Paving the way for a new reading of a substantial philosopher is a difficult task to accomplish, and this difficulty is compounded the more complicated the philosopher, and the more famous the text. Given that Katrin Pahl attempts such a feat with a philosopher as difficult as Hegel on a text as influential and revered as the *Phenomenology*, makes her interpretive endeavors in *Tropes of Transport* all the more impressive. What makes Pahl’s encounter with Hegel so engaging is the care she takes in problematizing one of the few features of the *Phenomenology* that does have rather wide ranging agreement, even if there is disagreement about its success, namely, that the *Phenomenology* charts a logical and necessary progression that culminates in absolute knowing. What’s more, she uses the very problem of how the phenomenology “moves” (its readers, the shapes of spirit, and even the language of the text itself) as the vehicle to put forward an innovative theory of emotion with wide-ranging implications that reverberate well beyond the field of Hegel scholarship proper.

There are many admirable features of Pahl’s text, from her rich familiarity with the German Romantic literary tradition to the sharpness of her prose, all of which aid her efforts to defend an interpretation that is sure to challenge and stretch many readers’ assumptions about Hegel’s project in the *Phenomenology*. One of the most impressive aspects of Pahl’s interpretation centers on her account of emotion as transports and the role emotions play in structuring the transitions in the *Phenomenology*. The goal of this paper is to explore this interpretation by testing not only the extent to which it serves as a credible reading of the *Phenomenology* but also whether her take on emotion as forms of transport can provide the foundations for a general theory of emotion. The importance of emotion, feeling and passion in the *Phenomenology*, both in the way the text is written and in aspects of Hegel’s arguments against the rigidity, formality and abstractness of various key positions encountered by self-consciousness, are characteristics many readers have pointed out in the past. What makes Pahl’s approach stand out is not simply her sensitivity to the multiple ways that emotion works, demonstrating how the different configurations of spirit embody passionate acts of resistance, but also in making the very experience of emotionality, at the level of transitions in the development of spirit and in our engagement as readers of the text, the fuel of Hegel’s argument. Pahl’s bold claim is that one can read Hegel’s *Phenomenology* in such
a way that the unfolding or development of truth is not primarily propelled by logical issues of coherence, but by emotional tension and dissonance. And this claim holds not simply for certain transitions in the text, but for the book as a whole. As she writes:

The Phenomenology as a whole is one unendingly plastic—shape-taking—emotional judgment. I read the Phenomenology as the meticulous exposition of all the conflicts and contradictions Hegel could detect in the one infinite judgment that is the self-reflection of spirit. The different figures of consciousness in the Phenomenology articulate this emotional judgment in progress while consciousness reads itself differently in each of its shapes.¹

The incessant disruption and displacement of positions is the rhythm of the text, but these disruptions do not just lead to a more comprehensive position that arises from the negation of the previous one, as traditional interpretations would have it, but the transition to every new shape and figure of spirit carries elements of disorganization that are never overcome or reduced to conceptual transparency. The new figure that emerges is always disoriented, and so too are we the readers who try to map how one configuration of spirit relates to another. Such disorientation and disorganization Pahl calls “the ‘emotional syntax’” of Hegel’s text, and this disruptive pressure never ceases unraveling the shapes of spirit, and remains in play even within the all-encompassing reflection of absolute knowing.

Pahl’s reading of Hegel follows in the tradition of scholars like Jean-Luc Nancy and Slavoj Žižek in emphasizing the absence of closure in Hegel’s logic of the whole. In the unique way Hegel draws together the fluidity of the speculative judgment with the intransigence of the logical understanding (Verstand) as inseparable aspects of self-consciousness, he gives us a robust account of how self-consciousness is always in transition while nevertheless appearing stable. Pahl situates her reading of spirit’s negativity as a logic of emotional transports wherein the clarity of conceptual contradiction is never fully separable from the dizzying expression of passion, whether this be sympathy, pathos, anxiety, or irony. As Pahl writes: “By ‘transport’ I mean an emotion—strong or slight—that carries one out of oneself and to a different self.” (TT 6) Rather than being blind urges, or affections whose immediacy is inevitably superseded or appropriated, emotions constitute the heart of what makes spirit self-conscious. What’s more, it is precisely Hegel’s Phenomenology that draws out the full implications of emotions as transports, fragmenting clear lines of division between subject and object, interior and exterior, “I” and we, to yield an emotional performance of moving configurations of spirit that resist being definitively pinned down to any one type of subject. Such a reading comes to light to the extent that we can see the multiple levels of resonant engagement invoked by the text; for example, its different stylistic levels of textual composition, narrative themes, and the multiple perspectives of author, narrator and protagonist the text plays on.

