EUGEN FINK AND THE QUESTION OF THE WORLD
Stuart Elden

Aion is like a child playing a game.
Heraclitus

The world never is, but worlds.
Martin Heidegger

RE-INTRODUCING FINK

Eugen Fink is best known in the English language for his work continuing the studies of Husserl and for his seminar on Heraclitus with Heidegger. As Ronald Bruzina writes, his work with Husserl is so important that “Husserl’s phenomenology, at least as it reached its maturity in his last years, was not just Husserl’s—it was Husserl’s and Fink’s.” Indeed, of one key piece by Fink, Husserl himself states that “it contains no sentence which I could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as my own conviction.” Following Husserl’s death Bruzina notes that Fink would complete Husserl’s work, “not in contravention to Husserl’s phenomenology but not in literal orthodoxy to it either.” The Sixth Cartesian Meditation of Fink can be seen in this context. As Bruzina notes, the Cartesian Meditations are “no longer, in Fink’s revision, very ‘Cartesian!’” Bruzina makes a similar case for a reading of the Heraclitus seminar that does not take Heidegger as the prime figure, suggesting that this “would be truer to the text.” Indeed, as Krell notes, while Fink offers Heidegger the “intellectual leadership” of the seminar, “it is Fink’s proposed interpretations which guide the discussion throughout.”

Of course, this is not to suggest Fink is of the same stature as Husserl or Heidegger, but to recognise that he is an important phenomenological thinker entirely in his own right. This is not substantially developed in the literature, with most of the attention in English, French and German being to Fink in relation to Husserl or Heidegger. While it is undoubtedly true that Fink’s ideas more generally are forged between the twin influences of Husserl and Heidegger, this mode of approach is necessarily partial. The literature tends to concentrate on the early Fink and his relation to Husserl, and yet while there are, for example, certainly links between Husserl’s notion of Lebenswelt and Fink’s work on world, there are differences in the later writings. Similarly, while Fink followed Heidegger’s courses for a number of years, especially those between 1928 and 1931, when he “took detailed notes”, what literature there is on this relation only discusses the Heidegger/Fink seminar on Heraclitus. In terms of the deeper linkages, we could note that in the 1928 course Introduction to Philosophy, Heidegger notes that “world is the title for the play [das Spiel] that the transcendence [of Dasein as such] plays. Being-in-the-world is the original playing of the play which every factic Dasein must get into in order to be able to play itself out in such a way that all through its existence this or that is the game played on
factic Dasein].” 15 This from a section of the course entitled “Welt als ‘Spiel des Lebens’”, World as ‘Life Play’. 16 As Bruzina notes, “Fink underlined every sentence in this passage”. 17

This is a theme to which Heidegger would return many times, suggesting in the 1950s that “the essence of being is the game itself [das Spiel selber]”. 18 Perhaps particularly significant for Fink is the 1929/30 course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, with its discussion of world in relation to animals. 19 This course is dedicated by Heidegger to the “memory of Eugen Fink”, who died shortly before Heidegger himself. Heidegger surmises that “something unthought of [Fink’s] own that determined his way” was sparked by this course. 20 As Heidegger suggests in an appendix to that course, which is a speech for Fink on his sixtieth birthday, written ten years prior to the dedication, Fink exemplifies Nietzsche’s suggestion that “one repays a teacher badly if one always remains merely a student”. 21 Yet in following his own way, this was a course central to Fink. As Heidegger notes in 1975, “over the past decades he repeatedly expressed the wish that this lecture should be published before all others”. 22

What these linkages show is that many of the works Fink undertook between Husserl’s death in 1938 and the 1966/67 seminar with Heidegger, are influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger. But it is important to note that, unlike the works on and for Husserl, or the seminar with Heidegger, they are independent studies. 23 They would undoubtedly merit English translation, something that has happened to only a few essays and more recently his book on Nietzsche. 24 Ronald Bruzina’s important and pioneering work on the relation between Husserl and Fink acts as a theoretical prelude to these post-war works of Fink’s. A case for translation can perhaps especially be made of Spiel als Weltsymbol, Play as Symbol of the World. 25

