The concept of the diagram plays an important, yet under-considered, role in the philosophies of Charles Sanders Peirce and Gilles Deleuze. Both philosophies, whilst having given rise to a somewhat bewildering array of defining nominations between them, may perhaps be best described as constructivist—for they both support a conception of reality as constructed, rather than given, and constructed in/as thought. For both, a “diagram” is the agent of this construction; hence its pivotal place in both systems. It is, in fact from Peirce that Deleuze borrows the concept, for its function as genetic agency, whilst, however, submitting it to a radical reworking that rejects the broadly representational philosophical framework within which Peirce situates it. An understanding of this reworking, which has hitherto received little sustained attention, permits clarification not only of Deleuze’s and Peirce’s understanding of philosophy as constructivist, but also of the (generally poorly understood) relation between these two philosophies, rarely thought together, whilst presenting some of the most trenchant stakes, and potentials, of diagrammatics as a constructive, pragmatic, and experimental venture.1

The paper is set out in four sections. Following a brief overview of the contrasting conceptions of diagrammatics by Peirce and Deleuze (part 1), I discuss the main features and functions of Peirce’s diagram, and its function in his philosophy, (part 2) and Deleuze’s borrowing and reworking of the concept for his own project (part 3). I conclude with an exploration of the contrasting conceptions of the future implicated by the two models: Peirce’s notion of “speculative rhetoric”, which presents the diagram as speculatively determining the future on the basis of the present possibilities of thought, and Deleuze’s diagrammatic construction of the future as the affirmation of the intensive forces of the “outside” that eternally exceeds that which thought can represent to itself.
1. PEIRCE’S DIAGRAM, AND DELEUZE’S DIAGRAM: SOME INITIAL POINTS OF DISTINCTION.

For both Peirce and Deleuze the diagram is the agent of the construction of reality. But there are two distinct conceptions of reality implicated here. For Peirce - committed logician and practicing scientist - reality is that mode of being asserted by a true proposition, regardless of what any actual mind thinks of it; reality is logical truth, independent of the actual experience or thought that is subject to empirical or dogmatic error. For Deleuze, in contrast, reality is that mode of being of material existence, in contrast to (logical) possibility. Furthermore the Deleuzian project is oriented not towards an already existing reality, whether actual or conceived, but towards the construction of “new” reality that does not already exist. So whilst for Peirce the construction of reality entails the acquisition of logical truths through a process of refining thought (through diagrams), for Deleuze construction involves the production of a new reality (through diagrams). Whereas for Peirce the function of a diagram is to aid thought’s process of approaching logical truth; for Deleuze, diagrammatic construction is not grounded on what can—according to present criteria—be deemed truthful, but rather is directed towards the production of new values “not inspired by truth” and beyond any established measure.

As the process of thought’s refinement, Peirce’s construction entails the representation of thought’s representational processes through diagrams, and the concomitant adjustment and refinement of these processes in order to more closely attain to truth. For Deleuze however, construction is not grounded in already existent processes of thought, but rather generated from the synthesis of what he calls “pure” difference, difference “in-itself”, independent of “the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same”.

Peirce describes the diagram as a map or schema, an “icon of relations” through which a future state is constructed on the basis of an existing state, through the representation, and formalisation, of relations between terms. This (relatively new) future state resembles past states through the diagrammatic construction of laws that relate the two via the mediation of the present. For Deleuze, however, the diagram is a map of “pure relations” - relations of forces “outside” related terms - a map of “lines of escape” that break through all law in a transcendental and unmediated construction of the qualitatively new (that which is new in kind) which bears no resemblance to past or present actuality. Peirce’s diagram retains a resonance with the “common-sensical” notion of the diagram as a “simplified drawing” or “schematic representation” of something. It functions as an aid to knowledge, operating within the regime of what may possibly be known given the present conditions of thought, assuming a form that can be recognised, and oriented towards the formalisation of a future state that can be projected on the basis of present actuality. But Deleuze’s conception of the diagram as the agent of breakthrough and creation, as a non-representational, groundless, deforming and unformed synthesiser of pure difference, subverts such common-sensical definition and demands a new conceptual framework.

These initial distinctions indicate two strongly contrasting philosophical positions, both invested in the production of diagrams: an idealist philosophy of representation that seeks to interpret the world through the logical processes of thought (Peirce), and a philosophy of difference that seeks to invest difference as the “source” of thought anew (Deleuze).

2. PEIRCE’S DIAGRAM: RESEMBLANCE AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

Inventor of a rich, and notoriously complex system whose contributions to and consequences for philosophy have perhaps yet to be fully grasped, C.S Peirce made it his life’s work to impart to traditional problems of metaphysics and epistemology a consistently pragmatic orientation, via a rigorous architectonic of logic, “objective” reasoning, and “scientific” method. It is above all for two things that he is most widely known: firstly, as the father of pragmatism (after his fellow pragmatist William James’ accreditation to him of this distinction); secondly, for his tripartite theory of signs. And it is for both these definitive features that his system
will appeal to Deleuze, who, with Felix Guattari, also engages in the articulation of a pragmatic semiotic—that is, a theory of signs orientated to their practical bearing on the “conduct of life”.

For Peirce, the idea that thought or conception (the two are for him equated) must be aligned with its conceivable practical effects in the world (pragmatism) must be understood as a semiotics (or ‘semeiotic’, as he preferred to call it), that is, a system of signs. Indeed, the sign is nothing other than a thought, one whose meaning is not self-evident, but rather determined by the process of its interpretation by a subsequent thought or action—or to put it another way, by its effect on another sign. Insofar as a sign points at once to its object (or referent), and to the thought that interprets it (its interpretant), this pragmatic semiotic/semiotic pragmatics is tripartite, or triadic. Again, what is particularly distinctive about Peirce’s system is the attribution of scientific, or logical, determinacy to this pragmatic semiotic; an understanding of thought as a rigorous, scientific method, governed by the ultimate, speculatively abstracted attainment of truth.

