It is widely known that the study of emotion, and of affectivity more generally, is burgeoning. Occasionally, one even hears talk of an “Affective Turn” in the academy. As I see it, a good portion of the theory of emotion, especially philosophy of emotion, involves a return to the 19th century, in particular the work of William James and his pioneering essay of 1884, “What is an Emotion?” There, James discusses what he calls “standard emotions” and makes a determined case for the centrality of physiology and feelings and for the obfuscations of what we have now been calling “cognitivist theories of emotion.” On his account, emotion is a form of interoceptive perception, specifically the perception of physiological changes of the body produced by a relevant elicitor. This account has influenced theorizing in neuroscience and in analytic philosophy of emotion. For example, the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and the analytic philosopher Jesse Prinz—significant representatives of their respective areas—are explicit neo-Jamesians. James’ focus on feelings has also encouraged sustained thinking about affectivity in phenomenologically-inclined or phenomenology-friendly work in moral psychology, like that of Michael Stocker, Elizabeth Hegeman, and Peter Goldie. Unsurprisingly, James has his critics. Cognitivists, like Robert Solomon, a neo-Sartrean theorist of emotion, and Martha Nussbaum, a neo-Stoic theorist, have either directly challenged James or the general type of position of which his is a paradigm. And his work has invited revisionist interpretation. A Heideggerian theorist, Matthew Ratcliffe, has made a case for a more existentialist reading of James on emotion.

Missing from this large portion of philosophy of emotion is another great theorist of emotion of the 19th century, G.W.F. Hegel. The publication of Katrin Pahl’s Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion offers an excellent opportunity to expand and rethink the recent 19th century groundings in philosophy of emotion. Her book is also an important contribution to an understanding of the development of Hegel’s thought. Here, one might think that the best entry into Hegel’s philosophy of emotion is the third section of the Encyclopedia, where a mature Hegel systematically explicates his philosophy of spirit. But, as Pahl shows, Hegel’s earlier work in the Phenomenology of Spirit has plenty to say about emotion and, through its narratival enactment of emotionality, offers an understanding of Hegel’s position on emotion that is not available in the didactically-configured
The overall aim of *Tropes of Transport* is to produce a new conception of emotion and a novel reading of the *Phenomenology* by centering emotion in the interpretation of the *Phenomenology* and by centering Hegelian self-actualization in theorizing emotion. In brief, her account offers a Transport Theory of Emotion, where transport is understood in terms of the negations—Hegelian *Aufhebung*—that move spirit toward self-actualization and the pluralization of subjectivity that enables negation. This account is built up out of a textualist model of subjectivity and a theatrical pathos conception of the *Phenomenology*. The book is comprised of two sections, the first on emotional subjects and the second on what she calls “emotional syntax.” And it has implications for current debates about modernity and violent emotion, which she addresses in the epilogue.

In the space I have available, I cannot do justice to the richness of the claims in *Tropes of Transport*. I will focus primarily on Pahl’s account of emotional subjects, the part of the book that has the most obvious contact with current work in philosophy of emotion and launches her Hegelian intervention in that literature. Two sets of critical remarks are offered. First, I call for greater clarification about precisely what in emotion—what beyond mere thought and desire—makes it central to what she calls “transports” in the self-actualization of spirit. Second, and I think deeply related to the first point, I raise a concern about the relative absence of discussion of experience and embodiment in Pahl’s account. The point here is not simply that her account of Hegel seems not to play up what we find in other theorists of emotion, but also that the Hegel of the *Encyclopedia*, in virtue of the extended discussion of experience and embodiment in that book, seems distant from the Hegel of the *Phenomenology* that she presents. So it would be helpful to hear Pahl speak to the tension in what is apparently two Hegels on the nature of emotion. I turn now to a brief summary of some of the major claims of her book.

Drawing from the *Phenomenology* §367-380, Pahl contends that Hegel rightly rejected a sentimentalist conception of emotion in his discussion of the “Law of the Heart.” Theorists like Rousseau, Schleiermacher, Schiller, and others organized their thinking about emotion by means of the metaphor of the heart and by such notions as: immediacy, simplicity, sincerity, authority, a special mental faculty, dichotomy with reason, special access to truth or profundity, and especially the idea of interiority, perhaps even a sacred or pure interiority, and the idea of a faithful expression of this interiority as being integral to self-development. In place of this expressivist idea of self-development, Pahl argues for a textual model of self-realization and later a theatrical pathos conception of emotionality, which will also be the key that unlocks an alternative exegesis of the *Phenomenology*.

