human-in-the-last-instance?
the concept of "man"
between foucault and
laruelle\textsuperscript{1}
thomas sutherland and elliot patsoura

Si l’Être est surhumain, l’Un est l’homme condamné à l’humain.
—François Laruelle, “Mon Parménide”\textsuperscript{2}

Élisabeth Roudinesco identifies the publication of Foucault’s *The Order of Things* (hereafter OT) in April, 1966 with the point of “entry of the mass media on the stage of theory.” “Journalists,” she notes, “would soon feel authorized to transform structuralist intellectuals into charismatic stars, glorifying—or stigmatizing—the complexity of discourses they in any event referred to as ‘esoteric’.”\textsuperscript{3} Within this novel arrangement, the closing lines of OT—infamously signalling an imminent “death of man” with the wager that man would soon “be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea”\textsuperscript{4}—offered an easily consumable encapsulation of the text’s anti-humanist sentiment, taking root in the sympathetic context of 1960s Paris, and in turn catapulting Foucault’s image above headlines screaming of “the greatest revolution since existentialism.”\textsuperscript{5}
Although Foucault’s subsequent position as the most prominent figure of French anti-humanism was due in no small part to the media’s uptake of the “death of man,” within a year he would come to take issue with the concept’s development into “something of a slogan,” indissociable from what he would later term “the most difficult, the most tiresome book [he] ever wrote.” In becoming such a slogan, the concept had been so dislocated from Foucault’s complex discussion that he entertained withdrawing OT altogether from further publication. In a telling interview given in 1967, Foucault found himself forced to remind a largely adoring public that whilst “[i]t is obvious that in saying [… that man has ceased to exist I absolutely did not mean that man, as a living or social species, has disappeared from the planet.” He became “increasingly irritated by the uncomprehending enthusiasm of his large new public,” but also “by the equally uncomprehending animosity of a growing number of critics.” That Jean-Paul Sartre was key amongst these critics indicates the high stakes of the debate surrounding the death of man. In what was to become a public tête-à-tête between the two most prominent representatives of the respectively humanist and anti-humanist schools of thought, Sartre responded to OT in an interview published in L’Arc, attempting to figure his own project as having already declared, after Marx, the death of man as a “sort of substantial I.” In turn, he cast Foucault as not only having missed the boat by quite a long shot, but failing to account for Sartre’s own figuration of the subject as surging negativity.

Foucault, perhaps rueing his decision to remove late passages directly criticizing Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason from the final manuscript of OT, drew on the latter in repeatedly casting Sartre in the mould of the “19th century philosopher,” “vehemently dissociat[ing] himself from Sartre and his era” in a 1968 interview, and in particular with the manner “in which a philosophical text, a theoretical text, finally had to tell you what life, death, and sexuality were, if God existed or not, what freedom consisted of, what had to do in political life, how to behave in regard to others and so forth.” The notion of man in this debate thus remained less an explicitly contested notion than an empty cavity, open for each participant to fill with their particular formulations so as to in turn chastise the other side. “[T]he debate about the death of man,” as Béatrice Han-Pile notes, “was not a genuine dialog but rather a case of philosophers talking (voluntarily or not) at cross purposes.” It was then notable for “provid[ing] a contrario insight into the nature of real philosophical exchange” as nothing more than “an exercise in solipsism”—a point that the conclusion to Foucault’s subsequent book, The Archaeology of Knowledge, illustrates most strikingly, in its staging of a dialogue “as
a kind of drama: an extended encounter between a figure who is clearly Foucault, and a hostile interlocutor” clearly identifiable as Sartre.14

The contemporary intervention of the “non-humanism” of François Laruelle into this debate on the death of man (which must be marked as a highly gendered and largely obsolete term within Anglophone scholarship, albeit one that still retains a great deal of philosophical and historiographical import) takes as its point of departure both this particular insufficiency of the philosophical approach to the question of man, and the dictatorial aspect of philosophy itself. In his essay ‘A Rigorous Science of Man’ from his so-called Philosophy II period, Laruelle grounds his approach in the axiomatic assertion that man is a priori foreclosed to philosophy as an object of thought, leaving each philosophical attempt to appropriate him as merely symptomatic of an age-old attempt to appropriate a real lying outside its purview. Laruelle instead explicitly refuses to “confus[e] the end of man with the decomposition of humanism,”15 by developing a “rigorous science of man” concerned with the description of “phenomena lived by ordinary man, phenomena that are invisible, in principle, to philosophy”.16 It is the task of this article to consider Laruelle’s non-philosophical intervention by detailing Laruelle’s position vis-a-vis both sides of the humanism/anti-humanism “divide.” It will focus in particular on Laruelle’s relation to the Foucauldian critique, which probably remains the most prominent instance of anti-humanism.

FRENCH ANTI-HUMANISM

The roots of the distinct notion of humanism at stake in these developments can arguably be traced back as far as the Age of Enlightenment, although they are perhaps more clearly manifest in the left-Hegelianism of Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx (especially in the latter’s concepts of labour alienation and species-being as they occur in his so-called “early works”). However, its modern continental architect is clearly Sartre, whose phenomenological account of existence effectively rescues and reappropriates theological attributes that were once given to God exclusively so that it might establish the preeminent freedom of man, the individual human being. Sartre himself traces this legacy of humanism back to the work of René Descartes, who he claims provides “a splendid humanistic affirmation of creative freedom, which [...] forces us to assume a fearful task, our task par excellence, namely, to cause a truth to exist in the world, to act so that the world is true.”17
Equating freedom and creation, in arguing that divine freedom “is pure productivity [...] the extra-temporal and eternal act by which God brings into being a world,” Sartre suggests that it is precisely this freedom which forms the foundation of all truth. The guiding principle of humanism, he declares, is that “man is the being as a result of whose appearance a world exists,” envisaging the human individual as constantly but futilely moving toward a state of completion: the *ens causa sui* of productive divinity. As Vincent Descombes notes, the “distinctive feature of humanism is this will to recovery and reappropriation of divine attributes, amongst them the most precious of all, the power to create and to ‘bring the world into existence’,” finding meaning and value in the freedom of the individual to take responsibility for their behaviour within the constraints of their own facticity, and thus emphasizing the originarity of existence over essence, understanding the latter as a continual project toward which one works, rather than a predetermined ideal from which one individuates. “[I]f God does not exist,” writes Sartre, “there is at least one being whose existence comes before its essence, a being before it can be defined by any conception of it.”