The diagram, or as Peirce also calls it, “existential graph”, plays a central role within this system. It may be most simply understood as Peirce’s answer to a central problem in post-Kantian philosophy—the reconciliation of reason with experience, of rational ideas with existential facts, of the “generals” of a cognition not grounded in experience with the “particulars” with which experience furnishes cognition. This reconciliation, which Peirce calls “the method of discovery”, takes place through the diagrammatic mapping of facts, and construction of laws that allows us to pass from particulars to generals. This experimental method—it is adjusted as it proceeds - may be understood as the counterpart to pragmatism - for if “pragmatism says that ideas work themselves out in facts”, the method of discovery “says that ideas may be discovered through facts”. Both processes are of course mutually implicated within a project that sets out to develop a theory of reasoning ideally in contact with (rather than noministically abstracted from) the empirical.

A mental construction, a type of sign, which may or may not take visual form (such as a graph), the diagram represents a “premiss” (a preliminary assertion—also called a “predicate” or “precept”) whilst pointing towards, or “outlining”, an outcome. The diagram can, indeed, be understood as the basis of all thought, where thought “always takes place by means of signs”, and is logical—that is, “self-controlled, or deliberated”. Indeed, a diagram is that “by means of which any course of thought can be represented with exactitude.”

Peirce conceives of this diagrammatic thought as a (representational) process—diagrammatism is the process of thought’s “self-controlling” or “deliberation”, a process of “reasoning”, where “reasoning is essentially a voluntary act, over which we exercise control”.

A diagram, Peirce tells us,

is an icon or schematic image embodying the meaning of a general predicate and from the observation of this icon [specifically the relations between its parts] we are supposed to construct a new general predicate.

The process of reasoning consists, he tells us,

in constructing a diagram according to a general precept, in observing certain relations between parts of that diagram not explicitly required by the precept, showing that these relations will hold for all such diagrams, and in formulating this conclusion in general terms.

The diagram, then, is a schema of relations, that allows us to go beyond a given theoretical premiss/originary assertion to new assertions, by constructing laws, formulae or rules. These rules guarantee that the “new” relations constructed by the diagram will “hold for all such diagrams”. That is, the role of the diagram is as generator of the laws that permit the determination of the future with increasingly greater clarity, to aid the movement of logic from the vague (particulars) to the definite (general), the movement of thought’s “self-controlling” towards its ultimate destination: truth.
This process of definition or clarification takes place within the regime of resemblance. Diagrammatic determination of the future is *iconic*, Peirce tells us, and an icon is a sign which signifies its object through resemblance: “likenessness, or, as I prefer to say, Icons, […] serve to represent their objects only in so far as they resemble them in themselves”.  

A diagram is a type of icon—specifically an *icon of relations*. It signifies its object not through direct resemblance of its form, but as a representation of the relations of its objects by *analogous* relations in its own parts. This makes it “particularly useful because it suppresses a quantity of details, and so allows the mind more easily to think of the important features.” It is a form of relations, and its “schematic” character lies precisely in this reductive formalisation.

So the diagram is the *formal presentation of the relations* of a given premiss. This can (but does not have to) assume a *visual* form, “composed of dots, lines etc., in which logical relations are signified by such spatial relations that the necessary consequences of these logical relations are at the same time signified, or can, at least, be made evident by transforming the diagram in certain ways which conventional ‘rules’ permit.” All “necessary reasoning” proceeds by such diagrammatic constructions—this necessity being due to the fact that we *know* (or come to know) the conditions of the diagram (and not their actual conformity with empirical cases).

It is the form of the diagram that may be worked on to achieve its function of rendering these consequences. As such, the diagram is not only an exact representation of a given premiss, but a form to which “something else” may be added, experimentally—“which is usually a mere May-be”. This experimental addition is, for Peirce, the *constructive* aspect of the diagram, the aspect that takes it beyond pure relationality—beyond the relation between itself and its object—and imparts to it a “third” component, as constructive “determination” of the future. It is a *course* of thought that the diagram represents, a course that is dynamic and ongoing.

Thus diagrammatics is not just a re-presentational mapping of an originary premiss. It more crucially concerns the attainment of truths which are not immediately evident from premises. The function of the diagram is to excavate general and universal truths (the outcome has to be shown to hold “for all such” diagrams) from particular assertions. And yet, whilst this construction adds something to representation, it nevertheless remains inscribed within a representational regime: the experimental additions of “may-be’s” is reintegrated into an ongoing process of thought’s representation of itself to the (ideal) point of final, universal validity (truth).

To consider this inscription let us consider more closely the four stages of the diagrammatic method: firstly, the formation of the icon; secondly, the observation on and experimentation with the icon; thirdly, the arrival at a conclusion; fourthly, the establishment of the universal validity of the conclusion.

The first step is to “form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic…representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible,…to represent intuitively or semi-intuitively the same relations which are abstractly expressed in the premises”. Following this formation of an icon, there is observation of and (perhaps) experimentation with the icon. Either the truth of the conclusion is drawn from the observation of the diagram as it is—in which case, the process is called “corollarial”—or “having represented the conditions of the conclusion in a diagram” we perform an ingenious experiment upon the diagram, and by the observation of the diagram, so modified, ascertain the truth of the conclusion—a process Peirce calls “theorematic”. It is this theorematic aspect of diagrammatisation, whereby “something else” is added, experimentally, and which Peirce also calls “experimental observation”, which constitutes its constructive component. Here, the diagram is “submitted to the scrutiny of observation, and new relations are discovered among its parts, not stated in the precept by which it was formed, and are found, by a little mental experimentation, to be such that they will always be present in such a construction.” Through this “experimental observation” of diagrams we arrive at a conclusion (the third step) with “universal validity” in so far as it will be shown to be always be the case under a set of certain conditions (the fourth step). Diagrammatism thus initiates a process by which “the mind is not only led from believing the premises to judge the conclusion true, but it further attaches to this judgment
another—that every proposition like the premiss … would involve, and compel acceptance of, a proposition related to it as the conclusion then drawn is related to that premiss”.24 In this way, the diagram serves as a model for similar hypothetical cases—it is a map of the necessary outcomes of reason in an “arbitrarily hypothetical universe…. Not yet entirely determinate”.25 The moment of experimentation, where thought alters its course from what is immediately given by the premiss, is ultimately geared towards the consolidation of this course, once it has been found to be “necessary”. It is not to point to new outcomes each time a diagram is drawn, but to consolidate a single outcome for all times (such that successive diagrams will reveal the same conclusion)—in other words, a truth, or final interpretant - an outcome that will, with future experiments, be shown to be always present26.

