the play of appearances.

3) We conclude with the synthesis of these two aspects, where difference is now construed as minimal difference, difference not between appearances but difference in itself: “the ‘pure’ difference that differentiates an element not from other particular elements but from itself, from its own place of inscription”; the minimal difference that “explodes this identity into the in(de)finite generative process of differentiation” (OwB, 64).

The most perfect repetition thus reveals difference in itself, which is precisely not a relational difference between articulated identities but a differentiation process (event) that undermines any articulated identity.
The problem here is that Hegelian dialectics, even in the most heterodox reading, is always directed towards the moment of reconciliatory unity in which identity and difference, individuality and particularity, are sublated into a concrete universality. Difference is inscribed within the very heart of universality, the Hegelian ‘identity of identity and difference,’ no longer as the reflective opposition between identity and difference, but now as one aspect of the threefold conceptual unity of universal, particular, and individual. Speculative dialectic, for Hegel, always recuperates difference, understood as singularity, within conceptual universality. This was precisely the spirit of Deleuze’s criticism of Hegel: that Hegel inscribes difference within universality, as conceptual difference within a system of representation, rather than arriving at the thought of a concept of difference, of difference in itself.\textsuperscript{14}

Zizek, however, flattens this Deleuzian criticism, ignoring the crucial difference between conceptual difference and a concept of difference, and attempts instead to sublate Deleuzian difference into the Hegelian speculative identity of identity and difference. Now Deleuze’s complaint on this point, we recall, is that Hegelian difference cannot think the advent of the New, precisely because it integrates difference as an aspect of universality. Zizek, however, proceeds to posit this Deleuzian difference in itself, and its self-differentiation in the productive repetition of the New, as the equivalent to Hegelian dialectical difference; a conceptual difference that reduces the New to the particularity and contingency of phenomena that find their conceptual meaning and ground within speculative thought. Zizek then goes on to argue that Hegel anticipates Deleuze’s contributions to the philosophy of difference, presenting what one might be tempted to call his own ‘poststructuralist’ (decentred, open-ended, heterogenous) reading of Hegelian dialectic (an ironic twist given Zizek’s critical dismissal of the ‘poststructuralist’ critique of Hegel elsewhere). The Deleuzian concept of difference in itself is thus reinscribed as Hegelian conceptual difference. The New conceals the Old; Deleuzian difference is a repetition of the Hegelian Same rather than an attempt to think the New, let alone break free of Hegelian dialectics, as Deleuze claimed of his own work.
One of the more interesting implications of Deleuze’s attempted Aufhebung of Deleuzian difference is to suggest that there is a parallel between Deleuze’s pure difference and Ernesto Laclau’s concept of an antagonism (OwB, 65 ff.). Laclau argues, in very Hegelian fashion, that while the logic of difference and logic of equivalence are opposed, pursued to their logical conclusion each converts into its opposite. A system of pure differentiality (defined by purely relational elements) without the possibility of antagonism renders all elements equivalent to each other; pure difference converts into pure equivalence in relation to an absolute outside (OwB, 65). The logic of difference and the logic of equivalence assume opposing poles, but are in fact mutually reliant since they convert into each other once taken to their respective extremes. Laclau argues that there is therefore no primordial opposition of poles (between difference and equivalence) but rather “only the inherent gap of the One” (OwB, 65). Equivalence is not opposed to difference; equivalence emerges because difference remains incomplete in itself. A system of pure antagonism without mediation, on the other hand, devolves to an intractable conflict between a naturalised Us and Them without any possibility of resolution or transformation. Hence the need find a way of rethinking antagonism so as to avoid this conceptual and political dead end. Within antagonisms such as sexual difference or class struggle, Laclau argues, it is not opposition but rather “the fissure” that is “primary” (OwB 65). To take the example of sexual difference, it is not that there is a straightforward natural opposition between the sexes; ‘woman,’ rather, is the effect of the structural incompleteness of ‘man’ (understood as symbolic categories that fail to adequately represent the traumatic ‘real’ of sexual difference). In short, “the tension between the Same and the Other,” as Zizek concludes, “is secondary with regard to the noncoincidence of the Same with itself” (OwB, 65). The opposition between difference and identity is a product of the inherent difference fissuring the One itself.

