This essay is an elaboration on some central themes and arguments from my recent book, *Chronopathologies: Time and Politics in Deleuze, Derrida, Phenomenology and Analytic Philosophy* (Rowman and Littlefield 2012). There is hence an element of generality to this essay that the book itself is better able to justify. But a short programmatic piece has its own virtues, especially for those of us who are time poor (which is pretty much everyone in contemporary academia). Moreover, it adds a dimension to the above book by more explicitly situating it in relation to what is an emerging view in some recent scholarship (such as John McCumber, Len Lawlor, David Hoy, and before this Liz Grosz) that time is central to the identity of continental philosophy, as well as considering some of the work that in different ways contests this kind of interpretation of the identity of continental philosophy (e.g. Simon Glendinning, and, tacitly, Paul Redding). In continuing to side with the former over the latter, I will also develop my argument that time is one of the most significant factors in the divided house that I think contemporary philosophy remains, and I conclude by offering a series of negative prescriptions regarding how we might better avoid particular chronopathologies, or time-sicknesses, that are endemic to these philosophical trajectories, and that are also present (to greater and lesser degrees) in the majority of individual philosophers standardly labeled analytic and continental. To the extent that such sicknesses are at least partly inevitable, akin to a transcendental illusion, this paper consists in a call to be more attentive to this tendency, and to the methodological, metaphilosophical, and ethico-political consequences that follow from them.

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: REFLECTIONS ON TIME AND THE POLITICS OF A NAME

Let me start off with the idea of continental philosophy, before turning to analytic philosophy, thus reversing, apparently anachronistically, a certain fairly influential story. On this story, there is the revolution of analytic
philosophy, a revolution whose identity depends upon distinguishing itself from what it is not, othering all of the philosophical work that is happening on the other side of the chunnel and thereby imposing a spurious unity on something it has called continental philosophy. Of course, that story is not simply false, and nor is it false that the idea of continental philosophy is partly a creation from North America in the early 1960s. One of the first published uses of the direct contrast, analytic and continental, appeared in 1962 in an American Philosophy Association Presidential address by Maurice Mandelbaum, and it appears that the ‘continental’ umbrella term was frequently used in the USA and other English-speaking countries to tie together teaching in many disparate and different areas that were apparently only negatively related—i.e. they shared in common not being within the canon of analytic philosophy (hence the connection between continental philosophy and pluralist societies since that time in the USA). If that was all there was to be said about the matter, the notion of continental philosophy would be equivalent to a racial cliché, a stereotype bestowed by those not born on the continent, and which ignores the diversity in question. Of course, while it is true that French, German, and other European-based philosophers did not call themselves continental philosophers, and no doubt did not conceive of the philosophical terrain in the way that many do today, more needs to be said before it can be concluded that there was not a meaningful philosophical tradition that came to be thus labeled.

Of course, if we try to pinpoint anything philosophically that is claimed to be distinctive of continental philosophy, we are confronted with some significant difficulties. As Simon Glendinning argues in *The Idea of Continental Philosophy*: “there is simply no category that would begin to cover the diversity of work produced by thinkers as methodologically and thematically opposed as those who are held within the continental one”, and “the unity of analytic philosophy is a unity of inclusion, continental philosophy of exclusion... and has no methodological, thematic or stylistic basis at all, broad, loose, or otherwise”. Given the difficulties with offering any adequate philosophical account of what continental philosophy is (i.e. any declaration that it is essentially this or that will be vulnerable to innumerable counter-examples), must those of us who practise what we continue to unreflectively call continental philosophy either be deflationists (there is just good philosophy), or perhaps take Ludwig Wittgenstein’s advice from the *Tractatus* and say something like “whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”? Many books on the subject of continental philosophy are largely surveys of what is canonically taken to be the field, a survey of the ideas of the “usual suspects” with the odd reference to lineage and the sense in which many continental philosophers are responding to each other, as well as the history of philosophy in general. This doesn’t much philosophically with the idea of continental philosophy, except to reinforce its contemporary usage and inheritance, and, of course, such chains of connection may be almost entirely contingent. Such a practice of tracing hence leaves aside the question of whether any kind of philosophical account can be given of the identity of continental philosophy in a non-reductive and non-backward looking way.

I have previously replied to Glendinning’s important challenge, suggesting that a family resemblance account of methodologies may allow one to attribute a genuine philosophical identity to continental philosophy without falling foul of either essentialism (which ignores the diversity of the tradition in question and is vulnerable to many counter-examples) or deflationism. Such a view must be, in principle, open to the possibility that our divided house will cease to be so divided, as well as to the possibility that it will split in other ways, perhaps with more ‘types’ or with the central dividing line being seen as rather differently structured, such as with the strongly naturalist analytic philosophy that dominates the USA being opposed to a non-naturalism, or at least a non-reductivism, that characterizes large swathes of analytic philosophy in the UK but also includes most "continental" philosophers. James Chase and I offer contingent reasons for not being optimistic on either score in our book *Analytic versus Continental*, but here I seek to elaborate on my earlier response to Glendinning that focused on time and method, albeit by paying more concern in the second half of this essay to the connection between time and politics, but also time and value, and time and normativity. I suggest that a concern with the conjunction of these themes is a central feature of continental philosophy as practised in the twentieth century, but one that started with Kant and reactions to Kant, especially Hegel and the temporalizing of philosophy that his work inaugurates.
If it is true that continental philosophy has a central preoccupation with time and historicity, then defining it with any given essence, property, attribute, or invariant method, would be peculiarly self-refuting, and we need only think of the persistent reinventions of dialectics, transcendental reasoning, and phenomenology, to cite but three methodological trajectories associated with continental philosophy. All such methods affirm what Mark Sacks calls “situated thought”7—which we might gloss here as a thought that attempts to take its own time(s) into account—and this means that these methods themselves are constantly being reinvented and renegotiated, perhaps in the kind of manner that Merleau-Ponty envisages for phenomenology, in his famous ‘Preface’ to *Phenomenology of Perception*. Indeed, likewise in *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty contrasts “hyper-dialectical” thinking with what he calls an embalmed dialectic, which would be a repeatable or programmatic dialectic, akin to a scientific experiment that assumes it is uncontaminated by the vicissitudes of the inquiring subject, and is likewise neutral in regard to the particular singularities of the object under examination. This variability of method is sometimes thought to constitute an objection to the many ways of doing philosophy labeled continental. After all, it seems to suggest that there can be no research program, no paradigm to invoke Neil Levy’s analysis of the ‘divide’ along these Kuhnian lines8, precisely because there is no common method.9 Of course, such objections betray an understanding of philosophy that is antithetical to this tradition, and they also remain sore points for analytic philosophy itself, for whom metaphilosophy has not been a strong suit, as Timothy Williamson concedes in *The Philosophy of Philosophy* when he remarks that analytic practice is sometimes not backed up by a well-developed understanding of the legitimate scope of analytic methods.10