Thus the diagrammatic process exposes the tripartite system of analogies that characterises Peirce’s semeiotic, and provides its many subdivisions. The conclusion of a diagram that represents its object through analogous relations is returned to the interpretation of other similar premises, which is returned to the “expanded” diagram, and so on.27 A three-way process of grounding is established via the diagram between objects, signs and interpreters—the three dynamic elements of the semiotic process—where the sign is that which is determined by its “object”, and which in turn determines an effect, its “interpretant”28—as a process of thought’s self-clarification and extraction of similarity, as law, between different cases.

Diagrammatism is a process of generalisation. Hence, whilst it always “has to start from a perceptual fact”, its proximity to “the real thinking-process” is “doubtful”, where this “real thinking-process” is a “particular”, or “finite” process of thinking that you or I may pass through. Indeed, the inferential, ideal process of diagrammatism is “of an entirely different construction from the thinking process”—because it is generalised, and deals with possibility rather than actuality—what should be thought given a certain set of conditions (as ultimately governed by a final truth) rather than what is actually thought by particular individuals. This is what characterises Peirce’s system as “idealist”, and diagrammatism as “ideal reasoning”, and, ultimately, speculative (a point we will return to).29

This ideal possibility attains its “forcefulness” through the diagram’s “compelling design”. But what does this mean? The design of the diagram is compelling because it is intelligible (it is an icon of “intelligible relations”30) - which is to say already intelligible to thought as it is - because the truths it constructs are recognisable, because it bears a clarity that appeals to the logical subject waiting to receive it. It is to the appeal of logic, which is a form of common sense (a “critical” common-sense)31, that diagrammatic reasoning appeals. The “universal validity” of the conclusions diagrammatism produces is predicated on the common structures of thought uniting the interpreting subjects; the effectiveness of the rules it constructs is premised on the fact that these rules bind “all minds alike”.32 Indeed, “the object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know”.33 “Learning” begins with the “immense mass of cognition already formed.”34 As Peirce clarifies, “a Diagram is an Icon of a set of rationally related objects. By rationally related, I mean that there is between them, not merely one of those relations which we know by experience, but know not how to comprehend, but one of those relations which anybody who reasons at all must have an inward acquaintance with.”35

It is therefore assumed that the diagrammatic process of learning is shared by a community of rational minds with such innateness of reason. This is why the forceful shape of a diagram can be predicted to convince an as-yet unspecified subject. The observation of the diagram “leads us to suspect that something is true, which we may or may not be able to formulate with precision, and we proceed to inquire whether it is true or not.” Such “suspicion” is grounded in “what we already know” - which includes an idea of truth. Peirce states that “we not only have to select the features of the diagram which it will be pertinent to pay attention to, but [that] it is also of great importance to return again and again to certain features.” Again, if we do not make such a controlled selection, or consolidation of the diagram’s compelling design “although our conclusions may be correct they will not be the particular conclusions at which we are aiming.”36 Thus, we can understand the diagram as a kind of confirmation, or “substantiation” of our “beliefs” (which provide the basis of all our premises)”37, subject to
our rational control.

In this way we see the function of Peirce’s diagram as a tool for thought (as reasoning), a process of experimentally attaining truths grounded in the recognition of what is already known to us driven by the establishment, through laws, of generals or universals, and oriented towards communication within a community of like-minded thinkers. Deleuze will borrow this conception of diagrammatics as an experimental synthesis of relations, whilst recasting it beyond Peirce’s representationalism, universalism and (logical) communitarianism.

3. DELEUZE’S DIAGRAM: DIFFERENCE AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

It is perhaps the notion of modulation in general (and not similitude) that will enable us to understand the nature of analogical language or the diagram.38

It is as the inventor of “the most extraordinary classification of images and signs”, of a semiotic with the potential to think production and oriented to “life”, that Peirce appeals to Deleuze.39 With Guattari, he is specifically attracted by Peirce’s conception of signs firstly “not as a function of determinants which are already linguistic”, and secondly, “from the point of view of genesis or formation”.40 From this perspective, Peirce offers a powerful alternative to what Deleuze and Guattari deem to be the interpretative impasses of (structural) linguistics—a pragmatic semiotics that can function as a “science of reality”.41

It is not from the perspective of meaning or interpretation that they invest Peirce’s concepts. In fact they explicitly reject this orientation towards meaning which for them renders Peirce “as much a linguist as the semioticians”.42 Rather, it is for his taxonomy of “sign elements [which] still imply no privilege for language”, of semiotic material not reduced to linguistic forms, that they turn to him, in their development of a productive, asignifying semiotic—a semiotic that is put to work both in the analysis of social mechanisms and in the analysis of artistic practice. Indeed, in his work on the cinema, we find Deleuze engaging in an intensive extraction and development of this nonlinguistic semiology for a dizzyingly comprehensive taxonomy of cinematic signs. This is a “free use” of Peirce, that borrows his terms “while changing their connotations”.43

It is, above all, Peirce’s concept of the diagram—in its function as the experimental constructor of new relations—which Deleuze and Guattari invest as the vector for this productive, asignifying semiotic.44 In accordance with their “free use” of Peirce, we find not a fidelity to Peirce’s diagram, but rather an extraction of what they consider to be its latent potentials—as an icon “with a distinct role, irreducible to either the icon or the symbol”. For them, the diagram offers a way out of the signified-signified relations of the index, icon and symbol that trap meaning within the binary of semiotic correspondence.45

In this way Deleuze and Guattari sever the diagram from the Peircian framework of a representational semiotic - rendering it instead the agent of breakthrough of the regime of representation, and the construction of the new, where this “new” has no basis in, or possible subjection to, what has actually been.46 This is not a new that will, under certain conditions, sometime in the future be recognised and established (as Peirce’s diagrammatic futures one day will), but the new that “remains forever new”. This is a qualitatively new, that “calls forth forces in thought which are not the forces of recognition, today or tomorrow, but the powers of a completely other model”, one of pure difference “in-itself” (difference beyond/outside all identity), the encounter with which “strips thought of its ’inateness’, and treats it every time as something which has not always existed, but begins, forced and under constraint.”47

Thus, the diagram is put to work for the sake of a philosophy of difference “in-itself”, as the synthesiser or “modulator” of difference, in contrast to Peirce’s representational synthesiser of forms that refines and builds upon already established processes of thinking, and which projects possibility on the basis of what is (already established and known to be) possible. For Deleuze, “the problem is not to direct or methodically apply a thought which pre-exists in principle and in nature [which might be said to characterise the model Peirce
upholds], but to bring into being that which does not yet exist … To think is to create.”