Zizek thus draws the very interesting parallel between the Deleuzian minimal difference between an element and its place and Laclau’s inherent difference constitutive of an antagonism. In doing so, however, Zizek proceeds to reinterpret Deleuzian difference as though it were readily translatable into the Hegelian triad of universal, particular, and individual:
The ‘minimal difference’ is the difference between the universal and the ‘surnumerary’ particular which directly stands in for this universal, the paradoxical particular that, precisely insofar as it has no place within the structure of the universal, directly gives body to universality (OwB, 66).

Zizek thus reinterprets Deleuzian difference as the “singular universal” or radical antagonism that is inherent to the One itself. It names the rift between the organic Whole that allocates each of its parts to its proper place, and the Whole embodied in the “singular universal,” the paradoxical part without any proper place within the Whole, yet which embodies the antagonism at the very heart of universality (OwB, 66). As we shall see, moreover, this fissure within the ontological structure of the whole is not merely conceptual or logical but also has direct political significance: “It is the rift between Society as the hierarchical structure and Society for which the excluded (demos, the third estate, dissidents) stand” (OwB, 66).

At this point, however, a difficulty arises. This interpretation of difference as “singular universal” is quite different from Zizek’s previous interpretation of Deleuzian difference as precisely not a difference between particulars or even between particular and the universal. The Deleuzian difference in itself was previously grasped as the difference between an element and its place; now Zizek interprets it, following Badiou, as a pure difference inscribed within the virtual One or background void of pure multiplicity. In accordance with Badiou’s reading, Deleuze is transformed into a thinker of the immanent One rather than of difference in itself. This is where we find, I suggest, the ontological background to Zizek’s reading of Deleuze, which, as he remarks, is heavily indebted to Badiou’s The Clamour of Being (OwB, 20). Here Zizek reverts from a conception of Deleuzian difference that does not presuppose a virtual One to one that does presuppose such an immanent One, fissured by difference as inherent to this virtual multiplicity. The theoretical advantages of doing so, for Zizek’s critique of Deleuze, are clear: the Badiouian reading of Deleuzian difference (as inscribed within the virtual One) make Deleuze’s ontology more readily assimilable to Zizek’s own Lacanian-Hegelian model of
subjectivity as the fissure of negativity inherent within the (fractured) totality, the self-differentiation of the singular within the concrete universal.

Such a move is perhaps not surprising given Zizek’s attempt to subsume, indeed sublate, Deleuzian difference into his own Hegelio-Lacanian schema. What is interesting is that Deleuze may have already anticipated, and thereby thwarted, this move in his own development of a concept of difference! In the Logic of Sense, Deleuze drew a parallel with Lacan and the radicality of pure difference as the difference between an element and its place, an inherent difference at the heart of the decentred subject in the Lacanian schema.¹⁵ Moreover, the radical potential of such a conception of subjectivity as singular universal has been amply developed, as we know, by Zizek himself. Yet in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze presents a more independent conception of the concept of difference, as distinct from conceptual difference, namely difference that cannot be subordinated to forms of representation—to identity with respect to concepts, opposition in the determination of concepts, analogy in regard to judgment, and resemblance in relation to objects¹⁶—which also means a difference that cannot be incorporated into the universality of the self-differentiating concept, embracing opposition and contradiction, of Hegelian speculative dialectics.¹⁷ So in this respect, it is not clear that Zizek’s attempt to sublate Deleuzian difference—mediated via Badiou—into the Hegelian conceptual-logical schema quite hits the mark. In any case, Zizek’s shift from one reading of Deleuzian difference to the other is left without justification, while the theoretical advantages of this move for his critique of Deleuze are not as obvious as first appears.

