These are tremendously rich and generous responses: my thanks go to John McCumber, Emilia Angelova, Jason Howard, and David Kim for such engaged readings and challenging comments. Rather than addressing each piece separately, I’m going to weave together my responses under two headings—the different Hegel that my reading of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* brings to the fore (including the issue whether this leaves us with two Hegels, the Hegel of the *Phenomenology* and the Hegel of the later works) and Hegel’s contribution to the current affective turn.

**DIFFERENT HEGEL(S)**

Readers of *Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion* won’t find the usual list of emotions in *Tropes of Transport*. I am less concerned with emotional content—let’s say fear or remorse—than with the particulars of movements across self-difference, or with transports. *Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion* is divided into two parts. The first (shorter) part, on “Emotional Subjects,” verges more on the side of discussing what Hegel says about emotion. This involves a certain reification of emotion; hence the tropes here are nouns: heart and pathos. I present Hegel’s critical analyses of two ways of understanding emotion: as feeling (organized around the figure of the “heart”) and as righteous passion (or “pathos”). The second and main part of the book explores how emotionality (dis)organizes the self-reflection of consciousness as well as Hegel’s text. This part is concerned with movements, transitions, or transports from one consciousness to the next. It elucidates the emotional implications of insight (of figuring things out and coming to a new consciousness or a new stance on things), of communication (relating to other minds or other world views), and of the transitions and echoes between the *Phenomenology*’s chapters. Because I am concerned with movement in this part, the tropes here are verbs: “release,” “juggle,” “acknowledging,” “tremble,” and “broken.” Because these movements relate and connect the various parts of the *Phenomenology* to one another, this part is called “Emotional Syntax.”
All of the tropes I consider are drawn from Hegel’s text. For example, in the discussion of the speculative proposition, Hegel writes that rhythm results from “juggling” “the conflict between the form of a proposition per se and the unity of the concept which destroys that form” (Phen § 61). Or, at some point late in the game, the protagonist of the Phenomenology has the feeling “that it has been rolled upon the wheel through all the stages of its existence and that every bone in its body has been broken” (Phen § 538, my emphasis). But these key words do not necessarily get fleshed out into themes by Hegel; with the exception of acknowledging, none of them constitutes the subject of a dialectic. For this reason I jump around in the text quite a bit. In the discussion of each of these tropes I draw different moments of the Phenomenology together and develop an argument about the non-linear emotional structure of the Phenomenology of Spirit.

John McCumber reminds us that the fear of fear is generative because it is what keeps negation determinate. As he puts it so compellingly, “if consciousness were willing to lose everything at once, it could cut to the end.” I want to insist on taking this point in a poetological as well as in an existential sense: if consciousness were willing to lose everything at once, there would be no need for a book (for the Phenomenology), but there would also be no consciousness (because consciousness alone is not capacious enough to experience absolute fear). While an absolute affect would dissolve what it afflicts (and creates), the self-reflective version of that affect—the fear of fear, for example—allows its subject to take and hold shape for a while. This is why, rather than presenting a flash of creation and destruction, the Phenomenology produces a series of transformations or transports across different shapes of consciousness. Emotions understood as transports intertwine a determinately constructive or stabilizing effect with a determinately destructive or dissolving effect.

Jason Howard asks me to devote more attention to the stabilizing work of emotion. He proposes that especially the later Hegel enables us “to account for the determinate stability that makes it possible for me as a unique individual to care for something deeply in the first place and re-commit to it over time.” In his essay “Hegel on the Emotions,” Howard offers a marvelously clear exposition of Hegel’s developmental theory of the emotions as laid out in various lectures and Encyclopedia sections on the philosophy of subjective spirit. Howard traces the genesis of subjective spirit from natural soul to individual thinking consciousness and argues that “emotions enable spirit to know itself in a way that is concrete, individuated, and meaningful” (72). He highlights in particular the role of habit, which allows the self “to distinguish itself from the pull of its own desires” (74). Habit introduces a distance to raw feeling by serializing sensations. While the power of the first sensation pales in these repetitions, habit doesn’t desensitize the subject. Rather, Howard argues, habit generates a new feeling: satisfaction. By way of habit, the natural immediacy and uniqueness of feeling is transformed into the self-distancing, self-reflecting, and self-satisfied ideality of emotion.