In arguing against the sentimentalist conception of emotion and its expressivist thesis, Pahl brings forth a host of cogent challenging considerations. For example, she points out that such a conception can be conducive to injustice in virtue of its creating a class of heartless people; that it naturalizes rather than spiritualizes feeling; that it turns out actually to involve insincerity since sentimentalists concede that emotion seems to lose vitality when externalized; that it may be motivated by a “protection mechanism” rather than appreciation of profound truth; and still other considerations. But more than these, Pahl invokes some important elements of Hegel’s work to radically undermine the notions of interiority and expressive fidelity that lay at the foundation of the sentimentalist perspective. One of these critical engagements invokes the distinction between text and expression, where language is not conceived as an expression that preserves an intention but as an utterance that is exposed to transformation. Pahl focuses on this passage of Hegel:

> Speech and labor are utterances… in which the individual in himself no longer retains and possesses himself; rather, he lets the inner move wholly outside of him and he thus abandons it to the other. For that reason, we can just as well say that these utterances … express … the inner too much as we can say that they express it too little. *Too much*—because the inner itself breaks out in these expressions, no opposition remains between them and the inner; they do not merely provide an *expression* … of the inner, they immediately provide the inner itself. *Too little*—because in speech and action the inner makes itself into an other and thereby abandons itself … to the mercy of the element of transformation, which twists the spoken word and the accomplished deed and makes something else out of them
than what they, as actions of this determinate individual, are in and for themselves.⁹

In place of the expressivist thesis, we have a textualist thesis. Sentimentalism regards inner feeling as the authority by which to measure the adequacy of the outer expression or externalization of feeling. In so doing, it takes the outer form to be “mere representation.” But, as Hegel argues, this inner-outer framework is misconceived. On this framework, the outer form will express too much because the alleged expressivity is so potent that the outer form becomes a replication, and no longer an expression proper, of the inner condition. The outer form will also express too little because the qualities of the inner condition that it allegedly has at the start can be quickly lost to the whims or manipulations of the outer world. Rejecting the framework presupposed by the sentimentalist, Pahl suggests that we read Hegel as offering an alternative conception according to which what is essential to the so-called inner condition is not the expressive fidelity of its outer representation, but precisely its “exposure to others” or transformations arising from the open contingency of the world. Following Jean-Luc Nancy on manifestation, she suggests further that these transformations arise from and return to “nothing;” that is, a “nothing” in contrast to the classically invoked “manifester.” All, then, is manifestation or transformation.¹⁰ Furthermore, in virtue of the production of transformable difference, texts offer an alternative model for the negations, sublations, or transports necessary for spirit’s self-actualization, and they reveal how emotions can transport without the element of expressivity. In fact, carried to its logical conclusion, argues Pahl, “the text is a self-reflective subject in its own right.”¹¹

In building her case against sentimentalism and the expressivist thesis, Pahl also shows how a textualist account of spirit’s self-actualization informs a genealogy of reason in the master-slave dialectic. Specifically, at the point in the dialectical story when self-consciousness becomes reason, Hegel engages in what is called “indirect discourse,” where multiple versions of the protagonist, or referents of the “it” of self-consciousness, are blended together and blended further with multiple versions of the witnessing phenomenologist, the reader, revealing the operations of differentiation that has undergone transformations. As she puts it, “Despite the finitude of its embodiment, despite its individuality, this self-conscious thing enjoys the pleasure of knowing that it is ‘in itself’ objective actuality or ‘all reality.’ Its happiness comes courtesy of the easy shifts in reference. These shifts have allowed consciousness to identify or confuse itself with the supreme other (anderes)—the position of objectivity and stable truth . . . .”¹²

As if the foregoing were not enough, Pahl offers a genealogy of the emergence of interiority in the Phenomenology, an account of inwardizing and the notion of intelligence as pit in the Encyclopedia, and a critical account of the “beautiful soul”—all this to layer and deepen her account of the textuality of sublation, subjectivity, and emotionality, and thus her alternative to the sentimentalist model.¹³ Many years ago, Richard Rorty effectively criticized the notion that minds work as mirrors of nature. Here, Pahl argues effectively against a correlated idea, namely that cultures work as mirrors of the psyche.

