Katrin Pahl’s remarkable book brings to life a surprising connection between emotion and reason at work in Hegel. I discuss Pahl’s method, which reveals a novel Hegel, of the “affective turn,” and is bound to have implications for the field of affect and emotion studies. To give a context for Pahl’s method, I draw from recent work that has already shaped a Hegel “after Derrida,” and briefly explore how this approach allows inquiry into an alternative temporality, and related to this, a new sense of the “acts” of the “ethical” in Hegel. Pahl’s brilliant and daring study is a tour de force in Hegel scholarship. It is also aptly positioned to address an audience wider than political liberalism for it embraces performative identity, including the constitution of new subjects for feminist and epistemic justice.

The focus of Pahl’s work is captured in the book’s title: “tropes of transport.” Her concern is with Hegel’s thought and textual practice, particularly, how the structural notion of mediation enlarges what is meant by “emotion” as that which moves or transports. Pahl subjectivizes non-human sites of agency and the self-reflection of spirit, and shows how the sharing of emotion creates relational dependency textures, including “impersonal” emotion. Structured in two divisions, this book engages above all Hegel’s method, comprising both his phenomenology and his speculative philosophy. In division one, we find analyses of different models of “anthropogenetic” emotionality, which is well known in Hegel, and concerns heartfelt feeling, dramatic pathos, or sense-certainty. In Hegel, these anthropogenetic models of emotion are tied to the human subject, understood through a genus and differentia specifica concept of animal rationale. In the second division, however, a more expansive approach to emotion in Hegel thematizes it as textual performance, hence the title of this division, “subjects of syntax.” Division two works methodologically, grounding the claim that and how Hegel moves away from a monolithic anthropogenetic model and to impersonal or syntactic, semio-textual subjects of emotionality. “Impersonal emotion, emotion as self-reflective subject indifferent to the human subject, is to be found on the level of textual performance [and texts are self-differential entities].”
I first draw from the recent body of scholarship in the deconstructive and reconstructive work on “textuality” and show why it matters to Pahl. Textuality always works back to produce a relation, namely, it adds a relation of “reading” as constitutive moment, a violence, to the interpretation of concepts in Hegel. Pahl thematizes the free indirect discourse of the _PdG_, its shifts between the narrative that is limited to the point of view of the protagonist (the shapes of consciousness) and the omniscient or objective commentary of the phenomenologist, which includes the reader in its first person plural enunciation. How does “reading” blur the outlines of phenomena and the experience of the subject, so as to destabilize the shapes and figures of understanding to which our faculty of perception and consciousness as power of transparent, fantastic seeing ceaselessly lends support? In Pahl, “reading” introduces a strategy, we may say, a strategic essentialism where contrastively, it aims to counteract and invent a counter-image, in order then to oppose it to the incessant flux of an experience that goes only deeper, each time uncovering alternative time-structures in Hegel. As a consequence, in Pahl’s Hegel, where the advancement of the “phenomenology” concerns the relation of the subject to the “point” or homogeneity of discrete objects forming a line as telos that has always-already happened, it becomes impossible to reduce to either an objective telos or a blind intuition of the sensible, the still more “originary” relation of the subject to the innumerable sensuous “traits” of the multiplicity of the “phenomenon.” In this latter “originary,” and thence privileged “absolute” relation, the subject attests to a different sense of the completion of the temporal, a welcoming from the future “as such”—the “explosion,” the unforeseeable of what is apprehended. Pahl pursues strategic “reading,” as in the deconstructive method of Derrida, and Malabou, to show how by virtue of the dialectical method of the sublation (Aufhebung) and the speculative philosophical proposition, Hegel constructs a “displacement,” a negation, effected “in” “Spirit.” As emphasized by the quotation marks around the name of spirit, the construct of an identity as Concept must fail to transcend the finite sensibility of the phenomenon of being exposed in its facticity (ontologically thrown-being), and so lays down the truth of arrival at oneself as if from the “outside,” as a stranger. “Spirit” does not have an origin in the past, as if a bygone (Vergangenheit), as would a fixed “now” point in time, resting safely beyond or behind it. In Pahl’s Hegel, a transformative impulse of a connectivity and a relationality, a non-property based view of community of those who have “nothing” in common, accounts for the auto-hetero-affective activity of the “Spirit.”