I agree with Howard when he argues that “emotions [or affective experiences] are not static biological states” and that Hegel encourages us to relate to emotion, practically and theoretically, as something that is “open to a degree of refinement.” I am in favor of a culture or a cultivation of emotionality. But I find it important to locate at least some of the agency of such a culture in emotionality itself (Hegel certainly gives us the tools to trace a self-cultivation of emotionality). And I am not as reassured as Howard is that the emotional self-discipline he describes always leads to harmony with self, or satisfaction. While he sees habit as “the primitive experience of being at home with oneself” (75) and finds even greater capacities to be ‘at home with oneself’ in full-fledged moral emotions, I would add that this satisfaction, to the extent to which it is “determinate” (as Howard indicates when he speaks of “determinate stability”), is relative and imbued with its opposite, i.e., dissatisfaction, restlessness, and the like. To attain the feeling of full satisfaction then would involve projecting this restlessness and dissatisfaction onto others. This poses ethical problems.

The ability to stay with torn, restless, trembling transports is of great value to me. Some of David Kim’s previously published work shows why it is socially and politically important to acknowledge and allow for unsettling and disruptive emotions. He considers the emotional labor of assimilation to the dominant culture through the lens of race. Others have done so through the lens of sexuality or gender. In all of these contexts, “feeling bad” can have politically and personally transformative potential once wrested from the neutralizing powers of
pathologizing and therapeutic discourses. Kim asks me here what human bodies in emotional transport feel. We feel unease, we feel troubled, we feel torn. Of course, we can also feel grounded, calm, and at one with ourselves—but those feelings come either in a break from transport or as effects of an extraordinary reconciliation with transport. In any case, these feelings of relative assuredness are, in Hegelian terms, mediated by the more perturbing aspects of emotion. Since human transports are accompanied (even if sometimes more implicitly) by the feeling of unease, of trouble, of tears, I argue in favor of an acceptance (even an enjoyment) of these negative feelings, and against the impulse to reduce, reject, or avoid these feelings and to dismiss or punish those who have them.

On the bed of a serious and honest acceptance of disturbing and difficult feelings, a different register of emotionality can unfurl: light, slight, airy, springy feelings. I am glad that Angelova picks up on the feminist implications of my critique of pathos and of my embrace of the theatrical over the dramatic. She amplifies the small trace of feminist potential in Romantic irony, which I am more than happy to recognize. From tragedy arises lightheartedness. It cannot but laugh about naked pathos.

Three of the commentators—Howard, Kim, and McCumber—worry in somewhat different terms about my almost exclusive focus on the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Howard and Kim see a tension between the Hegel I presented with my reading of the *Phenomenology* and the Hegel of the *Encyclopedia*, in particular the philosophy of emotion that they find in the part titled “Anthropology” of the section on “Subjective Spirit.” I would assume that it is possible to extend to the later works what I have brought out in my reading of the *Phenomenology*. McCumber observes that when *The Phenomenology* comes to an end, nobody survives, as it were. The protagonist/s vanish/es, the author disappears into his words, and the function of the phenomenologist/s ends together with the *Phenomenology*. All that is left is the “foam” of words. I would not say, as McCumber does, that it is “reality” that is lost, but rather—perhaps counter-intuitively—personality is lost in all these layers of reflection, mediation, and rendering-subject of substance. We lose Schiller, we lose Hegel’s personal investment in this project, and we lose all the personifications of the subject of the *Phenomenology*. And this emptying-out, this discharge of the personal—registered in the text in the phrase “ohne den”—enables what is left—words, speculative propositions—to connect freely and to thus give rise to the system.