On the other hand, we can exaggerate the point about continental philosophy being akin to a Kuhnian pre-science stage, where there is incessant dispute about foundations and a thousand flowers bloom. In contrast to such an account, there are some overlapping methodological concerns evident in hermeneutics, genealogy, transcendental reasoning, psychoanalysis, and critical philosophy, and between many of the famous and canonical figures associated with continental philosophy. In particular, while there is no agreement in continental philosophy as to the precise nature of the relationship between what David Hoy calls the time of our lives and the time of the universe (the “objective” time of physicists)11, let alone on the metaphysical significance of the past, present and future, etc., there is arguably a methodological agreement of sorts amongst the vast majority of continental philosophers: that is, that starting with the supposition of the ultimate truth of objective time is the wrong way to go (perhaps excepting Quentin Meillassoux).12 Of course, starting with the supposition of the ultimate truth of objective time standardly means starting with time itself as having an unchanging nature, and so begs the overall question of whether philosophy should be thoroughly temporalized. As such, for most if all not all continental philosophers, it is typically held that such a methodological starting point means that the time of our lives (and perhaps the place of our lives, since it is both the ‘here’ and ‘now’ which do not seem to be found in nature) will not be able to be adequately reconstructed, but it is maintained that if we adopt the reverse procedure, and start from the temporality of our lives, we can adequately explain objective time. Heidegger certainly argues that we cannot understand objective time without first examining Dasein’s existential time13, and such a move is not dissimilar to that made by Henri Bergson and various more recent thinkers, whatever the concrete differences in their actual accounts of temporality. Moreover, in different ways, all of the phenomenologists and poststructuralists seek to avoid a conception of time that we might associate with common sense and the natural attitude (e.g. time is a series of instants that is readily measured by clocks), and none have a deferential relation to science in which the truth about time is the physicist’s conception, and philosophical account of the times of our lives are relegated to the domain of the merely subjective or psychological, and hence (typically) claimed not to be of genuine philosophical import. So we see here the manner in which the various method(s) of continental philosophy are linked to time.

Quite a few contemporary philosophers have recently pointed to the importance of time to the identity of continental philosophy. Three recent books stemming from the USA all make temporality central to their arguments and claim (I think correctly) to serve as introductions to continental philosophy: Len Lawlor’s *Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy* (2012); David Hoy’s *The Time of Our Lives* (2009); and John McCumber’s *Time and Philosophy: A History of Continental Thought* (2011). Moreover, they focus on some
quite different philosophers, and it is not clear that there is any great continental philosopher who could not be considered within the remit of their positions. While the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Lacan is not considered in detail in any of these books, both might have been brought within their foci on time, albeit with the focus less on time-consciousness than on the elements of time that resist being comprehended by consciousness in Levinas’ case, a sentiment that is extended by Derrida. Certainly in *Time and the Other* and subsequent texts, Levinas said many new and influential things about time in his engagement with Heidegger and affirmed an ethical dimension that had always been central to the continental tradition, but which he developed in new directions14. But to consider what these three recent books do focus on, Lawlor’s book devotes chapters to Bergson, Freud and Merleau-Ponty, something that neither Hoy nor McCumber do. McCumber’s longer book dwells more deeply than Lawlor or Hoy’s on the nineteenth century, as well as upon Sartre and de Beauvoir, and the tradition of critical theory. Hoy also focuses upon the latter, but is unique in giving sustained attention to the work of Slavoj Žižek and Walter Benjamin, for whom the ‘world’ is time and history rather more than a totality of objects or perceptual appearances. In his final two chapters, McCumber explores the work of Badiou, Ranciere, Butler and Agamben in their relation to this tradition of continental philosophy, thus considering at least one philosopher—Badiou—sometimes proclaimed to be post-continental15. All three books substantially treat the works of Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and Foucault, albeit focusing on different texts of each of these thinkers.

McCumber’s central claim in *Time and Philosophy* is the following: “Continental philosophers accept two principles deeply foreign to traditional philosophy: a) that everything philosophy can talk about at all is in time, and b) that philosophers must be faithful to this at all times”16. He treats analytic philosophy as being but the latest guise of traditional philosophy—the “same old tradition in different dress”—thus downplaying some of this tradition’s claims to herald a genuine revolution, the origin myth associated with, and proffered by, Bertrand Russell in particular. We will come back to this, but if we accept McCumber’s characterization of continental philosophy, the contrast with analytic philosophers seems quite distinct, with these two features of continental philosophy’s “temporal turn” involving a manner of proceeding that is distinct from some (perhaps many) of the norms and methods of analytic philosophy. We might think, for example, of the linguistic turn and the manner in which analysis is often thought to reveal underlying structures that are ahistorical,17 as well as the insistence on defining truth as independent of any and all justifications (and hence historical processes of justification), and also, perhaps, the more general analytic concern with argument and rationality in which deductively formalized arguments constitutes a regulative ideal of sorts for philosophical practice, and which might be contrasted with “non-argumento-centric” modes of doing philosophy.18 Hence the common charge regarding the alleged atemporality and ahistoricity of analytic philosophy. And we know that Quine advocated paying no attention to the history of philosophy and Gilbert Harman reputedly had a note on his door at Harvard University that proclaimed: “JUST SAY NO TO THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY”.

While this is perhaps not an affliction that characterizes the majority of analytic philosophers today, as Robert Brandom protests on the opening page of *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, atemporal tendencies in analytic philosophy certainly remain, even if we find this divide running through the middle of the movement—this is what Peter Strawson calls the Homeric struggle—rather than between it and the continental tradition. However, despite this complication, it also seems to me that the less atemporal methods in analytic philosophy (that is, those methods that give pretheoretic opinion, intuitions, folk psychology, or common sense a central role) typically instantiate a temporal presentism of sorts that is also significantly different from much of what takes place in continental philosophy. By presentism I mean philosophies that accord some reasonable weighting (albeit fallible) to common sense, starting intuitions or what the folk think, and this includes those that use techniques of reflective equilibrium to attempt to match theoretical principles with basic opinions in particular cases. This is roughly the coherentist, or best-fit, approach to philosophy.