Pahl is certainly correct in her insistence that Hegel’s Phenomenology bears within its possibilities a rich view of emotion that is as prescient as it is perceptive. Although it is true that Hegel’s incessant criticisms of immediacy would seem to rule out emotion as having any fundamental and lasting place in the constitution of spirit, a sensitive reading of the way Hegel explores experiences of pathos, mutual acknowledgment, and the underlying despair that haunts natural consciousness, show that he is critical of certain views of emotion, but not emotionality as such.

What Hegel is opposed to are views that place feeling in opposition to rationality, which he thinks leads to either sentimentalizing or mystifying the experience of emotion. Hegel’s rich appreciation of emotion is easy to overlook to the extent one looks for explicit definitions of feeling and emotion; instead, as Pahl puts it: “We need to analyze what emotions do in Hegel’s text.” (TT 13) This entails paying close attention to those pivotal experiences in which emotions arise as “performative presentations” that transform, and so transport, spirit’s identity, rupturing the compact individuality of consciousness into plurality. Approached in this way, Pahl claims to identify at least three central features that make up Hegel’s take on emotion. First, rather than being adversaries or opposites, “reason and emotion implicate one another.” Second, emotions also color our thoughts and concepts and so are not simply confined to bodily affections, which make untenable any stark division between “interiority and exteriority.” Finally, to the extent that emotion operates as a transport that
disrupts, deforms, and transforms, frustrating the move toward unity and coherence, emotion also engenders a “plural subject.” (TT 13)

Whether we are addressing the transitions in the law of the heart, the pathos of ethical life and its impossible demands, or the infamous struggle between master and slave, in each case self-consciousness undergoes transport. Even in those transitions where emotions don’t seem to be operative, the very act of reflection pries open spirit’s assumptions about itself. Pahl stresses this in her claim that “[t]he space of interiority, which is opened up by the understanding, gives us the sense of self-incongruence that transports the subject beyond any ‘natural’ or given figuration.” (TT 41) Moreover, it is in the nature of emotional transports that they transcend internal contradictions and external struggles for superiority, for emotionality is always a performance at the same time. Pahl defends her claims about the performative aspect of emotionality by appealing to the different stylistic voices Hegel employs. She sees the Phenomenology as a narrative about spirit’s confrontation with its own culture (Bildung), while also a dramatic piece of tragic theatre, and yet again a lyrical work filled with poetic license, where much of the latter shines through precisely when Hegel is trying to express the fluidity of the “speculative proposition.” (TT 65)

What is particularly noteworthy about Pahl’s approach is the way she attempts to unpack Hegel’s rich appreciation of emotionality, as well as build up her own account, while refraining from giving us a list of typical emotions. Pahl gives up on the traditional idea of emotion as a passion that is locked inside the subject and occasionally springs into expression. Rather than simply look to what specific feelings are, or are not, invoked by self-consciousness, Pahl suggests it is the kind of transport that spirit experiences that is a better gauge of emotionality. This approach can be seen from the chapter titles of the second part of her book, such as, “release,” “acknowledging,” “tremble,” and “broken,” all of which attempt to indicate what she calls the “emotional syntax” of spirit’s journey. Each chapter highlights a transformation whose distinctiveness appears to rely more on its intensity than any one specific type of feeling, oscillating from tragic pathos to lightheartedness. Reading the transitions of spirit in this way strikes me as exegetically perceptive as it is original. Drawing on her formation in literary studies enables Pahl to expedite Hegel’s stylistic ingenuity to impressive effect, and allows her to focus on how the text is written, instead of just what it purports to be about, and this to a degree rarely seen in English monographs on Hegel. What is more, she uses Hegel’s stylistic ingenuity as a complement to his methodological ingenuity to forward the claim that the reader of the Phenomenology is also implicated in facilitating the transports spirit undergoes. The disorientation spirit experiences in continually being transported outside its comfort zone to emerge anew in some other form, is disorienting for us as readers at the same time. This confusion is not the result of any ineptness on Hegel’s part, certain critics notwithstanding, but a way of drawing the reader into the rhythm of speculative propositions. Pahl explains this elicitation of emotional transport between Hegel and “we” the phenomenologists reading the text, in the following way:

The clear-cut separation between subject and predicate, as well as between the reading subject and the content or subject matter of the proposition, are unsettled by the fact that the concept reaches through these divisions. Moved by the concept, the reader is unable to dissociate herself from what she reads…The violence of Hegel’s writing style consists in not allowing the reader to translate the conflicts of a proposition into the higher synthesis of a stable meaning. It interferes with the reader’s wish to be done with the text. (TT 112)

Consequently, far from being any type of defect, Hegel’s writing exemplifies the very argument he is trying to map out; it transports us by unendingly dislocating our own anticipated sense of completion and finality. One of the major implications of Pahl’s reading and her emphasis on the Phenomenology as wrought with transports that dismantle both the stations of spirit and the reader alike, is that it forces us to question the logical necessity that undergirds the architecture of the text. Although she reiterates this position throughout her book, I believe it finds its strongest support in her interpretation of the gaps between the major transitions in the life of spirit. For Pahl, all the configurations of spirit, starting explicitly with the fateful struggle between master and slave, are haunted and hounded by absolute fear, the fear of spirit’s own annihilation. Again and again the shapes of
spirit attempt to avoid dissolution, terrified of what might come to subjects who fully relinquish control over their own identity. But as Pahl reminds us of what Hegel states in his preface, spirit is at its fullest only when it can face down the negative and linger with it. (TT 161) In fear, spirit trembles before itself and its own possibilities. Yet as Pahl insightfully observes, fear is a “speculative negation,” or what she calls a “dying within life that, instead of simply destroying the body, sets it in motion” which is a decidedly different experience of negation than the abstract negation that comes with death. (TT 162)

The experience of fear yields spirit a glimpse of its own freedom, yet spirit continually avoids facing this fear head on, retreating into political ideologies, heavenly after worlds and beautiful souls. Pahl is clear that none of the configurations of spirit ever embrace absolute fear directly, and yet it does become manifest, namely, in what she calls “the blanks between the chapters.” (TT 166) Although consciousness never actually experiences absolute fear, we the readers get a sense of it in the ruptures that arise when one form of spirit comes to an end and another begins. Pahl prefers the term “leaps” rather than “transitions” as a way of describing the movements between new forms of spirit, since these movements disrupt any logical necessity or clear progressive development. The plausibility of Pahl’s position gets traction from the important fact that spirit develops differently within each chapter than it does between chapters. (TT 167) This is a point many commentators have noted, but most regard it as either a serious defect of the text or downplay the span of the chasm that spirit crosses. For Pahl, it is the very break in logical sense and coherence in spanning these gaps that is a testament to the real emotional genius of Hegel’s text, for it forces the reader to facilitate, albeit unintentionally, in the transport to a different kind of subject.

Perhaps more than any other aspect of Hegel’s Phenomenology, these logical gaps in the development of spirit, what one might call birth canals, enact the vibrancy of emotions as tropes of transport, enticing the reader to yield up the idea of a strictly “sequential” development and to imagine connections between the different figurations of spirit that are “other than linear.” (TT 167) Pahl goes on to call this space between spiritual worlds “a space of freedom” in which consciousness essentially blacks out, unable to comprehend its own disintegration and re-birth. (TT 168) Summarizing the magnitude of the leap from one form of spirit to another, Pahl writes the following: “Absolute fear is a moment of absolute negativity that can only be accounted for performatively. Spirit cannot grasp the transition from one figure of consciousness to the next; it goes through it. The wind blows through spirit, and consciousness goes blank.” (TT 169)

For Pahl, it is actually we the phenomenologists that enable the next phase of spirit to get on with things so quickly in assuming whatever has transpired in the previous stage is now finished, and we are simply left observing another, different configuration of spirit. In taking this approach Pahl implicates the reader’s participation in facilitating the movement of Hegel’s argument in a way that few traditional Hegelians would concede. The breaks between phases of spirit are outside historical time, and yet there are undoubtedly reverberations that echo between the many different “Gestalts” of spirit, and so it would also be a mistake to overemphasize the unique distinctiveness of each form of spirit. Instead, we need to see the life of spirit as, in Pahl’s words, “a multiplicity of consciousnesses that are neither completely different nor strictly the same, that move through each other without collapsing into one, and that send each other into ecstasies.” (TT 174)