Zizek draws another important implication from this re-reading of Deleuzian difference, namely that Deleuze badly misunderstands the Hegelian concept of the subject. Indeed, the subject, according to Zizek, just is the name given to this void or radical negativity that fissures substance from within; with the emergence of subjectivity, the void of the One becomes posited as For-Itself; virtuality irrupts into the order of actuality. Zizek is now in a position to claim that Deleuze’s failure to conceive of difference as concrete universality, the fissuring of the immanent One, prompts his reductionist reading of the Hegelian subject and subsequent dismissal of Hegelianism as incapable of thinking
difference as singularity and multiplicity. According to Zizek, Deleuze still conceives of the Hegelian subject as *substance*—“the self-identical foundation/ground of a process” (OwB, 72)—and not yet as the empty, non-substantial subject of radical negativity or pure virtuality.

In other words, we have a (productive!) repetition *cum* resolution of the Hegel-Spinoza conflict over substance and subject; but instead of a Hegelian *Aufhebung*, Zizek interprets this conceptual conflict as demonstrating Deleuze’s failure to proceed from substance to subject, in other words, to grasp the radical dimension of Hegel’s theory of subjectivity as negativity. Indeed, the Hegelian subject, Zizek argues, “eludes the opposition of impersonal intensities and positive self-identical entities” that is constitutive of the Deleuzian conception of the “cracked” I or dispersed subject (OwB, 72). To remain within this fixed opposition, which Zizek implies Deleuze ultimately does, means that one is committed to either uncritically affirming a positive order of actuality (affirming the flux of virtual becomings that parallels the flux of global capital), or else negating actuality by means of regressive relapse into de-subjectified delirium (the regressive, neo-romantic embrace of the schizoid dissolved subject as a form of ‘critical resistance’ to the established order of meaning, normativity, and practice). It is this unhappy opposition that distinguishes Deleuzian nomadology, for Zizek, as an ideological reflection of today’s ‘digital’ capitalism. The question is whether Zizek’s criticism is justified on this score, or whether it is an overstatement concealing a theoretical-political difficulty.

**Deleuze, Zizek, and the Politics of the ‘New’**

Once again, this critique of Deleuze’s account of the Hegelian subject has direct political implications, which Zizek explores in the final section of the book: “Politics: A Plea for Cultural Revolution”. Zizek begins by reversing Lecercle’s amusing anecdote about the Yuppie reading *What is Philosophy?* in the Paris Metro. What if the Yuppie does not experience bafflement and panic so much as a pleasurable recognition? What if the Deleuzian tropes of impersonal affects, presubjective intensities, and machinic becomings stimulate excited connections with marketing, advertising, cybersex, and postmodern commodity fetishism? What if the Deleuzo-Guattarian claim that resistance
to global capitalism requires a micropolitics of molecular becomings is in fact entirely in tune with the deterritorialising and desubjectifying character of globalised market societies? (OwB, 183-184). To put the point hyperbolically, Zizek’s critique of Deleuzian ontology targets “those aspects of Deleuzianism that, while masquerading as radical chic, effectively transform Deleuze into an ideologist of today’s ‘digital capitalism’” (p. xii).

While this might strike one as a rather tendentious charge, given the explicit critique of capitalism in *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Zizek is nonetheless pointing to a real deadlock facing the Deleuzo-Guattarian proponent of affective micropolitics and virtual becomings. There are, I suggest, two related aspects of this deadlock, which is both theoretical and practical. The first is the internal theoretical problem that Zizek clearly identifies, namely the dualism between Deleuze I (the ontology of the immanent but fissured One, recalling Badiou’s critical response to Deleuze) and Deleuze II (the ontology of molecular becoming and desubjectified flows, which represents a concerted retreat from the nature of radical subjectivity). Presumably, for Zizek, Deleuze I’s ontology is more capable of thinking this radical subjectivity than is Deleuze II’s ontology, which represents a retreat from the abyss of negativity that is immanent to subjectivity as negativity. Yet having rejected the conceptual-ontological framework that would have allowed a thinking of this radical subjectivity, subjectivity as radical negativity of the immanent One, Deleuze (and Guattari) is forced to embrace the neo-romantic figure of the dissolved nomadic subject, whose decoded flows and libidinal becomings would supposedly provide a radical political potential in the face of globalised capitalism.