While poststructuralist philosophers like Derrida accuse phenomenologists of being committed to a prioritizing of the living-present, or focusing on that about time which makes our experiences unified and coherent, and as being invested in a more general metaphysics of presence, even if such charges are true there are still some
radical differences between this form of a metaphysics of presence and either side of the Homeric struggle in analytic philosophy. For example, unlike the presentist tendencies in contemporary analytic philosophy, phenomenology remains dubious about the philosophical status of appeals to intuition, pre-theoretic opinions, and common sense. Indeed, this is precisely what any phenomenological reduction must first bracket.

It is for this reason that Len Lawlor claims, in *Early Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy*, that notwithstanding the contestation in regard to understandings of the phenomenological reduction, some form of reduction obtains for all continental philosophy: “the idea of transcendental philosophy means that continental philosophy is inseparable from the phenomenological method of the reduction or the epoché”19. For those familiar with the Kantian Copernican revolution, the point behind Lawlor’s invocation of the transcendental is not to ascertain invariant or atemporal structures of the human mind. Rather, the critical dimension of Kant’s work is retained, as well as the search for conditions for particular experiences, but this is supplemented by an account of the temporal fluidity of such structures, and hence also lends itself to hermeneutic, genealogical, deconstructive, and other such approaches. As such, the bracketing that Lawlor refers to may be of common sense (i.e. of present opinion), or what Husserl called the natural attitude. Certainly part of the point of doing a critical philosophy is to seek to inhabit a philosophical space that is not merely a coherentist weighing up of disparate knowledge claims, say, but aims to subject reason—and the activity of philosophy itself—to interrogation. Doxa is hence meant to be suspended, or, to phrase it more positively, thinking begins with *paradoxa* as Lawlor puts it, and the point is typically not to solve or dissolve a paradox but to explore its ramifications, something that is generally not true of many parts of analytic philosophy, where the opinions and intuitions of the folk are often thought to be a decent starting point from which to build philosophical considerations and where the aim is typically to solve paradoxes. Chapter 3 in my *Chronopathologies* explores the Deleuzian critique of good and common sense, and exhibits the reliance of many analytic methods (such as thought experiments, and the influential post-Rawlsian technique of reflective equilibrium) upon such features of thought. In the context of the metaphysics of time, this emphasis upon the indispensability of some kind of reduction means that it is not that continental philosophers must by default be considered what J. M. McTaggart called A theorists of time, just because they raise methodological issues with any prioritization of ‘objective’ time, such as is encapsulated by McTaggart’s B series. Rather, the point of any reduction is to attempt to examine the conditions for this way of conceiving of (and indeed experiencing) a temporal series.

I will come back to this, but of the four “formulas” that Lawlor associates with continental philosophy, the second and the fourth are those that relate most closely to the idea of a “temporal turn”. His second formula, expressed pithily, is that for continental philosophy, thinking happens in the moment, with the added claim that thinking has typically been construed in either presentist or atemporal terms. As such, for him, thinking has not yet taken the temporality of the moment seriously, at least not prior to the continental tradition as he describes it. For Lawlor, the moment is also experienced as a question with a twofold temporal dimension to it: what happened; what is going to happen? As he puts it elsewhere, this means there is a kind of anachronism at the heart of experience. There is a sense in which we are temporally “out of joint”: always too late, after the event and trying to come to terms with it like the Owl of Minerva flying at dusk; or too early, anxiously ahead of ourselves and projecting into the future. Another way of putting Lawlor’s point is that thinking, if such a thing occurs, happens in experiences which involve a disorientation in time, a being out of joint, an experience of powerlessness. As he puts it in concluding his book:

> Every experience contains an aspect of lateness and an aspect of earliness. Every experience is the experience of awaiting-forgetting. It seems as though I am late for the origin since it seems already to have disappeared; it seems as though I am early for the end since it seems still to come. Every experience then is not quite on time or in the right place. Experience, the experience exposed only by deconstruction, is “out of joint.” Being “out of joint,” commanding in ways that are irreconcilable, the experience is one of powerlessness, but, more explicitly, it is one of violence and injustice. It is precisely this “out of jointness” of the relation that raises *further questions*.”20
Lawlor’s fourth formula is, for him, tightly related to the temporality of the moment and experience *per se*. All continental philosophy is at least minimally ethico-political, for Lawlor, in that “thinking consists in responding to the imperative to render justice”[^21^], responding to this being out joint that is characteristic of the moment, and this must include navigating these dimensions of lateness and earliness. This might include addressing (both theoretically and practically) considerations such as how we carry the past that we are responsible for, and how we are open to the radical difference of the future. We will come back to the relation between time and justice later, but Lawlor sums up this central aspect of continental philosophy in the following way:

> The last formula for continental philosophy—continental philosophy consists in the movement from time to justice and politics, the movement from the question to responsibility and ethics—I think that this formula most distinguishes continental philosophy from any other sort of philosophy. The connection, the small step, between transcendental issues and ethical or political issues, between abstract concepts and the concrete, is the distinguishing mark of continental philosophy.[^22^]

This is common ground with McCumber, who links his reflections on time with the posing of a question, both in his essay in this volume and also in *Time and Philosophy*.

I have discussed some of the central features of David Hoy’s *The Time of our Lives* in framing this essay in terms of the contrast he draws between the time of our lives and the time of the universe, but in a recent review in *Notre Dame Journal of Philosophical Review*, Levi Bryant also nicely summarizes Hoy’s book in the following terms:

> If one were to cite one set of issues that distinguishes the Continental philosophy of the last century from prior philosophy, a red thread uniting movements as disparate as frankfurt school critical theory, German and French phenomenology, and French post-structuralism, it would be no exaggeration to cite the focus of these philosophical movements on issues revolving around time and temporality… what was new in the Continental thought of the last century was a sense that questions of time and temporality lay at the heart of questions of ontology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, ethics, and political theory.[^23^]

Hoy’s book has been criticized, including by Bryant himself in the above review, for not being realist enough due to its allegiance to this distinction between the time of our lives and objective time, but also by Charles Bambach for focusing on time-consciousness rather than the sense in which the past and the future should not ultimately be conceived of along egological terms (i.e. in terms of time-consciousness), but rather as dispersed into the diachrony of the Other. This helps to indicate the contested field of contemporary continental philosophy, but it does not reject the thesis of this paper that time—or better, temporality—is central to this field.