There can be little question that Pahl’s interpretation throws into disarray much of the traditional readings of the Phenomenology. Although granting much that is familiar, such as that the Phenomenology remains a text focused on spirit, one that interweaves history and speculative philosophy, and one that overcomes customary dichotomies through exploring the education of natural consciousness as the truth of negativity, Pahl rejects the idea that the text charts a sequential and causal development or that it ends in the speculative triumph of disclosing the logical reality of spirit in absolute knowing. (TT 174) It may just be the kind of scholarship I read on Hegel, but her interpretation here strikes me as extremely innovative. But even if her interpretation of the Phenomenology is credible, we can still ask whether it holds as an overall account of emotion in Hegel’s thought, and whether her account of emotion as transports works as a general theory of emotion.
Pahl recognizes that her interpretive endeavors fly in the face of some of Hegel’s directions about how the *Phenomenology* should be read and about the logical necessity that underscores the experience of spirit as a whole. And yet the innovations she suggests we look for in our reading follow from indications Hegel himself provides through the type of philosophizing he exemplifies, whether this be in the stylistic versatility of his writing, the power and perceptiveness of his examples, the multiple settings he invokes, the meta-narrative commentary he provides and, perhaps more than anything else, the gaps he includes in the development of spirit’s experience of itself. And so although she concedes that she has tried to “introduc[e] a shift in the meaning of ‘Hegelian’,” she does this as a “good friend of the text.” Qualifying her own approach she writes: “I derive my method of transformative reading—in good hermeneutic fashion—from the text’s own economy, so that (paradoxically) I remain true to the Hegelian text by transforming it.” (TT 84)

Pahl invites us to read the *Phenomenology* in a new and dynamic way. In doing so she allows us to uncover (recover and renew) another paradigm at work in Hegel’s early master work that gives unprecedented importance to emotionality as transports that enable, empower, and engender spirit to exist in the multiple incarnations that it does. And yet, however innovative this approach is, or perhaps because of it, I take her interpretation to be largely confined to Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, and so as a position that does not readily extrapolate to Hegel’s later thought. In a similar vein, I hold that although her idea of emotionality as transport may characterize aspects of emotional experience, it is limited as an overall explanation of how emotion works.

What limits Pahl’s account of emotion in Hegel to the *Phenomenology* is also what limits its explanatory power as a general account of emotion; both limitations stem from two related claims she makes in regard to emotionality. The first is her insistence, a point she makes at the beginning and end of her book, that “emotionality does not require a human self.” (TT 8) Now if what she means by this is that emotion extends well beyond humans and that humans are simply sophisticated instances of a much larger type of experience, we would be wise to agree with her; however, she seems to imply more than this. In her words, “I consider emotion as dynamic self-relations of emotionality to itself. That is to say, I subjectivize non-human sites of emotionality.” (TT 8)

Pahl recognizes the counter-intuitiveness of her claims but nevertheless suggests that much can be gained in understanding emotionality along these lines. The problem here is in what this starting point commits her to, which is claiming that the self-differentiating character of emotion “do not exclusively, and not even primarily, belong to rationality but are, rather, the domain of emotionality.” (TT 212) What I take her to mean here is that we can investigate the dynamics of emotion by looking to resources emotionality itself provides as a specific kind of happening or experience, a position that Hegel explicitly opposes in his later work and one that also jeopardizes Pahl’s account as a theory of emotion in general.

What’s more, Hegel’s later position goes a long way in showing why Pahl’s interpretation of emotion as transports must fail as an overall account of how emotions work for human beings.

One of the most conspicuous blind spots in Pahl’s account of emotionality is her silence on what Hegel actually says about emotion and feeling in his later work on subjective spirit in the 1830 *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Although she briefly references the section on psychology in Hegel’s *Encyclopedia*, her omission, even at the level of a footnote, of what Hegel says about practical feeling, (Das praktische Gefühl) (sections 471-472), which is as close as he ever gets to an explicit account of what emotion is and does, strikes me as neglectful. Once we take a good look at how Hegel views emotion in the life of subjective spirit, it becomes clear that much of his basic position either directly contradicts, or calls into question, the account of emotionality that Pahl discovers at work in the *Phenomenology*. What’s more, Hegel’s later position goes a long way in showing why Pahl’s interpretation of emotion as transports must fail as an overall account of how emotions work for human beings.

