This paper focuses on the ways in which perceptions and experiences of guilt and shame are shaped by political conceptions of who belongs to the more guilty and shameful parties. Guilt is ambiguous between guilt as the fact of having done something wrong, and guilt as a felt experience. Likewise shame can be felt even when there is nothing to be ashamed of. I will examine guilt and shame and the apparent expectation and need to take these emotions on when one is not directly implicated. This phenomenon is the converse of the refusal to accept guilt when one is actually culpable, a danger with the concept of collective guilt that Hannah Arendt points out. I use the debate between Karl Jaspers and Arendt over guilt and responsibility, as well as Jean-Paul Sartre’s and Giorgio Agamben’s work on shame, to develop an account of the political aspects of perceived and felt guilt and shame in people who are oppressed.

First, I articulate the nature of guilt and shame, then discuss how philosophers have, in some cases, argued that the oppressed should accept the burdens of guilt and shame expected of them because of the social nature of our ethical experience; and then show how that view can be questioned. For instance, Cheshire Calhoun argues that it makes ethical sense for members of racially oppressed groups, for example, to accept the shaming of the oppressor since we share a moral world with them. One instance Calhoun discusses is Adrian Piper’s professor insinuating that Piper has presented herself as black when, in his view, she is not. She writes “I think that vulnerability to feeling ashamed before those with whom one shares a moral practice, even when one disagrees with their moral criticisms, is often a mark of moral maturity.” While experiences of both guilt and shame have a social element, as Calhoun maintains, and social relationships are essential to ethics, I argue that the view that members of oppressed groups should experience the guilt and shame expected of them by dominant groups ought to be challenged.

In discussing shame, I am focusing on moral shame, rather than the kind of shame associated with modesty and desire for privacy, although there are connections between the two. For much of the twentieth century shame was not considered to be a particularly useful affect morally but in recent decades shame has come to
be thought of as more morally important than guilt.\textsuperscript{4} Furthermore, either guilt or shame has been thought of as the basic mood or emotion of the human being, for instance, in the work of Martin Heidegger and Agamben.\textsuperscript{7} Even more recently, the focus on shame to the exclusion of emotions that are not those of self-assessment, such as humiliation, has itself begun to be criticised, for example by Lisa Guenther.\textsuperscript{4} In this paper, I would like to take that development further by showing how the debate concerning shame and guilt in philosophy and everyday life has obscured emotions that are responses to the actions of others, such as humiliating treatment, thus leading to an inappropriate focus in philosophical discourses on the victims of wrongdoing rather than the perpetrators. This focus implicitly supports the dynamics of humiliation, as I will show. The paper examines three examples of this phenomenon: Calhoun's analysis of Adrian Piper's shame at being accused of "passing" as black that I mentioned, Agamben's reading of a young man's shame on a death march at the end of World War II, and contemporary shaming practices in punishment. First, allow me to explore two accounts of guilt that focus on guilt as response to wrongs.

**GUILT AND SHAME IN JASPERS AND ARENDT**

Two of the most important articulations of the nature of guilt are found in the work of Jaspers and Arendt. Both are strongly centred on perpetrators of offences, rather than much of the later philosophical work, which focuses on survivor guilt and shame. I discuss their ideas first to highlight how perceptions of guilt and shame have shifted from perpetrators to victims. In *The Question of German Guilt* (1947/2001), Jaspers considers whether, in the wake of the Second World War and the Shoah, there is a special kind of German guilt.\textsuperscript{9} He defines guilt as a feeling of culpability, in other words, as a felt recognition and concern that we have done something wrong. For him, guilt involves accepting the consequences of our choices to act or not act in relation to an ethically significant event.\textsuperscript{10} Jaspers believes it is important that we feel guilt: "The question is in what sense each of us must feel co-responsible."\textsuperscript{11} In addition to acknowledging the affective aspect of guilt, Jaspers argues that feelings have to be subjected to reflection before we can speak of our true feelings. He states:

Though immediacy is the true reality, the presence of our soul and feelings are not simply there like given facts of life. Rather they are communicated by our inner activities, our thoughts, our knowledge. … Feeling as such is unreliable. To plead feelings means to evade naively the objectivity of what we can know and think. It is only after we have thought a thing through and visualised it from all sides, constantly surrounded, led and disturbed by feelings, that we arrive at a true feeling that in its time can be trusted to support our life.\textsuperscript{12}

Feelings must be subjected to individual phenomenological reflection. They have to be assessed through that reflection so that they are sincere, authentic, not "raw" feelings, and Jaspers aims at providing the tools for that reflection through his own discussion of the issue.\textsuperscript{13}

To enable understanding of the nature of guilt Jaspers famously devises a scheme of distinctions. Briefly, there are four kinds or concepts of guilt: criminal guilt, where crimes can be proven and judged in a court of law; political guilt, where leaders and citizens have to be held guilty for the actions of a state, because they are co-responsible for those actions;\textsuperscript{14} moral guilt, in that every person has responsibility for all their actions and can be judged morally, including following military commands, even though there may extenuating factors, such as risk of life, extortion, and intimidation; and metaphysical guilt: human beings live in a relation of solidarity that makes everyone co-responsible for all the wrongs and injustices that occur, especially for crimes witnessed and known about that we do not try to thwart. This last feeling of guilt cannot be conceived legally, politically, or morally. The guilt comes from not extending the capacity to only live if the other is not harmed to a sufficiently wide circle; we do not love others enough. Only God can judge this guilt, he claims.\textsuperscript{15} Furthermore, there are consequences of each of the kinds of guilt, according to Jaspers: "The consequences of guilt affect real life, whether or not the person affected realises it, and they affect my self-esteem if I perceive my guilt." Each form of guilt has to be dealt with in a different way; for example, crime is punished. These consequences have to be addressed through a range of thought and actions. I will focus primarily on moral and metaphysical guilt here,
as they are the most relevant to the issue of the expectation of guilt feelings in victims.