TWO SPURS: THE CHILD AND PHENOMENOLOGY

For Fink a key source of inspiration for thinking the question of the world is a fragment of Heraclitus, number 52 in the Diels-Kranz numbering. Heraclitus declares that eternity, or time [aion], standing as a cipher for the world, is “like a child playing a game”. 26 Fink usually translates aion either as time or as terms including the notion of world such as Weltlauf, course of the world. 27 But the temporal and spatial aspects of this term are perhaps best captured by Heidegger’s translation of aion as Weltzeit, time of the world; 28 although he also used Seinsgeschick, a term to which I will return. In Fink’s reading of Heraclitus the notion of aion is linked to other key terms. As Schenk-Mair notes, in an important book entitled Die Kosmologie Eugen Finks, “Fink’s thinking is cosmological and its central concept is the world as a whole. The concept of the world is derived from Heraclitus’s physis”. 29 Fink similarly links the notion of aion to the divine fire, or the lightning that charts the course of the world. 30 As Sallis and Maly suggest, concerning the Heraclitus Seminar, “it is the rhythm of conflict and accord between Heidegger’s ‘logical’ reading of the fragments and Fink’s ‘pyrological’ or ‘cosmological’ reading that gives the seminar its momentum and makes it a testimony to the concrete practice of thinking”. 31 In their reading Heidegger moves from logos to fire; Fink the reverse. 32 As Krell notes, fragment 52 is not discussed in this seminar, but all the themes in it are: “it is thus the shadow of the philosopher’s inquiry, being present yet absent”. 33

World, for Fink, which is a term he sometimes employs without an article, should not be understood as reified, but as something fluid and in motion. Following the suggestion from Heraclitus, Fink’s argument is that “play can become the symbolic theatrical enactment of the universe, the speculative metaphor of the world”. 34 Thus “play is both a cosmic symbol and a symbol of the cosmos”. 35 Yet while ‘world’ is the key philosophical focus of his later work, the basis for this is clearly indicated in a note from as early as 1934 where he lists “consciousness of world and world” as a theme for further study; and one from 1936 when he outlines “the metaphysics of play” as the first item in a list of the “philosophy” that may perhaps lie in my life”. This programme of work is something he explicitly outlines as he enters his thirtieth year. 36
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Thus, for Fink,

The transcending of the world which takes place in performing the phenomenological reduction does not lead outside of or away from the world to an origin which is separate from the world (and to which the world is connected only by some relation) as if leading to some other world; the phenomenological transcending of the world, as the disclosure of transcendental subjectivity, is at the same time the retention of the world within the universe of absolute ‘being’ that has been exposed. The world remains immanent to the absolute and is discovered as lying within it.\(^{33}\)

Fink argues that “the true theme of phenomenology is neither the world on the one hand, nor a transcendental subjectivity which is to be set over and against the world on the other, but the world’s becoming in the constitution of transcendental subjectivity”.\(^{39}\) As Fink recognises, “Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts already constitute an extensive carrying out of the constitutive interpretation of the world”.\(^{40}\) Yet this analysis is not simply of the world in a Husserlian sense. Fink wants to broaden his analysis beyond simply theoretical reflections on the world: “The broadening of the conception beyond mere phenomenological analysis is reflected in the alternate titles it receives in his notes: in 1934, ‘The History of the Concept of World’; and in 1935, ‘Historical-Systematic Studies on the Theory of the Concept of ‘World’’.\(^{41}\) Thus Krell characterises Fink as simultaneously pursuing “hermeneutics and ontology” in his study of play.\(^{42}\)

In his study of the early material, Bruzina notes that

As the idea progressed it became quite comprehensive: historical, critical, investigative. This is manifest in the longest and most detailed outline he produced, fifteen pages of handwritten text probably from 1936. Here more space is devoted to Kant than to Husserl, and even Heidegger gets more mention than Husserl, although all three are critically treated. Now entitled ‘World and World-Concept: A Problem-Theoretical Investigation’, the projected work seems to be intended as a full delineation of the lines needed to raise the issue of the world properly, in all the dimensions that philosophic labours have so far discovered for it, rather than to work out and demonstrate a final positive doctrinal solution.\(^{43}\)