The problem is that such a figure of ‘desubjectified subjectivity’ is itself a figure of the concrete universality of global capitalism today. This brings us to the second aspect of this deadlock, the political deadlock inherent within contemporary capitalism itself. For the latter has clearly mastered what Marcuse and the Frankfurt School called processes of “repressive desublimation,” the pseudo-emancipatory capture of libidinal energy by desire-driven consumer culture. Indeed, as Bernard Stiegler has recently argued, it is the phenomenological constitution of *subjective experience*, processes of individual and
collective *individuation* that globalised capitalism now aims to capture and control, largely through cultural-technological networks and virtual imaginaries that process and manipulate consumer desire subjectively and collectively. This process occurs through what Stiegler has called the “synchronisation” of subjective experience, the technologically mediated selection of stereotypical images and affective responses that serve to bind libidinal energy for the purposes of enhanced consumption and political-ideological manipulation.  

Interestingly, Deleuze and Guattari could be said to have a sympathetic relation to this post-Frankfurt school, Stieglerian critique of the instrumentalising of subjective experience through the synergy between consumer culture and global techno-capitalism. Indeed, Brian Massumi puts this challenge facing the Deleuzian critic of global capitalism—namely the hijacking of affect for the purposes of consumption and profitability—very well:

> Capitalism starts intensifying or diversifying affect, but only in order to extract surplus-value. It hijacks affect in order to intensify profit potential. It literally valorises affect. The capitalist logic of surplus-value production starts to take over the relational field that is also the domain of political ecology, the ethical field of resistance to identity and predictable paths. It’s very troubling and confusing, because it seems to me that there’s been a kind of convergence between the dynamic of capitalist power and the dynamic of resistance.  

For Zizek, capitalism is the all-encompassing concrete universal of our historical epoch, which means that, while it is a particular formation, “it overdetermines all alternative formations as well as all non-economic strata of social life” (OwB, 185). But this does not imply, contra Deleuze and Guattari, that the Deleuzo-Guattarian figures of nomadic subjectivity, molecular becomings, or affective politics provide the only viable strategies of resistance against the established global order. As Zizek points out, contemporary neo-
liberal economics is very far from being, as Naomi Klein asserts, “biased at every level towards centralization, consolidation, homogenisation. … a war waged against diversity”22 (OwB, 185). On the contrary, contemporary global capitalism thrives on the very deterritorialising dynamic that Klein, along with some contemporary Deleuzo-Guattarians, sees as providing a vital source of micropolitical resistance to the global system. For Zizek, the important lesson here is that the appropriation of molecular becoming, impersonal affectivity, and other Deleuzian tropes into the dynamics of global capitalism—at level of the processing and management of subjective experience through the virtual vectors of media, marketing, and informational flows—means that we can no longer appeal to these tropes as part of any neo-romantic anti-capitalist critique. Far from presenting a marginalised or resistant mode of subjectivity, Deleuzian dissolved nomadic subjectivity presents a neat ideological fit with the deterritorialised fluxes of global capitalism. Rather than celebrate bodily becomings, impersonal affects, and presubjective intensities as sources of theoretical and practical resistance, Zizek thus urges us to “renounce the very notion of erratic affective productivity as the libidinal support of revolutionary activity” (OwB, 185).

