There is a threat hanging over forms of life today. They groan under the oppression of an entire global apparatus of political decisions, economic practices, and techno-industrial constructions. And this disconcerting weight is properly speaking not even “hanging over” us, given that today, we have become the technical masters of a sky that we were unable to leave to the “angels and the sparrows.” No, it resides at the heart of a world that has turned the human being into a geological force that is entangled with the biosphere. Something like a climate turn appears to inflect cutting-edge contemporary thought towards a consideration of the unrecognized foundations of our historical situation. To the point that we would declare non-contemporary, that is to say: sterile and sterilizing, any thought that theoretically reinforces the causes of the disaster by continuing the same motives of emancipation, the same political categories, the same philosophical concepts as those that will have lead us to the perhaps irreversible deterioration of forms of life.

Roberto Esposito’s philosophy is contemporary. It developed at the same time as what was happening to us; and as what was not happening to us. These are the three slopes of a philosophy that tries to think the presence of a being-in-common that is always still lacking something [démuni]. That wants itself to be an “ontology of the present [actualité]” (to recall Michel Foucault’s formula); Bios, published in 2004, begins with a description of the salient traits of our belated modernity (the Perruche affair, the humanitarian bombardments in Afghanistan, the massacre at the Dubrovka theatre); at the same time, Esposito’s philosophy wants to be the present of ontology, the necessity and self-defense of metaphysics, this “possibility to think beyond itself, in the Open,” this “form of consciousness in which one seeks to perceive more than that which happens, or that does not content itself with that which happens” (Theodor W. Adorno). To be contemporary doesn’t at all mean to stick to the present; it means, rather, to take up the distance of an interface between that which happens and that which doesn’t happen. Between that which saturates the present, and that which the present is lacking.

Communauté, immunité, biopolitique [Community, immunity, biopolitics], which was published in 2008 in Italian as Termini della politica, gives an almost chronological account of the constitution of this interface, of the process through which in Esposito’s work the present and ontology have become engaged in a fruitful association. The
book is put together of articles or texts written between 1996 and 2008, and they mark out the publication of the key books that motivated the French translation of *Termini: Communitas* (1998), *Immunitas* (2002), *Bios* (2004), to which one should add *Terza persona* (2007). But these “roadmarks” aren’t just “marking” Esposito’s path: a careful reading of *Communauté, immunité, biopolitique* reveals a very singular movement of thought that one would perhaps unjustifiably attribute to every thinker. They outline an *organic* development, in the sense that each new article, and each new book, appear to produce a conceptual fruit that the plant coming before it was preparing. In other words, *Communauté, immunité, biopolitique* gives the impression of profound continuity. And the latter is certainly not without relation to the ethico-political demand that emerges from Esposito’s works: to choose life.

Of course! But which life? It is perhaps around these questions that our future is being decided, on which the very possibility of a future depends. Such a future will not happen without a fundamental rethinking of the terms of the political—of its words, ends, of the fruit as well as the compost that it produces. Esposito’s book takes up this task: it aspires to a terminological reform dedicated to life.

**OF LIFE TURNED INTO DEATH**

Yes, Esposito’s philosophy cannot be thought without a “philosophy of life”; that is also the title of the last chapter of *Bios*. However, formulated in this way, it says nothing—or even worse: Esposito argues, in fact, that “Nazism’s transcendental is life rather than death,” and he opposes himself to naturalist philosophies that turn some biological code into the basis of all values and all political action. Symmetrically, he criticizes those bodies of thought that deny the order of the living in the name of a Humanism or of the human Person. The position that is taken up here is complex. Because life, as one could say parodying Aristotle, negates itself in a variety of ways: liberal, totalitarian, humanist, and so on.