Bruzina’s reading yields a number of important insights in term of how Fink’s problematic is derived from a phenomenological position. Fink’s contribution, in part, was to “set the theme of the world squarely in the position of dominant topic in the new presentation of phenomenology”. Fink was to reorder Husserl’s materials, published and unpublished, and the theme of the world was intended to be “the Ariadne thread that could take the reader through the vast maze of Husserl’s analyses of detail in critical reconsideration, systematic coherence, and integrating reinterpretation”.\(^{44}\) Thus the world arises as a problem for Fink not out of Heidegger’s formulation of the issue in the lectures developing from Being and Time, but from a more fundamental grasp of why that problem would have arisen for Heidegger. “Transcendental phenomenology began in the recognition that the world had to be taken explicitly precisely as an overwhelmingly comprehensive structure that remained yet to be thematized properly in philosophy”.\(^{45}\)

But the roots of this mode of thinking go back further still. Fink claims that he does “not think the cosmological from out of Heraclitus”, despite the undoubted spur to his thinking, “but rather from out of Kant and from the antinomy of pure reason”.\(^{46}\) Equally he claims that Kant’s philosophy can be seen “as the first exhibiting of the cosmological horizon of the idea of being”;\(^{47}\) and that in Kant it becomes a problem of general ontology and a special question of metaphysics.\(^{48}\) Nonetheless, his work is orientated around a central perspective on this: “Is a non metaphysical thinking of the world possible?”\(^{49}\) Thus the work with Husserl, through to post 1938 works continuing this project, to the post-war works of his more independent thought can thus be linked through this theme. Bruzina concludes with this insight, although he does not elaborate the links at length. As he notes, “the suggestion of organic development from Fink’s first years through to his independent endeavours after the Second World War is indeed a corollary of the present study”.\(^{50}\)
PLAY, SYMBOL, WORLD

These issues come together most explicitly in *Spiel als Weltsymbol*. In this book Fink sets himself an ambitious task, to look at the notion of play in myth, ritual and philosophy; a complex analysis which explores the relation of the play or the game to the world. In its final chapter, on “The Worldliness of the Human Game” is particularly key. This book is important for its mediation between ancient and modern sources, and for acting as a bridge between the German and French intellectual traditions, a point to which I return in conclusion.

Fink suggests that to understand play, we must understand the world, and to understand the world as play, we must gain a much more profound insight into the world; and thus his “research on play is subordinated to the treatment of a fundamental philosophical project. This problem is that of the relation between the human and the world”. Yet despite this fundamental importance, Fink contends that play or the game has tended to be devalued in the metaphysical tradition – as mimesis, imitation, or even further as copy, or as mirror image. Fink contends that image is the generally neutral rendering; less than this is a copy; but more than this is a symbol. This is what he suggests that play can be, something that signifies rather than imitates. More than merely something which indicates or represents something else, “a symbol is a fragment destined to be complete”.

Equally, as well as being devalued, it has also been supplanted. As Krell explains: “For the Greeks, play, παιζεῖν, is what a child, παις, does”. Yet in the later Plato, “Pædeia is subordinated to pædeia or pedagogy, the latter conceived on the model of technique”. Play thus becomes instrumentalised, subordinated to technique. Play is devalued and supplanted, and the world totalised and objectified, rendered understandable through the operations of technology. To begin to grasp it through play may open up other possibilities. For Fink, “the world is not an object; it is perhaps rather the region of all regions, the space of all spaces, and the time of all times”; “The word ‘world’ becomes the title for the whole of being”; “the world is therefore the collective name for all that occurs, for all that there is [es gibt] in general”. Indeed it raises fundamental ontological questions, since “our understanding of being is thoroughly linked to the world”. Fink thus states that “the being of beings and the being worldly of things are almost synonyms”.