Sartre’s philosophy, enormously influential at the time—both within the intellectual milieu of France and in broader Western thought—draws upon the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger in order to describe what he considers a distinctly non-metaphysical, existentialist ontology. As he writes in *Being and Nothingness*, “ontology appears to us capable of being defined as the specification of the structures of being of the existent taken as a totality,” whereas metaphysics raises the question of “the existence of the existent,” such that the former merely attempts to describe the nature of being as it appears to consciousness, whilst the latter strives to explain the origin of such a structure. Yet, as we have seen, Sartre’s intense popularity also brought with it an acute scrutiny of his philosophy, beginning with Heidegger himself, who in the *Letter on Humanism* disavows Sartre’s interpretations, criticizing him for falling into the trap of understanding humanity as “determined with regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of the world, that is, of beings as a whole.”

For Heidegger, who argues that humanism proper actually first emerges in the Roman Republic, the self-proclaimed existentialism and humanism of Sartre’s project is at odds with his own fundamental ontology from which it is partly derived: the swapping of existence and essence from their traditional Platonic formulation is inadequate for escaping the strictures of metaphysics and onto-theology.
Heidegger writes, “the reversal of a metaphysical statement remains a metaphysical statement”—for it still suppresses the question of the destiny of Being, and masks the essence of man qua ek-sistence. Humanism, according to Heidegger’s account, universalizes a false image of man—following the tendency of all humanisms to presuppose “the most universal ‘essence’ of man to be obvious”—as an autonomous being, luxuriating in its own freedom. Heidegger, by contrast, attempts to think Dasein as necessarily shackled to the ecstatic time of ek-sistence, and thus thrown into specific social and historical circumstances over which it does not and cannot have full control.

In the aftermath of Heidegger’s rather pointed critique, a number of French philosophers (the cohort that we would typically now designate the structuralists and post-structuralists) leapt at the opportunity to denounce Sartre, the great intellectual star of the rive gauche, and more specifically to demonstrate the extent to which their own approaches were able to overcome the dogma of humanism. One might interpret such battles as symptomatic of the broader contestations by which the terrain of philosophical discourse is mapped out, an auto-warfare that challenges the dictates of individual philosophers in order to shore up the predominance of the philosophical discipline and modality of thought more broadly. Continually waged over the past two-and-a-half millennia, philosophers fall over themselves trying to prove their projects more radical than those of their competitors, and more drastic in their attempts to upset reified orthodoxies.

We can observe such anti-humanism in the structuralist Marxism of Louis Althusser, whose authoritative position within the aforementioned university gave him considerable theoretical sway over many ensuing students. Althusser opposed the trend toward theoretical anti-humanism that he witnessed occurring in the French Communist Party, describing it as an “ideological” rather than “scientific” concept, insofar as it “really does designate a set of existing relations,” but cannot “provide us with a means of knowing them.” He dismissed the newly translated Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844—which had enabled scholars and activists to embrace a vision of Marx as humanist, concerned with the alienation of man’s species-being through the brutality of labour—as yet another manifestation of the bourgeois idealism peddled by philosophers from Kant onward. Inasmuch as the Manuscripts justified the primacy of the autonomous human subject as a means for masking social relations and thus enabling the normalization of labour exploitation, Althusser rejected the Hegelian and Feuerbachian legacy of humanism within Marx’s early works.
Drawing instead on the “epistemological break” of Marx’s 1845 German Ideology, Althusser aspires to develop a scientific form of Marxism that comprehends the subject as an epiphenomenal product of larger ideological structures, and of a historical becoming-without-subject. As Knox Peden puts it, “Althusser’s heralding of science was less a return to a bygone positivism than the resurgence of a rationalism only briefly eclipsed during existentialism’s heyday in France,” adopting “Gaston Bachelard’s concept of the ‘epistemological break’ [...] to describe both the moment that Marx took leave of the ideological humanism of his youth for the science of Capital, as well as the moment that any given subject moves from the terrain of ideology to the discourse of science tout court.” The conceptualization of a self-contained, self-sufficient, and autonomous science, sundered from all socio-empirical exigencies, was in effect the return to an Enlightenment rationalism valorizing the theoretical sciences above all else.

Moving away from the directly political concerns of Althusser’s work, but with a similar focus upon the illusory nature of the humanist subject, Jacques Derrida’s post-structuralist anti-humanism declares that even Heidegger is unable to escape the impediments of the humanism that he condemns, for his thought is “guided by the motif of Being as presence [...] and by the motif of the proximity of Being to the essence of man,” such that “the thinking of the truth of Being, in the name of which Heidegger de-limits humanism and metaphysics, remains as thinking of man.” Heidegger’s attack on Sartre, in other words, remains within a metaphysics of presence that privileges the question of proximity between man and Being. Jacques Lacan (whose work on this question actually precedes that of Althusser), similarly denounces the notion of any self-present unity of the subject, instead foregrounding the scission that lies at the heart of subjectivity, and the according impossibility of unmediated reflection upon itself. Finally, Gilles Deleuze denounces “humanism’s exaltation of the human fact,” contending that the image of the self or ego is merely a stratified representation of a pure, uninhibited encounter with the sense that precedes it, and which forms the condition of real experience. In all of these accounts, humanism is criticized for its reification of man as a concept synonymous with a self-present interiority of thought, and the concomitant occlusion of those various forces (e.g. relations of production, discourse, difference, etc.) that these anti-humanist philosophers view as providing the conditions that precede and exceed such a concept.

The anti-humanism of Foucault’s OT continues this line of critical inquiry, attempting to identify the evident decomposition of humanism at the hands of
structuralism with that of a broader event occurring at the “archaeological” level of thought: the collapse of an epistemological configuration termed “man,” operative as the transcendental condition of Western thought since the time of Immanuel Kant’s so-called “Copernican turn.” According to Foucault, man emerged at the close of the eighteenth century in the form of an “empirico-transcendental doublet”: at once as an object whose empirical finitude was “understood synthetically from empirical observation about the nature of human beings as living or speaking entities,” and a subject to be located at “the point of origin of every type of knowledge,” whose transcendental finitude could only be “analytically deduced” from the “transcendental as standpoint.” To be seen in this doublet form, then, is a simultaneous separation and unification of its two elements—the empirical and the transcendental—what has been termed man’s fundamental “ambiguity.”