Here is where we also find the core of Zizek’s critique of Deleuzo-Guattarian politics, the politics of multitude, which derives from the ontology of Deleuze II (of molecular becoming) rather than that of Deleuze I (the immanent One). Zizek’s critical move here calls for further reflection. Zizek seems to imply that the politics of singular universality, which could effectively oppose the concrete universal of capitalism and thus inaugurate the radically New, could be derived, in a manner recalling Badiou, only from the ontology of Deleuze I. This would be a politics of the singular universal that would be comparable to a heterodox Hegelian ontology of concrete universality and subjectivity as radical negativity. By contrast, Deleuze II’s ontology of pure difference, which cannot be recuperated into the immanent One of the Concept, and which dissolves fixed subjectivity into a flux of libidinal becomings, is generated as a reaction to a deadlock within Deleuze’s own thought (between virtual becoming as sterile effect versus becoming as productive cause). For Zizek, Deleuze’s dualism between becoming as pure sense-event and becoming as generative flux repeats the dualism between the molecular
flux of singularities and the impassive One of pure immanence. Following Badiou, Zizek claims that the more radical dimension of Deleuze and of Deleuzian politics is not to be found in the vulgar Deleuzo-Guattarianism of molecular becoming, but rather in the radical thinking of multiplicity, of pure immanence as the fissured One. Indeed, this Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of the multitude falls right into the ideological trap, _i_ ek contends, of reflecting rather than resisting the very nature of deterritorialised capitalism today. Hence Zizek’s hyperbolic claim that Deleuzo-Guattarianism is the ideological expression of today’s ‘digital capitalism’. It is clear that this model of immanence riven by difference, albeit construed as negativity, has affinities with the Hegelio-Lacanian conception of the subject. What is less clear, as I shall discuss presently, is whether it has the sort of advantages over Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics that Zizek argues it does.

To put it simply, does Zizek not overstate the deadlock afflicting the Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of the multitude? While it is true that the multitude shares in the desubjectified flows of global capitalism, the multitude, as Spinoza already pointed out, is surely an ambivalent social and political phenomenon. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari are at pains to point out that the deterritorialising flows of desire, capital, bodies, information, and so on, are always accompanied by reterritorialising processes that serve to institutionalise, capture and recode such indeterminate flows. Subjectivity, even in its dispersed, ‘multitudinous’ guise, is both deterritorialising and reterritorialising at once, always capable of reproducing the flux of codified desire inherent to contemporary capitalism as much as of undermining or subverting these coded flows in favour of an irruption of the New. The multitude can of course be construed as a moment within the self-differentiation of the concrete universal of capitalism; but this does not determine whether the multitude must necessarily remain either a sterile epiphenomenon, an ideological supplement, or, for that matter, a radical collective ‘subject’ capable of revolutionary transformation. Indeed, this is not a theoretical matter, to be determined according to a conceptual reading of history; rather, it is a political reality, to be decided on the contingent terrain of historical and political practice.
So what is to be done? Zizek’s wager is that we must return to a politics of the *concrete universal*: the “part of no part” (Rancière), excluded from the whole and having no legitimate place within it, the radically excluded who suddenly demand justice, *egaliberté* (Balibar), and in doing so change the very co-ordinates of the existing order in the name of a radical universality. From this perspective, Zizek argues, we should reject the postmodern politics of cultural recognition, spurious claims about the plurality of singular modernities, or celebratory strains of multiculturalist liberalism that tacitly presuppose the unquestionability and inalterability of global capitalism.

He also argues that, for precisely the same reasons, it is time to problematise the Deleuzian influence on Hardt and Negri’s *Empire*. The later, as is well known, argues for a pluralist assemblage of heterogenous groups, united by their opposition to the effects of globalisation, as a source of political resistance through their access to, and participation within, informational-communicational processes of production. As in Hardt and Negri’s Deleuzian motto, we should see the “multitude as the site of resistance to the Empire” (OwB, 197). For Zizek, however, we should be critical of the Deleuzo-Guattarian elements of Hardt and Negri’s critique of Empire, which remains abstractly utopian. For example, unlike Spinoza, Deleuze’s inspiration, who recognised clearly the ambivalent power of the multitude both as democratic force *and* as irrational-passional ‘mob’, Hardt and Negri highlight only the positive revolutionary potential of this heterogenous multiplicity; their radical potential as a ‘machinic’ assemblage of bodies and desires capable of thwarting the interlocking informational, biopolitical, and economic orders of Empire.