Looking to his work of subjective spirit, Hegel distinguishes in section 402 between sensations (*Empfindung*) and feelings or emotions (*Fühlen/Gefühl*) (the latter two terms he uses interchangeably), and claims that feelings (of shame, remorse, grief, etc.) be sharply separated from sensations, which he aligns with sensorial/perceptual capacities. Feelings separate from sensation early on to the extent they are open to more extensive idealization which makes them more amenable to higher-order differentiation and cognitive refinement. He states in the previous remark (§401) that our emotions, what he also calls here internal feelings, systematize
themselves with the same degree of specificity and necessity as that evidenced by our five bodily senses. (Enc. §401, 76) In fact, Hegel goes as far as suggesting the need for a new science of “psychical physiology” that could index all the emotive feelings and their corresponding physiological disturbances. (Enc. §401, 75) This is a claim he also makes in his earlier 1827/28 lectures on subjective spirit and continues to hold on to in all later versions of his work on this issue.³ The crucial point here is to carefully note Hegel’s assumption that every specific feeling has a corresponding physiological source, which limits or helps distinguish each feeling. What guides the refinement of internal feeling, more than any other single factor, is determined by the requirements of greater mental facility implied in the very plasticity of spirit as the instantiation of self-consciousness.³ For Hegel, cognitive capacities and affective powers develop in a close-knit dialectical relationship, full of feedback loops both internally within the agent and that of sensorial capacities without, which multiplies our capabilities at the same time as it refines them. The crucial role that habituation and enjoyment play in unlocking the potential of consciousness to be self-aware are too complicated to get into, but suffice it to say that Hegel’s entire investigation here is fixated on the embodiment of spirit as individuated self-consciousness. There simply is no informative investigation of emotionality in human agency without an understanding of the physiological and biological constraints placed upon us, which, however much they are negated and idealized, condition the function and shape of who we become. It may sound peculiar to hear Hegel insist so adamantly on the restrictions physiology imposes as enabling conditions on spirit’s awakening to itself, but insist upon them he does.

Pahl is certainly right that Hegel values emotion much more than is typically acknowledged, and that he has much to say to us today about emotion, but I am not so sure the Phenomenology is the place to find it, at least not if we want to know not only how emotions function the way that they do, but also why. As he goes on to explain in section 472, the variety of different emotions are best explained in terms of what he calls the practical ought (Sollen) they instantiate. Quoting Hegel, “The ‘Ought’ (Sollen) of practical feeling is the claim of its essential autonomy to control some existing mode of fact.” (Enc. §472, 231) This ought is experienced in different ways, and it is fair to say that how emotions become distinguished and remain distinguishable turn, in large part, on the form of ‘ought’ they instantiate, which is to say, the type of ownership they make on the world. As Hegel makes explicit: “Delight, joy, grief…shame, repentance, contentment, etc., are partly only modifications of the formal ‘practical feeling’ in general, but are partly different in the features that give the special tone and character mode to their ‘Ought.’” (Enc. §472, 232) The difference between types of emotions, for example, moral emotions and other kinds such as jealousy or lust, does not merely reside in their objects, but the actual evaluative experience we have of these objects. Our emotional commitments, say to law and ethical life, are experienced in a fundamentally different trajectory than other kinds of emotions, since these are firmly anchored in an intellectual recognition that is lacking in other types of emotive experiences.

In the Zusatz to §472 Hegel stipulates that there are three levels in which the practical ought expresses its emotionality. First, what is agreeable or disagreeable. Second, those emotions whose content arises through intuition or representation, and which have determined objects; for example, pleasure, joy, hope, fear, anguish, and pain. The final class of emotions, Hegel qualifies in this way: “…there is a third kind of feelings (Gefühlen) arising when the substantial content of right, morality, ethics, religion, which originates in thought, is received into the feeling will.” (Enc. §472, Zusatz, 233) Under this final class of emotions Hegel draws special attention to remorse and shame as being emblematic.

I draw this contrast with Hegel’s later work on subjective spirit not to hijack the discussion away from the Phenomenology or short change Pahl’s interpretive accomplishments, but to indicate how Hegel came to see emotion, which stands in some contrast to the openness Pahl so adeptly discusses in his earlier work. Thus, it serves to make explicit the fact that what she says about the Hegel of the Phenomenology should not be carried over or transported to Hegel’s later views on emotion. Insofar as Pahl is silent on whether her interpretation of emotion in Hegel might extrapolate to his other works, I want to simply point out that it does not. In addition to this rather academic point, however, I also wanted to leap forward to Hegel’s final reflections on emotion because they provide us—in Hegel’s own terms—with an insight into why Pahl’s view of emotionality as
transport cannot supply us with a general account of emotion.