In the system, unity and disruptedness (*Zerrissenheit*) overlap. This is what makes it an emotional system. But its emotionality is impersonal. With my book, I have begun to analyze Hegel’s system as an emotional subject that is torn and unified. There is not enough space in this response to continue this project and to flesh out a reading of Hegel’s later works. This would take a serious engagement with the texts, since my work is text-based and text-bound.

I use the tools of the literary scholar to analyze philosophical texts. *The Phenomenology of Spirit* lends itself to such an analysis—indeed it asks for it—because, rather than making atemporal truth claims in the name of the author as traditional philosophical discourse does, it enacts the development of consciousness and has us accompany the self-assessment of exemplary worldviews. This conceit not only temporalizes truth, it also requires frequent and sometimes subtle shifts in the subject of the discourse (in whose name statements are made). As I show in my book, Hegel uses a philosophical version of free indirect discourse—a narrative technique that shifts between the more or less omniscient voice of the narrator and the point of view of a character. The *Phenomenology* presents its epistemes by oscillating often imperceptibly between the voice of “natural consciousness” and the phenomenologist’s voice. A mix of sincere identification and ironic distance characterizes all the discussions in the *Phenomenology*.

The *Phenomenology*, thus, has introduced point of view and more or less personal perspective into the truth claims of philosophy (while also undermining any attempt to comfortably settle into the personal and shore up the self). This makes it particularly suitable as an entry point for the exploration of the emotional in Hegel’s
philosophy. We have seen that the *Phenomenology* ends in an emptying out of personality. The next step in the system—and the text that I would like to analyze next for the transports (or “transitions-by-death,” as Mc-Cumber puts it) that hold together and divide this impersonal subject that is Hegel’s system—is *The Science of Logic*. The *Science of Logic* also integrates form and content. It refuses general rules of thought, less by moving between points of view (like the *Phenomenology*) than by developing forms of thought dependent on the subject matter. Prepared by our reading of *The Phenomenology*, we might be in the position to register the indirectness that informs the shifting identification with the various contents that determine the forms of cognition laid out in the *Logic*.

I can see why the Anthropology sub-section of the *Encyclopedia* is crucial for anybody who is interested in Hegel on emotion. My concern is a different one. I am less interested in what Hegel says about emotion—his theory or philosophy of emotion. In general, I look at affect and emotion not as the object of philosophical knowledge. Instead, I explore how emotion organizes and disorganizes thought. Howard understands that I am concerned with what emotion does. So, in his response, he takes us to what Hegel says about what emotion does. I show, instead, what emotion does in Hegel’s text without Hegel saying much about it and sometimes at a tension with what Hegel says about it. In any case, since both Kim and Howard want to hear more about my take on Hegel’s anthropology in the *Encyclopedia*, I am happy to offer some comments.

Emotional beings register their own self-difference and respond to it. I am sure that a text or a thing or a plant also registers and responds to its incongruence or dissonance and that we can observe these responses. They are, in my view, emotional beings. I am not sure whether this means that they feel emotional. But then there is so much still to learn about feeling, experience, ensoulment, emotionality, especially on the level of blind material processes. Does Hegel have something to offer in this regard? Yes, I think that his comments on the feeling soul in the *Encyclopedia* are useful.

Hegel describes feeling (*Empfindung*) as *dumpfes Weben*, that is, as a weaving that remains somewhat underground and dull, and that goes on pervasively without congealing into a distinct contour or form (§ 400). At the beginning of Hegel’s science of the human we, thus, encounter textuality. The beginning—any beginning—is unsettled by textuality, here in the form of the woven, interwoven, and limitlessly on-weaving texture of the “general soul” (*allgemeine Seele*). Individually embodied, anthropogenetic souls may participate in this one soul of all nature by sympathizing with or living along with (*mitleben*) the general planetary life (§ 392: “Der Geist lebt in ... der natürlichen Seele das allgemeine planetarische Leben mit”). There is a connection with the life of the planet that we can sometimes feel in the mode of moods (*Stimmungen*, ibid.). But even if we don’t feel it (and we could certainly further cultivate this kind of sensibility), the life of the general or all-interweaving soul of nature, its movements and e-motions, exists and weaves on in a dull and muffled underground kind of way.