Zizek, however, argues that this antagonistic assemblage of resistant forces reflects the antagonistic character of global capitalism itself; far from providing a source of resistance antipathetic to the established order, the heterogenous multitude simply reflects its prevailing ‘deterritorialising’ logic. His criticisms of Hardt and Negri are thus twofold: 1) the ‘multitude’ is not an independent phenomenon (indeed the concept tends to exclude class in favour of other axes of ‘difference’), but rather a function of the development of the state apparatus and legally regulated market institutions, and in fact could not exist without these political and institutional conditions; 2) Given this socio-historical fact,
what would the multitude actually do were it to appropriate institutional and political power? For their part, Hardt and Negri propose, in their minimal political programme outlined in *Empire*, three key demands: 1) the demand for global citizenship, 2) the right to a social wage, and 3) the right to reappropriation (social ownership) of the informational-communicational means of production (OwB, 202). This means in effect that Hardt and Negri’s radical critique of the neo-liberal order of global capitalism has recourse to the latter’s prevailing framework of formal equality and legal rights when it comes to articulating concrete political demands. To be sure, these demands are ones that any decent liberal or social democrat would applaud; yet they presuppose a legal and state apparatus that Hardt and Negri are otherwise at pains to critique as central to the hegemonic order of Empire.

Defenders of Hardt and Negri might reply that Zizek’s criticism presupposes an outmoded concept of ‘power’: in the new globalised ‘information society,’ power is no longer centralised, ‘sovereign,’ but has been dispersed into multiple flexible networks, informational and communicational flows. In response, Zizek points out that in order to exercise power, however dispersed, we would still have to presuppose “the complex network of material, institutional, legal and other conditions that must be maintained for the informational ‘multitude’ to be able to function” (OwB, 201). Appealing to the multitude as a way of regrounding materialist critique and political practice thus appears to be something of a chimera, Zizek insists, since the multitude is a structural feature of the global dynamic of contemporary capitalism and its correlated neo-liberalist institutional frameworks.

As I argued above, however, we could charge Zizek here with overstating the ideological complicity of the multitude with the social, economic, and political structures of neo-liberalism. As a product of the complex dynamic of global capitalism and its institutional frameworks, the multitude is on the one hand potentially a reflection of the prevailing order, but on the other also capable of contesting, undermining, and transforming intersecting communicative processes within our neo-liberalist geo-political context. That, at any rate, is the hope for Deleuze and Guattari as much as for Hardt and Negri.
Surely the *ambivalence of the multitude*, like any potential political subject or collective assemblage, if one will, is precisely what lends it its multiform yet precarious power. Much like Marx’s proletariat, the Hardtian-Negrian multitude is potentially the micropolitical saboteur of contemporary capitalism as well as its historico-political product.

While we might argue over the precise political potential of the multitude, the broader point is that it does not seem obvious that Zizek is any better off than Hardt and Negri, or Deleuze and Guattari, in this respect. We should recall that the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of molecular becoming cannot be isolated from the “molar” processes and structures that Zizek identifies as historical conditions of the production of the multitude (material, institutional, legal and other processes). Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari insist that the process of deterritorialisation always coexists with correlated processes of reterritorialisation: no deterritorialisation without a corresponding reterritorialisation, and vice-versa. Klein is therefore partially right to point to the ‘reterritorialising’ aspect of life under global capitalism (think of the homogenisation and ideological export of Western popular culture across the globe), which at the same time coexists with the ‘deterritorialising’ dynamic of incessant change and flexible networking celebrated in the economic sphere but also in the ideology of contemporary marketing and hyper-consumer culture.

The criticism that Hardt and Negri offer no indication of what the multitude would do if it came into possession of political power may of course also be directed at Zizek’s own political philosophy. Such a criticism of Zizek was earlier made by Ernesto Laclau, who argued that, while Zizek’s concrete political proposals cohere with most Leftist social democratic theorists, his hyperbolic Marxist rhetoric, which uses concepts like “class” and “capitalism” as theoretical fetishes, simply lapses into utopian gesturing. Zizek’s bluntly polemical conclusion to *Contingency, Solidarity, Universality* stands as a striking example of Laclau’s complaint:

> The only ‘realistic’ prospect is to ground a new political universality by opting for the impossible, fully assuming the place
of the exception, with no taboos, no a priori norms (‘human rights’, ‘democracy’), respect for which would prevent us also from ‘resignifying’ terror, the ruthless exercise of power, the spirit of sacrifice … if this radical choice is decried by some bleeding-heart liberals as Linksfaschismus, so be it!