Without attempting to further summarize these impressive texts or do justice to the precise details of their arguments about the centrality of time, they (like me) are faced with a challenge. Perhaps we are all “chickening out” as Simon Glendinning says others on this topic have done—such as Simon Critchley and Robert Pip-pin[^24^]—shying away from the uncomfortable conclusion that there is no such philosophical tradition beyond that which is being performatively invented through this very act of naming. Glendinning suggests that practitioners of continental philosophy both do, and should, feel uneasy about this. Even if this quasi-psychological claim were true, which would be hard to show, a feeling of uneasiness is not evidence of fictitious falsifying. On the contrary, as many historians would also attest, making a single tradition (or narrative) out of a number of given facts is a creative act, requiring groupings and exclusions as well as thematic interpretations. Nonetheless, it is worth drawing attention to two recent criticisms of my postulation of a distinctive continental “temporal turn” here, since if these objections are sound, they also apply (to greater or lesser extents) to these other books and this kind of position in general.
For his part, Paul Redding was recently kind enough to offer a thoughtful review of my co-authored book (with James Chase), *Analytic versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy*, in an earlier issue of *Parrhesia*. His review focuses primarily on the chapter of our book that develops some of these claims regarding time. Redding maintains that philosophy was temporal until analytic philosophy. As such, he suggests that perhaps we should talk about analytic philosophy’s “atemporal turn” and instead see continental philosophy as continuous with the practice of much of the history of philosophy. In the context of a discussion of the standard A and B series differentiation in analytic metaphysics of time since McTaggart, Redding suggests:

> But continental philosophers seem attracted to the A-series. Chase and Reynolds treat this as the “temporal turn” of continental philosophy, but to describe this as resulting from a “temporal turn” is to regard the analytic embrace of the “B-series” as something like a default position. Might not the difference be equally described as the result of analytic philosophy having taken an “atemporal turn”? And if so, we might ask, what were the historical conditions and consequences of this turn?25

Before I respond, it is necessary to provide some background. McTaggart illuminated two ways in which positions in time can be ordered. His A-series of time represented a psychological experience of succession that roughly corresponds to what the phenomenologist might call the natural attitude in regard to time, with certain events being futural, coming to be present, and then moving into the past and the even further past. All of these temporal designations are relative to a given present, from which certain events are seen to be in the future and others in the past. To put this another way, for the A-series, positions in time are orderable according to their possession of properties like being two days future, being present, being one day past, etc. But McTaggart also suggested that positions in time can also be ordered by two-place relations like two days earlier than, one day earlier than, simultaneous with, etc. This B-series of time—of before, now and after—involves a succession that maintains permanent relations among events, and suggests that temporally tensed sentences (like “I will finish this talk within the allocated time”) are not required.26

Against Redding’s characterization, however, I don’t think that continental philosophers are simply unaware proponents of the A-series, nor that the B-series should be a default position, as we explicitly note in *Analytic versus Continental*. Allow me to quote the relevant passage from the chapter in question:

> Can we even situate the “continental” perspectives that we have considered in terms of the debate between two views on the nature of temporal reality—presentism and eternalism—that have dominated analytic philosophy? Both seem to fail to capture what is at stake in continental reflections on time, whether at the beginning of the twentieth century or the end. Continental philosophers since Heidegger want to dispute the philosophical priority of the present, as most of the analytic eternalist camp does, but also to insist (unlike eternalists) on temporal becoming, on ontological distinctions between past, present and future, as well as between time and space. This conjunction of claims has no obvious equivalent in analytic philosophy, perhaps because it is not readily compatible with physics. Of course, there are some analytic philosophers who feel that the eternalism and presentism alternatives are unduly restrictive, including those who maintain that the debate is merely verbal because each side is using the word “real” in a different sense: one untensed and the other tensed. Nonetheless, perhaps owing to the analytic tilt on developing inferential connections so dialogue and communal progress can be made, much of the debate revolves around evaluating the pros and cons of two (or at most three) main accounts of time: presentism, eternalism and, to a lesser extent, the “growing universe” theory. None of these frameworks resemble in either methods or conclusions the kind of positions and arguments proffered by Deleuze and Derrida, or for that matter by Husserl and Bergson. Consider, for example, the commonly espoused (old) B-series claim that (i) the semantics of “past”, “present” and “future” can be explicated entirely, without loss of meaning, in terms of relations to the time of utterance (for instance, to say “the 1950s are past” is to say no more than “the 1950s are earlier than the time of utterance”), and (ii) the idea that there is such a thing as the
passage of time arises entirely from an incorrect understanding of such semantic matters. This idea that the past might become part of an omni-temporal space–time block, rather than retain its own significance, is, we think, precisely what the notion of an immemorial past (Derrida), or a virtual past (Bergson and Deleuze), would deny.27

John McCumber’s work helps to provide some further reasons for resisting Redding’s implication that continental philosophers are essentially A theorists about time on McTaggart’s schema. He suggests that proponents of both the A and B series have at least the following two central presuppositions:

1. The A and B series both incorporate necessary features of our experience of time; otherwise the experience of them would merely deliver subjective impressions, which might not tell us anything about what McTaggart wants to investigate: the nature of time itself.

2. We experience time as an ordering of events, which in turn are things with properties (being before and after; being past, present, or future).

McCumber suggests that much continental philosophy (but also the work of Augustine and others) invalidates (1) by denying (2): we do not necessarily experience time as an ordering of events, which means that we do not always experience time as either an A or a B series. Phenomenological analyses can show this, whether they invoke experiences like boredom, reminiscence, listening to a melody, etc. As such, the A series is closer to the natural attitude towards time rather than something continental philosophers (with the reduction that Lawlor maintains is omnipresent in some form or another) explicitly, or even tacitly, subscribe to. Towards the end of his essay in this issue of Parrhesia, McCumber adds:

In order for us to talk about past and future, we must populate them with content: we must see them as successive orders of things … But when we do that, we suppress two facts about our experience of time, facts which are highlighted in the experience of being-asked: that the future is intrinsically less knowable than the present and the past, and that the past is not only relational but personal, and so unstable and malleable. What scientific, logical, and metaphysical theories of time have to capture is our experience of it. If the view of time as an event-series falsifies that experience, then those theories can at best be capturing something else.

Notwithstanding this disagreement regarding whether continental philosophers who are interested in the time(s) of our lives (and their conditions) should be seen as roughly proponents of McTaggart’s A series, Redding’s overall objection still has some force. On his account, Chase and I are making the mistake of taking analytic philosophy as a norm, and then concluding continental philosophy is not like that, but there are, as Glendinning has pointed out, many ways to not be analytic, and not being analytic doesn’t suffice to establish any meaningful philosophical identity to the idea of continental philosophy.