FOUCAULT AND THE DOUBLET

The emergence of man as doublet, placed at “the point of origin of every type of knowledge,” gives way to a newfound imposition of necessarily “interrogating man’s being as the foundation of all positivities,” the basis of which all knowledge could be constituted as immediate and non-problematized evidence.” But man was therefore also in a position to “become, a fortiori, that which justified the calling into question of all knowledge of man.” In the absence of an absolute transcendence within the ambiguous structure of the doublet, the transcendental remains to a certain degree “subject” to temporal subsumption by the empirical; that is, to a reversal in the critical formulation, whereby an empirical determination of man operates in the mode of a “pseudo-transcendental” condition of possibility of the transcendental itself.

According to Foucault, this potentiality manifests at the “surface level” in the problematic relation of the human sciences to that of science and philosophy respectively, in the form of a “double and inevitable contestation”:

that which lies at the root of the perpetual controversy between the sciences of man and the sciences proper—the first laying an invincible claim to be the foundation of the second, which are ceaselessly obliged in turn to seek their own foundation, the justification of their method, and the purification of their history, in the teeth of ‘psychologism’, ‘sociologism’, and ‘historicism’; and that which lies at the root of the endless controversy
between philosophy, which objects to the naïveté with which the human sciences try to provide their own foundation, and those same human sciences which claim as their rightful object what would formerly have constituted the domain of philosophy.\textsuperscript{38}

For Foucault, the “existence” and “untiring repetition” of these two particular relations between the human sciences and science and philosophy respectively “for more than a century, do not indicate the permanence of an ever-open question; they refer back to [man as] a precise and extremely well-determined epistemological arrangement in history.”\textsuperscript{39}

It is the ambiguity inherent in this arrangement that, most worryingly for Foucault, enables the human sciences to posit empirical determinations in the form of pseudo-transcendentals. As a result, insofar as each scientific endeavour is either subject to the foundational claim of the human sciences, or (in what amounts to the same) actively seeking to determine its own conditions through recourse to psychologism, sociologism, etc., the “danger” of “tumbling over into the domain occupied by the human sciences”—the “danger of [...] anthropologism” proper—is ever-present.\textsuperscript{40} Likewise, in the case of philosophy, its “dangerous familiarity” with the human sciences enables a transition from the traditional, critical form of the relation between the empirical and transcendental—maintaining the latter’s claim to epistemological determinacy, as seen in Kant’s first Critique—to that of an “impure,” anthropological mode that “makes epistemic determination ultimately dependent on its empirical, causal counterpart.”\textsuperscript{41}

Anthropologization, according to Foucault, is “the great internal threat to knowledge in our day” given its promotion of the empirical into the pseudo-transcendental, and its consequent rendering of the transcendental-empirical relation into one of vicious circularity.\textsuperscript{42} The death of man as the death of a (post-)Kantian epistemic structure is thus an event to be welcomed for its occlusion of the possibility of anthropologizing thought in the first instance. In later contending that “the ambiguity of man as both subject and object [...] no longer seem[ed ...] a fruitful hypothesis, a fruitful theme for research”, Foucault was clearly figuring OT to be the last text of its type: a final anti-humanist manifesto of sorts deployed against the forces of anthropologization, and so effective on the historical scale.\textsuperscript{43}

Now whilst OT gained much of its popular purchase from attempting to tie this particular configuration of philosophy, resultant from the recent invention of
“man” as doublet, to the local event of humanism’s decomposition, the reality of the situation (as Foucault’s subsequent minting in 1967 of modernity’s epistemological arrangement as “anthropologico-humanist” perhaps symptomatizes), is that the very relation between the problem of anthropologization and that of humanism was in fact very poorly articulated by Foucault, if at all. That is, despite its centrality to the “death of man” thesis, precisely how Foucault’s critique of the anthropologization of modern thought translated into an effective critique of humanism proper remains—somewhat ironically given the aforementioned centrality of the notion to the text’s spectacular uptake in the humanism/anti-humanism debate—almost entirely unaddressed by Foucault. As Han-Pile would have it, “The Order of Things has succeeded so well in narrowing the meaning of ‘man’ to the empirico-transcendental double that the gap between ‘man’ and its humanist incarnations seems fairly unbridgeable. Yet for Foucault’s critique of anthropology to bite on humanism, such a gap needs to be bridged.”

If one had failed to read Foucault’s tome closely, simply following (in the aforementioned terms of Roudinesco) the media’s widespread substitution of the complexity of its account for a glorification of its “esotericity,” and its drawing of a direct causal link in this manner, the intervention of the media onto the stage of theory meant that one was in all likelihood able to confidently identify the collapse of humanism with the death of man. On the other hand, Foucault’s failure to provide “any explicit account of how the various humanist conceptions of man” were in fact related to his own account of man as “epistemic structure,” as ambiguous doublet, meant that to have effectively engaged with the text was to come away with little to no determinate means with which to effectively bridge Foucault’s critique of philosophy’s subjection to modernity’s anthropological configuration and his immense dissatisfaction with humanism proper.

Within the charged socio-political context of 1960s Paris, it is clear how the former potentiality could override the latter. Despite the sheer difficulty and irregular structure of this “terrifically uncongenial” text—“rendering itself practically impenetrable to the lay reader”—OT offered an irresistible expansion of the sense of radicality to be enjoyed from participating in a revolt against the philosophical humanism so dominant at the time. Such revolt had, to be sure, pre-existed the publication of OT in various forms, yet OT seemed to allow such participation in the local downfall of humanism and the most important thinker of post-war France in Sartre, to be identified with that of the broader collapse of a nearly two hundred year old arrangement governing the entirety of the human sciences and
philosophy as such. A serious questioning of the theoretical tenability of such a relation would therefore be confronted at each point by a number of interested parties: a sympathetic “readership” rejoicing in a newfound, expanded sense of revolt; a mass media seriously invested in maintaining that relation and so entertaining (knowingly or otherwise) the slippage of the term “man” within a largely vacuous, sloganistic formulation; not to mention a newly famous author symptomatically casting the relation, as we’ve noted, as “anthropologico-humanist” in interviews subsequent to OT’s publication.

In the glaring absence of Foucault’s explicit discussion of the problem, Han-Pile identifies three potential approaches through which a bridge could be constructed, and their respective failures in each case. First, to entertain the idea of Foucault’s having misread the humanist account of man in a manner analogous to Sartre’s aforementioned misreading of the “man” of OT seems somewhat disingenuous or “premature.”

Second, to attempt to figure Sartrean man and OT’s man as in fact identical is even more problematic given, as we’ve seen, the wide disparity between the two notions. Finally, to have Foucault contend that humanism proper, and its conception of man in particular, remains determined by the epistemic structure that is “man,” faces three challenges.