Zizek makes this startling pronouncement as the conclusion to his argument that we should refuse the hegemonic liberal democratic demand for consensus. Rather than assume the tacit framework of liberal democracy and global capitalism, we should adopt the radical stance of “flatly rejecting today’s liberal blackmail that courting any prospect of radical change paves the way for totalitarianism.” Zizek thus defends the great motto of ’68, Soyons realistes, demandons l’impossible!, which remains to this day his “politico-existential premiss”. In this respect, however, Zizek is paradoxically Deleuzian, since Deleuze too argues for the becoming-revolutionary of subjects as a necessary stance in the face of the intolerability of the world, distinguishing this revolutionary becoming from the conservative lament that actual revolutions usually end badly (which, roughly speaking, is Hegel’s own position on the rationality of gradual social reform over violent political revolution).

The question now as then, however, is what does this mean in practical and political terms? Is Zizek advocating insurrectionary violence? Maoist cultural revolution? Red Brigade style terrorist attacks? It is difficult to say, since the aim of these remarks is seemingly to provoke rather than to prescribe. If that is the case, however, it hardly seems fair to accuse Deleuze and Guattari, along with Hardt and Negri, of an insufficiently articulated vision of the practical implementation of their philosophical critique. While the image of Hardt and Negri as “bleeding-heart liberals” (for holding to minimal liberal democratic tenets) seems bizarrely comic, one could justifiably ask, philosophical and political joking aside, what the Zizekian politics of assuming the exception “without taboos,” resignifying “terror” through “the ruthless exercise of power, the spirit of sacrifice,” and so on, would mean in political practice.
To return to my earlier question, why does Zizek subsume the Deleuzian philosophy of difference into the Hegelio-Lacanian theory of the subject? My suggestion is that this move enables Zizek to distinguish the ‘good’ Deleuze of the incorporeal sense-event from the ‘bad’ Deleuze (and Guattari) of molecular becomings. This separation in turn allows Zizek to argue that Deleuzian theory, hence politics, is reducible to an ideological reflection of “today’s ‘digital capitalism’”, while the ‘good’ Deleuze can, by the same token, be sublated within the Zizekian theory of subjectivity and critique of global capitalism. Zizek can make this claim, however, only by hyperbolically criticising Deleuze and Guattari for remaining the unwitting captives of contemporary neo-liberalist ideology. Zizek’s claim, we recall, is that any attempt to challenge global capitalism, while remaining tethered to the terrain of liberal democracy (‘human rights’ ‘democracy’, and so forth), is bound to be ideologically complicit and politically impotent. Yet this seems to dramatically overstate the case concerning the complicity of the multitude with global capitalism, presented with little evidence, we should note, apart from Lecercle’s amusing anecdote about the Yuppie enjoying What is Philosophy? It has to be said, moreover, that Zizek courts this apparent same risk of political impotence, which he attempts to circumvent by adopting a hyperbolic radicalism (Postmodernism or Linksfaschismus? Yes please!), a radicalism that begins to evaporate once subjected to critical and practical scrutiny.

My suggestion is that Zizek can only engage in these ‘hysterical’ provocations—in the Lacanian sense of bombarding the Master with unfulfillable demands—by ignoring Deleuze and Guattari’s attempts to conceptualise precisely the deterritorialising and reterritorialising ambivalence of global capitalism and hence overlooking the fundamentally ambivalent character of the Deleuzo-Guattarian politics of the multitude. Indeed, the deadlock I identified earlier in Deleuze’s ontology and politics (the theoretical deadlock between the ontologies of Deleuze I and Deleuze II, and the political deadlock of the capture of desubjectified flows of desire by contemporary global capitalism) remains largely unresolved in Zizek’s own response to Deleuze. This is despite Zizek’s attempts to subsume Deleuze I’s ontology to the (Badiouian) ontology of the fissured, immanent One, an ontology that would presumably better ground a politics
of concrete universality and radical subjectivity that Deleuze and Guattari seem to eschew.