Moral guilt can only be discussed between friends and metaphysical guilt is probably not discussed at all, Jaspers argues. Moral failings create the conditions for crime and political guilt, by ignoring events, such as the wrongs of others, by justifying their behaviour, and promoting wrong in one’s own case and that of others. Interestingly, Jaspers refers to metaphysical guilt as a kind of shame, writing, “There remains shame for something that is always present, that may be discussed in general terms, if at all, but can never be concretely revealed.” Perhaps what he means is that because this guilt must remain hidden it becomes a kind of shame, something that we live with and that is not attached to a specific action. Jaspers says that “If human beings were able to free themselves from metaphysical guilt, they would be angels, and all the other three concepts of guilt would become immaterial.” In other words, if we really extended our concern for others to everyone, we would not need to be guilty of anything. Yet we are not angels, and so all the kinds of guilt are significant for us.

For Jaspers, moral guilt exists for everyone who allows conscience and repentance to function. Guilt may occur due to conforming with an immoral system out of self-interest, showing indifference to the suffering of others, failing to resist, accepting the Nazi regime’s values, giving tacit support (for example, by saluting or signing an oath), trying to see something “good” in the regime, or deceiving oneself that one could change the system from within. He says that “Although this always burdens only the individual who must get along with himself, there is still a sort of collective morality contained in the ways of life and feeling, from which no individual can altogether escape and which have political significance as well. Here is the key to self-improvement; its use is up to us.” Through sympathetic identification with others, I can come to feel co-responsible for wrongs I did not commit or support. This identification is precisely what concerns Arendt, as we shall see, who argues that we should judge others rather than feel such sympathy. Nevertheless, to be fair, Jaspers also notes that there are risks in acknowledging guilt: we may make false confessions of guilt feelings that are really a desire to feel superior to others: “His confession of guilt wants to force others to confess. There is a touch of aggressiveness in such confessions. Moralism as a phenomenon of the will to power fosters both sensitivity to blame and confessions of guilt, both reproach and self-reproach, and psychologically it causes each of these to rebound into each other.” This problem implies another sense in which we have to try to ensure that our feelings are pure; we have to be sure that we do not inauthentically profess guilt.

Jaspers argues that a feeling of guilt throughout the community helps to purify everyone. People have to realise their guilt in order to transform themselves and to develop morally. He says that “By our feeling of collective guilt we feel the entire task of renewing human existence from its origin—the task which is given to all men on earth but which appears more urgently, more perceptibly, as decisively as all existence, when its own guilt brings a people face to face with nothingness.” Furthermore, the moral change comes through individuals who inspire each other, by “restitution, atonement, by inner renewal and metamorphosis.” Jaspers’ view reflects the idea that moral guilt produces insight and leads to confessions and attempts to make up for the harm caused, or in other words, moral improvement. He argues that penitence and moral renewal can only arise within ourselves, unlike in relation to criminal and political guilt, so cannot be demanded by others. Also in a quite positive vein, Jaspers suggests that metaphysical guilt can end in a transformation of human self-consciousness before God, and there pride is given up.

According to Jaspers, the accused may be charged by the world in the case of crimes and political guilt or by their own soul when they are charged with moral failure and metaphysical weakness. He claims that “Morally, man can condemn only himself, not another—or, if another, then only in the solidarity of charitable struggle. No one can morally judge another” except perhaps where we are very close, in friendship where we can freely communicate. But shouldn’t we judge and discuss the nature of moral wrongs? Aren’t such wrongs connected to the other kinds of guilt? Jaspers’ assertion about moral guilt is one that can be challenged.

Thus Arendt is concerned about this aspect of Jaspers’ views, arguing that we must be able to make moral judgments at the same time as searching for understanding of crimes and perpetrators. She criticises his idea of
collective political guilt on a number of different bases and contends that responsibility is a more appropriate
term in the political context. Jaspers was concerned that innocent people would be swept up in guilt, whereas
Arendt is apprehensive that guilty people will be overlooked. In her essay “Personal Responsibility under
Dictatorship” (1964/2005) Arendt insists that we can and should judge others morally and opposes Jaspers’
view that there can be collective political guilt on the grounds that it is a way of evading genuine guilt, which
is always individual.28 I agree with Arendt that responsibility is the more appropriate concept for collective
liability.29 It makes sense to hold a collective responsible for past actions in a way it does not to hold that a
collective is guilty of past actions. Arendt explains how political responsibility can be collective, in that it
is appropriate for governments to assume responsibility for what previous governments have done, and for
nations to take responsibility for their past.30 Communities can take on responsibility for what an individual
has done or be held responsible for what has been done in its name.31 When we are held responsible or assume
responsibility for past wrongs, we may not feel personal guilt, but nevertheless we are connected to those
wrongs because we are part of the group that committed them.