However, whilst Peirce is explicit in his presentation of thought as diagrammatic, Deleuze is not. This difference should be taken less as a measure of the relative importance they attribute to the notion, but rather as a reflection of the differing ways in which they present their philosophical systems: in Peirce’s case, an “organic” systematisation that attempts to move ever closer to increasing refinement and completion of itself encompasses precise, and consistent, exposition of diagrammatics; in Deleuze’s case, an “open” system, supporting on-going conceptual creation that forbids any “essentialising” self-presentation, or, re-presentation of it, forces from the “reader” a re-construction of diagrammatics from the various instances of its appearance in his work. Whereas we were able to re-present Peirce’s own pronouncements on the diagram, practising a consistency with the representational tenor of his system, and indeed, with his definition of diagrams as representing the representational processes of thought, Deleuze forces us to produce a construction beyond his own explicit pronouncements—something which, again, is consistent with his view that philosophy and its concepts should not be reflected on, but used, and put to work on a “line of flight” that displaces them from their “origins”; of philosophy as a creative rather than re-productive or communicative enterprise, and his definition of the diagram as a map that does not represent, even something real, but functions to create a new kind of reality, a reality “yet to come”. And it is precisely such a view—of a creative practice of philosophy deforming its inherited history - that is indubitably put to work in Deleuze’s unfaithful reworking of Peirce’s diagramatism.

The notion that insists, without explicit presentation, in Deleuze’s philosophy that the creation, or genesis of thought is diagrammatic is one which thus requires an elaboration beyond exegesis. The new reality “yet to come” is as it is for Peirce, a new thought reality. But in contrast to Peirce’s ideal reality, it is a reality that is immanent to the matter of real experience.

We encounter Deleuze’s diagram, with its “distinct role, irreducible to neither the icon or the symbol” in three key texts: A Thousand Plateaus (1980), Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation (1981), and Foucault (1986). Across these texts, the diagram is presented as the agent of a construction that involves a destruction of existing “givens” and the production of the “new”. In A Thousand Plateaus, it is “a map of [the forces beneath] what is blocked” or “overcoded” in a regime of signs, that permits “original interactions”, and “plays a piloting role”. In Francis Bacon, after Bacon’s own description of his process of painting, it is “the operative set of asignifying and nonrepresentative lines and zones, line-strokes and color-patches” that catastrophises the visual givens of painting and permits the emergence of new “possibilities of fact” in the form of a “figure”. In Foucault, after Foucault’s own reference to the diagram as “that which makes power-relations function”, it is “the map of relations between forces”. In this reading of Foucault, Deleuze further conceptualises the diagram as the synthesiser of thought, where thinking is no longer “the innate exercise of a faculty, but must happen to thought”; that “does not depend on an interiority uniting the visible and the utterable but takes place under the intrusion of the outside that curves the interval” in “the formless disjunction” where the diagram acts, as thought’s genetic element.

This reading of Foucault’s diagram suggests that Deleuze’s semiotic conception of the diagram is—as it is too for Peirce - inseparable from a certain conception of thought. For both thinkers, thought happens in signs. But the notion of an “a-signifying” semiotics—to which diagrammatic agency is for Deleuze central - would have been unintelligible to Peirce. Asignification functions to explode the proliferation of meaning permitted and legitimated by structures and processes of reference, and to subvert the possibility of communication, “which only works under the sway of opinions in order to create ‘consensus’”. A-signifying signs do not refer and re-produce; they produce. Thus, asignification is incorporated into an expanded concept of the sign. Whilst for Peirce, the sign is a “representamen”, with “representative quality”, for Deleuze, signs “are not signs of a thing; they are signs of the passages of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, they mark a certain threshold
crossed in the course of these movements”; the sign is “what flashes across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparates”—a “communication” that, again, is an a-signifying relation, a new order of communication that bears no allegiance to common sense, or to an already existing community of thinkers. Deleuze’s definition of the diagram as the “height of abstraction, but also the moment at which abstraction becomes real”56 could have been taken from Peirce - and indicates their shared constructivist position (that reality becomes real through a construction). But for Deleuze this “abstraction” does not entail schematic simplification of the formal outlines of a problem, and this “reality” has no basis in, or resemblance to any previous reality (whether conceived, or existing). “Abstraction” designates rather the intensive (differential, prior to the distinction interior/exterior), “machinic” (immanently and non-deterministically functional) and genetic (immanently creative/constructive) plane of forces that “precedes” formalisation and from which “a real that is yet to come, a new type of reality” emerges. Deleuze’s diagram acts as an “abstract machine”, a “pure Matter-function” with no form or substance of its own, impelled not by a problem posed to the form of thought that can recognise it as a provisional and subjective moment in the progressive elaboration of our knowledge (as it is in Peirce’s diagrammatism), but rather by the encounter with pure difference/intensity that forces a creation that affirms it, violently projecting thought onto a plane beyond that of its own natural progression.

This genesis of thought has a transcendental element, where transcendental designates the plane of the real in its “exceptional conditions” of pure difference. That is, whilst immanent to “real” experience (the diagram is “entirely oriented toward an experimentation [or experience] in contact with the real”58 it concerns a genesis that invests the intensive, and transcendental, forces of the “outside” (the “nonthought within thought”)59 as the conditions for a “new” reality.

Whilst Peirce’s diagrammatic thought expands thought beyond what is immediately self-evident to it by constructing mediated possibilities on the basis of what is inherently possible for thought, Deleuze’s diagram is a construction of new possibilities that explode that which inhere in thought, explode thought as a form of inheritance, and forces thought on a “line of flight” with the “outside” (the intensive “outside” of pure difference). “To think is always to follow the witch’s flight” on the plane of “machinic” intensities/forces, of unliveable possibilities that could not have been projected on the basis of what already exists, and shatters what thought can already think. A “thought without image” is opposed to the thought with image that recognizes itself in the act of thinking and subjects thinking to a self-grounding in its representational activity. This “thought without image” is a “thought which is born in thought, the act of thinking which is neither given by innateness nor presupposed by reminiscence but engendered in its genitality”, a thought that thinks only by means of difference around a point of ungrounding.60 Deleuze’s constructivism expresses this genesis of thought (reminding us that his interest in Peirce is from the very perspective of the genesis of signs). “Constructivism requires every creation to be a construction on a plane that gives it an autonomous existence.” Thought as creation (construction) of the “autonomous” new (that which has liberated itself from all allegiance to a ground, and persists independently of those who have or will experience it) is posited against thought as reflection in its own image.