With the presupposition of a textual soul of nature, Hegel offers a counterweight to the individualizing aspect of feeling which we tend to overemphasize, in my view. As a culture we have invested heavily in the notion that my feelings are about me and are mine. This gets us into all sorts of (very grave and disabling) problems with the communication of feeling. I think that it is important to realize that these problems are the effect of the cultivation of a particular, individualizing, sense of emotion, at the expense of the communicating, connecting, and onweaving quality of emotion. Before and beyond the anthropocentric and individualistic notion of emotion, feelings are texts and texts are feelings. This does not necessarily mean that texts have feelings. But we humans might also be better off not claiming all the time that we “have” feelings. I show that transports escape the individual and exceed the individual’s ability to feel. Transports are not owned by the self and the self cannot exactly own up to them. As we move from one self to another self, we traverse or leap over and are divided by nothing—a tear in the ability to find something in the self (*empfinden*). There is this loss in-between because, at least for a moment, no single or individual self is in place—only transition, only pluralization, only connectedness.
HEGEL IN THE AFFECTIVE TURN

Emilia Angelova pushes me to claim more space for Hegel—the new Hegel that some of us (starting perhaps with Nancy and including, most recently, Comay) have produced—in the affective turn, which, as she says, is dominated by the very powerful and innovative return to Spinoza with Deleuze. As I see it, both Hegel and Spinoza are important for a theory or philosophy of affect or emotionality because they offer strong philosophies of relationality. Relationality conceived in terms of mediation in Hegel, and of composition or assemblage in Spinoza. The question is: what are the differences between their formulations of relationality? And what specifically can Hegel contribute to the affective turn that Spinoza doesn’t?

When these two philosophies are constructed as opposing camps, Hegelian negation is usually pitted against Spinozist affirmation while Hegelianism usually embraces a humanism that Deleuzian Spinozists see as ethically and politically counterproductive. I straddle both maps in that I appreciate Hegel’s paradigm of determinate negation but also emphasize the impersonal aspects of his philosophy. Hasana Sharp, whom Angelova brings into the discussion, finds it unhelpful to focus on questions of affirmation versus negation to describe the difference between the two systems because it means yielding to a characteristically Hegelian theme (120). Instead she argues that Hegel and Spinoza “differ because Hegel is concerned above all with relationships of representation, while Spinoza examines relationships of composition among human and nonhuman forces” (121). In other words, while Hegel unduly foregrounds the human, Spinoza is useful for a politics of re-naturalization—which is her project.

I do not agree with her reading of Hegel’s philosophy as based on relationships of representation. This reading turns on the Hegelian concept of recognition (Anerkennen), which she understands in line with pretty much everybody else (with the notable, and very different, exceptions of Judith Butler and John McDowell) as a desire and struggle for respect that is fundamentally based on an epistemology and politics of identity and its reproduction (or representation). Instead, I show that Anerkennen has nothing to do with re-presentation for Hegel. There is no “re” and there is no presence, no identity that is found or presented again in another instance, no identifying-as, and no content to the cognition that would allow it to serve as re-cognition. There is just incipience, the beginning of a knowing, as it were, that moves toward and is moved by another. For this reason I translate Anerkennen as ac-knowledging. “They acknowledge each other as mutually acknowledging one another,” writes Hegel. The movement is circular, empty (the “as” directs us to no substantive content but only to the movement itself). It is impersonal because there is no substantive personality yet, no personal content, no individuality—just relation. It is ungrounded and thus fragile or precarious even though it cannot not be mutual because it is the experience of the fact that self-consciousness emerges in the plural and as related.

What Hegel describes here, at the beginning of the chapter on Mastery and Servitude (before the struggle for life and death, and before the figures of master and servant emerge), is clearly an ideal. It emerged out of a series of connected realizations: that things or objects are living things are subjects, and that consciousness is now self-consciousness because its object has become (or turned out to be) a subject. Keeping this history in mind allows us to get into view that there is a subjectivity other than human or conscious subjectivity, and that consciousness alone does not make subject status.