Guilt is strictly personal or individual, on Arendt’s account, since “Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles
out; it is strictly personal. It refers to an act, not intentions or potentialities. It is only in a metaphorical sense
that we can say we feel guilty for the sins of our fathers or our people or mankind, in short, for deeds we have
not done, although the course of events may well make us pay for them.”32 Guilt refers personally both to the
wrong-doer and the person who is harmed and has to refer to something objective, a particular act that has been
committed. Professed guilt for the acts of others is self-indulgent or it can be a kind of sentimentality, Arendt
argues: “Those young German men and women who every once in a while ... treat us to hysterical outbreaks
of guilt feelings are not staggering under the burden of the past, their father’s guilt; rather they are trying to
escape from the pressure of very present and actual problems into a cheap sentimentality.”33 The sincerity and
authenticity of the professions of guilt are questioned and in addition, sincerity should not have a place in
politics, as what matters is action. Political life concerns speech and actions that convey a meaning to those
who experience them, rather than the internal mental states of politicians, for example.34 Arendt argues that
professing guilt feelings for the acts of others, in contrast to recognising individual criminal guilt, becomes
a vice in politics, because felt guilt is only appropriate in the private sphere and is essentially self-regarding.
She does not believe that felt passions such as guilt should play a role in political life because they are private
experiences that distort the public space of the political sphere.35 It brings people in the public sphere too close
together, whereas we should maintain a distance or in between space. It also leads to moral confusion, she
claims, as the innocent declares their guilt, whereas “very few of the criminals were prepared to admit even the
slightest guilt.”36 For Arendt, assertions of collective guilt unwittingly “whitewash” true guilt.

More importantly for my discussion here, a related phenomenon that is the converse of Arendt’s critique of
professed guilt for others’ deeds is that individuals, especially if they are oppressed, are prone to assume guilt
when they have not done anything wrong.37 Survivor guilt or shame after atrocities is one of the most striking
examples. So the articulation of guilt—especially as it relates to responsibility—has to take into account that guilt
is distributed, so to speak, in differential and unjust ways. In cases of collective responsibility, we may be more
likely to feel shame, rather than guilt or remorse, Arendt argues. She writes that “For the idea of humanity,
when purged of all sentimentality, has the very serious consequence that in one form or another men must
assume responsibility for all crimes committed by men and that all nations share the onus of evil committed
by all others. Shame at being a human being is the purely individual and still non-political expression of this
insight.”38 Shame, then, for Arendt, is an acknowledgement of shared responsibility for misconduct, a different
concept from Jaspers’ notion of metaphysical guilt or shame due to limiting our love for others. If we take
Arendt’s idea seriously, survivor shame does not concern specific acts but a strong acknowledgement of shared
responsibility, a feeling that is relevant to all human beings, not just survivors. Her suggestion is that shame is
collective in a way that guilt is not. Thus it is useful to consider how shame is different from guilt and how it
may relate to our membership in a specific group before considering how the oppressed are expected to bear
the burdens of guilt and shame, according to much contemporary philosophical literature.
There are two senses of shame that are relevant here. One is a pervasive sense of shame that feminists and antiracist thinkers have argued that women and others in an oppressive culture are more likely to experience than the non-oppressed. The other sense of shame, alluded to by Arendt, is the particular moral shame that someone may feel in relation to a wrong they or others have done. Perpetrators of crimes and abuse may feel shame and find that they can no longer respect themselves. Writing on the relation between shame and the self, Dan Zahavi calls this sort of shame “repenting, self-reflective shame,” felt, for example, by a man for committing atrocities in the Rwandan genocide. Such shame correlates to personal guilt for such crimes, as well as a sense of how one must be seen by others, at least those whose judgments one takes to be important. Zahavi stresses the felt need to hide oneself in both types of shame. To some extent these two sorts of moral shame are conflated. However, I wish to focus on the first type of shame, which we feel in relation to others’ perception of us. Both these kinds of shame undermine our sense of self, confidence and openness. Shame is generally distinguished from guilt in a number of ways, including through its close connection to the perception of others and sometimes by it concerning the self as a whole, or character overall, rather than a particular action. What is of interest to me here is how both guilt and shame are differentially attributed and experienced. Perhaps the most famous discussion of shame occurs in Jean-Paul Sartre’s *Being and Nothingness*, where he discusses shame as a phenomenon that reveals the mode of Being-for-Others, in contrast to Being-in-itself and Being-for-itself. He provides a lively description of a person who staring through the keyhole of a door and suddenly feels observed by another: “But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? It means that I am suddenly affected in my being and that essential modifications appear in my structure.” They experience shame through this look or gaze of the other seeing them as a voyeur or jealous spy. Sartre’s argument is that we feel shame and other emotions only in the face of others. While shame is reflexive in that it is “an intimate relation of myself to myself … it is in its primary structure shame before somebody.” His elucidation of shame as in its essence relational is widely accepted. Shame is where we experience ourselves as others see us; pride and other emotions have a similarly reflective quality. As Sartre writes “Shame—like pride—is the apprehension of myself as a nature although that very nature escapes me and is unknowable as such.” Shame and pride give us a kind of being, a sense that we really are as we are perceived. That makes it different from guilt felt as a response to our responsibility for a particular wrong. Sartre does not posit either guilt or shame as primordial; they are both experiences of the presence of the Other in our lives. The Other does not actually have to be there; perhaps the footsteps were not human steps. It is enough that they are experienced as being there. Sartre’s example shows that it is our internalised sense of the look of other people that matters.