Pahl is right to ask after what emotion does for Hegel as opposed to simply how he defines it. What Hegel comes to see with more and more clarity as his thought progresses is the indispensable function emotion serves in developing subjective spirit in its genesis from natural (animal) soul to individual thinking consciousness. Seen from this vantage point, the answer to the question “what emotions do” is that they enable subjective spirit to know itself in a way that is concrete, individuated, and meaningful. To know the specifics of how emotions accomplish this is to know Hegel’s theory of emotions. What is especially impressive about Hegel’s later account is the way he anticipates so much of the debate taking place today in the philosophy/psychology of emotion, particularly his insight that emotions are developmental, intentionally differentiated, affective experiences that are open to a degree of refinement; emotions are not static biological states.

The virtue of Hegel’s approach, or we might say what Hegel can teach Pahl about the limitations of her account of emotion, is that Hegel’s later view can explain how we participate in our emotional life as opposed to being constantly unraveled by it. Given Pahl’s basic approach to emotions as transports *sui generis*, it becomes very hard to understand how our affective experience expands and contracts to varying degrees in loose response to our own take on the world. However innovative her account, emotionality appears for Pahl as something beings go through, something that happens to them, instead of with and for them.

The current over-reliance on cognitivist accounts of human emotion aside, emotions do have an intentionality to them, some more specific than others, that differentiates them, and they do reference, albeit with varying degrees of clarity, states of affairs in the world; and, most importantly, they are especially sensitive to the specific concerns and needs of human beings, both ourselves as individuals and that of others. Pahl’s construal of emotion as transports that transform our identity and multiply subjectivity to create plural and multiple agencies affected by pathos and sympathy is certainly one aspect of what emotions do, which is clear not only in cases of trauma and hysteria but also in cases of intense love and moments of self-sacrifice, but it cannot be the ground of emotion; it cannot explain why emotions do what they do. And it cannot do this, not because it downplays autonomy or overemphasizes passion, but because it lacks the resources to account for the determinate stability that makes it possible for *me* as a unique individual to care for something deeply in the first place and re-commit to it over time.

What Pahl’s idea of emotionality as transport brings center stage is the alterity that lives within and without each one of us, and for that she is to be commended. As she claims, “Emotional subjectivity is plastic,” and in this plasticity is a rich abundance of satisfactions ranging from ambivalence to extremely complicated acts of emotional investment. A few lines later she explains: “Transports are differentiated forms of emotionality that self-augment and self-attenuate through reflection and that mobilize the self’s resources to reflect and save itself. Put differently, the emotional subject or the subject in transport doesn’t have to die for its passion.” (TT 217) I think she is right on the mark in her estimation of the variability of emotional life and its “saving” quality, but I just don’t think she can defend this claim without a detailed appreciation of the specificities of embodiment which help make these transports what they are. The challenge, it seems to me, is to refrain from seeing emotionality as subservient to rationality, or vice versa, and look to the plastic, dialectical interaction between these two capacities as a mutual entailment/entanglement, the specification of which directly depends on the kind of being we want to know about. In that sense there can be no account of emotionality *sui generis* as a relation in and of itself.

Pahl’s *Tropes of Transport: Hegel on Emotion* is a challenging text, but there are many rewards for those who wish to journey with her through the passionate complexities of Hegel’s speculative descriptions. Stretching not only how we read and think about Hegel’s *Phenomenology*, Pahl also shows how Hegel continues to impact us emotively in our engagement with this master work. The results of my own encounter with *Tropes of Transport* and my assessment of it are on the whole very positive. To reiterate, I believe Pahl gives us a novel and defensible reading of the *Phenomenology* that opens up new vistas in Hegel scholarship. The view she
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puts forward, however, to the extent it is an explication of emotion in Hegel, is limited to the *Phenomenology*. Lastly, with regards to her own ambitious attempt to lay out the groundwork for a new account of emotion, her work succeeds in demonstrating some key aspects, often neglected, of what emotions do as transports that transform and multiply identities, but falls short in providing an overall explanation of emotionality. In terms of this last shortcoming it seems, as in so many things, that Hegel still has important lessons to teach both Pahl and the rest of us when it comes to grasping what emotions do for beings like us.

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