In this re-thinking of the vocabulary of phenomenology in the “phenomenology of spirit,” for Pahl, as for Malabou, time-form in Hegel stands for a referral to the “original plasticity” of the singularity of the relation of existence, the form giving-receiving activity (Formtätigkeit) of the “absolute relation.” The new Hegel emerging in Pahl lays down the truth of the active production of a writer’s own most systematic self-knowledge and anamnesis, and avails himself of an active, yet secondary, faculty for supplementarity. The effect is a complete reinterpretation of the fundamentality of the Hegelian absolute relation, all the way to the telos and the possibility of its deconstruction, the “ending” without ability to end. Pahl relates, then, to this new Hegel, and not necessarily using his own tools, to dismantle the master’s house. Hegel the text (already creating its inverse, “reading”) avails itself of a différence co-posted as textuality at the very level of creation of the “subject” (time-consciousness “as” subject), in this way producing juridically-legislatively the very thing and idea that is the subject, not merely representing it. This will have to include performativity in and as text. It is primarily the inscriptive movement back and forth which creates time between transitions, and Pahl means this in the more originary sense of productivity, that the impersonality of emotion, alongside emotion of the ordinary subject, is validated. Pahl’s primary finding, I think, bears on validating first the impersonality of emotion. Emotion is a trope since it is capable of introducing an expressivity for which interiority is not a limit. Instead, to follow through to its very foundation this expressivity, it is to face up to the systematic and pervasive textual difference that underlies it—“between chapters in the sense of silences between chapters” and also, the “movement between chapters differs from the movement within chapters.”

Specifically, as Pahl shows, Hegel admits into existence the Formtätigkeit of time-relation as absolute relation, the singularity of the relation of existence. He can do so if and only if he simultaneously admits into existence this relation’s plural relationships, its tropes. Language, which acts simultaneously as one and more than one, is here conceived of on the model of a closed system of tropes or catachrestic signs, and on this account, language launches as well a faculty of supplementarity as producing both the sign and its double. The underlying idea is
COMMENTARY: ‘HEGEL’S EMOTIONAL REASON’

that sign is the vehicle of a spiritual transformation and it is at the same time, also the vehicle’s very absence, the exemplary Beispiel and the example that has no wheels, deployed so as to underscore the arbitrariness of the meaning of the sign. It seems to me that here Pahl, her pairing of emotion and reason, follows Warminski, his pairing of life and consciousness, in a now classic work on Hegel. Warminski has shown that textuality in Hegel goes back to the recognition that Life too has no other—that is, in virtue of its tropes the system includes, e.g., life itself within itself as its own other. So in the PdG, Hegel says: Life now points to Consciousness: “points to an other [verweist das Leben auf ein Anderes].” In Hegel, natural “Life” is not determinately negated in consciousness, therefore life enters in a relation of “disjunction” with its Gattung (genus), i.e., the unity of consciousness. Indeed, consciousness stands for the repetitive process of making use of the “name,” trope, by analogy with reaching out to a referent, for the sake of producing or establishing a cross-checking function of signification and (self-) referencing of its own acts. These acts transcendens, these “acts” of consciousness, introduce a “necessity” but this cannot be but the “internal finality” of the temporal. Much as Hegel enables consciousness as textuality and trope, an incessant othering as internal necessity according to Warminski, Pahl argues, so too Hegel enables emotionality of reason as textuality and trope. Much like relating to “echoes from elsewhere,” from another language, the appropriated language that is now brought into being, but at a tension, internally necessarily at odds with the language of the occupier, the master, the colonizer, in Pahl, emotion as drama and property of the One will show itself to be the projection of an illusion, unable to stand in for the simplicity of identity (as if Life were One, and Reason were One).

Pahl’s bold work on Hegel’s utterance theory shows just that. In order for there to be content and utterance, tropes and transports must remain quasi-cause and quasi-effect, less than individual existences, less than countable relations of singularity: they must be enunciations in Benveniste’s sense. Pahl’s terminology of tropes and transports brings to recognition a use of “expression,” but where expression has nothing to express, nothing to learn, to know. Utterance communicates itself, Pahl argues, yet not with a view to an Ausdruck-based “reconciling what is torn”; for it is rather to be understood as a tool “for reconciling oneself to tears.” We must understand that this is the consequence of time-structure in Hegel as alternative temporality, “there is little time for grief.” “Each shape of consciousness dies a death without pain, without grief, without burial, a death that does not haunt.” The presentation of the phenomenon of the disruption “of” the externalizations, or “self-emptying,” of spirit, its Äußerung, Entäußerung communicates utterance such that nothing is to express, leaving the ending open. “Absolute knowledge,” rather than closing the circle of “spirit’s self-exploration once and for all,” “finds more and more ways to indicate openings.” About Hegel’s utterance theory in Pahl, we need to see how in Hegel there is dependence upon Benveniste’s insight that enunciation of the personal pronouns “I” and “You” refers to a reality (to which I or you refers) that is solely a reality of discourse. They refer to nothing but the fact that someone is speaking or has spoken. The content of the exclusive dyad of these words’ reality (for there is no independent relation to which I or you refer) falls away, they only expose the exercise of language. The connectivity that is here presupposed, needs to be taken back to Hegel. Pahl’s contribution to Hegel lies in showing that connectivity as non-appropriable and as a relational, intersectional property is more than central.