In retrospect this will have been the moment of anthropogenesis. But only because the story has to take sides, and bias is human. As soon as the Phenomenology, true to its method, looks at the movement of acknowledging from the perspective of one, and then the other, of the consciousnesses involved, we get a one-sided picture. We encounter a greedy desire to abstract from biological existence by negating living things (the master), who, as Hegel shows, remains paradoxically bound to the body by his appetite. And we see a fearful clinging to life that finds freedom and transformative capacity in this very fear (the slave or servant or bondsman). We get human emotion. While Hegel embraces bias, the point of Hegel’s philosophy is also not to fully identify with it. So, as I see it, both Spinoza and Hegel offer invitations, arguments, and tools for moving beyond an anthropocentric perspective.
What Hegel contributes to a theory of emotionality that Spinoza doesn’t is determinate negation. Determinate negation, i.e., a negation that does not end in death or nothingness but produces a new shape, allows us to understand emotion as transport. Transports carry one out of oneself and to a different self. Such determinate self-negations can have a disciplining character or they can be liberating. Transports undo any simple and coherent unity of the subject. They pluralize subjects, and mediate between and within selves (including impersonal selves).

It might be overdue, at this point of our discussion of the difference between Hegel’s and Spinoza’s philosophy, to address Kim’s question how emotion differs from conation. In Hegel, desire (Begierde) is negativity directed only at the other, not the self. The desire that Hegel introduces at the beginning of the chapter on self-consciousness is co-extensive with the self. It expresses the self rather than unsettling it. But, in the same chapter, Hegel moves beyond desire (which is one-sided and abstract in its intentionality) toward mutual acknowledging (or links desire to recognition, as Butler has it). To me, mutual acknowledging is a form of emotionality or a transport, because it includes self-negation and thus unsettles naïve self-assuredness. Hegel draws the same difference in his discussion of Zweifel (doubt) and Verzweiflung (despair). Doubt or skepticism hovers somewhere between cognition and conation, but it only calls the world of objects into question—the thinking I or cogito remains untouched by doubt. Unsatisfied with skeptical philosophies, Hegel moves us—on this “path of despair” that is the Phenomenology—to also call the “I” into question. Self-negativity is not desire or conation, it is emotion.

How is emotion different from cognition, then? I agree with Kim when he deplores that many theories of emotion end up “reduc[ing] emotion to belief or judgment or sometimes to desire” and that “such cognitive or conative accounts divest emotion of affect or feeling.” To address his question, I will take a detour away from Hegel to evolutionary cognitive neuroscience. Neuroscientists speak of a seesaw between the analytic brain (i.e., the processing of factual information, problem-solving, memory, abstract thinking) and the social brain. The social brain, this new science claims, is a late and highly sophisticated product of evolution. In other words, it is particularly evolved to want to have friends. The social brain includes empathizing with other minds and imagining (anticipating, projecting) other people’s feelings and reactions. The seesaw image captures the fact that we tend to be able to only do either or—either analytic thinking or social feeling. So, for this current of neuroscience, emotion is clearly different from cognition.

Neuroscientist Matthew Lieberman points to the different physiological location of these “two brains.” It seems to me that he does so because he is a bit at pains to pinpoint a phenomenological difference. In an interview, he excuses the fact that researchers used to not differentiate between emotional brain activity and general or analytic brain activity, suggesting that they feel the same. And yet he offers rich descriptions of both mental activities that would indicate that they don’t feel the same.

Our social brain is always on; it is highly—one might say hyper—active. When we try to think analytically or to figure something out, we need to shut the social brain off. This requires focus and is often hard to achieve because the social brain keeps interrupting and distracting the analytic brain. If we are successful and deal with the analytic problem at hand, our social brain resurges back into activity as soon as we are done with whatever we focused on.

I am not a neuroscientist, but as somebody who has been described as a problem solver, I can say that the two mental activities don’t feel the same. Analytic brain activity can be much more satisfying than social brain activity because, if you put in the effort, you get the reward and then you are done with it. On the other hand, social brain activity—feeling ourselves and imagining how others might feel—has something inconclusive, repetitive (sometimes even obsessive), and limitless about it.