Other authors have connected the experience of shame to that of oppression, and I would like to take the ideas in this work further and show that oppression alters and broadens the experience of shame. Oppression means that the Other’s look is even more important. Feminist phenomenologist Sandra Bartky, for example, accepts that shame “requires if not an actual audience before whom my deficiencies are paraded, then an internalized audience with the capacity to judge me, hence internalized standards of judgment.” She argues that we become or experience ourselves as others see us; pride and other emotions have a similarly reflective quality. As Sartre writes “Shame—like pride—is the apprehension of myself as a nature although that very nature escapes me and is unknowable as such.” Shame and pride give us a kind of being, a sense that we really are as we are perceived. That makes it different from guilt felt as a response to our responsibility for a particular wrong. Sartre does not posit either guilt or shame as primordial; they are both experiences of the presence of the Other in our lives. The Other does not actually have to be there; perhaps the footsteps were not human steps. It is enough that they are experienced as being there. Sartre’s example shows that it is our internalised sense of the look of other people that matters.
However, my argument is that the other point that can be drawn from the experiences Bartky refers to is that abusive treatment is shaming and humiliating, yet because the victim of this kind of treatment is unable to feel that they are not at fault, although they may know that quite well, such treatment is transformed into an experience of shame. We may even feel ashamed of feeling ashamed, knowing that there is not a good reason for feeling ashamed. Being subject to abuse makes one feel low and small, it debases and demeans us, but not because of our self, our actions, or our character, but because of the actions of others. This is the fundamental distinction between humiliation and shame. While shame involves an internalised audience that is seen to judge us as deserving to feel ashamed, humiliation involves an actual other acting to make us feel mortification.51
A complication in our moral lives I wish to explore here is that oppression creates a structural context where humiliation is assumed, taken in, and focused on the self and so experienced as shame.

One of the characteristics of oppression is that the other’s negative or judgemental view is internalised in a heightened way. Almost everyone is capable of feeling shame, perhaps even undeserved shame, yet the situation of oppression makes that a persistent occurrence. One is always at fault. Beauvoir argues of women in The Second Sex, “the Other has to submit to this foreign point of view” and in so doing absorbs that view and trains it on the self.52 For women are the Other not only for men but for themselves. For oppressed people, the injustice of domination is almost always accompanied by an internalised audience judging one as the Other. Humiliation then is experienced in that context. Consistent or regular humiliating treatment often makes us feel that we are somehow deserving of that treatment or responsible for it, as we are denied the respect and esteem that we need to repel that demeaning view of us. Such feelings can coexist with a degree of self-respect and confidence. It is this aspect of shame that is often overlooked in philosophical discussions of shame. The guilt of the abuser identified by Jaspers and Arendt becomes the shame of the victims of abuse and the socially marginal. In the next section I consider how shame is inappropriately expected of victims of oppression in much philosophical discussion by considering three examples of shame.

FEELING MORAL SHAME

The first example I consider is one discussed by Cheshire Calhoun in her paper “An Apology for Moral Shame.” Her paper is a response to earlier work that took shame to be a primitive emotion of limited moral import, and addresses the idea that shame is more centred on how we are perceived by others than on our judgement of wrongdoing. Calhoun argues that feeling ashamed before other’s shaming contempt can be a sign of moral maturity.53 It is precisely the distinction between properly attributed shame and improperly attributed shame that Calhoun resists in stressing the social nature of shame and arguing that it at least makes sense for us to feel shame even when we have not done anything wrong. Part of her motivation is that dismissals of the shame of subordinated peoples “encourage us to find fault with ashamed people” and that is incorrect and uncharitable.54 Rather than suggesting that shame is a result of low self-esteem, Calhoun argues that shame at insults can co-exist with confidence and outrage at the demeaning behaviour. She cites the philosopher Adrian Piper’s example of ticking the box for “black” when applying for graduate school. At the welcome for postgraduate students, Piper is greeted by the most well-known and respected professor’s remark “Miss Piper, you’re about as black as I am” — that is, not black at all.55 He is deciding what category she belongs to, in some sense taking away her own power of self-definition. Piper wrote about her groundless shame, stating “Their ridicule and accusations then function to both disown and degrade you from their status, to mark you as not having done wrong but as being wrong.”56 Calhoun explains the feeling of shame here as a sign of taking the other seriously, although in other ways Piper was very self-confident.57 In sum, Calhoun argues that the professor’s view and others like it, even though wrong, have a practical weight for us because we share some moral social practices with them.58 For her, moral practices are fundamentally social and so must involve these anomalous experiences.

The grain of truth in Calhoun’s view may be that in feeling shame that is unmerited we respect the other; we take them seriously as moral beings even though they are mistaken and unfair. However, this way of understanding shame implies that shame in an inverted or perverted world like that of the concentration camp,
which I will soon discuss, is unintelligible. How can we feel shame when we have no respect for the other and share no social moral practices with them? Furthermore, even in this case, the responsibility and the emphasis are shifted from the unpleasant sarcastic professor, who presumably forgot the remark by his next conversation, to Adrian Piper and what she should or should not feel. Calhoun concludes that we have to take these “deformed identities” seriously and at the same time try to reform and challenge the defective moral practices of contempt. So in that sense we should not dismiss the feelings of shame of the oppressed, as they point to problematic moral perceptions and judgements. Calhoun makes a significant point in the sense that these experiences alert us to subtle structural features of oppression that are reflected in theories of shame. It is on this point that I think attention should focus — on the practical and philosophical conceptions that put the onus on the oppressed to feel shame or guilt and not on the behaviour of the dominant group. The philosophical concern centring on the feelings of guilt and shame in the oppressed reinforces the dynamics of oppression that expect those feelings in the oppressed and ignore the lack of those feelings in the oppressors.