So if we must reject the sentimentalist conception and its expressivity thesis and adopt instead a textualist conception of subjectivity and self-actualization, then how exactly should we understand emotion as a form of subjectivity and as an enabler of self-actualization? Pahl puts forward a theatrical pathos account of Hegelian emotion, which is characterized by a two-level emotionality configured by what she calls “lightheartedness”. This is distinguished from a merely first-order dramatic pathos. Her account develops in two stages. Focusing on Hegel on tragedy, she notes three salient features of dramatic pathos. Her account develops in two stages. Focusing on Hegel on tragedy, she notes three salient features of dramatic pathos. First, steering clear of sentimentalism, tragic Homeric heroes are marked by exteriority, for the gods of the heroes are abstractly universal but actualized in the actions of the heroes. Moreover, the passions of the heroes are ethicized for Hegel since they are about fulfilling a god-given cause. Second, the passionate heroes exhibit a kind of rationality in virtue of their subjective reasons for acting being identical with the will of objective gods. Third, the heroes are grandly intransigent, for they have an unchosen and total commitment to their god-endowed cause, often with horrific consequences, where this is central to their greatness. Importantly, a crucial feature of this intransigence is the utter lack of hesitation, ambivalence, or other forms of self-differentiated self-reflection.¹⁴
On this third point, we have the transition from dramatic to theatrical pathos. Pahl observes that the Greek tragic heroes not only fail to learn, but die in virtue of their single-mindedness. Thus, they can neither be models for emotionality, nor capable of the negations or transport crucial to self-actualization. But rather than replacing this element of intransigence with something else at the same level, as it were, Pahl goes meta. She suggests that we consider the emotionality of the spectator of the dramatic pathos of the heroes as a part of the overall emotionality. She contends that we are doubled in both identifying with the passionate heroes and as having the ironic distance to appreciate ourselves as viewers of the unfolding drama. This is theatricality, and theatrical pathos is the ethicized, exteriorized, actional passions configured by the second-order feelings involved in one’s being an engaged spectator. This bi-level emotionality has a certain light-heartedness to it and invites a kind of humility. It offers, therefore, a model for Hegelian emotion. As she puts it,

    Every protagonist and every phenomenologist has the ability to self-negate, that is to say, to die and survive at the same time. This is the negativity that so famously defines the subject in Hegel. This negativity is, in my view, fundamentally emotional because it is the ability to acknowledge and negotiate inner difference. Such emotionality is plastic and theatrical rather than linear and dramatic, because there is always a remainder of the subject in action that hovers above the scene and reflects it. At the same time, the subject is existentially enwrapped in the passionate act. \(^{15}\)

This clearly has many implications. Just one of them is a rejoinder to interpreters of Hegel who read his master-slave dialectic as revealing a combative or violent perspective on the achievement of self-consciousness. As Pahl maintains, the characters in the *Phenomenology*, like those in Athenian tragedy, must elicit some degree of identification, but there must also be a differentiation of self that allows emotive ascent to the second-order of theatricality and thus a kind of light-heartedness and humility. So we must not assume that Hegel endorses strict identification with the protagonist and thus violent struggle in that part of the *Phenomenology*.

We have in the theatrical pathos model of emotion a replacement of the sentimentalist model and something squarely within the textualist conception of subjectivity. In fact, Pahl goes further and draws out what she takes to be an implication of this view.

    Pathos has become reflexive; it behaves like a self-relating, self-dividing, and self-negating entity and in that sense it acts as a subject. The tragicomedy of pathos might involve human beings, but, if so, then always in the plural, that is to say, always as inwardly divided and ontologically dependent on others. Human subjects or characters might come on the scene, play a part, show up for an act, but they are neither a sufficient nor even a necessary requirement for emotionality. \(^{16}\)

The *Phenomenology* itself, then is emotional, and this in a strong non-metaphorical sense of the term.