Firstly, the “slippage” of anthropologization was shown by OT to be a “typical” but by no means “necessary” philosophical manoeuvre. Even though the aforementioned “contestation” between the human sciences and philosophy was, according to Foucault, “inevitable” under the epistemological arrangement of “man,” the option remained open at all times for philosophical abstinence from the “confusion of the empirical and the transcendental.” As Foucault’s earlier, posthumously published Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology—submitted in 1961 as a minor thesis and widely understood as the precursor to OT—illustrates, philosophy could and indeed did maintain itself in a critical rather than anthropologized mode (in the form of Kant’s first Critique) meaning that “there is no reason to think that the empirico-transcendental structure” in the form of doublet, “is intrinsically flawed” (a point Laruelle will seriously contest below).

It is thus important to note that Foucault’s approach remains in this sense a fundamentally critical one; that one must identify OT as an extension, an attempt to shore-up the fundamental components of the strictly critical modality of philosophy. Moreover, and at the risk of further saturating this case of the philosophical divide between humanism and anti-humanism with irony, Han-Pile points out that Sartre’s early phenomenology in fact constitutes “a type of humanism more aware of the
dangers of anthropology and keen to preserve the separation of the empirical and the transcendental.” A hermetic enclosure indeed.

Secondly, what Han-Pile identifies as the “implicit normativity of Foucault’s analysis,” or more precisely its vacillation between the neutral presentation of the “surface effects” of a given epistemological configuration, and an explicit isolation of humanism as the most pernicious of such surface effects—a gesture only further exaggerated in Foucault’s engagement with the media following the publication of *OT*—seriously problematizes the “apodictic” aspirations of Foucault’s archaeological approach and its findings, given that it leaves Foucault open to the humanist charge that he “did not practice what he preached, and that his discourse was no less normative than theirs.”

Finally, in utilizing the evident decomposition of humanism—“due in large measure to the structuralist development”—to substantiate the archaeological claim regarding the death of man as epistemic structure, Foucault falls into a viciously circular argument. He cannot deduce this demise from the mutation of Western thought’s epistemic structure, so far as such a mutation remains undetermined within his account (hence the empirical course to humanism’s decomposition as “evidence”). Foucault can only take past epistemic mutations as precedents for upcoming ones, not as sufficient causes, meaning that the death of man strictly exists only as a possibility in *OT*, subject to what Foucault terms his purely descriptive discourse’s “problem of causes,” and so the object of what is strictly a “wa-ger” that man is “perhaps nearing its end”. Yet of greater concern is that to utilize the evident decomposition of humanism in such a way would be to replicate the anthropological manoeuvre that his archaeological analysis works so hard to diagnose and so condemn, for:

if one takes seriously the characterization of ‘man’ as the historical a priori which has formed the condition of possibility of knowledge since the end of the eighteenth century, then the logic which consists in using empirical observations to infer its disappearance is somewhat dubious: by definition, transcendental conditions are immune to empirical refutation.

One could retort, Han-Pile continues, that the historical dimension of man as epistemic structure (the “historical a priori” of modernity) leaves it open to modification by “empirical changes”—with the spectacular advent of *OT*’s publication perhaps being amongst them—but to do so would still be to privilege the *causal*
mode of determination characteristic of the empirical over that of the epistemic determination of the transcendental, and thus in a manner that can only be seen as replicating the anthropological manoeuvre. Intriguingly, and perhaps most importantly for our discussion below, if Foucault’s critique were to indeed be guilty in this sense it could therefore “be seen as a further development (rather than a way out)” of thought’s anthropologization: “man’ may have a greater life expectancy than anticipated.”

Foucault’s attempt to supplement OT’s structural inability to clear its final hurdle by rhetorically tying the anthropological to the humanist (both within OT and, as we’ve shown, in the public domain more broadly) not only left him just as guilty of capitalizing on the hazy figuration of “man” in the death of man debate as his interlocutors, but more worryingly had him mirroring these despised objects of his enquiry.

Although it would be too simplistic to present it as a mere response or rebuke to this Foucauldian account, the non-humanism of François Laruelle intervenes at precisely this point of failed identification between the death of man and the fall of humanism, and the hermetic enclosure of the philosophical that it exhibits. Foucault’s response to humanism (in addition to those of his various anti-humanist contemporaries) is simply not sufficient for Laruelle, from whose perspective they would appear to still remain too humanist (or perhaps more precisely, too philosophistic, which remains in effect a residual humanism), whilst simultaneously and paradoxically not humanist enough.

LARUELLE’S CRITIQUE OF BOTH HUMANISTS AND ANTI-HUMANISTS

The problem is that as much as these philosophers present themselves as having undermined the mythology of the unitary philosophical subject, they still remain attached to the fundamental Parmenidean axiom that “thought and being are the Same.” In all of these accounts it is the philosopher who is able to think beyond the merely epiphenomenal representation of the subject as a unitary entity. As a consequence, this figure of the philosopher—“the human par excellence in speaking, knowing, acting” is posited as the individual who is able to think the real in the synthesis of empirical, everyday experience with the category of being that both conditions it and legislates over it. Thus, regardless of any philosopher’s specific position in regard to subjectivity, there is still a unitary locus of thought present, insofar as the philosopher presumes it possible to think the real in the terms that she or he has established. This is what Laruelle refers to as the claimed sufficiency of philosophy, whereby it is assumed that all is philosophizable, thus universaliz-
ing philosophical thought in relation to the real. Whilst the anti-humanisms of these thinkers (Althusser, Lacan, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, etc.) are accepted by Laruelle as in earnest, he questions the extent to which anti-humanism as such is capable of escaping a broader *philosophism* that still presupposes the primacy of thought *qua* being: “the confusion of One and of Being.”

At the same time though, it would seem that these approaches are still not actually humanist enough by Laruelle’s standards—or more precisely, he claims that they are still unable to think man, the human individual, in a rigorous and scientific sense. “Philosophy such as it exists, precisely because it can be an anthropology, does not know man,” he writes, “it knows the inhuman, the sub-human, the too-human, the overman, but it doesn’t know the human.”

Unlike Foucault, Laruelle has no intention of defending philosophy against the human sciences. Instead, his project of non-philosophy seeks to defend man—“ordinary man,” as he refers to it, who “really exists, and is really distinct from the World”—against both of these fields of study, because in his view philosophy, anthropology, sociology, psychology and so on and so forth all think something *other than* man. In contrast to these seemingly failed approaches, Laruelle attempts to identify ordinary man as a radically finite, immanent individual, irreducible in his multiplicity and irreplaceable in his singularity.