Moreover, Redding rightly points out that the dominance of the B series within analytic philosophy itself depended on certain prior conditions, namely the timeless view of the proposition, which is something that occurs only at the end of nineteenth century following developments in logic, whereas in earlier periods (e.g. medieval, Aristotelian) neither the proposition nor logic in general was conceived of in quite such a timeless manner. Redding is correct that this is something that Chase and I don’t dwell on in sufficient detail in Analytic versus Continental, although it is worth pointing out that we do examine these kind of background conditions in the chapter on transcendental reasoning. Moreover, as is also maintained in that chapter, the connection between the temporal turn and transcendental reasoning is very tight indeed.

Redding goes on to comment of the B series’ dominance in early analytic philosophy:

These were important intellectual achievements, but that such a picture of time bound up with these
projects should be thought of as the default conception for trying to think about everything else can seem odd indeed. From the ensuing intellectual perspective of mainstream analytic philosophy, continental philosophers like Heidegger have looked like they were obsessed with an odd picture of time, but it may have just been the old one, and perhaps a more appropriate one for thinking about a whole range of phenomena other than the very particular issues with which analytic philosophy in its early decades had been concerned.28

These are salient reminders, but must we conclude that continental philosophy is just traditional philosophy in a new dress with Redding, or should we agree with McCumber, who at one point makes the reverse claim that analytic philosophy is traditional philosophy in a new dress, the materials of which were provided by the resources of post-Fregean logic? Another way of posing this issue might be to ask whether or not continental philosophy and traditional philosophy are continuous or not? This is a distinction that Hans-Johann Glock insists upon in What Is Analytic Philosophy?29, but Redding's position at least implies that they are continuous. McCumber, on the other hand, accepts that there is a 'turn' (with Kant, and more particularly with reactions to Kant and especially Hegel), although he also concludes the book by referencing Plato and begins it with ruminations on Augustine.

My sympathies are more with McCumber's position, especially if this is an either-or issue, but perhaps we are better served maintaining that there is a temporal turn that inaugurates continental philosophy, and an atemporal turn at the heart of early analytic philosophy. While not univocal, both trajectories persist as a significant force today, with the continental temporal turn roughly beginning with Hegel (and different enough from much of the rest of the history of philosophy to mark the beginning of a tradition), the analytic atemporal turn (later supplemented by a methodological presentism, as suggested above) beginning around the start of the twentieth century with Moore and Russell's philosophical uses of Fregean logic. Certainly it seems unlikely to me that Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, etc., would have accepted the two precepts that McCumber attributes to continental philosophy. If this is plausible, it suggests that the discontinuity between continental philosophy and traditional philosophy is reasonably significant, and it is likewise difficult to dispute that Kant's methodological investment in transcendental reasoning also marks a significant transformation—perhaps even a Copernican revolution—from what had gone before.

Glendinning, however, makes some points closely related to Redding in reply to an essay of mine on his book, The Idea of Continental Philosophy. He thinks that there is an interpretative decision made here, and one that is rather blinkered. He puts his point thus:

> It may well be that poststructuralists and this new wave have ploughed the furrow of a temporal turn that distinguishes it from most analytic philosophy today, and I explicitly accept in the book that confining the title to the new wave is a coherent and understandable strategy. However, with respect to the post-Kantian line of thinkers who are undoubted contributors to the texts that make up the primary works of Continental philosophy, we should not regard that strategic arrogation as showing up the unity or even 'quasi-unity' of a distinctive Continental tradition.30

Contrary to Glendinning, I think that reading such post-Kantian figures in relation to a temporal turn is not merely a strategic appropriation of these eighteenth- and nineteenth-century texts: we can see clear evidence of these claims in the texts of the vast majority of the usual suspects, which is not to deny that any positing of a tradition also involves a creative act. Indeed, McCumber's book, in particular, valuably details the temporal foci of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche, in the nineteenth century in a way that I have not myself done. While Glendinning is probably correct that such an interpretation is conducted with the benefit of hindsight and involves a relationship to these texts and thinkers that is irremediably altered by concerns that became more prevalent in the twentieth century, this seems to me to be hermeneutically inevitable—otherwise we run the risk of adopting, or trying to adopt, a view from 'nowhen' on the history of philosophy, something that most continental philosophers would abhor—and this fact does not automatically invalidate the thesis itself. Indeed,
if it did we really would have no knowledge of the past at all.

TIME, METAPHILOSOPHY, AND THE ETHICO-POLITICAL

I gave a version of this talk at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy in 2011 and Samir Haddad noted that he accepted the argument about the centrality of time to continental philosophy as I had presented it, but not the connection variously made between time and ethics, time and politics, time and normativity. In what follows I endeavor to make this clearer than it was in its original instantiation, although there will be some imprecision on account of the expanded ways in which ethico-political concerns are typically treated by continental philosophers, a style that Gregg Lambert calls *une grande politique*.31 Hopefully, however, the preceding discussion has begun to show that if continental philosophy is oriented around time, it is not that it is oriented around time as an explicit topic, such as the metaphysics of whether time is real or not. Rather, the concern with time is primarily methodological and metaphilosophical, but it is also ethico-political too, in the sense that it is claimed to be how one ought to do philosophy, but also in that it is typically maintained that we can glean some fundamental insights—albeit not universally prescribed actions that would purport to hold atemporally—into how one ought to live in relation to temporal experience and its conditions. Has this dimension of continental philosophy been part of the history of philosophy? To some extent, yes, since philosophy has traditionally been a form of coming to terms with one’s own mortality/temporality, as well as a place for practical advice and techniques regarding how to deal with the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune. Arguably, it is the concern with metaphilosophy and time, or what we might call the connection between transcendental philosophy and normativity, rather than (simply) with how to practically deal with say the transience of time and death that is distinctive of the continental tradition, but there is not typically a strict separation drawn between such matters.

Without being able to do more than provide a snapshot of this here, I think that continental philosophers invariably invoke time when it comes to thematizing the ethico-political and normativity more generally, and this often depends on forms of transcendental philosophy and temporal orders of priority. This is partly due to the vast influence of Heidegger, including his direct association in *Being and Time* of “vulgar” or ordinary time (that is, time understood as fundamentally what is tracked by clocks) and inauthenticity (see § 81), notwithstanding his protestations that this is not a moral distinction. Roughly speaking, for Heidegger, an inauthentic mode of being-in-the-world is one without temporal unity and an authentic mode of being-in-the-world has temporal unity, a thesis that is subsequently contested by Levinas, Derrida, and Deleuze (as well as others) despite their indebtedness to some other aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy of time. But Heidegger didn’t come from nowhere in this respect. Other continental philosophers associated time and normativity (time and value) in the nineteenth century, and Derrida and Deleuze, for example, have continued to so. While Hegel is an obvious case, arguing that the task of philosophy ought to be to grasp one’s own time in thought, we might also think of Friedrich Nietzsche’s revaluation of values in which time is central. Nietzsche argues, for example, that all *resentment* is resentment of the present (the “now”) and claimed in *Ecce Homo* that the notion of the eternal return of the same was his greatest idea, along with the associated idea of *amor fati*: become what one is. We might also consider Karl Marx, whose rich and varied analyses of the relation between certain modes of production and time (e.g. time-as-measure) remains influential. Søren Kierkegaard’s *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* is primarily concerned with the manner in which the genuinely religious life involves a contradiction between temporal existence and eternity, as well as the manner in which the choice, or leap of faith, occurs at an instant in which time (lived time) and eternity are envisaged to intersect. Likewise, Kierkegaard has Johannes De Silentio declare at one point in *Fear and Trembling*: “temporality, finitude, that is what it is all about”32 and Schelling’s *The Ages of the World* is all about time, prefiguring substantial aspects of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*.