Within such a framework, the diagram functions as the antithesis of the image—which, in its iconic character, Peirce’s diagram very much remains. Peirce’s diagram constructs and upholds an image of thought that is superimposed onto an actual reality “outside” of thought. This, we recall, is what constitutes Peirce’s idealism - diagrammatic construction is ideal, even if for it to attain meaning, it must bear a relation to experience, a relation that will be tested in order to refine the reasoning process. It is speculative rather than actual. It is conceivable, but has no actual existence. This idealism is of course the ground, and destination of Peirce’s pragmatic project—for “pragmatism” is, we recall, defined as “the theory that a conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies exclusively in its conceivable [but not actual] bearing upon the conduct of life”.65
Deleuze’s critique of thought as a form of interiority motivates his severance of the diagram from the Peircean category of the icon. For images or icons, he tells us, are produced through an “interior molding” where relations are subordinated to the form of resemblance. Diagrams, however, produce resemblance through “non-resembling means”, through a pure modulation of relations that creates a “sensible” or “aesthetic” rather than a formal resemblance, an “aesthetic analogy”. As such, what Deleuze refers to as “the analogical language of the diagram” is markedly distinct to the form of analogy that characterises Peirce’s diagram. Peirce’s diagram formalises analogy, rendering analogy—as similitude—the ground of future determination. But Deleuze’s diagram constructs new relations whose analogy to their “object” is “sensible” and material, rather than formal.

Thus, in Francis Bacon’s paintings we find the diagram acting as the informal zone of experimentation that permits new relations between “matter-forces” to construct the form of the new (the figure). However, though it ultimately assumes new form (for otherwise, it would remain a “formless and unproductive mess”). It is as a diagram of “sensation” that the diagram functions; its diagrammatic traits are “traits of sensation, but of confused sensations”. Sensation is the differential ground of diagrammatic construction—not as the sense-data of given experience, but rather as the unlivable “being of sensation” that comprises the matter of a transcendental empiricism that generates new thought.

Such a transcendental empiricism is distinguished from ordinary empiricism in so far as it does not pertain to sense-data (in their formalised status as qualities) but rather to the passage of sensation through unformed matter. Transcendental empiricism “does not refer to any object nor belong to any subject (empirical representation) … It is certainly not the element of sensation (simple empiricism) … rather, it is the passage from one sensation to another, however close two sensations may be, but as becoming, as an increase or decrease in power”. This becoming of sensation, this “pure” relationality, furnishes “the conditions under which something new is produced (creativity)”, conditions that are “no wider than the real” (the transcendental is not transcendent) but which are not given in ordinary experience as qualitative sensible data, but experienced as the intensive relations of forces. Whence Deleuze’s attribution to (a superior/transcendental) empiricism of the motto: relations are external to terms (whereas for Peirce, relations are always dependent on the terms they relate).

This diagrammatic constructivism is not a methodical process, if by method we understand a form of control possessed by the common sense of the thinker in advance of thinking, and superimposed onto the “matter” of what thought thinks. According to such a definition Peirce’s diagram is, precisely, the methodical regulation of the process of thinking as logical reasoning. Logic is “the theory of self-controlled, or deliberate, thought”, and the problem of thought must be solved through method, projected by the voluntary act of reason. But Deleuze’s diagrammatism is not a voluntary exercise: it is instead an involuntary synthesis of difference. Experimentation is not methodical. For Deleuze, thought is forced in a “violent encounter” with the differentials of sensation that constitute the matter-force of the real, but which as intensities cannot be experienced under normal, “lived” conditions and are imperceptible to an empirical exercise of the faculties. Under the exceptional circumstances of an “encounter” with “free or untamed states of difference in itself”, sensibility “finds itself before the level of a transcendental exercise”, an exercise that reciprocally determines the real sensible “object” and a sensing “subjectivity”. Transcendental empiricism pertains to the discovery of the conditions of the given, “that by which the given is given”—difference in-itself. But Peirce’s constructivism is grounded on the given possibilities of thought.

For Deleuze, it is the encounter with the “pure being of sensation” that impulses conceptual creation as a singular thought, with no basis for consensus. Whereas Peirce’s diagrammatism produces a reassuring continuity of thought, oriented towards a community of “ideal” reasoning subjects, sharing common faculties, and shared forms of experience (against which the conclusions of diagrammatism will be tested), Deleuze’s diagrammatism ruptures such continuity, and has no subject already waiting. It rather forces a new “subject” to be adequate to the reality it constructs on a transcendental field—the pure a-subjective, pre-reflective, impersonal stream of pre-consciousness without a self—a reality that has no coincidence with lived experience, projecting us beyond what we had thought was possible to live.
Thus, Deleuze’s diagram and Peirce’s diagram reflect two contrasting notions of thought: thought as a process of discipline, regulation and control that reasoning subjects enact (Peirce), and thought as violent encounter that happens to us in the groundless encounter with difference (Deleuze); thought as grounded in the possibilities of thought as it already knows and recognises itself, and as the conditioning of a possible future continuous with its present form (Peirce), and thought as a creative and violent destruction of thought in its present form for the sake of a new image of a thought without image (Deleuze); thought as pragmatic experimentation for the sake of the determination of real effects through their conception (Peirce), and thought as an experimentation that effects a new possibility of pragmatism as the transformation of the existing state of liveable affairs in the genesis of the hitherto unthinkable new that shatters the experience of continuity as lived time (Deleuze). These distinctions between Peirce’s and Deleuze’s diagrammatism bear important consequences for the nature of the “future” that is determined in each case—which we shall now, in conclusion, explore.