An important distinction here is between shame as felt response to others’ perception of one as lacking in moral worth or as having done something unacceptable, and practices of shaming and humiliation. In contrast to Calhoun’s view, David Velleman argues that “The shame induced by racism is a case of utterly inchoate shame, whose subject is successfully shamed without being ashamed of anything in particular. Inchoate shame typically results, as in this case, from deliberate acts of shaming.” He affirms the point that one can be shamed even if one is not ashamed and do not feel self-hatred. Velleman sees this shame as brought about by feeling vulnerable because exposed as not in control of one’s own self-definition, a good way of describing an aspect of shame in Piper’s experience. And this is part of the complication of shame — that others can force shame on us in a range of ways, even when we repudiate the view they have of us. Deliberate acts of shaming come closer to humiliation because it is the actions of others that induce the shame rather than the subject’s own actions. Furthermore, humiliation itself becomes experienced as shame in cases of oppression.

In a recent article, Lisa Guenther stresses the ambivalent nature of shame in both being used against members of oppressed groups to exclude and control them and having an important ethical function in evoking a moral response to the Other. She articulates shame as not only concerned with particular acts but with our “very existence” — a kind of ontological shame. Yet this concept of ontological shame also obscures shame’s link with humiliation, as I will show here. The concept of ontological shame is associated with the work of Agamben, who draws on Primo Levi’s description of the reaction of the first Russian soldiers to liberate Auschwitz:

It was that shame that we knew so well, the shame that drowned us after the selections, and every time we had to watch, or submit to, some outrage: the shame the Germans did not know, that the just man experiences at another man’s crime, at the fact that such a crime should exist, that it should have been introduced irrevocably into the world of things that exist, and that his will for good should prove too weak or null, and should not have availed in defence.

Many of the complexities of shame are introduced in this quotation: that shame can be felt not only for oneself but on behalf of others, that some do not, perhaps cannot feel shame, and that we can feel shame at the existence of wrongs and of not being able to prevent them. The just person feels shame at the actions of others, whereas the ones who have committed the crimes are shameless; they are not concerned with justice or how they appear in the eyes of the world. The gap left by their shamelessness is filled by the shame of the victims and witnesses.

In his discussion of the work of survivors of the Shoah, Agamben generally addresses shame rather than guilt as he sees shame as the more fundamental affect. Levi articulates the feeling or at least the suspicion as one of being a traitor, of having taken someone else’s place, the fundamentals of survivor guilt, in a poem “The Survivor” (1984) and in The Drowned and the Saved (1989). Agamben’s account of survivor guilt turns toward dissatisfaction with Levi’s later discussion of shame in these texts. This lack of satisfaction is because Levi links guilt and shame and because Agamben believes Levi cannot “master” his shame since Levi links it to small “excusable” incidents in the camp he deeply regrets. The fixation on specific events is a way that a
survivor’s distress is experienced as guilt for specific actions, which Agamben does not acknowledge is a common phenomenon in everyday life. Moreover, Agamben himself seems to be linking or fusing guilt and shame when he describes mastering shame as separating innocence and guilt. Other thinkers who survived the camps, such as Bruno Bettelheim, Elie Wiesel, and Ella Lingens, express feelings of guilt for not having helped others, for surviving, and for being glad to be alive. Bettelheim states in an essay in the *New Yorker* that “Only the ability to feel guilty makes us human, particularly if, objectively seen, one is not guilty.”

According to Agamben, Bettelheim’s expectation of the feeling of guilt from the innocent survivor is suspicious. He links his suspicion to Arendt’s criticisms of collective guilt discussed earlier, and claims that such guilt is a sign of an inability to handle an ethical problem. Agamben accepts that the assumption of collective guilt is often used as a way to avoid specific responsibility and punishment. Levi concurs, saying (as Arendt does) that guilt could only be inherited in a metaphorical sense, and that the only collective guilt of Germans at the time of the holocaust is connected with not testifying to what they “could not have seen” (Agamben’s words) but must have known. He also is not sure that the survivor feels guilt for having taken the place of another, for it makes their shame a kind of Hegelian tragic conflict. The Hegelian tragic model concerns the conflict between a seemingly innocent subject such as Oedipus and the objective guilt of their deeds. However, Agamben argues that this model is far from being true of Auschwitz, for example, as the survivors feel the reverse: innocent of any objective guilt, and guilty of subjective guilt. His suggestion is that Primo Levi suffers “a shame that is not only without guilt but even without time.” There is no deed to attach shame to and there is no time when the shame began or when it can end; that is what makes it ontological shame.

Agamben also quotes Robert Antelme’s first-hand account in *The Human Race* (1998) of the flush of a young Italian man when he is picked out to be killed, at random, during a death march between Buchenwald and Dachau. In this case, the shame is not for surviving, but for having to die, Agamben argues. This is clearly a very different kind of shame, and he wishes to link such shame with human existence in general, describing shame as “both subjectification and desubjectification.” The desubjectification is the collapse, the disorder, the oblivion, of fleeing, but the subjectification is the realisation of our presence to ourselves. Agamben likens shame to the abjection of disgust, and concludes that shame “is nothing less than the fundamental sentiment of being a subject, in the two apparently opposed senses of this phrase: to be subjected and to be sovereign.” He claims that shame is the hidden structure of consciousness and means “being consigned to a passivity that cannot be assumed.” That is, we cannot assume our identity or express that identity. In saying ‘I’, the subject does not coincide with their experiences.