Indeed, in different ways this normative dimension of time is also something that Lawlor, McCumber, and to a lesser extent Hoy, emphasize in their recent books on continental philosophy. Recall, for example, the two metaphilosophical principles that McCumber begins and ends his book with: a) everything is in time, and b)
philosophy must never allow itself to forget this (390). McCumber concedes that we are in a bit of trouble if we understand these principles in traditional ontological terms (it seems self-refuting to say that all things are in time, since what of the putative eternal validity of this statement itself?), or epistemologically, since how could such a claim be proved? He says it is instead a practical counsel of “philosophical prudence” (391). Lawlor also invokes considerations to do with philosophical prudence that are also meant to allude to ways of responding ethically. Lawlor says:

We must become something other than the worst violence... Perhaps... it amounts to this: If we cannot stop the violence of repetition on the event, we can let it happen; if we cannot stop the violence of the event on repetition, we can let it happen. This letting happen means that we have the ability—the power maybe—to be unable. We are able to obey the law of repetition (we must always await the repetition in each event, obligated thereby to forget each event); we are able to obey the law of singularization (we must always forget all the repetitions of events, obligated thereby to wait for another event). Is this obedience a listening to the murmur of the outside? Is this obedience a welcoming of all the events across the border that divides while binding, welcoming all repetitions across the threshold that binds while dividing? Maybe this obedience would do the least violence. Nothing is certain... In this reaction of the least violence, we have opened the border of who we are to others, to all the others that haunt us from the past (they keep coming back to us) and to all the others that wait for us in the future (they keep coming toward us).33

This kind of reflection, as Lawlor acknowledges, is indebted to the generation of ‘les incorruptibles’, Hélène Cixous’ somewhat quaint characterization of her contemporaries in France—Deleuze, Derrida, and Foucault in particular. It is not restricted to this generation, however, and draws on a tradition of continental philosophy that extends back to the various philosophers Lawlor considers—Bergson, Merleau-Ponty, etc.—and also further into the nineteenth century as McCumber shows.

This desire to contextualize ethico-political problems historically, and to treat how one experiences time as central to the good life (however that is understood), has various consequences. It means that continental philosophers rarely invoke rule-following accounts of ethics and politics. Very few, for example, would concur with Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason and Dale Miller, who in their introduction to *Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader*, argue that the task of ethical theory is to come up with a code of rules or principles, that would, ideally, (a) allow a decision procedure for determining right action in a particular case, and that (b) could be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand it and apply it correctly.34 Rather, they are instead typically engaged in forms of ethico-political reflection that are closer to virtue ethics, in that the focus is not typically on the consequences of particular acts, nor even their motivating intentions (in the sense of what one deliberately and consciously aimed to accomplish by a given act), but on character and patterns of action over periods of time. With Nietzsche, for example, one key question is: could we wish for our whole life, with everything that happens in it, to occur again without difference? Moreover, Nietzsche dismisses utilitarianism as an ethics for children and mediocre Englishmen35 and it is significant that no well-known continental philosopher has ever, as far as I can discern, subscribed to utilitarianism and it has rarely even been discussed seriously.

As would be apparent, I think there is something philosophically vital to this trajectory. For many analytic philosophers, however, this interest in how one ought to respond to the time(s) of their lives, and the social and political dimensions of this question, makes their continental counterparts look like they are doing something other than philosophy. What, an analytic interlocutor might ask, is the relation between metaphilosophy—questions concerning the value of and how one ought to do philosophy, i.e. temporally—and considerations to do with the good life, norms, and ethico-political matters in general? Is there any relation at all? Many analytic philosophers would dispute this and theoretical reflections on the conjunction of such matters would be claimed to be something more like para-politics, as Hilary Putnam suggests—that is, a politicized philosophy that sees itself primarily in social and political terms.36 Indeed, analytic philosophers have been worried about
this trajectory in continental philosophy since Bertrand Russell and many others of that period maintained that
German Idealism had philosophically overreached itself in such a manner that it led, fairly directly in their
somewhat scurrilous views, to Fascism and Hitler.

Of course, the ostensible neutrality of analytic philosophy regarding the social and political possibilities of
philosophy37—in contrast to the simultaneously critical and utopic aspirations of much continental philosophy
since Hegel and Marx—is not as neutral as it might appear. That is because this neutrality is deemed not only
to be metaphilosophically prudent, but also socio-politically desirable, since it is implied that the alternative
is a sophistic discourse that is threatening not only philosophically, but also to the social order. As such, many
analytic philosophers are not actually neutral about the connection between metaphilosophy and socio-political
matters. On the contrary, even in recent times well-respected philosophers like Jonathan Cohen and Nicholas
Rescher have aligned analytic philosophy’s norm of clarity of argument with the spirit of democracy and evince
a moral element to them. Cohen’s The Dialogue of Reason, for example, argues that there is a close connection
between analytic method, democracy and non-totalitarian stances; it is implied that the lack of such a method
threatens to presage evil, philosophical or otherwise38. This, of course, simply echoes the formative thoughts
that were proffered by Russell and many others, as the idea of a ‘divide’ between ways of doing philosophy
began to be entrenched in the early twentieth century.