4. DIAGRAMMATIC FUTURES: SPECULATIVE RHETORIC/CONSTRUCTIVISM

For both Deleuze and Peirce, the function of the diagram is to “determine” a future reality. But there are here, and not unexpectedly, two distinct notions of the future: a speculative (conceived but not actual) future in Peirce’s case, and a constructed future in Deleuze’s (as the intensive, differential reality of the present).

What Peirce calls the “compelling design” of the diagram renders it the principle agent of that branch of semiotic method he calls “speculative rhetoric”. The “highest and most living branch of logic”, the function of speculative rhetoric is to ascertain the formal conditions of a sign’s effects, “to ascertain the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another”.

That is, speculative rhetoric pertains to the way in which signs determine, through law, their future effects. Futurity is the destination of Peirce’s semiotics: indeed, “the conclusion of a Reasoning proper must refer to the Future”. It is insofar as the diagram is the method of discovering such laws that it is seen as the agent of this speculation. As such, diagrammatic constructivism is for Peirce speculative—it speculates on a general form of the future through the construction of laws. What might be called “diagrammatic speculation” thus pertains to the futurity of signs in their continuing effectiveness, a futurity which assumes a general form, and is conceived, ideal, and hypothetical, rather than actual (although of course the great Peircian hope is that one day, in the ideal circumstances, and when we have had time to undertaken sufficient experimentation, it will become actual).

Speculative rhetoric concerns the sign’s “power of appealing to a mind, that is, of their reference in general to interpretants”, where the interpretant is the destination or effect of the sign. For Peirce’s sign is, we recall, tripartite—it “is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign.” The interpretant, the “third” element of semiosis, in turn acts as a sign/representamen (a first), to determine another interpretant (another third), through the Some object (a second)—and so on apparently till infinity (but actually up until the final interpretant is reached). Peirce’s semiotic is a dynamic, continuous and ongoing process of the determination of meaning grounded in the presupposed law of similitude.

As the study of the determination of the futurity of signs, of their interpretants, speculative rhetoric concerns the sign’s thirness. By this is meant that mode of being of law, which consists in the fact that future relations (or “facts of secondness”) “will take on a determinate general character”. Thirness is that future effect which is determined by the diagrammatic process. This, we recall, constitutes the constructive aspect of the diagram. Beyond its character as a representation of relations (a second), it is, in its construction of new relations, its experimental addition of a “May-be” to a given premise, a determination (through the substantiation of the form of relations) of a future conclusion as law-giver. The function of the diagram is to determine what general effects can be determined, through laws, given certain conditions (the conditions we know, or will come to know, all about, since the diagram is of our own creation.)
This diagrammatic experimentation is conducted within the regime of the possible—the possibilities that thought can in its present form think. It concerns the sign’s capacity to determine an interpretant, making no claims as to actuality—what individuals actually think. The future that the diagram speculatively infers, the future that can be thought, is predictable on the basis of what is thinkable, and will be similar to it—what should be thinkable through the constructions of diagrams. The possible future is determined by and grounded upon present actualities of thought (the actual conclusions of reasoning) attained through diagrammatic constructivism in the present. Thirdness imparts a quality to reactions in the future by “moulding in conformity with the form of a proposition [produced in the present]—a form which is constructed through diagrams”. It is because of this conformism to ideal constructions, because it is assumed that the future is continuous with the present, and because it is assumed that thinking subjects can all think in the same way, that the diagram can be believed to compel assent amongst interpreting subjects in the future.

Diagrammatic speculation concerns the control—generated in the present—of future conduct. It is a means too of escaping the past actualities of existence that haunt our memory and over which we have no control (insofar as, in Peirce’s understanding here, memory is involuntary). Indeed, “the only controllable conduct is Future conduct.” And that which in the Future “is not amenable to control are the things that we shall be able to infer, or should be able to infer under favourable circumstances [or conditions].” The function of the diagram, and its “strategic design”, is to effect this purchase over the future. As the conclusion of reasoning, the future is a general form, a formal possibility that, though it may “little resemble even the perceptual facts”, and whose coincidence with the “matter” of future cases remains to be tested, does resemble conceived facts.

Deleuze’s theory of the diagrammatic production of the future as qualitatively new rejects this formal determinism, and mediation, of speculation. Whence his rejection of the Peircian category of the interpretant—his rejection of the perspective of representation, mediation, grounding, speculative finality and common sense in favour of a genetic perspective, that considers the sign’s productivity through the diagrammatic construction of relations from asignifying sign-matter. Whilst for Peirce, the sign is a “representamen”, with “representative quality”, for Deleuze, signs “are not signs of a thing; they are signs of the passages of deterritorialization and reterritorialization” - the deterritorialization of common sense and the reterritorialization of new sense produced in the affirmation of asignifying difference, a new order of communication that bears no allegiance to common sense, or to an already existing community of thinkers. And the new here is not a general form, but the affirmation of that which is irreducibly singular in the matter of experience.

For both Peirce and Deleuze, to think is to determine—but whereas for Peirce, this determination is a means of controlling our future in accordance with our projections constructed in the present, for Deleuze, thought is a determination of the new from the immanent affirmation of difference that destroys the present form, or image, of thought. Determination here is at once (reciprocally) of matter and the (new) form of the real—an immanent genesis that bypasses the problem of the dualism of idealism and empiricism that Peirce’s diagrammatism, despite its heroic attempts to the contrary, ostensibly retains (that is, the problem of how the ideal coincides with the empirical), by investing as its source pure difference/intensity in the disjunction between the sensible and the conceptual. For Peirce, the control of the Future is effected through the projection of our reasoned thought. But for Deleuze, the experience of the Future as the new happens to us, and is something over which we have no voluntary control, and, indeed, excludes the self. Peirce’s future is always deferred—it is what will happen “given a certain set of conditions”. But Deleuze’s new future is experienced now, in the transcendental encounter with difference that raises us beyond the lived coordinates of the present.

Peirce’s speculative future is mediated. His diagram is a mediating third, acting between forms—the form of the past and the form of the future, which are separated by the continuous line of time. But Deleuze’s diagram can only be thought of as a “third” in a peculiar way—as intensive agency rather than mediation - that is, not between two forms situated on the plane of representation, and separated by time as chronological unfurling, but functioning on an intensive, transcendental plane of forces. Deleuze’s diagrammatic determination takes place not as mediation but as the groundless and unmediated repetition of force. The diagram is the “immanent
cause” that enacts “the power of repetition as a machinic force”. Diagrammatic synthesis of difference takes place as repetition—but not as the repetition as voluntary control (Peirce’s methodical control over the diagram, where we rationally “select the features of the diagram which it will be pertinent to pay attention to”) but as the affirmation of the intensive difference that makes itself return against all control and method, as “a power which affirms itself against the law, which works underneath laws, perhaps superior to laws”: repetition as the return of an original chance encounter with difference.