In concluding his discussion, Agamben finds that subjectification and desubjectification are basic to subjectivity, meaning that subjectivity is really shame: “Flush is the remainder that, in every subjectification, betrays a desubjectification and that in every desubjectification, bears witness to a subject.” The blush shows the paradoxical nature of subjectivity and language, according to Agamben: that when I try to speak I reveal there is no solid subject, but at the same time attempts to prevent speech or to dehumanise a human being reveal the subject. Agamben argues that the subject cannot speak, as they are identified with the event of discourse rather than their subjectivity. Thus shame is articulated by Agamben as the human being’s basic mode of attunement because it reveals our condition in relation to subjectivity and speech.

There have been a number of criticisms of Agamben’s interpretation of Antelme’s account, which note his selective quotation and interested reading of the text. In her characterisation of shame, Claudia Welz criticises Agamben’s description of the Italian student’s blush, quoting more of Antelme’s account, and arguing that what the student most likely expresses is surprise. She cites Antelme as stating: “Ready to die — that, I think, we are, ready to be chosen at random for death—no. If the finger designates me, it shall come as a surprise, and my face will become pink, like the Italian’s.” In addition, Welz notes that Antelme links the pink flush of the student with the pink face of a small child, concluding that we cannot deduce one specific emotion from a flushed face. Ultimately her account is critical of Agamben’s broadening of the concept of shame. Of course, we cannot know what the student felt. Yet I would argue that what most accounts so far have left out is the...
phenomenon of humiliation, both in this example and more generally. It is the behaviour of the Nazi guard that makes the student blush, not his feeling about himself as such. He has been singled out in front of his comrades for a senseless, arbitrary killing. The humiliation is experienced as shame, as if he were at fault or as if someone must feel shame in such a situation.

On a more general note, the literature in this field focuses on either guilt or shame and does not consider humiliation as a possibility, with the exception of Lisa Guenther’s paper “Resisting Agamben”, where she argues that he conflates humiliation and shame in his interpretation of the young student’s blush, ignoring the specific context provided by Antelme’s testimony. She rightly notes that Agamben identifies “subjectivity with the empty individuation of humiliation rather than the ambiguous relationality of shame, as if political oppression were the fundamental human condition.” Guenther’s contextualization of Antelme’s work is a useful corrective to Agamben’s discussion, as is her observation that Agamben’s reduction of shame leaves it as an empty concept. Her view is that shame represents the structure of intersubjectivity, not subjectivity.

However, I argue that Agamben has, perhaps unwittingly, revealed an important point about the nature of shame and its experience by members of subordinated groups. While the situation is one of humiliation—it is the behaviour of one person demeaning, degrading and menacing another—when the person is a member of an oppressed group, they are likely to transform that experience into one of guilt or shame, to direct the pain that might otherwise be felt as indignation or anger against themselves. The reasons for this are multiple. It can be a result of the internalisation of the Other’s view. In contrast, suppressing or redirecting anger could be necessary for survival or a level of flourishing. Another reason could be a more or less deliberate decision not to risk the corrosive effects of unexpressed anger. The survivor guilt or shame felt by Levi and others is neither a proper felt response to wrongs done nor a mark of our shared human situation; it is an expression of a profound experience of oppression, violence, abuse, and humiliation.

I will end with a slightly different set of examples, concerning punishment, to highlight what I mean. Some of the recent literature on punishment, such as the work of John Deigh, has shown how shaming practices are used in conservative forms of punishment that aim to make the punished person an object of public contempt and disdain. Like the Scarlet Letter ‘A’ of Nathaniel Hawthorne’s story that betokens Hester Prynne’s act of “adultery” (1818), the crime is advertised through the newspaper, on TV, or by making the person hold a sign or wear something like a T-shirt signifying the crime. These are sometimes known as shaming penalties and may be (although they may not be) designed to evoke shame, and sometimes guilt, in the offender. Deigh, commenting on these phenomena, notes that one of the main motivations of these punishments is saving the cost of imprisonment.

Yet these practices also involve shaming more than shame, the practice of humiliation and demeaning behaviour on others, and so can shed light on the differences between experiences of humiliation and shame. In her book, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, Martha Nussbaum argues that shaming practices are used against those who disturb conventional sensibilities or disrupt conventional norms, such as members of minority groups and the homeless. She sees this as a kind of social pathology that tries to put others down; it means “a fragile ego that finds affirmation of its own precarious sense of worth in the humiliation and dehumanization of others.” Legal sanctions used to publicly humiliate or shame others manifest a similar impulse, Nussbaum claims. These forms of punishment can be criticised for their attempt tohumiliate, shame and degrade their objects, even if they may not be successful in getting them to feel shame. Nussbaum distinguishes humiliation from shame on the grounds that humiliation involves something being done to the person who feels it. We can talk about acts of humiliation and shaming as well as experiences of humiliation and shame. Deigh argues further that humiliation involves being treated with disrespect but that may not mean one feels unworthy of respect. Shame, in contrast, involves a recognition that one is unworthy in some way. Nussbaum and others note that humiliation leads to anger and bitterness rather than an attempt to rejoin the group and affirm its standards, as
shame may occasionally lead to, although as I noted shaming of the oppressed may not have that effect.