Each time, however, the same problem returns, like a *criterium* of political philosophy as well as practical government: whenever there is a bad relation to life, death is produced. How many murders, genocides, camps have been committed in the name of life? That is the fundamental question, “the enigma of biopolitics”: *how can a politics for life become a politics of death?* In other words, “why does biopolitics run the perpetual risk of turning into thanatopolitics”? The contemporaneity of thought, as we described it above, is conjugated here in two ways: 1/ on the one hand, any philosophy that does not take biopolitics into consideration as a domain of study will be worthless; 2/ on the other hand, the study of biopolitics’ transformation into its opposite is the necessary path towards the institution of a non-thanatological politics. Foucault skipped this stage, just like those who, zigzagging in his tracks, have still not correctly thought the relation between life and politics. On this point, Esposito pulls off a conceptual masterstroke: in *bio-politics, the hyphen is immunological*. Every philosophy that studies the mirroring relation between politics and life will lack this third term, which is the mirror itself. Because politics plays a dirty trick on life: while wanting to protect it, it can end up destroying it. This strange reversal, this inversion or perversion, is at the heart of Esposito’s questions and of our societies, in which we undergo the effects of *highly dubious protections*. However, we need protections, and every society, just like every individual, has always wondered how it can avoid danger. But it is in the modern age that this question has become *politically* crucial. It is because he did not uncover the immunological determination of modernity that Foucault remained unable to articulate historically the relation between sovereign societies and forms of governmental biopolitics. But sovereignty is the means by which modern politics deals with the question of life; and its dealings are, *fundamentally, immunological*.

Of course, life protects itself, “by nature”; but modern sovereignty must be thought of as a second, “meta-immunitary” *dispositif* that, coming from life itself, separates itself from it, and forms a transcendent instance that bears down on life to the extent that it destroys it. That is the logic of Thomas Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. If this inaugural modernity preserves, between life and sovereignty, the existence of an Order—juridical, social, cultural—that disjoins one from the other, the second modernity, which begins at the end of the eighteenth century with the governmental technologies that target the health of the demography and are pursued through nationalisms, makes this mediation disappear: life becomes an *immediate* political object, and the completed
political development of this immediation will produce the concept of race. From this point of view, Nazism is the exacerbation of biopolitics under immunological conditions; Esposito shows how Nazi politics must be understood as an “actualized biology” that is based on the medical body and therapeutic practices that are free from metaphors, but bent on protecting the purity of the Aryan race by eliminating everything that might work against it. It is an absolute perversion of the terms of politics.

It won’t suffice to reverse this process in order to do justice to life: it is only by modifying life’s direction/meaning that one will be able to change biopolitics. And this change implies knowing what to do with negativity. It is this knowledge that Esposito’s book can constitute for the reader.

**IMMUNITY VERSUS COMMUNITY**

A question remains: why is political modernity of the immunological type? If we started with the end—which is life—to explain the modern political condition—immunity—that exercises its influence over it, we now have to return to the primal scene of this book, that of community. It is in the relation between these last two concepts—immunity and community—that one can discover one of the singularities of Esposito’s thought.

The “immunitary paradigm” has circulated amongst the sharpest thinkers of the final quarter of the twentieth century. Esposito’s specific thesis is that immunity is a reaction to community. He dedicates the entire first part of *Communauté, immunité, biopolitique* to clarifying what he means by this last term. Etymologically and conceptually, community associates the word *cum* (Latin for “with”) with *munus*, another Latin word that means “task,” “duty,” “law,” but also “gift,” a work to be done rather than to receive, in other words: an “obligation.” Based on his analyses of Rousseau, Kant, Bataille, and Heidegger, Esposito defends a major hypothesis: community is the giving up of the proper. “Giving up” in the sense of “ex-ist”, of movement outside of oneself, exodus, ecstasy, and therefore of communication (via Bataille). It is, in the end, a logical argument: in order for there to be something common, there must be something else, something more, something that is different from the proper, the private, or the individual. As the giving up of all identity closed onto itself, community is thus forcibly taken up in a movement of originary exile, of finite transcendence that Heidegger (like Bataille) was able to theorize. Existing only outside of itself, community is first and foremost a lack of Self, of unity, of a One. It is, literally speaking, commune-nothing, founded around a “hole,” a “nothing,” a “lack,” around a “suffering,” a “fault,” “death.” Let’s be clear: for Esposito, the Self of community never took place and will never take place; all political options that state the contrary will be in denial of this truth.