This qualitative difference between cognition and emotion—the difference in how each feels—brings me back to Hegel. I see a high dose of the repetitive, recurrent, insisting moves of the social or emotional brain in
Hegel’s philosophy. Nothing is ever completed, solved once and for all, done with, and let go off. Instead, everything returns and everything is anticipated before it takes place. The structure of Aufhebung is emotional. Let me finally call attention to the fact that a Hegelian perspective on emotionality enables us to develop a different notion of unity or wholeness. McCumber appreciates that, by “demonstrate[ing] over and over again that the emotional dimension of the Phenomenology is … central to the work as a whole … [Pahl] actually shows us … what kind of ‘whole’ it is”—a whole that is open, incomplete, unending, disrupted. A Hegelian perspective on emotionality keeps us alive to the tears in the whole as well as to the unity in the dismemberment. Howard seems to agree with me when it comes to my reading of the Phenomenology, but he seems to resist this speculative unity of unity and disunity when it comes to explaining emotion. He separates the two, presenting my account as one that sees emotion only as ‘unravelling’ and claiming the side of unity for himself, or for his Hegel, when he considers the assimilation of feelings into a unity of self a moral requirement.

I am wary of notions of unity that exclude disunity. This might be one of the reasons why I don’t focus as much on embodiment as Kim would like me to. There are ways of foregrounding the body that facilitate or even compel stark individuation. In Howard’s emphasis on embodied spirit, embodiment serves to stabilize the identity of subjects (“the embodiment of spirit as individuated self-consciousness”) and the identity of emotions (“every specific feeling has a corresponding physiological source, which limits or helps distinguish each feeling”). Kim’s phenomenological approach to the body would certainly be capacious enough to describe trans-individual transports. But, as he notes, I take a strongly textual approach to matter. To me, bodies are texts, as well. They are articulations of matter, syntactical arrangements of shapes and cells that imply the temporal vector of experience. Experience, to me, is most productively understood as reading—reading the textuality of our selves not as stable, independent, and autonomous but as plural and transsubjective, as connected in a texture of anticipation and remembrance of the I that is We and the I that is another, of acknowledging, juggling, trembling across difference, and of a brokenness that sticks. Reading Hegel trains us, if you want, in relating different pieces of the text (different chapters, different figures, different tropes) to one another—map them onto one another while attending to their difference, hold them together in our mind even as they present themselves as contradictory. This training can be applied not only to other texts, but also to personal experiences and bodily feelings.

But methodological concerns about phenomenology versus textuality aside, the notion of a unity that does not exclude disunity throws into relief the defining characteristic of emotionality. Kim asked me, what in emotion (beyond thought and desire) makes it central to the self-actualization of spirit? What is specific about emotion? It is its disruptive and self-disruptive quality. Emotional transports spark change but they also keep a light-hearted distance from themselves and from the violence inherent in disruption and change.

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NOTES

1. I also want to thank J.M. Fritzman and the Hegel Society of America for organizing the Author-Meets-Critic session on "Tropes of Transport" at the 2013 Pacific APA Meeting in San Francisco, and the Advisory Book Selection Committee of SPEP for choosing "Tropes of Transport" for one of the special sessions at their 2013 Annual Conference in Eugene. I finally want to thank the audiences at both events for their discussions.


3. David Haekwon Kim, "Shame and Self-Revision in Asian American Assimilation," in Emily S. Lee, ed., Living Alterities: Phenomenology, Embodiment, and Race, Albany: SUNY Press, 2014: 103-32. Kim argues that "in virtue of entrenched public [anti-Asian] stigmas and the conditions that sustain them, [Asian-Americans] potentially experience … a distinctive vulnerability to being shamed or undergoing self-contempt" and "must develop efficacious normative structures of esteem or stigma management" (120). Without a chance to acknowledge shame or shame vulnerability (a difficulty compounded by the very structure of shame and its impulse to hide) and self-contempt (difficult to acknowledge because of its moral ambiguity and epistemological precariousness), such normative structures can become rather costly.