Philosophy, Laruelle contends, regardless of where specific philosophers see themselves as sitting on the humanist/anti-humanist divide, is guided by a desire to universalize itself by identifying the All, or totality (i.e. that which *exists*, which is, under the aegis of being) with *the real*. Philosophy thinks man, and thus thought, in terms of being (or whatever manifestation this category takes within a particular philosophy). In effect, philosophy tries to couple man to its universals. On this point, Laruelle writes:

> [i]t identifies man with generalities or attributes, with a knowledge, an activity, a race, a desire, an existence, a writing, a society, a sex; and it is once more the philosopher who pushes himself forward behind the mask of these generalities—the philosopher requisitioning man in the service of his aims and his values, which are very specific but which need the cover of the universal.

The result is that philosophy *conflates the lived experience of the ordinary man with the universalized and abstract category of being*, such that the former remains un-
thought by philosophy, because its real conditions are filtered through these universals.

Founded upon a “mixture and parallelism of man and logos,” philosophy is a mode of discourse, and accordingly its (linguistic) communicability must be assured: it is a basic principle of philosophy, albeit an unspoken one, that truth must be communicable through philosophical categories. This blending of man and logos means that rather than beginning with the solitary, contemplative individual, philosophy instead is formed in the mixture-form of two concepts: man and being. With this in mind, we can then frame the divide between humanism and anti-humanism that we explored earlier in this article. Whereas the former understands these two terms as synonymous (such that for Sartre, man is characterized by his being-for-itself and being-for-others), the latter demotes man in the name of being, revealing that man is in fact the product of some other substance or impetus (for the Foucault of O’T, man is nothing but the “reduction […] to the structures within which he is contained”). For the anti-humanists then, man as concept is doubled between the vulgar empirical experience of the individual as given, and the superior forces that underpin this representation (as givenness): a relationship that only the philosopher can apparently perceive and synthesize.

Non-philosophy, in contrast, claims to be founded upon the truth and essence of man as the real, not merely as a being that resides within it. It is a “question of treating, from the start, the real in the strict sense as philosophically unengendered or non-constituted.” The first consequence, and the most basic axiom of non-philosophy is not so much that man exists (this is what philosophy tells us), but that man is already-given: the individual does not require the givenness of being, for they are determined and complete from the outset. This ordinary individual is both finite and inalienable. It is undivided and indivisible, preceding all forms of claimed universality, for as Laruelle notes, “all these universals [...] do not amount to even the most modest beginnings of a specific science of man, distinct from the science of historical man, speaking man, social man, psychological man, etc.” The ordinary man does not need philosophy, for he is not alienated or in need of rescue, to identify the being that lies unrecognized either within or beneath him. Laruelle notes:

science must be unique and specific if it would be a real science and cease to be a techno-political phantasm; and it is man who must be irreducible in his multiplicity if he would cease to be this anthropological fetish, this
somewhat drab phantom that is but the shadow of the Human Sciences, that is to say of the self-screening light of Reason.72

The unusual corollary of this is that the All is not all: man does not belong to the world, man is introduced into it, and is distinct from it. The real is not the same as the world, for non-philosophy identifies the latter as given specifically through philosophy. The non-philosophical project therefore manifests as a rather odd mode of humanism (a “non-humanism,” as we should probably refer to it, following Laruelle’s own pattern) that seeks to think a generic, rather than merely possible reality of man: man as the One, rather than as being (in either the ontological or ontical sense).

THOUGHT ACCORDING TO THE ONE

The purpose of non-philosophy, proclaims Laruelle, is to think the radical immanence of the One, but to avoid doing so in philosophical terms, which would seek to think it in other terms, as we have already seen; instead, he claims that non-philosophy thinks “the One insofar as it succeeds Being as well as the Other and Difference as the principal theme of thought.”73 The One, as synonymous with both the real and the ordinary man, is entirely foreclosed to thought as an object of knowledge: we do not, and cannot think about the One, he argues, without reducing it to the Other (as occurs in philosophy, which posits the real as thinkable through the transcendent givenness of being, and thus idealizes the conditions of its thought). Philosophy, although it usually asserts its capacity to think the real in itself, does not allow the real to act, for it attempts to know it (and thus interpret it) in specifically philosophical terms, and thus categorically reduces the real to the representational structure of decision, in which the real is divided between an empirical and an ideal component. Man is thus cleaved between his everyday experience of the world and the category of being through which this experience is both conditioned and judged.

Whereas philosophy is dependent upon a reversible causality between being and the real, such that the latter can only be thought on the basis of a synthesis of the a priori and the empirical (an act of mediation between transcendence and immanence of which only the philosopher is capable), Laruelle instead remains committed to an understanding of the real as both radically immanent and utterly inaccessible to thought. Man is, in his account, foreclosed as an object of thought. This real, the ordinary man, the non-philosophical One, is not a being,
nor a vector of becoming. It is not in any way manifest, and contains no trans-
cendence, division, exteriority, or negativity. It is a unity, but does not, as in
the case of the empirico-transcendental doublet, unify differences within itself
(which would make it unitary—a cardinal distinction in Larueilian terminology).
It is given-without-givenness; that which is already-given prior to all thought, that
which is immanent only to itself and in itself. Unlike prior philosophers, whose
ideas demand communicability, the One does not need to be described in any
manner. For non-philosophy then, we don’t attempt to think about the One, nor
even to describe—for in trying to do this, we inevitably represent it as an object
in a manner that would make it determinable by thought—but rather, we think
according to the One.

This, then, is not a humanism premised upon the attempt to know or understand
what the human being is; on the contrary, it is based upon a force of thought im-
manent to man, unalienated by the transcendence of philosophical categories. To
think about philosophy from the finitude of the One, and thus of man in his most
ordinary form—a perspective that Laruelle refers to as vision-in-One, and which
“determines non-philosophy [...] as a positive practice of philosophy rather than
as something that would subtract itself from philosophy’s self-sufficiency”—is to
think it from a perspective which suspends its sufficiency in order to treat it as inert
“material.” Philosophy thus provides non-philosophy with the data from which
it operates, transformed into simple phenomena, the latter operating through a
mode of thought appropriate to the real, and where philosophy “can no longer be
the presupposition (in the traditional sense) of this thought,” for “it is only its pre-
supposition without auto-position,” relative to the real. Suddenly, philosophy
finds itself no longer in a position of presumed sufficiency (and hence primacy),
but instead, on an equal footing with those regional (i.e. extra-philosophical) phe-
nomena over which it once claimed dominion. The “auto-decoupage of the philo-
sophical body,” surrounding it with the trophies of those extra-philosophical on-
tologies over which its superiority is given and self-evident, is utterly suspended.