Pahl shows that Hegel has a rigorous argument for emotion and its connectivity. This first of all pertains to her close reading of Hegel’s own warning against the abstract rationalist and the empiricist claims. The Nothing is not being, and not a mere immediacy—but is, to the extent to which we can say (and mean) “that” it is, always as result. As Pahl puts it: “[F]ear of absolute fear at the same time impedes and facilitates consciousness’s movement toward absolute knowing. By repeatedly averting the realization of absolute change ... consciousness draws its path ... which twists and turns—performs precisely the movement of change and interdependence that consciousness is afraid of. In turning back and forth—away from and toward fear—the text actualizes the oscillating movement, the absolute trembling of absolute fear. No single figure of consciousness experiences absolute fear, but in their arrangement or in their syntax the various figures of consciousness in the phenomenology together realizing fear’s trembling motion.” Since 1928, in his “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger will have asked a related question—for it is on the basis of being that the nothing is posited. Pahl’s Hegel, I suggest, similarly entertains a hypothesis that the nothing is a connectivity. The very idea of the
“nothing” introduces dependency upon there to be “something,” which is then discerned by rational faculties as separate phenomena. This establishes the origination of the referential paradigm of “self-creation or creation of law ex nihilo” by means of the very contrast that the separability of “nothing” provides. Interconnectivity, mutual dependence here stands in opposition to the foundation of separability. This illuminates in the first place, ever since a certain Hegel was repeated in Heidegger, the ontological interconnection of beings with the ‘nothing’, a notion of literal separate-ness that is used in the development and perpetuation of an anthropogenic paradigm of personal, morally autonomous Reason as One.

To restate the lesson: Pahl’s handling of the thematic of emotion and reason in Hegel claims that Hegel already understood the immanent dialecticity of the linguistic idea of the non-originary origin of the substance (Verwesung and techne20) of being (as doubling of rationality upon itself, ratio et oratio). This brings the linguistic idea in Hegel rather close to idealization as well as neutralization21 of (Heideggerian) facticity, the way Heidegger uses language for the sake of eliciting intellectual idealism, the idea of unity, the One, grasped as pure intelligibility. Pahl concludes from this that already at work in Hegel is a telic practice of rationality that cannot further be ethicized by adding to it an ethics as extension; rather practice is in and of itself of self-containment, it is its own critical ontological force that is to say, always already theoretical.22 It is in this way that importantly, for Pahl, already internal to Hegel there is an argument of emotion theorized as “against external violence.” This argument against external violence motivates Pahl’s interest in Hegel where “texts tremble”: texts tremble in their in-appropriability23 for an instrumental rationality. The argument in Pahl about emotion and “performativity” makes a genuine contribution to and deepens work in Malabou (and Nancy), drawing from "plasticity" in Hegel. Pahl shows that a more profound plasticity belongs with emotion in Hegel. As Malabou has previously established: “Plasticity designates the future within closure, the possibility of a structural transformation: a transformation of structure within structure, a mutation ‘right at the level of the form’.”24 Pahl shows how this entails implications for a non-normative ethics of emotion: the practice underlying the spirit’s externalizations (utterance theory) is the practice of suspending the ground of what exists; this opening of space (the spatiality of the body) “for” the decision of freedom and a decision “for” freedom so becomes the medium and endgame in which beings are mutually (singularly) affirmed.

Pahl relates in her approach to other recent work on Hegel, notably, Rebecca Comay’s Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution. Common to both approaches is the idea that in Hegel, something about the untimely birth-death, a premature constitution of consciousness is of the matter, and she cites Comay, who analyzes “absolute knowledge” as the exposition of the “constitutive yet traumatic untimeliness of consciousness,”25 The focus in Pahl, similarly falls on the foregrounding of the chapters on Spirit in the PdG. So, for the purpose of a short clarification, I will return briefly to Antigone in Hegel.