5. While I am very sympathetic to Paul Redding's work on the importance of German Idealism for the tradition that culminates in Freud and William James of elaborating an unconscious logic of affect, and agree with his reading of Hegel as "concerned that a wedge not be driven between feeling and concept" (131), and while I very much appreciate his argument that there is a specific logic of affect that is different from the logic of reason and, what is more, that this logic of affect productively transforms rational logic (regarding Hegel, see 143), I would not reduce the scope of emotional logic to the first (and most basic or immediate) part of Hegel's logic, the logic of being (as Redding does, 140-43). Rather than locating emotional logic within Hegel's logic, I want to analyze how emotionality structures The Science of Logic as a whole. Paul Redding, The Logic of Affect, Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 1999.

6. Tropes of Transport discusses other parts of the Encyclopedia, notably the passages on memory (Erinnerung und Gedächtnis) in the sub-section on "Psychology."


8. Butler and McDowell offer outlying views to the common reading of the Hegelian scene of recognition in that McDowell suggests that there are less than two and Butler suggests that there are more than two selves involved.

McDowell argues that the dialectical that includes the movement of Anerkennen, the struggle for life and death, and the master and slave relation serves as an allegory for the process of unifying subject and object, a process that, to his light, goes on within consciousness. That is to say, according to McDowell, this dialectic does in fact not pitch two individuals opposite one another as "each recognizing the other as another of what it is one of" but only one self-consciousness misrecognizing its own alienated self as an embodied other (159). While I agree that Hegel's programmatic oscillation between the intra- and the intersubjective make such a reading possible and convincing, and while I endorse the goal of integrating split-off parts of the self (in his words: "integrating, within a single individual, a consciousness aiming to affirm itself as spontaneously apperceptive and a consciousness that is conceived as immersed in life in the world" (165)), I find it politically unhelpful and not in keeping with Hegelian philosophy to hierarchize between a transcendent (here called "actual") truth and the way this truth presents itself, and to thus dismiss the manifest entry of two consciousnesses as mere appearance or figuration. McDowell underestimates the actual and self-actualizing powers of figuration (both in the real world and in Hegel's philosophy) when he claims that "it is only within an allegorical presentation that the master consciousness and the servile consciousness are embodied in two separate individuals" (164). John McDowell, "The Apperceptive I and the Empirical Self: Towards a Heterodox Reading of 'Lordship and Bondage' in Hegel's Phenomenology," in Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (2009), 147-165.

While Butler often uses the Hegelian notion of recognition as shortcut for her own, extremely generative, account of the ambivalent desire to be rendered intelligible within existing social norms, she is certainly alive to the precarious and destabilizing quality of the movement of Anerkennen, as Hegel describes it. In "Longing for Recognition," Butler argues that "Hegel has given us an ek-static notion of the self," one that is not self-identical—and that therefore cannot be easily represented or simply recognized—but that is always already outside of itself and at a temporal remove from itself, and, thus, multiple and relational (148). She calls attention to the fact that, while reciprocal recognition constitutes subjects (i.e., without or prior to recognition there is no subject), such recognition is iterative and, at each instance, involves subjects pluralized by the history and future of their recognitional encounters and by the various others deposited within their subjectivity by these encounters. Judith Butler, "Longing for Recognition," in Undoing Gender, New York: Routledge, 2004: 131-151.
HEGEL AND THE AFFECTIVE TURN: RESPONSES

9. See, for example, Undoing Gender 2: “The Hegelian tradition links desire with recognition.”
10. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* § 78
11. Ibid.
15. “Now, the thing that makes this system, I think, really interesting is that thinking about other people and their thoughts and feelings doesn’t feel that different than other kinds of thinking, but it turns out that there’s a different network in the brain for thinking socially and for thinking non-socially.” http://www.npr.org/2013/10/18/237100760/logging-in-to-the-brains-social-network. Accessed May 3, 2014.