The object of non-philosophy is therefore not experience, but these various re-
gional knowledges and practices with which such experience is given and situ-
ated, presenting itself as a transcendental modality of thought in relation to these
knowledges. Its purpose is “to deprive philosophy of its transcendental claim
over the real and to tightly fasten it to experience,” such that philosophy becomes
the simple a priori of all possible experience. All philosophy attempts to think
the real (and hence the One, for the real is always thought philosophically in a
unitary manner), but when thought from the perspective of vision-in-One, what is revealed is the way in which this attempt actually stymies the heterogeneity of thought, for the latter (in its non-philosophical guise) is not a being, but rather, determines-in-the-last-instance all thought of being. The non-philosophical One, unlike the categories of philosophical transcendence, cannot be exhausted or alienated, for it is in all cases already-given. It is not an excess, it does not overflow. Likewise, as we have already seen, whilst we can attempt to describe the One (either non-philosophically through axioms, or philosophically through decision), the One has no need of this description in order for it to be real. When we speak of ordinary individuals, we are speaking of “real essences, lived in experiences that are pre-political, pre-linguistic, etc.—true immediate givens.”

Determination-in-the-last-instance is thus the unilateral determination of philosophy by the One.

This determination, which forms the transcendental condition for philosophy as material, is entirely irreversible: philosophy does not determine the real at all. Observes Alexander Galloway:

Laruelle’s “last” is not a chronological last, nor is it “last” like a trump card (which is always played last). It is a messianic last. Laruelle’s last philosophy is last only in the sense of “the last instance,” an immanent and finite last-ness that trumps nothing, supersedes nothing, and indeed is not a “meditation” at all in the proper sense of the term as reflection-on or consciousness-of. Rather, Laruelle’s in-the-last-instance means roughly “in the most generic sense”. Laruelle’s messianism is therefore neither ancient nor modern, neither special nor particular. But merely generic. The last, the least, the finite.

Non-philosophy aims “to refuse philosophy its principal pretension and to be entitled to say that it does not reach the real, even if necessarily maintaining certain relations with it.”

Not to negate or revolt against philosophy, nor to replace it, but to bring it down a peg or two, so to speak. The causal (non-)relationship thus established, whereby the One gives philosophy without philosophy giving it anything in return is referred to as a unilateral duality. Truth, in a non-philosophical sense, is not a knowledge, a concept, an intuition, or a mode of phenomenological perception—it is a process of thought that gives-without-givenness. It is a truth, Laruelle argues, involving a radical indifference to the world, premised upon a real which is “absolutely distinct from and even indifferent to empirico-ideal reality,” and thus the effectivity of philosophical decision.
It is important to note at this point that the One, in its non-philosophical manifestation, is not the totality of all that exists (the solipsistic or sophistic position), for existence itself (i.e. the state of being) is a philosophical category. Philosophy, as we have already witnessed, is characterized by the Parmenidean conflation of thought and being: the presumption that all is by its very nature philosophizable. Accordingly, whilst it was only Kant who first explicitly identified and formalized this connection, making being inseparable from thought through the identification of an unknowable thing-in-itself that literally cannot be thought, and thus identifying a realm apparently unable to be colonized by philosophical ideality—a position that Quentin Meillassoux infamously designates correlationism, “the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other”—it would seem that, contra Foucault, this suture is not necessarily an innovation in Kant’s critical project: all philosophy, in its mixture of the empirical and the ideal, necessitates the codetermination of thought and being. Kant merely uses this identification in order to shore up his own credentials, and those of philosophy more broadly: it is only the philosopher, he infers, who is able to at least somewhat resist the temptations of reason and keep him or herself wedded to the true objects of knowledge.

The real, writes Laruelle, is “like Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’: unknowable and even unthinkable, but with the difference that it is not so from transcendence but from immanence (the One and not the Other) foreclosed.” Non-philosophy seeks to pull apart the Parmenidean (correlationist) ligature, such that thought becomes the necessary condition of being. The result is that the One and the real are best understood as the inalienable and immanent identity of the individual human ego: “[n]on-philosophy ‘postulates’ that the Ego is already revealed through-and-through in its proper mode before the manifestation of being and thought.” This does not mean, however, that the One is equivalent to the transcendental subject of post-Kantian philosophy; conversely, the subject, from the perspective of force-(of)-thought, is determined-in-the-last-instance by the ego, and it is this ego—the ordinary man—that we understand as the One.

Non-philosophy is, therefore, an attempt to develop a new theory of man: one in which the ordinary individual exists as the radically immanent, necessary but insufficient condition of all thought. This individual is human but also non-human, in that they are foreclosed to all thought, all language, and all representation that might ascribe the qualities we would normally associate with the human being.
upon them. Man, according to this account, is just an axiom, rather than a concept or the object of a concept. We do not describe him, but we act as him. The ordinary, inalienable man, as distinct from the world which philosophy claims he inhabits, is the real. The ego precedes being and thought. The result, in summary, is an odd brand of humanism: one that seeks to preserve the individuality of the ordinary man by foreclosing our ability to speak of him—refusing to allow man to be reduced to an object of knowledge. The One, as the ordinary man, is that which is unspeakable, incommunicable, and thus unphilosophizable, but which forms the necessary but insufficient condition for philosophy. Rather than claiming a knowledge of man, non-philosophy provides an “ignorance where natural, popular consciousness inheres,” prioritizing the emergence of thought in its diversity and multiplicity over its colonization by philosophy.\textsuperscript{86}