For one, Nietzsche’s own seemingly opposing stance to Hegel (“veilers of the unconscious”) stands to be revaluated: “Hegel anticipates the Nietzschean deflation of exalted values through genealogy. Above all, he contests the value of sober and unchanging, objective, and timeless truth.”26 Through re-working Hegel’s Antigone, Pahl deviates from orthodox readers, and shows primarily the ambivalence of Romantic, dramatic, irony. An “uncontainable”27 irony is at work in pathos. For Pahl, what Hegel calls “the eternal irony” of the community that is “woman,” “the feminine” “actually compels pathos to ‘come forward in its own nakedness’”; and this is to say, it so compels because it “transforms” and “inverts” pathos. This theatrical, transformative pathos introduces non-human subjectivity “lets the mask of [gravity] drop); and it makes subjectivity in Hegel float with comic levity: the theatrics is of interest in Pahl. The theatrical Hegel uncovered behind the use of “irony” is a significant enlargement over and above a traditional Hegel. The anthropogenetic model is “neither a sufficient nor even a necessary requirement for emotionality29—to dramatize (cause-effect action) effect. And Hegel is not fully understood if reduced to the level of (doubling of doer behind the deed, and discrete subject acting and object acted upon) a particular, a naturalizing thrust, including self-serving individuality, and the idea of the supremacy of one human subject or group of human subjects, say women, a Leidenschaft morality of ressentiment. Rather, for Pahl: “Pathos has become reflexive; it behaves like a self-relating, self-dividing, and self-negating entity and in that sense it acts as a subject.”30
Thus, Hegel shows the work of connectivity between genres, Pahl argues, crucially the opening of philosophical syntax to the syntax of poetry an opening “to another”: and this shows that and how “one needs the other, needs ‘others,’” in order to “become emotional.” By the same token, the self connecting with itself just is the “oscillating middle point” (Pinkard), determined by Hegelian mediation, \( \text{Vermittlung} \): “mediation is constitutive of emotionality in general.” And that is, determination involves a double genitive, where not the subjective but the objective genitive matters. To determine the mediation, it is not simply to admit into existence the other (I is an other) but to admit into existence the significance of the truth “that” the one who is speaking is as well the one with a responsibility to the One with capital “O,” just as much as s/he is known, i.e., appearing in the field of the signifier as the capitalized Other. This is a mediation across the distinct divide of the difference that passes between the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’, but in Pahl’s utterance theory, this entails that the one who is speaking now bears a dual responsibility of speaking for, and in place of, acknowledging both the ‘others’ of the Other and the ‘other’ myself as another to all the others. In spite of the separation of the ‘self’ from the ‘other’, here the connectivity (a manifestation of meaning established on the basis of a derivation from being) of the “nothing” (as result, radical empiricism, no sheer immediacy) is contrastively used, so as to re-establish rather the inseparability between the two. These then are genuine links between the alternatives in Hegel: The renewal of meaning is to convey the mediation of the Concept as a derivative of the non-origin of original. Emotion—if ontic-ontologically thought, realized, ethically understood—is co-constitutional of the movement of the middle term that is the “effect” caused in “Spirit” of the “absolute relation,” alongside with Reason, it is structurally and phenomenologically of the construct “I is an other.”

The deepening of the aesthetic beyond dramatization, is analyzed in Pahl with regard to Aristotle’s *Poetics*, and then demonstrated at work in Hegel (which I cannot repeat here). In Aristotle, the spectator’s identification with the protagonist via \( \text{eleos} \) and \( \text{phobos} \) implies a cathartic, finality-guided model of copy and original. In Hegel, on the other hand, we find something more akin to a kinetic agency. The key for Pahl’s Antigone is provided from *The Critique of Judgment*: Kant’s (non-) experience of the sublime has meant “the death of natural feeling.” As Pahl writes: “At the same time, this idea of a natural, authentic, substantive, self-harmonizing ‘feeling’ brings us to the verge of the conception of ‘emotionality’—as the negative, supplemental, and hollow feeling of self-discord.” Pahl concludes that with and against Kant, in the PdG, Hegel will “imbirate rationality and emotionality”:

Rather than dismiss intellectual analysis for interfering with, perhaps even threatening, the holistic intuition of feeling—as the philosophers of feeling do—Hegel proposes that the analytic activity of the understanding actually produces and furthers emotionality. As a strategy to dismantle the construction of interiority, we have analyzed how Hegel twists together the counter-vectored movements of internalizing and recollecting by literalizing \( \text{Erinnerung} \), and thereby undoes the inner-outer opposition. In fact, we will see that the *Phenomenology* offers a naturalizing and a theatrical account of pathos. It thus builds on the lesson of the sublime that, in the absence of feeling inside, pathos must be fabricated and exhibited on stage—including the stage that is the world.