The Human, the World, Space

The question of the human’s relation to the world is a “particular aspect of the relation between the intraworldly being and the world which embraces everything”. Thus “all things in general are intraworldly, or to put it differently, the being of all beings is necessarily grasped as ‘being-in-the-world’”. Yet, the human perspective on this is unique, a point Fink develops from Heidegger. For Heidegger being-in-the-world is a particular characteristic of human existence, *Dasein*, and while other things necessarily are in the world, this is not to make the same point. Although Fink takes forward the idea that being-in is not to be understood in a predominantly spatial sense for *Dasein* – at least, not in the sense of a spatial container – his is equally not a purely human analysis. He wants to distinguish two senses of the term being-in-the-world. First, the being-in of all things within the universe; second, being-in-the-world of humans, “marked by a worldly/cosmic [weltbezog] relation of understanding”. But this is not a rigid distinction, because the former is included, folded into, the latter. All finite things have place and duration, within space and time. Yet, like Heidegger, Fink wants to retain something unique about thinking about the world, something that the standard usage of the term tends to miss. We speak too easily of the ‘world of the middle ages’, the ‘European world’, the ‘world of the child’.

Fink thus wants to mediate between a Heideggerian conception and a Kantian one. For Kant space and time are *a priori forms of intuition through which we perceive the world. Kant describes them as “the ground of all intuitions… the condition of possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them”. Thus they are frames through which we encounter the world rather than characteristics of it as such. In the early Heidegger space, in particular, is seen as a characteristic of *Dasein*, and derivative from temporality. This is not the case in his later work, where he is concerned with thinking the relation between space and time rather than either of their derivative natures. This is a position endorsed by Fink, who argues that “original temporality as
the meaning of the being of transcendental subjectivity is always spatial”. Bruzina notes that in doing this, “Fink wishes to emphasize is the way the integration of space with time means the ultimate time-flow is itself also the action of the constitutive deployment of the world”. Fink’s position is thus similar to Heidegger, and in distinction to Kant, because he wants to think the idea of space from the interpretation of world, rather than the other way round. It is for this reason that he argues that “the worldly position [Weltstellung] of the human is not an objective situation [Lage] in a space [Raum] comprised of a homogeneous system of positions [Stellensystem]; nor is it a duration within a plurality of uniform durations”. This is therefore an attempt to recognise that a Cartesian or Newtonian system of homogenous space is profoundly limited in grasping the world. Instead we need to grasp that from the perspective of play. “The space and time of the ludic world [Spielweltraum… Spielweltzeit] are neither place [Ort] nor duration within ‘real’ space and time”.

This position was elaborated as early as his *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*

> The world as the total unity of the really existent [Seienden], boundlessly open in space and time, with the whole immensity of nature filling it, with all the planets, Milky Ways, and solar systems; with the multiplicity of existents such as stones, plants, animals, and humans; as soil and living space for human cultures, for their rise and fall in the turn of history; as locale for final ethical and religious decisions; the world in this manifoldness of its existence [Dasein] – in a word, being [das Sein] – is only a moment of the Absolute.

*Being Worldly*

Yet the nature of the relation between the human and the world is not readily understood. As Fink puts it, “the human lives everyday in the world, but not in relation with the world”. Similarly he suggests that “the human is a being in the world; worldly in the way that they are found like all things in the universe, and worldly in the way they are open to the world”. We must therefore ensure we do not think human and world as distinct, even as we think their relation. Fink contends that the relation between the human and the world is prior to either of these terms. This is, as Fink acknowledges, perhaps the hardest aspect to grasp. “The relation between the human and the world, as it manifests itself in the human game, is not a relation between two separate matters, but it is preceded by a relation of difference between what is reunited in their relation”.