Likewise, legal philosopher Raffaele Rodogno contends that humiliation is a more likely consequence of humiliating and shaming practices of punishment than a productive shame that made an offender keen to improve themselves in order to become a respected member of society.\textsuperscript{89} He cites psychological studies that suggest shame and humiliation differ in a number of ways, including these: humiliation is more painful, humiliation is more closely linked to public exposure, and humiliation is more likely to lead to anger and vengeful feelings directed against others.\textsuperscript{90} Shame, in contrast, focuses on the self and directs negative emotions against the self. He argues that shaming penalties closely fit the structure of humiliation.\textsuperscript{91} If the psychological research on the likely effects of humiliation is correct, that is at least one reason to be deeply concerned about their use. In addition, the so-called shaming penalties have a different structure from what I argue is the case for many examples of oppressed groups subjected to humiliating treatment. They are likely to lead to an infuriated response. In these cases, humiliation can be rejected; humiliation can make us angry and fail of its end. Of course, some offenders may similarly internalise shaming treatment into guilt or shame, since they will be members of oppressed and marginalised groups.\textsuperscript{92} In either case, these punishments are unlikely to be either ethical or productive.

My point is that an act of humiliation may anger or it may shame. Humiliation is a kind of assault that touches the person but it may touch them in such a way that while it is painful, there is still a kind of rejection of the view that the humiliation is presenting and potentially retaliation against it. However, in shame, that view is somehow experienced as deserved or warranted, due to a feeling of fault in the victim and in that sense internalised. Shame exhibits that feature and transforms humiliation and other acts of domination into self-condemnation. An important aspect of responding to oppression on a personal level is overcoming self-blame for the behaviour of others. Moreover, there can be cases where direct action to stop humiliation may be taken. How we should respond to humiliation is a large subject that I cannot deal with here. Yet as I noted earlier, there can be many good reasons for not becoming enraged by humiliating treatment or not expressing that rage directly. In extreme situations, containing or subduing anger may be necessary. In less extreme situations, other forms of response to oppression may be more productive. What writing on these issues can contribute is calling humiliation for what it is, rather than presenting it as the victim’s shame or the shame of all humanity.

CONCLUSION

The three examples show how oppression and subordination make us less resistant to humiliation, and liable to experience humiliation as shame. To return to Calhoun, perhaps Adrian Piper’s response to her lecturer’s unpleasant comment is also better described as humiliation, rather than shame or guilt. The lecturer has disrespected her and tried to shame her and she feels bad but she may not and I would argue should not, feel unworthy. Calhoun and others connect the experience of shame with the contempt of others\textsuperscript{93} but contempt does not properly delineate the attitude of the murderous Nazi Agamben discusses and may not help us to understand cases of humiliation. Perhaps in general we are too quick to call something an emotion of self-assessment like shame, rather than a response to the actions of others. What we can say is that while it may not be wrong to feel shame, when shamed or humiliated, that it definitely appears churlish and unkind to criticise survivors of trauma and genocide for their feelings of guilt and shame or not to acknowledge they can have confidence in other ways, what’s more important is that it is wrong for members of dominant groups to shame and humiliate others.\textsuperscript{94} That issue seems to be treated as tangential in many discussions of guilt and shame.

Furthermore, one feature of the structure of oppression, in addition to systematic injustice and domination, where the oppressed internalise the negative views of others, implies that members of oppressed groups are likely to experience shaming and humiliation as shame, for they turn the negative view and censure of others onto themselves. This seems true in Adrian Piper’s experience and in the case of the Italian student, although we cannot be sure what they felt. In that sense, Agamben could be right that the student felt shame even though what was going on was a humiliating and murderous act. The examples of punishment could be slightly
different, as offenders subject to humiliating and shaming punishments may be able to reject the design of the punishments and find that they become angry. In many cases, in life as in philosophy, both victor and victim blame the victim. Our focus in philosophical discussions needs to shift from the victims to the perpetrators and members of dominant groups, or at least to realise that we should be suspicious of attributions of guilt and shame and sensitive to the structure of humiliation. The oppressor might not feel that what they are doing is humiliation, and so that needs to be exposed and articulated. We need to remember both that we may claim guilt and shame unrealistically and self-indulgently, as Jaspers and Arendt were concerned about, and that guilt and shame may be inappropriately expected of, attributed to, actively brought about through humiliation, and experienced by those in the most vulnerable groups.

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NOTES

1. I would like to thank UQ for supporting this research through a UQ-UWA Bilateral Research Collaboration Award, and my collaborators Michael Levine and Terrilyn Sweep, audiences at the UQ-UWA workshop and at the ASCP in 2012, two anonymous reviewers for *Parshesia*, and Christine Daigle for helpful feedback on earlier versions of the paper.


4. Ibid., 129.


7. For example, guilt is taken to be basic in Heidegger’s case, and shame in Agamben’s. The problem with this way of viewing both shame and guilt, as occurs with Jaspers’ view of metaphysical guilt, is that it makes it difficult to distinguish where guilt and shame are appropriate.


10. As Smith notes, we may properly feel guilty about feelings, attitudes, or thoughts that we have not expressed. Angela A. Smith, “Guilty Thoughts.” *Morality and the Emotions*. Ed. Carla Bagnoli. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 235-58.


12. Ibid., 23.


14. This is judged by the victor in accordance with prudence and norms of national and international law, since the Germans waged an unjust war. Jaspers clarifies the point that political guilt implies the liability of all citizens for the consequences of actions of their state, but it does not mean that every single citizen has criminal and moral guilt for all crimes committed in the name of the state.