We may benefit from a brief context that is background, I think, for this re-thinking of the acts of the ethical in Pahl. The prehistory to how Antigone—from Sophocles’ trilogy—enters into Hegel, is worth briefly recounting. For the poet Hölderlin, Sophocles’ *Antigone* comes to be the exemplary case of the appropriation of a divine position, for she positions herself against Creon and the rules of the city, thus presupposing the “appropriation of the right to institute difference by oneself.” Antigone transgresses the human limit in the manner typical for the tragic hero—one who “desires difference and exclusion excludes himself, and suffers, to the point of irreversible loss.” As tragedy is about “expulsion” and thus about transgression generally, the question that Hölderlin ponders in his “return” to the Sophocles of *Antigone*, however, stands out, since what takes on the form of transgression here is not concerned as such with the particularities of instituting the difference by oneself, as is the case with the decidedly “modern” tragic personality of Oedipus that “goes into particulars,” offering up a religious and sacrificial interpretation of the social ill.
For the poet Hölderlin, the “fable” of Oedipus is set as a “trial of heresy,” the tragic fault falling with the individual who “interprets too infinitely the word of the oracle and in which he is tempted in the direction of the nefas. [The transgression, the sacrilege, is thus the excess of interpretation.]”\(^37\) With transgression in Antigone, however, the topic changes: for Hölderlin, Sophocles pursues a “denegation” of Aristotelian mimetology of original, copy and catharsis, the experience of guilt as purification as per the theatrical-imitative relation to the subject. The very case of Antigone is different.

Thus the “guilt” that associates with Antigone in Hegel’s chapter six, though singular, paradoxically belongs to two sets of values at once, two cultural-historical epochs at once, the Modern Romantic theory of individuality, the “speculative suicide” or sacrifice and at the same time, the Ancient Mimetic theory of catharsis, the purification of passion, tragic effect or guilt. But it also belongs to neither. Cixous has noted that tragedy is human. Such a statement is feminist for strategic reasons, and Pahl underscores both the feminist and the dialectical points as represented in Hegel.\(^38\)

My question for Professor Pahl is this. And I am thinking along the lines of ideas already developed partly here especially of the last chapters of the book, “Broken,” and “Against (External) Emotional Violence.” Hegel himself (cf. Preface of PdG) will remember Spinoza for the rationality of substance, an ontological-epistemological method. But where does Hegel—and that is, the exceptional phenomenologist uncovered in Hegel and Emotion—fit in today’s relatively recent but very dynamic, very present affective turn?

In today’s context of philosophy, Spinozists have undertaken to develop radical implications of his ideas and hold the leading role in the affective turn. Hasana Sharp considers issues of both affect and identity more equally in her 2011 book, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization to defend a Spinozist approach to a pedagogy of radical self-reflexivity. (This may include moments of Deleuzian auto-ethology. The term ethology was first used by Deleuze to describe Spinoza’s Ethics. Borrowed from biologists and naturalists, an ethology, for Deleuze, is a study of one’s capacities for affecting and being affected. We can bring together affect theory with critical pedagogy through a politics of re-naturalization of the self.\(^39\))

Professor Pahl’s reading of Hegel can be seen in parallel with a Spinozan political project related to freedom, the unique sources in it for a re-conceptualization of self-understanding and affect. Hasana Sharp, for instance, seeks to contextualize affect’s parallel relation to the representational aspects of the Spinozist mind. Writing of ethology, Sharp describes the optimal effort as a combination of two ends. As Sharp sees it, this combinatory effort “endeavors to cultivate a sensuous receptivity, in order better to determine the relations of composition that most enable one to think and thrive. Since one can exist and act only by virtue of the affects that circulate in one’s environment, ethological ethics entails the development of mutually beneficial affective compositions.”\(^40\)

Now, this combinatory effort may not be too far away from Professor Pahl’s newly discovered Hegel in whom, most importantly, emotion enters the field but not as immediacy but indeed, compellingly argued, as mediation.