In sum, the theoretical anxiety behind Zizek’s critique, I suggest, is that Deleuze and Guattari may well be doing what Zizek identifies as the crucial task at hand: attempting to think the New in order to create possibilities of creative resistance and social transformation that shift the coordinates of the prevailing frameworks of theory and practice. Rather than construing Deleuze as a dialectically superseded precursor, or as an unwitting apologist for postmodern capitalism, Zizek’s own critical project could benefit from recognising that Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics is a response to precisely those deadlocks concerning ontology and politics that Zizek himself identifies. Although one could argue, as does Zizek, that the Deleuzo-Guattarian response may be inadequate to the complexities of contemporary capitalism—its capture of desire and libidinal energy, its re-engineering of subjective experience in the service of consumption and control—it is clear that it is nonetheless a critical response to, rather than ideological reflection of, our condition. Perhaps Zizek senses that the ontological politics he endorses (the politics of concrete universality grounded in an ontology of the immanent One) might also not be entirely adequate to the deterritorialising fluxes of global capitalism. Given such a demoralising ideologico-political deadlock, one could perhaps understand Zizek’s mock-heroic plea for a new Linksfaschismus! For this is the real question at stake in the perverse coupling between Zizek and Deleuze: how to construct a political philosophy and practice adequate to the deterritorialising dynamic of global capitalism. A question that points to the need to confront, theoretically and politically, the ways in which subjective experience has now become the target of libidinal capture, technological manipulation, and economic management within contemporary “societies of control”.

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1 I would like to thank the anonymous Parrehsia reviewer for his/her very thought-provoking questions and critical remarks that prompted me to rethink and refine aspects of my argument.
4 Cf. Deleuze’s remark that he attempted “to see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous.” Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 6. It is interesting how Deleuze’s masculinist metaphor of conceptual buggery has proven a far more popular topic than what Deleuze describes as its equivalent, namely (feminine) “immaculate conception”!
7 See my “Active Slaves and Reactive Masters? Deleuze’s Anti-Dialectical Nietzsche,” Social Semiotics, August 1997, for a critical discussion of the residual dialectics in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy.
10 Deleuze’s account of the emergence of Italian neo-realism in Cinema II is curious. The purely immanent Bergsonian analysis of the conceptual elements of the movement-image suddenly gives way to a quasi-historicist account of the dislocation of social life and meaning under the impact of WWII, a historical backdrop that is supposed to account for the crisis of the action-image and shift towards time-image regimes. Having served its purpose, however, this ‘quasi-historical’ account then disappear for the remainder of the book.
13 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 42-45.
14 Cf. “Perhaps the mistake of the philosophy of difference, from Aristotle to Hegel via Leibniz, lay in confusing the concept of difference with merely conceptual difference, in remaining content to inscribe difference within the concept in general. In reality, so long as we inscribe difference in the concept in
general we have no singular Idea of difference, we remain only with a difference already mediated by representation” Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 27.


16 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, p. 137.

17 Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 42-54.

18 See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, pp. 87-88, for his account of the “cracked” or “fractured I”. Cf. Deleuze’s lapidary description of the inherent difference within the dissolved cogito: “A Cogito for a dissolved Self: the Self of ‘I think’ includes in its essence a receptivity of intuition in relation to which I is already an other.” *Difference and Repetition*, p. 58.


24 As Laclau again observes, “it was only when [the] process of centralisation [in early modernity] had advanced beyond a certain point that something resembling a unitary multitude could emerge through the transference of sovereignty from the king to the people” Ernesto Laclau, “Can immanence explain social struggles?” unpublished manuscript, quoted in Owb, 197.