Fink thus uses the idea of the ‘worldly’ in four senses

1. the intrawordly being of all things and events
2. not the items within the totality, but the totality of being as such – what gives time and space and those things that are within them; and in particular the guiding, governing or steering nature of this
3. A fundamental and decisive trait of human existence; Dasein’s way of comporting itself toward the world, a understanding of that relation. The grasp of the ontological and the openness to the world, derived from the fundamental determination of the human as the *zoon logon echon*. The human is thus “more worldly” than other things, such as a stone, tree or animal.
4. a derogatory meaning that implies the worldly as the sensual, not spiritual; a Pagan rather than Christian sense; worldly as the equivalent of the fraility of the flesh.

Fink suggests that human play can be said to be worldly in the first, third and fourth of these senses. Krell helpfully outlines these different meanings in Fink’s work. “It is an intramundane activity of innerworldly beings, it is an exceptional mode of Dasein’s behaviour towards the world, and it is a pre-Christian, pre-metaphysical, hence ‘pagan’ activity”.

Yet it is the second of these meanings that is crucial to the ontological grasping of the significance of the relation between play and the world. Play in a non-metaphysical sense can provide insight into this relation, yet it is not something that can be seen as initiated or even guided by the human. Play is a cosmic symbol and a symbol of
the cosmos; it produces and realises the ontological difference. Yet this is play without subject: “the world is play without a player”; “the play of the world is not the play of a person.” This is the meaning of Fink’s suggestion that the human and the world are not related as two separate things, but are both “enclosed… and disclosed together.”

Fink’s claim here can be related to Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus’ fragment. For Heidegger “the child at play is the Seinsgeschick”, the fateful sending of being”. This notion, related to the Ereignis that is the propriating event of being, is what gives space and time. Paralleling Angelus Silesius’s line about the rose, Heidegger suggests that the child of the ‘play of the world’ “plays, because it plays”. Heidegger’s claim is that the ‘because’ is subsumed in the game. The game is without ‘why’. For Heidegger, the “play of the world” is thus the “sending of being”.

KOSTAS AXELOS, HENRI LEBEBVRE AND MONDIALISATION

This argument can also be found in two French language writers, whose ideas are beginning to be related to the thinking of the world. The first of these is Kostas Axelos, a Greek émigré who arrived in France in 1945 and who took up a place at the very centre of French intellectual life. Axelos developed these ideas in his own writings, notably Le jeu du monde, and also in some of the texts he chose to have translated for the Arguments book series he edited. These translations included Fink’s Spiel als Weltsymbol, which appeared in 1966; as well as Fink’s study of Nietzsche and one on phenomenology; Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization; and Wilfrid Desan’s Planetary Man. In his Le jeu du monde Axelos makes a number of related claims to Fink, notably that play and the world need to be thought in relation; and that the making-worldly of phenomena is through a logic implicit only to itself, without external cause or purpose. For Axelos, it means that the world can only be understood through this continual process of becoming. Thus for both Fink and Axelos the true sense of Heraclitus is that the play is without a player. What happens to the child? As Krell asks, “is the world the play of an innocent, or is it innocent of players? The first can be properly thought only through the second: when the child plays there is no player. Everything is played”.

These themes are also developed in the work of the second of these thinkers, Henri Lefebvre, particularly in his 1970s works The Production of Space and De l’État. Lefebvre is interested in the question of the world, le monde, both in terms of a level of production – the notion of l’échelle mondiale, the worldwide scale – and through his term mondialisation. Mondialisation can only imperfectly be translated as globalization, but is rather the process of becoming-worldly, seizing and grasping the world as a whole, comprehending it as a totality, as an event in thought and practice. For Lefebvre, the writings of Axelos provide intellectual formulations for thinking through these issues, even if his analyses, like those of Fink and Heidegger, lapse into speculative metaphysics.

While Lefebvre’s principal reference on this topic is Axelos, he acknowledges Fink’s writings, even as they are filtered, for him, through the work of Axelos. Lefebvre also explicitly acknowledges the importance of Heidegger’s work, as he does elsewhere, even as he critiques it. Lefebvre is particularly taken by Heidegger’s famous suggestion in the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Ground” that the “world never is, but worlds”. Developing the insights of Fink and Axelos, Lefebvre considers that this near tautology allows us to grasp how the world operates independently, devoid of an external cause or trigger.