Deleuze’s diagrammatic synthesis as affirmation of difference challenges law, denouncing its “nominal or general character in favour of a more profound and more artistic reality”. Diagrammatic synthesis produces a singular reality as the impersonal affirmation of the differential being of sensation in a process (rather than the domain of actual works of art) whose forms are not determined in advance. The diagrammatic violence of sensation is an act, not a product, a shock of multiplicity that fractures the subject’s purchase on time. So in his affirmation of the chance eruptions of pure matter-forces of paint, in his creation of a new figure from his diagrams, Francis Bacon becomes an artist, or more precisely, a “cosmic artisan”, leaving “the milieus and the earth”—the terrain of the lived—behind to become the bearer of a new world. Chance is affirmed as a construction accompanying destruction. The new is not sketched in the present, and projected as a conceived form (as a formal design of a product to come)—it emerges now, in the act of diagramming that splits the emerging from the lived and formed present.

Peirce’s diagram functions, precisely, as a sketch of what will one day come, given thought’s natural progression. It is never fully actually embodied: its laws are how “an endless future must continue to be”. Thought is an ongoing process of self-determination, reflecting an evolutionary model premised on the presupposition that the universe is “progressing from a state of all but pure chance to a state of all but complete determination by law”. This progressive movement of thought is grounded in a final interpretant, which, whilst never attained, would be “the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered.” It is the projected existence of this final interpretant, or truth, that protects Peirce’s system from the threat of infinitely substitutable meaning. For through it we are given to understand that there is one destiny of thought, which unites thinking subjects, driving and imparting purpose to their collective thought and action.

But for Deleuze, the very idea of thought’s progress would be a betrayal of its chance encounters with difference; the very notion of a conceivable destiny as a continuation of what we already know abhorrent. Instead, chance is the first moment of a rupture with the form of thought as custom, and all that can be thought, the moment of a radical discontinuity when thought is seized by the intensive forces of the unthought outside, and generated in a new form through a diagrammatic map of a destiny hitherto unconceivable. There is no deferral to an anticipated speculative future here, but the emergence all at once of the new. The future is now, coextensive with the event of construction—a creation in the present that splits the time of the now or the current from the lived present in which we exist as historical agents - the experience of which generates new coordinates of life.

Peirce’s diagrammatic projection of the form of the future “turns upon the perception of generality and continuity at every step.” It is a progressive process, laid out in a linear and continuous time. And, as an evolutionary conception of thought, it is part of a lived history, where this “history” is understood as the ongoing and communal summation of our thought processes. The rational agent is a historical agent, inscribed in the shared thought processes of his predecessors, and speculating for a future agent who shares his own. He is subjected to history, and the reasoning processes that are constructed for all time. But Deleuze’s diagram breaks through the historical continuity of forms and the linear time it presupposes, and “when it constitutes points of creation or potentiality it does not stand outside history but is instead always “prior to” history.” This “prior” is not chronological anecedence. Whereas Peirce’s diagram projects the future through a law that casts the form of the Same through linear, continuous, and chronological time, Deleuze’s diagram ejects the future under the force of an exceptional event, throwing time out of joint, drawing together the before and the after into the deranged circle of affirmation.
This is the polemical horizon, whose consequences demand further exploration, of Deleuze’s diagrammatic thought - a thought of the new beyond history, through which we become agents of critique and creation, cosmic artisans acting not in the name of what we already are as circumscribed by the labour of history, but acting under the impulse of a shock, for an unknowable but experiencable time to come. It is here, in the excesses of the diagrammatic construction of the new in a now that catastrophises the lived present and the future that would naturally unfold from it, here, in a diagrammatic empiricism where a new reality is experienced to make sense now without needing to wait for a deferred future to acquire meaning, here in a diagrammatic transformation of the lived that splices through the burdensome continuity of lived suppositions and liveable possibilities - that we perhaps encounter the most profound consequences of Deleuze’s reworking of Peirce’s diagram—the conquest of time.
NOTES