But to return to the central issue of the connection between time and normativity throughout much continental
philosophy, it might be maintained (especially when viewed from outside by an analytic philosopher) that
this history of continental philosophy appears to be a history of failures. After all, none of the attempted
elucidations of normative matters from salient temporal features of experience are entirely convincing, and all
such attempts are contested by other continental philosophers, as we have seen even in the brief discussions
entered into here. Perhaps the conclusion we should reach, then, is that this is not the way to do philosophy,
and that if philosophy is done some other way then these risks—essentially the risk of sophistry, the risk of
being fragmented and without a research program—might be avoided. To put it another way, if the history of
continental philosophy shows that claims to transcendental priority concerning time are typically accompanied
by illegitimate (in the sense that they cannot establish their necessity) normative moves, whether in Hegel,
Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Deleuze, etc., one response to this might be to consign transcendental philosophy
and/or temporalizing philosophy to the dustbin of history. But, again, that would presuppose a very different
conception of philosophy in which there is a set of neutral methods that might immunize philosophy against
the risk of failure, or at least against failure of this kind. And it might be fairly protested that nothing like this
has yet come about, despite the progressivist optimism that undergirds the practice of analytic philosophy. On
the contrary, from the outside analytic philosophy also appears to be a history of failures. Both Richard Rorty
and Robert Paul Wolff have noted that after World War II, analytic philosophers still expected to wrap up the
task of solving or dissolving all traditional philosophical problems in a few years, yet not a single one of its
problems has gone away: think of the existence of God, free will, the nature of truth and reference etc.39 Even
today, Michael Dummett is prepared to bet that the analytic methods will solve (at least to the satisfaction
of this academic community) the problem of the existence of God within two generations: he thinks in the
affirmative.40

From my own perspective, however, the best solution is not to give transcendental/temporalizing philosophy
up, since the consequence seems to be an impoverished account of time and politics that is itself partial and
dogmatic in various different ways. In particular, such philosophies cannot offer an “ontology of the present” as
Foucault puts it, a “genealogy of ourselves”41, and instead seems committed to an intellectual view that Simone
de Beauvoir describes as the curator of the given world.42 Indeed, to the extent that a philosophical trajectory
tends to oscillate between atemporality and temporal presentism it will be limited, especially in ethico-political
terms, where much of what we desire, wish for, are fearful of, is irremediably temporal. Indeed, it is to threaten
to give philosophy no role in regard to the time(s) of our lives.
In his earlier book, *Reshaping Reason*, McCumber’s last chapter focuses on the ethical dimensions of methodological issues and gives what is essentially an ethical argument for a form of methodological pluralism concerning time. McCumber contends that the temporal conditions of the possibility of experience show us that we need to be pluralists about reason and knowledge. For him, knowledge is an affair of the present-tense only. It is inferential thinking. But narrative thinking pays more attention to the past, and demarcation focuses on the future. Demarcation is said to mean opening up a gap, as a way of bringing about a future. As he pithily puts it, “demarcation without narrative is empty; inference without narrative is blind; narrative without demarcation is reactionary; narrative without inference is fiction”. It would be clear, already, that he associates inference with analytic philosophy, and the other two tendencies predominantly with parts of continental philosophy. Moreover, the past and the future have an ethical flavor that is missing from the present-tense (immemorial time for Levinas, the future “to come” for Derrida), and to restrict a philosophical account to any single one of these times is to have a restricted philosophy, perhaps even a myopic or chronopathological one.

In *Time and Philosophy*, McCumber also includes a revealing quote from Quine to help make apparent the manner in which a metaphilosophical privileging of one or the other of these times enables a dismissal of other times, in this case demarcation and narrative, and thus verges on a form of theoretical fundamentalism. He sees Quinean talk of ridding ordinary language of its temporal elements as part of an “old tradition” for which true reality is located in an atemporal domain. Those who don’t do this are wrong-headed, and Quine adds, that “if one pursues philosophy in a scientific spirit as a quest for truth, then tolerance of wrong-headed philosophy is as unreasonable as tolerance of astrology would be on the part of the astrophysicist, and as unethical as tolerance of Unitarianism would be on the part of hell-fire fundamentalists”. This is a strong comparison for Quine to draw. It suggests that there is a fear of losing something that is loved, in this case the atemporal ambitions for philosophy to disclose truths that do not depend upon subjective times or historical contingencies, and that his fear of losing what he loves precludes any ecumenical tolerance or consideration of the varieties of so-called lived-time, for example, or the essential finitude involved in structures of lived-time. Indeed, we might note in passing that following the French existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel’s lecture on death, the British ordinary language philosopher J. L. Austin, himself dying of cancer at the time, reputedly stood up and said, “we all know we have to die, but why do we have to sing songs about it?”

But again, my point is not that Quine and Austin are somehow irremediably bad, and Marcel (let alone Heidegger) are by contrast good, embracing both metaphilosophically and ethically a richer expanse of times. Indeed, we know that Heidegger, at least, has a very strong dismissal of ordinary time and clock-time (and presentist structures in general), in *Being and Time*, one that arguably cannot be sustained, and there are other questions about his enduring nostalgia for the pre-Socratics. Philosophically, it is arguable that he made temporal mistakes; politically, of course, he did too. Likewise, other continental philosophers may not practice what they preach regarding the various dimensions of the time(s) of our lives. While I do think that the continental tradition gives us some essential insights into the relations between time and normativity, and highlights the kind of violence that neglect of particular aspects of time can do, that doesn’t mean that they are thus immune from these errors, from their own time sicknesses. Hegel, for example, emphasizes the past but gave very little philosophical reflection to the future. By contrast, there is also a prophetic futurity about many of the philosophers associated with poststructuralism that does not deny the importance of the inheritance of a past, but which I argue in *Chronopathologies* does result in a philosophical—and also ethical—denigration of the living-present and its temporal conditions. The attempt to articulate conditions for present experience and present identity tends towards a prophetic futurity and a philosophy of difference that involves, more or less directly, a denunciation of good sense, calculation, and the structures of time alleged to sustain them. As such, my point is that there are chronopathologies within both analytic and continental philosophy, and that these respective time-sicknesses do currently split in separate directions and form a constellation around that we call analytic and continental philosophy (perhaps so-called speculative realism will change that, but that remains to be seen).

To see this, it is helpful to borrow some terms from Martin Hagglund, who discusses the manner in which
chronophilia (love of an aspect of time), and chronophobia (fear of the loss of that time) depend upon one another: psychoanalytically speaking we only fear the loss of that which we love, or at least what we would prefer to not lose.46 We might say, risking a strong generalization, that continental philosophy loves exploring certain dimensions of time (the times of our lives, but also the times that are the conditions for our lives and/or render lived-time unstable and open it to the new and different), and, fearful of the naturalist/physicalist/ objectivist rejection of such times, claims that these are not the proper object of philosophical reflection. Indeed, I think that transcendental philosophy can (but in its better forms does not) serve an inoculating or immunizing function, preserving a proper domain to which one might safely abscend from mere empirical or ontic temporal considerations. Analytic philosophy, on the other hand, loves the time of the universe and the view from nowhen, or alternatively it tends to trust heavily in present intuitions and coherence building techniques, and is fearful of the loss of such times in historicism, contextualism, relativism, etc., and argues that these are merely subjective and psychological rather than objective. It is also arguably fearful of that dimension of the future (which we might even call its essence) which cannot be predicted or modeled, and which Derrida in *Of Grammatology* calls its monstrosity. This monstrosity may be dangerous for continental philosophers, but it is also the only chance for interruption to the imperialism of the same (this is the worst, for them). When Deleuze and Guattari invoke the need for resistance to the present, in relation to the people to come, it is clear enough that this has an ethico-political dimension. When Levinas emphasizes that importance of the immemorial past, or Derrida discusses the ‘to come’, these kinds of reflections are both meant to refer to structures of our experience, transcendental laws of the times of our lives we might say, and they also have a normative element too.