Here once again, the localization of negativity is key. We would say that the way in which a thought or a political practice metabolizes, symbolizes, or rejects negativity can be used as a test—as a projection of what its ultimate consequences will be. Esposito knows the point at which this conception of community is dangerous, and doubly so. First of all, it is conceptually dangerous: don’t we have here a purely negative conception of community? One that, in the strongest sense of the term, identifies community to Nothingness—“community is not a *res*, and even less the *Res*. It is not the Thing, but the lack thereof.” He speaks of the melancholy character of community. This is why the text titled “Community and Nihilism” is so important: contrary to the majority of existing discourses on nihilism, Esposito reminds us that the latter is not an affirmation of Nothingness, but its foreclosure, the lack of the lack—there where community is defined by a single imperative: do not give way on your lack [*ne pas céder sur le manque*]. Which means that one should know that this lack is irremediable, that community will never be full, self-present, absolute, divine, pure, natural. These theses, which have already been broadly used on several occasions by the deconstructivists (Derrida, Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe) have to be insisted on again and again: one can of course create links or relations, for example on Facebook or through the intermediary of *Twitter*, but these relations will not in the end belong to their members, they will not give anything back to them—and this enables, as the entire economic present illustrates, their capitalist exploitation. Facebook, like any other social networking formation, presupposes an ontological expropriation (being put outside of oneself); and, we want to add, it thus enables the self’s economic capture. In Esposito’s lexicon: community is “necessary and impossible.”
THE BIRTH OF IMMUNOPOLITICS

But then, the second danger, which is no longer conceptual but practical and political, reveals itself: by demanding that one insist on Nothingness, and by prohibiting the possibility of a stable and closed identity, the community produces fear. And it provokes the immunitary reaction—recall, on this count, that in juridical terms, immunity is first of all the exemption from a common charge, in other words the exoneration of that under which all of us fall. Here we arrive at a key point that Esposito’s reader should keep in mind: modernity is, for Esposito, the historical moment of political immunization. As both concept and reality, the individual is the result of this process of immunization. An individual constructed by philosophy and liberal practice, armed to the teeth with subjective rights instituted to protect it against the attack of the Other and of others. This argument is, of course, extremely treacherous, and the reader will undoubtedly return to it over the course of her or his reflections. Because what distinguishes, after all, the immunological will of, say, Marcus Aurelius, when he wants to fortify his soul to the point of wanting to turn it into a “fortress,” from that of the modern individual trying to constitute itself as a subjective “bubble,” to take up one of Peter Sloterdijk’s concepts? The difference is this: whereas the first has to rely only on himself, the second is the effect of a political construction. The Stoic had of course placed his bets on the cosmos rather than on the polis.

DESTRUCTION, OVEREXPOSURE, AND AUTO-IMMUNITY

There is no question that Esposito’s conceptual system enables us to understand how our societies function. Think, for example, of the difficulties that Obama faced when he was trying to pass his proposed health-care reform—they are typically immunological. Because people experience the State as an intrusive element, it is unconditionally rejected in the name of so-called individual liberty—a rejection that leads, however, to a situation in which millions of people, and in the end anyone who lives in the margins of existence (margins that are programmed, one should note, by our fatal, neoliberal “risk societies”), are without medical protection. And one could multiply the examples. Immunisation does not only affect individuals; it also concerns collectives. Historically, this has been the case since the birth of nationalisms. And today, we see how so-called “national” “identities,” even though they have had their day and are no longer capable of “imagining” themselves, replace the impossible imaginary institution of society by the reality of walls, camps, of fortress Europe, of control and spatio-temporal surveillance. But should societies stop, then, to immunize themselves against themselves? Through a sort of immunization of community that would mark the biopolitical destiny of modernity?