1. Here, and throughout the paper unless otherwise specified, the nomination “Deleuze” includes the joint work with Guattari, indicating the theoretical continuity of the latter with the work authored by Deleuze alone.
4. “Thought is the chief, if not the only, mode of representation.” CP 4:418
6. Peirce described his philosophy as “the attempt of a physicist to make such conjectures as to the constitution of the universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that has been done by previous philosophers.” CP 1:7. “Philosophy, as I understand the word is a positive theoretical science, and a science in an early stage of development” CP 5:61. “Philosophy ought to be deliberate and planned out” CP 1:179.
7. CP 6:490. Peirce defines pragmatism as follows: “consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your conception of the object.” CP 5:438
8. CP 3:191; CP 1:444.
11. CP 4:530
12. CP 2:145
14. CP 1:53
15. One of three types—the other two being an index and a symbol. EP 2:460-461.
16. A “...a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic representamen may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. Hypoicons may be roughly divided according to the mode of Firstness of which they partake. Those which partake of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors.” EP 2:273.
17. EP 2:13
18. CP 4:233.
22. CP 2:267; CP 7:204.
24. CP 2:444.
25. CP 4:431
26. “My Final Interpretant is ... the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect ...the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered. The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends.” Letter to Lady Welby, Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby. Eds. Charles S. Hardwick,
27. EP 2:442; 2:274
29. CP 2:54. Peirce’s idealism may be defined as “the metaphysical doctrine that the real is of the nature of thought; the doctrine that all reality is in its nature psychical.” EP 1: xxiv. “There is nothing but lack of time, of perseverance, an of activity of mind to prevent our asking the requisite experiments to ascertain positively whether a given [ideal] combination occurs or not.” CP 3:527
30. CP 4:531; CP 4:418
31. Peirce, *Philosophical Writings*, 290-301
33. EP 1:111.
34. EP 2:331.
35. CP 4:316.
36. EP 2:212
37. “We believe the proposition we are ready to act upon,” CP 1:635
41. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 29. Deleuze and Guattari see pragmatics not as “a complement to logic, syntax, or semantics”, but, on the contrary, as “the fundamental element upon which all the rest depend”. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, Trans. Brian Massumi. London: Athlone, 148. A regime of signs is irreducible to the structural constants and “superlinearity” of linguistic categories.
42. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 30. “Linguistic signs are perhaps the only ones to constitute a pure knowledge, that is, to absorb and reabsorb the whole content of the image as consciousness or appearance. They do not let any material that cannot be reduced to an utterance survive, and hence reintroduce a subordination of semiotics to a language system.”
43. Deleuze, *Cinema 1*, 71; Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 531, n41.
44. There has been little sustained critical work, and to my mind, much misinterpretation of Deleuze’s concept of the diagram. The work of Éric Alliez on diagrammatic transdisciplinarity and a diagrammatic regime of contemporary art (cf. “Ontology of the diagram and Biopolitics of Philosophy. A Research program in transdisciplinarity” *Deleuze Studies* 7:4 (May 2013), and “Diagrammatic Agency vs Aesthetic Regime of Contemporary Art”, *Deleuze Studies* 6:1 (Feb 2012)), is an important exception. Both Jakub Zdebík (*Deleuze and the Diagram: Aesthetic Threads in Visual Organization*. London: Continuum, 2012), and John Mullarkey (*Post-Continental Philosophy*. London, New York: Continuum, 2006) misunderstand the diagram as a visual map/graphic image. Mullarkey describes it as a “philosophical drawing” that does “metaphilosophical work as a moving outline that takes both a transcendent view (representing immanence) while also remaining immanent”, that can be used to outline a particular philosophical system and the “parallels and non-parallels” between philosophical systems. (Mullarkey, 9). But it is precisely for the sake of a thought of immanence liberated from any “transcendent view”, Deleuze conceives of the diagram as a map of new concepts/thought, whose function is not to summarize/reflect, but to act as a pilot. As such, it is fully in contact with the material plane of the real, and has no (visual, or other) form of its own. Manual deLanda has rightly stressed the non-visual characteristic of Deleuze’s diagram, in his “Deleuze, Diagrams and the Genesis of Form”, *American Studies* 45:1, 2000.
45. “Indexes, icons and symbols seem to us to be distinguished by territoriality-determinational relations, not signifier-signified relations.” Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 531, n41. Peter Osborne is right to point out that this is a misreading of Peirce, since by including the tertiary category of the interpretant, Peirce augments/supplements the binary structure of the signified-signifier. *Philosophy in Cultural Theory*. New York: Routledge, 2000, 49.
49. On open systems, “systems based on interactions, rejecting only linear forms of causality and transforming the notion of time”, see Deleuze, *Negotiations*. Columbia University Press, 1997, 31-32
51. Whereas Deleuze’s most explicit discussion of a philosophy of difference as the problem of thought is to be found in his early works—such as *Difference and Repetition* - the concept of the diagram, and the notion of constructivism, manifests
explicitly only after the commencement of his collaboration with Guattari. However, I argue that the name “diagram” is given to the synthesizer of difference for which Deleuze had no explicit name in his earlier texts. As such, I read a continuity of the later works with Guattari with Deleuze’s early works.
52. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 141-6
55. Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 125
57. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 146
58. Deleuze, *Foucault*, 35
60. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 167. A primary target of Deleuze’s critique of a “thought with image” is, of course, Kant –indubitably a figure of great importance for Peirce (who in fact compares his diagram to the Kantian schema, a comparison also made—as distinct—by Deleuze (CP 2.385, 5.531; “Michel Foucault’s Main Concepts”, 251)). Indeed, the distinctions made in this paper between Peirce and Deleuze in many ways can be understood with respect to their positions with respect to Kant—a topic that demands further consideration.
62. CP 5.412.
63. Deleuze, *Francis Bacon*, 117
64. “Immanence: a life”, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 384
65. Dialogues, vii
67. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, xx, 140
68. CP 2:108; CP2:229
69. EP 2:359
70. CP 1.559
72. CP 2:228
73. A fuller treatment of this dynamic process of interpretation would demand closer study of Peirce’s three types of interpretants: immediate, dynamic and final.
74. CP1:26; CP 1.536-537; CP 1:356.
75. CP 1.343
76. EP 2:359
77. This distinction between Peirce’s speculation (or speculative constructivism) and Deleuze’s construction is used strategically to underscore Deleuze’s distinction from Peirce, and the way in which their two systems conceive of the production of the future. I propose to understand speculation here as future projected on the basis of present possibility, in contrast to the groundlessness of Deleuze’s construction. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze shows how Nietzsche critiques the (Hege- lian) idea of speculation in favour of “dramatization”. Whereas speculative propositions bring a proposition into play from the point of view of dialectically-inflected form, a dramatic proposition supplants the absolute determination of speculation with “relative determinations which correspond to the forces entering into synthesis with or in the idea” being problematized: “the dramatic proposition is synthetic, therefore essentially pluralist, typological and differential.” *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 152; “For the speculation element of negation, opposition or contradiction Nietzsche substitutes the practical element of difference, the object of affirmation and enjoyment” 9.
78. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 89
79. Insofar as Deleuze’s constructivism involves determinism, and not a “pure flow”, insofar as the real is constructed, and not “immediately given”, Deleuze indeed does engage—contrary to Peter Osborne’s assertions—with the question of how “to live another kind of life”, beyond the mediation within this life that Peirce’s subject remains circumscribed by. *Osborne Philosophy in Cultural Theory*, 51-52
80. EP 2:197. *Peirce on Signs*, 244
81. For power as “a third element”, see Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 174
82. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 498
83. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 3. We are here reading diagrammatic determination through Deleuze’s assimilation of Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return as the affirmation of difference. I see the diagram—as the synthesizing affirmator
of chance that produces the future—as functioning as what Deleuze calls, in *Difference and Repetition*, the “third synthesis of time”—the time of the future that he formulates through Nietzsche’s eternal return. More work needs to be done on the notion of the diagram as the agent of this synthesis of the future. *Difference and Repetition*, 54-55.

85. CP 1:536-537
88. EP 1:207
89. Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 141-2