It seems that there is a certain kind of chronopathology—that is, theoretical myopia about time—that can afflict both traditions and which has a metaphilosophical dimension, as well as an ethico-political and normative dimension. Allow me to draw together some of the main claims I have made about analytic philosophy which bear this out. We have seen evidence of a chronopathology prevailing in analytic philosophy: an atemporality in some cases (e.g. utilitarianism, four-dimensionalism, etc.), a presentism in other cases (we have to start from somewhere: e.g. the intuitions of the “folk”). In addition, in political philosophy there is also a general preoccupation with distributive justice and rule-following prescriptions that remains anathema to most forms of continental ethico-political reflection. This chronopathology is also en ensconced in some of the core philosophical methods of analytic philosophy more generally: analysis aims to reveal underlying structures (sometimes logical) that are timeless; truth is defined as independent of all justification (and hence historical processes); thought experiments are “intuition pumps” that call on pre-theoretic opinion and then structure debates by serving as placeholders; the deferential relationship to the best findings of the sciences indexed to the present (hence an expert presentism, which requires perennial updating); the prima facie credence given to common sense (a non-expert presentism); as well as the general prevalence of coherentist devices like reflective equilibrium which take seriously both pre-theoretic opinion and the findings of the various expert domains. Of course, to suggest that this amounts to a time sickness might seem to beg the question by assuming that such views are false, and it might be fairly protested that nothing quite so strong has been established. But my weaker claim here is simply that the methods and metaphilosophical understanding of the role of the philosopher are temporally limited and partial. I would also add, however, that any claims to them being exhaustive seem especially weak in regard to ethico-political reflection. Indeed, I have suggested that the motivation and impetus for change, for example, generally requires both a more utopian (future-oriented) and a more critical and genealogical (past-oriented) dimension.

If I am right about the general contours of this position, this suggests that a rapprochement is desirable. Philosophy needs to be able to adequately come to terms with what Hoy calls the *time* of our lives—I prefer to pluralize this to the *times* of our lives—and yet the poststructuralism of Deleuze and Derrida has an excessive emphasis on times (and methods) that resist the present while simultaneously at work within the present, and analytic philosophy tends to have a deficiency of such methods generally being either atemporal or presentist. Whether any such rapprochement is genuinely possible (for philosophical reasons, as much as socio-political ones) remains less clear given that some fundamental metaphilosophical and normative orders of priority make
it difficult for the twain to meet. This is due to norms like methodological empiricism and respect for common sense in analytic philosophy, and the continental “temporal turn” with its association with a hermeneutics of suspicion and transcendental philosophy. Hence we are confronted by an aporia: while each tradition needs the other, each is also precluded from that very dialogue to the extent that they take these norms seriously, especially in regard to the divergent methodological and topical significance given to time, which is a blind spot at the heart of both analytic and continental philosophy, what we might call an enabling and disabling condition. The aporetic challenge for our time(s) is hence to do what we as philosophers find almost impossible to do: engage in a genuine conversation with our respective others, whether they be analytic, continental, phenomenological, or poststructuralist. To put it more Socratically, we need to know that we do not know, which as with the Greek use of aporia, ought to inspire us to find out more. Such a desire is a precondition for any postanalytic and metacontinental future to emerge.⁴⁷

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NOTES

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2. In 1961, the University of Melbourne conducted some weekly seminars under the heading of recent continental philosophy, with Professor Boyce Gibson doing a talk entitled “British versus continental philosophy”. Thanks to Tim Oakley for passing on to me the published proceedings of this series.
4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. G. E. Anscombe. London: Blackwell, 1953, see § 65–6, especially the famous discussion regarding the definition for a game—no necessary and sufficient condition definition seems to suffice—and the rope that has a unity despite no single thread persisting throughout the whole rope. For more on this, see my paper, “Continental Philosophy and Chickening Out”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2009, but also Glendinning’s reply in this same issue and his recent article in Southern Journal of Philosophy (2012).
8. Neil Levy, “Analytic and Continental: Explaining the Differences”. Metaphilosophy 34:3 (2003, 284–304). Levy looks at their divergent research practices (with some reflection on their respective methodologies) by way of an analogy with Thomas Kuhn’s account of scientific methodology. For Levy, analytic philosophy is paradigmatic, and functions in the manner of a normal science (with research clusters, methodological canons, technical training, and so on), whereas continental philosophy exhibits the features of what Kuhn called prescience (lack of agreement on methods, no unifying work, etc.).
9. Daniel Dennett, referring to phenomenology, famously says that the “first person science of consciousness is a discipline with no methods, no data, no results, no future, no promise. It will remain a fantasy”. See D. Dennett, “The Fantasy of First-Person Science”, http://ase.tufs.edu/cogstud/papers/chalmersdeb3dft.htm, but also Steven Crowell’s essay, which anticipates Dennett’s view, “Is There a Phenomenological Research Program?”, Synthese 131 (2002, 419–444).
12. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude. Trans. Ray Brassier. London: Continuum, 2008. Meillassoux contends that many continental philosophers are “correlationists” to either a weak or a strong degree (depending, roughly, on the extent to which their inheritance is Kantian and Hegelian), and so cannot adequately account for the reality of ancestral claims regarding “arche-fossils” (including in physics, biology, etc.) that pre-dated human subjects.
20. Lawlor, Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, 207.
21. Lawlor, Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, 10–11.
22. Lawlor, Early Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy, 11.


37. We also know that the appearance of socio-political neutrality can be politically expedient. In such a vein, John McCumber argues in *Time in the Ditch* that the rise and success of the ostensibly politically neutral analytic philosophy in the US in the McCarthy era is more than a coincidence (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001).


39. Thanks to the anonymous referee for pointing this out.


47. John McCumber also makes a related point in *Reshaping Reason* (cf. 33).