EMILIA ANGELOVA is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Concordia University.
COMMENTARY: ‘HEGEL’S EMOTIONAL REASON’

NOTES

4. Catherine Malabou, The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and the Dialectic, trans. L. During (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 148-9. “Indeed the subject is much less implicated in its relation to the ‘point’—the determination—than it was in its relation to the innumerable sensuous ‘traits’ of the phenomenon . . . . But, at another level, it is the point which makes it possible to follow the phenomenon until the very end, to bring it to completion at least in some sense, and that may well mean for it to die in becoming its concept.”
5. See Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion, 35. Compare that Heidegger uses it this way, “Spirit”: “‘Spirit’ does not first fall into time, but it exists (existent, italicized by Heidegger) as originary temporalization (Zeitigung, italicized by Heidegger) of temporality. This temporalizes the time of the world in the horizon of which “history” as intratemporal happening can appear.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & E. Robinson. (Harper & Row, 1962), section 82.
6. Being and Time, section 12. The ontological positing of my death as a certainty, a telos of being-toward-death, is underwritten by the double structuring of the temporal, as relating to the determination of the point (Jemeinigkeit). But at the same time it is relating also to the multiplicity of the phenomenon (the they, das Man dies).
7. Derrida, Of Spirit, p. 29, says: “[W]e already perceive, behind and beyond the quotation marks, this spirit which is no other than time. It returns, in short, to time, to the movement of temporalization, it lets itself be affected in itself, and not accidentally, as from the outside, by something like falling or Verfallen.”
9. Andrzej Warminski, “Hegel/ Marx: Consciousness and Life,” in Hegel After Derrida, ed. Stuart Barnett (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 184. “By virtue of life’s pointing that anything like ‘consciousness proper’—i.e., a system of consciousness that would include life within itself (as its own determinately negative other) and thereby constitute itself as a closed tropological system—can come into existence in the first place.”
11. Hegel After Derrida, 182. Hegel’s PdG is modified in Warminski: “[L]ife—in the result of its dialectic, i.e., genus (Gattung)—points to or indicates or beckons toward another than it (life) is, namely, consciousness, for which it (life) can be as this unity, or genus.” Important here is to explain why it is said that it is “in the result.” Warminski, 183, quotes Hegel: “in diesem Resultate verweist das Leben auf ein Anderes, als es ist, nämlich auf das Bewußtsein, für welches es als diese Einheit, oder als Gattung ist.”
14. Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion, 83. Heidegger writes of the “externalization” of Hegel’s notion of Spirit, that it “falls outside” also in the sense of “falls from”: “Spirit” (Der Geist) does not fall into time, but factitious existence (die faktische Existenz) “falls” (“fällt!”) in that it falls (als verfallende) from (or outside, aus, italicized) originary and proper temporality (authentic: ursprüngliche, eigentliche Zeitlichkeit). But this “falling” itself has its existential possibility in a mode of its temporalization which belongs to temporality.” Being and Time, section 82, 436.
15. Pahl challenges this way Kojève’s long standing reception of Hegel on death, the struggle to the death of master and slave. See Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion, 160-161: “In his work, the servant objectifies fear, turns it outward. Rather than fleeing fear, consciousness now expresses its fear. The servant’s labour takes on a therapeutic aspect. He fashions objects in order to come to terms with the traumatic experience of the trembles of absolute life.”
22. Basic Writings, Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism.”
28. PdG #474 and #744.
34. Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion, 49.
35. Nancy comments on an “originary ethics” as different than original ethics, which supposes an origin and original as beginning; the point rather is to diffuse the very idea of originality and origin as actual beginnings and the metaphysical structures that are usually associated with such idealisms. For Nancy thus, “thinking the origin as ethos, or conduct [which does not presuppose an original], is not the same as representing an originary ethos [which does].” Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, 75.
38. See Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion, p. 84.
39. Cf. Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present (London: Routledge, 1999), 100: “Ethology will provide a sketch of that which aids, and that which harms, a particular being’s characteristic relations with its surroundings, along with a description of its desires and aversions. Ethology eschews any analysis which seeks to determine the proper function or form of an individual by proceeding from an analysis of species, to genus, to individual. In contrast to a morality which claims to know what should count as universally good or bad, virtuous or wicked, for human beings as a ‘type’, ethology will not claim to know, ahead of observation and experimentation, what are the capacities of this or that being, or the powers which it may come to possess.”