This would amount to defining an auto-immunitarian logic, which Esposito explains as a terminal excess of immunization that occurs when defenses begin to attack the body itself. This point is decisive, and it is here that the real questions arise. Let’s note, first of all, that Esposito uses the concept of auto-immunity to explain the way in which “Islamic fundamentalism, bent on protecting, unto death, its supposed religious, ethnic, and cultural purity,” has entered in a collision with a “Western world that wants to exclude the rest of the planet from its cornucopia of riches”: global auto-immunisation, whose torments we are undergoing, marks the end of a “double immunitary system that, until then, had held the world in its grip.” The problem is that in order to capture the logic of auto-immunity, Esposito brings in an entire series of new parameters: religion, capitalism, “biological terrorism,” “technologies,” “psycho-pharmacology,” and, finally, the “anthropotechnical, or anthropopoetic, vector that is more and more active in the contemporary world”—“more and more”? Meaning what? We agree with the fact that one must introduce these data—but why do they follow, both conceptually and historically, the question of modern political community? Let’s not dance around the issue: aren’t capitalism, religion, and technoscience the originary parameters that constitute the goals of immuno-politics? This doesn’t take anything away from the analyses that Esposito dedicates to the singularity of the modern political moment, from his insightful reading of the immunitarian function of sovereignty—but it does perhaps force us to rethink the logic of immunity within a history that is multiple. Such a history would combine three different strands, and three chronologies that are partly different: religions’ long immunological formation of spaces of indemnity, of sacred, holy, transcendent spaces; the dreadful destabilization that capitalism forced onto societies, and the responses that the latter have had to invent within this emergency situation; and the technoscientific production of an indemnity of immanent substitution (the mathematization of nature) as the preliminary condition for its appropriation by capitalism. A focused analysis of such a heterogeneous history would enable us to know
whether the current protections, however outrageous they might be, work against the common or against the absence of the common. Were they created against the lack of a lack of a lack (the ultimate insight, even if it sounds confusing)? If the Nothingness of community must serve to break down the always resurging and disturbing forms of identitarian saturations, we can very well feel the politico-philosophical urgency that consists in proposing new individual and collective assemblages that would enable one to offer to our ontological exile Existential Territories (Guattari) that would bring new lust for life. Because how to confront the dangers that threaten us without the promise of a life that would be worth living?

The modern status of immuno-politics is inseparable from the—modern—forms of capitalist destruction (negativity revving out of control) and tele-technical overexposure to others, a phenomenon that one would have to distinguish from the simple originary existential exposure that according to Esposito defines community.

The question that is withheld here would then be the following: how to regulate politically the problem of capitalist expropriation on the basis of the ontological communitarian expropriation without falling into the phantasm of identitarian appropriation? …

IMPERSONAL LIFE

To answer this question, let’s return to our point of departure: life, yes, but which life? There is one evident answer: common life. But what’s common is the improper, that which is not one’s own. Therefore, common life will be impersonal life. Let’s explain this formula.

We must avoid a double danger: on the one hand, as we have seen, the naturalization of politics; on the other, and symmetrical to it, the humanist denaturalization of human life. That is to say, not naturalist immanentism, but the transcendental exception of that which, in the human being, would escape the living—that which is called reason, soul, or spirit. In every case, the aim will be to “subtract,” to “remove” [excentrer] the human being from the biological sphere (one could call this the humanist form of the indemnification of the being). This is what the concept of the “person” is still newly producing today; it will always have the reverse effect of depersonalization. But then how to formulate the “humanity of the human being” without subtracting it from the “concept” and the “natural reality” of bios? Without “offending the human kind” (Elizabeth de Fontenay)? How to do justice to the living in the human being? First of all, by extending community to non-human beings, by taking into consideration other living species, such as animals, plants, and non-organic materials, even technics itself. We for one would love to hear more from Esposito on this point—think, for example, of what Donna Haraway, Bruno Latour, or the deep ecologists have been able to achieve in their different ways by opening up the collective in this way.