**LARUELLE AND FOUCALUT**

From this discussion above, Laruelle can be seen to figure his approach in a manner parallel to that of Foucault, offering not only a diagnosis of the problems at hand, but in turn attempting to actively participate in the very process of mutating thought, to effect a transition from the circularity of “the unitary paradigm.”\textsuperscript{87} Accordingly, he clearly echoes a number of concerns central to OT, such as that of the circularity inimical to the doublet form, the philosophical proximity to the anthropological, and the threats posed by the human sciences in particular to science. Yet it is in this last instance that the point of differentiation between the two is perhaps most clear, as articulated in Laruelle’s declaration that “[w]e shall not take up the old combat: defending philosophy against the human sciences”—or what, in OT, would equate to a defence of the critical formulation of philosophy against the anthropological slippage—“[r]ather, we defend man against this authoritarian family in league against him.”\textsuperscript{88} More specifically, Laruelle shed some further light on the relation between his non-humanism and OT in a recent interview, when noting the moment in which

little by little, I identified the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy, and above all its form, its expression [...] the doublet form of philosophy. Foucault identified a transcendental-empirical doublet. But that’s not all—there is a second, transcendental-real, doublet, which we can see at work in Kant, in Heidegger. There are two doublets, three or four terms.\textsuperscript{89}
In so adopting the doublet form and extending it beyond Foucault’s comparatively localized critique to philosophy tout court in the form of the principle of sufficient philosophy, of philosophy’s reliance on the reciprocal determination of two “partially undetermined” parameters or “terms,” Foucault’s own position—or, more specifically, his struggle in attempting to bridge his account of the death of man as epistemic structure to the decomposition of humanism—would come under the purview of this principle. This is to be seen, we contend, in what would amount to Laruelle’s responses to each of the three aforementioned challenges OT would face in attempting to bridge the gap between the death of man as epistemic structure, and the evident demise of humanism—what, we contend, equates in each instance to an effective “trumping” of Foucault’s response in this particular book to humanism.

Firstly, the ongoing tenability of the doublet structure in philosophy, only entertained in OT through an emphasis of its potential but not necessary enabling of an anthropological inversion of the critical formulation (and thus limited to post-Kantian philosophy), is maintained by Laruelle’s expansion of the range of doublet form so as to figure the circular, self-sufficient manoeuvre of reciprocal determination (regardless of a particular philosophy’s “terms”) to be characteristic of the philosophical, as the primary symptom of unitary thought. Furthermore, the fact that, as Han-Pile points out, Sartre’s early phenomenology constitutes “a type of humanism more aware of the dangers of anthropology and keen to preserve the separation of the empirical and the transcendental,” strengthens Laruelle’s point regarding the hermetic nature of philosophical revolt in this sense, with revolt remaining precisely philosophical.

Secondly, the “implicit normativity” of Foucault’s analysis, opening it to a possible charge of formally mirroring the humanist manoeuvre of reifying the image of man as synonymous with a self-present interiority of thought, finds a drastic rebuttal in Laruelle’s suspension of philosophy’s auto-position and auto-donation, not only figuring philosophy as just another regional knowledge, but safely avoiding the privileging of man in his rendering the latter entirely foreclosed to, and in a position of unilateral determination with, thought proper.

These previous two points come to combine in the third Laruellian response to the challenges faced by OT. The fact that the circular relation articulated between the evident fall of humanism (an empirical matter) and the transcendental matter of the death of man as epistemic structure replicates the very structure of anthro-
polologization by effectively inverting the critical relation between the empirical events and their transcendental conditions, would seem to, again, validate the Laruellian diagnosis of the philosophical as always-already operative in line with the principle of sufficient philosophy. That even in an attempt to exit from the philosophical arrangement that forms the philosophical object of its philosophical critique, philosophy cannot help but repeat the fundamental components of the latter’s gesture. If, as Han-Pile contends, man as epistemic structure, as empirico-transcendental doublet, can indeed then expect a greater life expectancy than bestowed upon him by the closing wager of OT, Laruelle would not be in a position to disagree; indeed, he needn’t do so, for in bestowing upon “his” “ordinary man” a lengthy lifespan, philosophy and the epistemic structure that determines it (and its particular treatment of man) continues on resigned to the level of regional knowledges, determined in the last instance by a real entirely foreclosed to it.

CONCLUSION

Laruelle thus offers not only an innovative (although obviously still highly contestable) means for analysing philosophical doxa, but also an important and timely provocation regarding the place of man in philosophy, and in discourse more generally: in short, non-philosophy asks whether in trying so hard to categorize, classify, and circumscribe the attributes of the human being, we have consistently failed to embrace the full possibilities of human thought, inasmuch as they are irreducible to the adjectival idiom of philosophical communication. Although in this article we have focused chiefly upon his analysis within a single essay (“A Rigorous Science of Man”) from his Philosophy II period, we nonetheless believe that the tendencies identified manifest, in a roughly consistent manner, across his oeuvre. In *Principles of Non-Philosophy*, for instance, the key text of Philosophy III (the subsequent period in which he would self-consciously attempt to expunge non-philosophy of its more crudely scientistic impulses), Laruelle describes one of his objectives to be the “democratic humanization of thought,” placing “the Real at the heart of man or man at the heart of the Real rather than one at the periphery of the other as philosophy itself does.”

Across the variegations of Laruelle’s writings, what does remain stable is his commitment to this humanism or humanization, and the attendant desire to develop a true science of man: man as the Name-of-Man, a generic humanity; man as the Stranger-subject, gazing dispassionately toward the world; man as Man-in-person, the identity in the last instance of all religious experience; man as the Christ-
subject, the saviour of the world from the world; man as Man-without-Essence, foreclosed of alienation; man as Victim-in-person, the necessary but insufficient condition for any justice; even man as uni-sexual, irreducible in the last instance to all sexual differentiation. As he puts it in *Anti-Badiou* (from Philosophy V, the most recent period of his work), non-philosophy replaces all philosophical hierarchies “with a defense, in every case, of humans, and not of philosophy,” and complementarily, “the universal defense of humans qua generic subjects, a principle of minimizing the inevitable harm done to philosophy and to the modes of thought that are subordinate to it.” This is a celebration of humanity as always already given-in-Man.

At the same time though, further discussion is still needed, reflecting upon the occlusions that potentially exist within this project and might jeopardize its proposed (non-)humanism and its engagement with the broader debate surrounding humanism and the status of man. For Laruelle’s identification of the One—that within which all ontologies, discourses, knowledges, and practices find their identity in the last instance—with the human would seem to be in its own right a form of decision (even taking into account non-philosophy’s self-professed reliance on a contingent philosophical lexicon in order to support its own practice) that is in some sense fatally arbitrary in its investment of the Laruellian real “with a minimal degree of ontological consistency,” so compromising any subsequent championing of a truly generic Real, stripped of all philosophical attributes.