The world-wide [le mondial] conceives itself in and by itself and not by another thing (history, spirit, work, science, etc.). The world becomes world, becoming what virtually it was. It transforms itself by becoming worldwide. In it discovery and creation converge. It does not exist before it creates itself, and yet, it proclaimed itself, possible-impossible, through all the powers, technology, knowledge, art.

But just as Axelos and Fink do, Lefebvre and Heidegger both refer back to Heraclitus.
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Lefebvre and Axelos thus both discuss the process of mondialisation, a process of world-isation or a becoming-worldwide. Axelos contends that mondialisation is worth preserving as an alternative to ‘globalisation’ not for narrow linguistic reasons of French versus English, but rather because it retains the notion of the ‘world’, le monde, and therefore has a connection to the notion of the ‘world’ which globalisation no longer preserves.

Globalisation names a process which universalises technology, economy, politics, and even civilisation and culture. But it remains somewhat empty. The world, as an opening is missing. The world is not the physical and historical totality, it is not the more or less empirical ensemble of theoretical and practical ensembles. It deploys itself. The thing that is called globalisation is a kind of mondialisation without the world.

Thus for both Axelos and Lefebvre the world is an object of thought in its own terms, rather than understandable through other means or substitutes. To think mondialisation before we think about globalization may be a powerful means of introducing a material and philosophical basis to the thinking of the space of the world. Lefebvre argues that the notion of the mondial, and the process of mondialisation is not an absolute solution, but that it gives us important insight into contemporary problems:

Sometimes it obscures, sometimes it illuminates: global by definition, it does not just deal with the economic, nor the sociological in isolation; neither demography separately, nor traditional historicity taken as criteria of direction. It implies the criticism of separations, especially if they have had their moment and their need. Here we try to grasp it through a process of mondialisation of the State, which supposes the world market, world technicality, etc. but which goes beyond these determinations.

Globalisation is thus made possible by a prior grasping of the world as a totality, the process of mondialisation. While Lefebvre’s notion of mondialisation has begun to be excavated politically, the argument here is that precisely because it provides a philosophical and practical account of the world, theoretically grounded and politically aware, it needs to be understood in terms of its philosophical heritage. The suggestion here is that, though filtered through Axelos, and inherently indebted to Heraclitus, Marx and Heidegger, it is one in implicit dialogue with the writings of Eugen Fink.

Fink’s Spiel als Weltsymbol is therefore a largely untapped philosophical resource for thinking about the world, and the process of becoming-world. Such a sustained thinking provides a way of beginning the practice of addressing Axelos’s well-made complaint that globalization is a kind of mondialisation without the world. Globalisation is understood as a political or economic process, most thought of which fails to comprehend the world or the globe over which this is extended. This is the case in both material and philosophical senses. To begin to undertake this analysis, we can see the potential for rethinking the way the world is constructed that does not simply fall into mechanistic, technocratic ways of rendering.

One of the key consequences of this is that thinking the world of globalisation forces us to realise that this is not a transcending of spatial or territorial problematic. Globalisation does not mean the end of geography, but rather its reconfiguration within existing terms. Territory, understood as the political corollary of calculative space, offers us insight into the world scale, or the notion of the worldwide. This is because the spatiality of globalisation is a matter of scale, a difference of degree rather than an ontological transformation. Second, that the process of globalisation is therefore an acceleration of the homogenous understanding of space and time, as coordinates on a three and four dimensional grid. The understanding of space and time as calculative, and extension as the primary characteristic of material nature is to make it amenable to science through geometry and measure more generally. In Leibniz we find the claim that “cum Deus calculat fit mundus”; “as God calculates, the world comes to be”. Heidegger’s retranslation is that “as God plays, world comes to be”. Fink and Axelos begin to give us some insight into how that might be the case.
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NOTES


4 Ronald Bruzina, “Translator’s Introduction”, in Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation*, pp. vii-xcii, p. xxviii. See Bruzina, *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink*, especially pp. 60-1 on the *Crises* texts. An interesting perspective on their working relation is provided by Dorion Cairns’s notes from his conversations. Fink barely says anything in the discussions, unless Husserl is not present. Yet we should remember most of these discussions took place when Fink was in his mid 20s. See Dorion Cairns, *Conversations with Husserl and Fink*, edited by the Husserl Archives in Louvain, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.