But who is to say that such an extension will guard us against immunopolitics? Who can guarantee that an increase of candidates for the Collective will prevent the formation of political auto-immune diseases? This will only be possible, Esposito tells us, if—and only if—we consider the living’s characteristic of “impersonality.” That which cannot be reduced to the “I,” nor to the identitarian “You,” but that is the “It” [Il], rather; something undividable, from which nothing can be separated—perhaps because lack and negativity are already implied by the prefix im-. For such a concept of the living, Esposito will base himself on Spinoza, Canguilhem, Simondon, and Deleuze. His mission is extremely delicate: it consists of nothing less than achieving a synthesis between the negativity of the impersonal and the positivity of life! Because “the living is that which always exceeds the objective parameters of life,” it is its own proper norm, its proper capacity of problem resolution in the form of new individualizations. It is this process that is impersonal, in the sense that it cannot single out any assignable person, but instead concerns all forms of life. That is Spinoza’s lesson; for him, “each form of existence […] has an equal right to live according to its proper possibilities”, in function of the “relations into which it is inserted.”

Thus, the reader will have passed from Heidegger and Bataille to Spinoza and Deleuze. From lack to excess. It would be a mistake to see a contradiction here: rather, as we have already said, this passage is the necessary path towards the emergence of a political philosophy capable of confronting immunopolitical disasters. That
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does not mean that the passage from an affirmation of finite transcendence to the affirmation of immanence is completely evident. For the last sentence of *Communauté, immunité et biopolitique* still describes a way of being a human being that would “eventually coincide only with its proper self.” When all of the words here are taken one by one—eventually, coincide, only, proper, self—are they precisely opposed to everything that community stands for? A community that implies the eventual non-coincidence of the self with the proper?

How to affirm that life is an “undividable place” without reintroducing the concept of the individual—a concept that Esposito at the same time wants to abandon in favor of the concept of individuation? Of course, the question of immanence comes into play here, and Esposito seeks to think an immanence that would escape total immunization (to escape *immunization*). But the field of Deleuzian immanence, Esposito writes, “refers to nothing but itself.” Isn’t this exactly why Esposito criticizes theories of auto-organization, of *autopoiesis* and auto-regulation, namely because they end up “questioning the idea of exteriority itself”? To refer only to oneself, to finally coincide, would this not be the apex of immunization, the end of all contact with that which is other, even if this auto-reference is moving and changing?

Perhaps one should reverse the procedure on the basis of the analyses presented here, and use the operator immanence as a technique of equalization that must return to the modalities of finite transcendence the irremediable status of “deprived” *[démuni]* being—“deprived,” “démuni,” in the etymological sense: without fortification, without protection, without guarantee.

TO LIFE

How can we evaluate, in conclusion, the political consequences of such a conception of the living? By taking note of the change of pre-position that it demands—indeed, it is precisely this transformation that needs to take place: to pass from a politics “on” life towards a politics “of” life. This would mean, first and foremost, to make impossible any transcendent normativity, which will always have as its effect to prescribe a dreadful distinction between a good life on the one hand, and on the other hand a life that deserves only death or abandonment. But a politics “of” life would also mean: doing full justice to the origin, the birth, the “continuous production of difference.”

“What would be this justice that is still lacking? Let’s try to imagine it. “If rights belong to the person, justice is of the order of the impersonal,” Esposito writes. He is commenting on Simone Weil, who claims the following: “That which is sacred in the human being is not at all the person, but the impersonal.” The impersonal would be the sacred—the Sacred? From our perspective, there is nothing wrong with declaring sacred everything that is, the way Allen Ginsberg did for example. But if I say that only that which is impersonal in the human being is sacred, am I not still in the process of reproducing a separation against which one would need to guard oneself? Wouldn’t my immanence dissimulate a Transcendence? And if this is the case, how to avoid the obvious conclusion that pure immanence, which is always pure Transcendence, inevitably ends up destroying itself... One can thus understand Esposito’s critique of Rights *[Droit]*, when these are reduced to the rights of certain determinate subjects, and when the other side of this determinism implies the production of those without rights *[sans-droits]*. Whence the necessity of positing that there exists a justice that is always to-come, not as a waiting for what’s better (the kantian Idea in its rather patient social democratic variation), but as the refusal of the existing order. It is without a doubt of this justice that Esposito speaks to us: a justice that is only impersonal in order to refuse unjust divisions that are all too personal.