This constitutes the key dissatisfaction for Ray Brassier in his treatment of the Laruellian project (with which he sympathizes, but of which he is also highly critical). Brassier draws attention to a fundamental distinction, elsewhere upheld in Laruelle’s work, between claiming to be “identical-in-the-last-instance with,” “think[ing] in accordance with” or having “my thinking [... ] determined-in-the-last instance by [the real],” and that of actually being “the real qua One.” For Brassier, “[t]o privilege, as Laruelle does, the irrecusability of the ‘name-of-man’ over and above the contingency of other occasional nominations of the last-instance, is effectively to confuse the real with its symbol,” and to do so in a manner, we might add, formally comparable to the aforementioned instance of “implicit normativity” to be seen in Foucault’s archaeological analysis, where the neutral presentation of the “surface effects” of a given epistemological configuration is abandoned for an explicit isolation of humanism as the most pernicious of such surface effects. Strictly speaking, “[w]hat I think I am can have no privilege vis-à-vis the identity of a real already given independently of anything I may hap-
pen to think about it,” if the identity of the real as entirely foreclosed to such a determination is to maintain this fundamental “characteristic” as such, just as the fall of a pernicious humanism cannot be isolated as the preeminent instance of a mutation at the archaeological level of epistemological configurations, if the level of apodictic neutrality aspired to in the archaeological approach, is to be upheld.

The descriptive power and broader cogency afforded their respective projects by Laruelle and Foucault’s approaches of ‘neutrality’ with respect to their respective ‘objects,’ is thus compromised in both instances upon attempting to enter into and, in doing so, actively resolve the debate surrounding humanism. The specificity of the normative claim upon which such an entry is rendered relevant simultaneously and immediately threatens to shatter the broader cogency of the archaeological and non-philosophical systems respectively, at the precise point they each attempt to become an active participant in the debate. The respectively apodictic and “scientific” aspirations of Foucault’s and Laruelle’s responses to the debate surrounding humanism thus seem to constitute the price of entry in the first instance, suggesting we must constantly take stock of the points at which such theories fall back into the philosophical tendencies that they each claim to suspend.

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NOTES

1. We’d both like to thank Justin Clemens for his assistance in the process of drafting this article, as well as for chairing and supporting the conference panel from which it originated.


5. Miller, Passion, 148.


7. Miller, Passion, 158.


9. Miller, Passion, 158.


11. Qtd. in Miller, Passion, 44. There was a balance to be struck in Foucault’s playing the role of anti-humanism’s most prominent representative against the established authority of Sartre, for, as Miller continues: “Foucault later asked that these comments be edited out of the program before it was broadcast. When an unedited transcript of the interview was nevertheless published subsequently by mistake, he blew up. Addressing an angry letter to the offending magazine, Foucault was humility incarnate: ‘I think that the vast oeuvre of Sartre as well as his action, will mark an epoch. It is true that many today are working in another direction. I would not allow anyone to compare--particularly in order to oppose them--the minor historical and methodological spade work that I have undertaken with an oeuvre like his.’”

12. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 123; 135.


14. “The interlocutor bore many of the characteristics of Sartre, as would have been evident to readers […] A virtual Sartre and Foucault thus collided on terms dictated by Foucault. Their choreographed verbal confrontation over what had or had not been achieved in the preceding chapters gave Foucault the opportunity to move beyond reaction, and to take his attack directly to Sartre.” Eric Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power and Knowledge. New York: Other Press, 2006, 38. See Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972, 199-211.


24. Heidegger conceives of humanism as a particularly Roman formulation, which sought to distinguish *homo humanus* from *homo barbarus* by way of the cultivation of virtue through education, the mantle for which they had inherited from the Greeks. He notes that the form of humanism which is revived during the Renaissance is directly related to this earlier Roman humanism, insofar as it filters the works of Greek civilization through a specifically Roman lens, distinguishing the humanist scholar against the barbarity of medieval scholasticism.


32. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 126. (Original emphasis.)

33. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 126.

34. Foucault, “Who are you”, 93.


41. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 126.

42. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 348.

43. Foucault, “Who are you”, 93. OT, of course, exhibits a clearly Heideggerian tenor in this sense. The text as a whole could indeed, somewhat crudely, be seen to complement its “strong affinities with the unfolding of epochs in the history of Being” with the Bachelardian epistemological break, capitalising on the revolutionary capacities open to evocation through the former once coming to bear directly on the philosophical. On the relation between OT and

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44. Foucault, “Who are you”, 93; qtd. in Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 128.
45. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 129.
46. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 135.
47. Paras, Foucault 2.0, 19.
49. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 129.
50. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 129.
53. This identification of Foucault as philosopher remains a point of contention in the literature. For an overview of what is at stake in this debate, see Gary Gutting’s review of Han’s Foucault’s Critical Project, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/23402-foucault-s-critical-project/ (accessed March 18, 2015); and her response: http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~beatrice/Gutting%20_answer_%202003-05.pdf (accessed March 18, 2015). See too Marc Djaballah’s use of the distinction between the Kantian doctrine and the “idea of criticism” in his exploration of Foucault’s relation to Kant throughout the former’s career, in Kant, Foucault, and Forms of Experience, New York: Routledge, 2008, 1-22.
55. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 133.
56. Foucault, “Who are you”, 93.
57. Foucault, The Order of Things, xiii.
58. Foucault, The Order of Things, 387. (Emphasis added.)
59. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 134.
60. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 134.
61. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 135.
64. Suffisance in French meaning not only “adequacy,” but also “vanity” or “self-importance.”
69. Foucault, “Who are you”, 93.
70. Laruelle, “A Rigorous Science”, 64.
73. Laruelle, Principles, xxi.

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77. In Laruelle’s writings there is a sharp distinction between the transcendental and the a priori that we do not find in Kant or Husserl: whilst the transcendental founds the force-(of)-thought by which non-philosophy is able to suspend the auto-position of philosophical decision (in his later writings, this is effectuated via the process of cloning), the a priori is by contrast the state of said decision once this suspension has occurred, transformed into an inert material.

78. Laruelle, *Principles*, 47.


82. Laruelle, *Principles*, 56.


88. Laruelle, “A Rigorous Science”, 35. (Emphasis added.)


91. Han-Pile, “The ‘Death of Man’”, 132-3.

92. Laruelle opens “A Rigorous Science of Man” with the following: “There is every reason to revolt against philosophers. But to what end? Is revolt its own reason, one more reason? Isn’t it philosophers who, dispensing reason, and in particular the reasons for revolt, dispense revolt? Should we not finally cease to revolt, founding our existence on a firm yet tolerant indifference toward philosophy?” See Laruelle, “A Rigorous Science”, 33.