6 Bruzina, “Translator’s Introduction”, p. xxix; Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink, *passim*.


10 This is where Fink is treated at all. Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, for example, almost wholly neglects Fink, with the two references being confined to the appendix on “The History of Phenomenology”, pp. 212, 213. David Bell, *Husserl*, London: Routledge, 1990, has only one brief reference to Fink as a commentator on Husserl (p. 93).

11 See, for example, Sebastian Luft, *Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie: Systematisch und methodologisch der Phänomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink*, Kluwer: Dordrecht, 2002, which only treats the early phenomenological work.


14 Bruzina, *Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink*, p. 129.

15 Martin Heidegger, *Einleitung in die Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe Band 27*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996, p. 312; following Bruzina’s translation and additions, based on Fink’s transcript of the course.


23 It is worth noting that despite Fink's close association with Husserl, he worked with Heidegger post 1933 and then again post 1945.
26 Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, p. 162, fragment 52.
29 Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, Gesamtausgabe Band 10, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997, p. 168. These variant translations of Fragment 52 in Heidegger are provided in Sallis and Maly (eds.), Heracletism Fragments, pp. 10-11.
30 Schenk-Mair, Die Kosmologie Eugen Finks, p. 11.
31 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 29.
34 Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 63 n. 4.
36 Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 64.
37 Notes Z-XIV II/a-b, and OH-VII 30; cited in Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink, pp. 66, 67.
39 Fink, “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism”, p. 139.
40 Fink, “The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism”, p. 146 n. 16.
41 Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink, p. 202, see p. 558, n. 96.
42 Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 64.
45 Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink, p. 174.
47 Note from Fink, 1934, quoted in Bruzina, “Translator’s Introduction”, p. liii. See Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 25; 49; 212.
48 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 212.
49 Eugen Fink, Grundphänomene des menschlichen Dasein, Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1979, p. 196.
50 Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink, p. 136.
52 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 62.
53 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 66.
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54 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, pp. 112-3; see pp. 123, 233.
55 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 118.
56 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 128.
57 Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 77.
59 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 23.
60 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 211.
61 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 207.
62 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 47.
63 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 210-11.
64 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 66.
65 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 47.
66 See Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 47.
67 See Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 214.
68 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 55.
69 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 48.
71 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 49.
73 Bruzina, Edmund Husserl and Eugen Fink, pp. 277-8.
74 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 35.
75 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 42.
76 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 110.
77 Fink, Sixth Cartesian Meditation, pp. 143-4. On the world as a totality, see also Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 45, 211.
78 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 139.
79 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 230.
80 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 232.
81 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, pp.210-23, 225; Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, pp. 85-86.
82 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, pp.224-5.
83 Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 97.
84 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 230. See Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 87.
85 Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, p. 241.
86 Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 88; Fink, Spiel als Weltsymbol, pp. 232-3.
87 Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, p. 168; see Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 74.
88 Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, p. 169.
92 Indeed, as Lefebvre puts it, for Axelos, “the play of the world is time – becoming”. “Le Monde selon Kostas Axelos”, Lignes, No 15, 1992, pp. 129-40, p. 134. In his most recent work, Réponses énigmatiques: Failles – percée, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 2003, p. 88, Axelos ties this to Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis, the event or appropriation, which he translates as Avènement, ‘advent’. Ereignis gives being and time, and includes the ‘world’.
93 Krell, “Towards an Ontology of Play”, p. 93.
95 Heidegger, Wegmarken, p. 164; Pathmarks, p. 126.


98 Axelos, “Mondialisation without the World”, p. 27.


100 Lefebvre, *De l’État*, Vol III, p. 133.