17. Ibid., 27.

18. Ibid. Another suggestion Jaspers makes is that there may be a guilt that we all suffer from regardless of our involvement in particular forms of wrongdoing, due to the fact that we are all enmeshed in power relations: “This is the inevitable guilt of all, the guilt of human existence” (ibid., 28). Here Jaspers seems to be referring to something like original sin, but he does not pursue the point. We can counteract this guilt by supporting moves toward human rights.

19. Ibid., 57-64.

20. Ibid., 73.


22. Ibid., 75.

23. Ibid., 98.

24. Ibid., 39.

25. Jaspers outlines a number of ways of responding to guilt, both by others and by the guilty. First, what he calls “force” decides conflicts, unless people reach an agreement. Once war begins right of justice ends and is replaced with force, although international law is an attempt to regulate it. He argues that the victor can decide what to do with the vanquished when the
vanquished are in the wrong, as in Germany’s case. However, the victor’s mercy is likely temper the effect of strict justice and destructive force. (Ibid., 31-2.)

26. Ibid., 33.
27. There are also ways to defend against guilt: The accused can insist on differentiation from the guilty in order to avoid feeling guilty, they can compare facts and they can appeal to natural law, human rights and international law. But if a state has violated natural law and human rights it cannot claim recognition of them in their favour, Jaspers argues. (Ibid., 38.)
29. See the paper “The asymmetry between apology and forgiveness” *Contemporary Political Theory* 5:4 (2006): 447-468, for my argument that the concept of collective responsibility is better than collective guilt to understand our responses to historical and group injustices.
31. Ibid., 149.
32. Ibid., 147.
35. This aspect of Arendt’s thought could be challenged; however, I do not have the space to do so here.
37. Tessman also observes that for the oppressed there is a tendency to feel guilt rather than anger when one has been wronged because of a kind of psychic or moral harm. Lisa Tessman, *Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 37.
43. Ibid., 245.
47. Bartky, *Femininity and Domination*, 86.
50. Judith Boss sees this shame as a misdirection of anger and resentment that should be felt towards the abuser. Judith Boss, “Throwing Pearls to the Swine: Women, Forgiveness, and the Unrepentant Abuser.” *Philosophical Perspectives on Power*
and Domination. Ed. Laura Duhan Kaplan and Laurence F. Bove. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997, 235-247. She also mentions that victims of abuse may blame themselves and others may blame them for the abuse. Furthermore, victims of shaming and humiliating violence and abuse often repeat the abuse they have suffered. See Wendy C. Hamblet, Punishment and Shame: A Philosophical Study. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. 2011, 189.

51. As Roberts suggests, humiliation flows from “having been shown to be or having been made to appear to be unrespectable (unworthy) by some action or event that puts one’s real or apparent unworthiness on display for others.” Robert C. Roberts, Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2003, 233.


54. Ibid., 137.


56. Ibid., 235.


58. Silvan Tomkins explains the importance of shame in terms of interest, a term which appears too broad to capture what is unique about shame as response to a perception of lack of worth by others. He connects shame and humiliation very closely, along with shyness and guilt, and claims that they are the one affect. Silvan Tomkins, Shame and its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader. Ed. Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, 135.


61. Another example of the artist’s model who feels shame when she realises that the artist is viewing her sexually appears in Scheler, Persons and Self-Value, 15-16; Taylor, Pride, Shame and Guilt, 60-61; and Wollheim, On the Emotions, 159-63. This is a good example of humiliating treatment being converted to shame.


64. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 88.

65. Ibid., 94.

66. Ibid., 89-94.

67. Quoted in ibid., 93.

68. Ibid., 96.

69. The executioners used the tragic model, in invoking the “just following orders” defense (ibid., 97).

70. Ibid., 103.

71. Ibid., 104.

72. Ibid., 106.


74. Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, 110.

75. Ibid., 130.

76. Ibid., 112.

77. Welz, “Shame and the Hiding Self.” Leys argues that the pink flush most likely signifies “threatened aliveness or vitality” and that Antelme is more concerned with human interconnectedness. Leys, From Guilt to Shame, 174-9.


80. For example, Simone de Beauvoir notes in The Ethics of Ambiguity that Nazi humiliation of their victims lead to the victims’ feeling disgust at themselves. Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity. Trans. Bernard Frechtman. Secaucus: Citadel, 1997, 101. [Pour une morale de l’ambiguïté. Paris: Gallimard, 1947]. Similarly, Frantz Fanon describes a moral splitting in the self due to anti-black racism: “Moral consciousness implies a kind of split, a fracture of consciousness between a dark and a light side. Moral standards require the black, the dark, and the black man to be eliminated from this consciousness. A black man, therefore, is constantly struggling against his own image.” Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks. Trans. Richard
81. As Tessman notes, tremendous anger may be “ultimately unhealthy or corrosive for its bearer” (Burdened Virtues, 124).
85. Deigh, “The Politics of Disgust and Shame,” 411. Nussbaum sees this as a primitive shame that is not related to ideals, but more to a sense of helplessness (391).
90. Ibid., 433-4.
91. Ibid., 449. “Guilting” punishments are centered on coming to recognize the harm that has been caused to others, rather than publicizing the offence (453-550).
94. Similarly, the focus of moral concern should be the perpetration of the bizarre punishments and torture carried out in Abu Graib rather than assuming that there is a “shame culture”, or concern with averting dishonour, among the victims, as Leys notes in her book (From Guilt to Shame, 3-4).
95. One difficulty here may be that perpetrators rarely feel guilt or shame, so there is not enough material for thinkers to work with.