It’s a justice that the concept of democracy appears unable to accept. But this concept is already invalid: as Esposito shows, one can reasonably no longer speak of democracy (or perhaps of a republic) from the moment when politics no longer solicits equal deliberative capacities but bodies, which are always different by definition. What would be a better name for it? Biocracy? Would we have passed from parliamentary bureaucracy to medicinal biocracy? Or should we speak of immunocracy? During the winter of 2009-2010, the French appear to have experienced their first immunocratic upheaval by refusing to let themselves be vaccinated against a flu with an epidemic imaginary. The informed resistance of the populations deflated this imaginary, and in the end,
it only uncovered the real of the pharmaceutical industries, namely their lack of money.³⁰

There can exist forms of beneficial protection, when they are not applied oppressively but instead define a politics whose motto would be: to life. Without confusing themselves with life, and without imposing a single norm onto it. A reading of Communauté, immunité et biopolitique leads towards this point, this other proposition that presupposes forms of auto-organization that, while refusing to delegate power, accept the loss of their sovereignty. If the names demos and kratos no longer apply, perhaps one should, by reconsidering the terms community and immunity from their common root (munus), invent a new form of municipality that would do justice to the munificence of forms of life. This would require the local suspension of immunitarian procedures, a suspension that biology calls “tolerance.” A tolerance that would end the power over life or death that politics has always claimed as its privilege.

FREDERIC NEYRAT is a French philosopher who is associated with the journals Multitudes, Rue Descartes, and Ctheory. In French, he has published seven books ranging from philosophical study of Heidegger to a book on biopolitics and catastrophe. The author of numerous articles on issues in continental philosophy and contemporary culture, in he was recently a fellow of the Society for the Humanities at Cornell University.
NOTES

1. [TN: This essay was first published as the introduction to the French translation of Roberto Esposito’s Termini della politica, titled Communauté, immunité, biopolitique: Repenser les termes de la politique (trans. Bernard Chamayou [Paris: Les Prairies Ordinaires, 2010]). The translator would like to thank Frédéric Neyrat for his helpful comments and suggestions. Parrhesia would like to thank Les Prairies Ordinaires, and Rémy Toulouse in particular, for generously granting us the right to publish the essay’s translation into English.]

2. [TN: In English in the original.]


4. [TN: The French word “démuni” contains the root “munus,” which is central to Esposito’s philosophy of community and immunity. Later on in the text, in a different context, I have also translated “démuni” as “deprived”; there also, I added the word “démuni” in square brackets so as to preserve the reference to the word “munus.”]


6. Theodor W. Adorno, Métaphysique. Concept et Problèmes, trans. Christophe David (Paris: Payot, 2006). 122, 217. [TN: Since the French translation with which the author is working was unavailable while I was preparing this translation, I am translating here directly from the French.]


8. Bios, 13-44.


13. Roberto Esposito, Communitas. Origine et destin de la communauté, trans. Nadine le Lirzin (Paris: PUF, 2000). 22, 25. [TN: Since the French translation with which the author is working was unavailable to me while I was preparing this translation, I was unable to locate these quotations in the English translation of Esposito’s text. I am translating here directly from the French.]


15. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 137.


17. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 118-119.

18. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 166.

19. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 187-188.

20. Bios, 189.


22. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 226.

23. Bios, 192.

24. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 83.

25. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 147.

26. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 149.

27. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 222.

28. “The world is holy! The soul is holy! The skin is holy! The nose is holy! The tongue and cock and hand and asshole is holy! Everything is holy! everybody’s holy! everywhere is holy!”, and so on. In: Howl, and other poems (San Francisco: City Lights Pocket Poets Series, 1956).

29. Communauté, immunité, biopolitique, 204-205.

30. Industries for whom the only munus is money…