As I noted earlier, there is much to recommend in this book, and I cannot delve into all its details adequately. But even this much discussion indicates how far we have come from Jamesian interoceptive perception of charging bears. We are deeply ensconced in the complexities of self-actualization in a social world and can wonder how studies of the sensations of the viscera can lead us to where we have arrived. I turn now to some critical commentary.

My first concern is about how exactly, on Pahl’s account, emotion transports? A classic but valuable discussion in philosophy of emotion goes as follows: much about agency can be explained by adverting to an agent’s beliefs and desires, cognitions and conations, judgments and goals, or depictings and impellings, so what does emotion contribute beyond these? It is not uncommon for people to act on the belief that, say, there is a threat and the desire to avoid a threat, without actually feeling fear. For example, I may slow down my driving on a wet road out of a belief that high-speed driving in the rain is dangerous and a desire to avoid such a threat, and yet not feel fear. Perhaps after slowing down, I get consumed by the music I’m listening to and forget the safety measure I just took and begin to accelerate again. When my tires slip, I feel fear, perhaps both for myself and
for my child in the backseat, and then I slow down again. I take it that the second scenario is quite different than
the first in virtue of the presence of emotion. Emotions contribute something beyond what beliefs and desires
deliver to the subject. And it seems a central issue to figure out what they offer.\footnote{17}

Now, central to Hegel’s project is explaining not just any action, like the mundane case I just raised, but the
self-actualization of mind, a dialectical project pushed along by negations, sublations, or transports. It seems
clear that emotions can play this role, but in virtue of what does emotion play this role, especially when it
would seem that cognitions and conations would suffice. Certain emotions, like fear, play a crucial role in the
story of the development of the unhappy consciousness in the \textit{Phenomenology}. But why exactly? It seems clear
\textit{that} fear or a similar emotion must be invoked, but it is not obvious what Hegel thinks is the explanation for
\textit{why} it, as opposed to some correlated cluster of cognitions and conations, plays the crucial role. Why couldn’t
belief in a threat and a desire to avoid a threat support the negation? In \textit{Hegel’s Practical Philosophy}, Robert
Pippin notes that emotion as a “mode” of negativity involves “a way” of taking up a feature of the world, like
a threat.\footnote{18} This seems right, but it is left unclear what this way and hence this mode is. For his immediate aims,
such elaboration may be unnecessary. But, as summarized above, Pahl explicitly makes a case for emotion
specially instantiating the role of negation or transport in self-sublation. Thus, for Pahl, the elaboration cannot
be deferred. Here, too, \textit{that} emotion fits the bill seems clear, but I think more can be said about \textit{why}; that is, in
virtue of what feature of emotion, beyond cognitions and conations, does emotion negate.

Pahl says that self-differentiation and reflexive awareness are crucial for negation, but these seem insufficient
for emotionality.\footnote{19} Can’t we have thoughts about ourselves, even ones including emotively-normative ideas,
like threat, loss, or resounding success, without feeling the typically associated emotion, as when one is dist-
tracted, exhausted, or depressed? At one point, she says,

\begin{quote}
Our ability to feel emotion is, then, a matter of understanding emotionality. I mean this in the double
sense. Emotionality is a mode of understanding, or, as Terada puts it, ‘emotions are an interpretive
act that involves representation and mediation.’ But we also need the right understanding of emo-
tionality—we need to understand emotionality as self-reflective—if we want to feel emotions. If we
think that the authenticity of emotion lies in its immediacy, we will have a hard time experiencing
emotion.
\end{quote}

The issue can be pressed this way: the elements that Pahl adverts to, like understanding, interpretation, represen-
tation, mediation, and reflection, sound highly cognitive and not obviously specially affective or emotive.
This is not to say that emotion cannot involve these. In fact, many emotion theorists think emotion can directly
or indirectly involve all these. But, again, what is distinctive to emotion? Without an answer to this, emotion
simply turns into a species of belief, desire, or a complex of these. In much of the literature in philosophy of
emotion an attempt at an answer to the question has typically focused on felt experience, especially either felt
embodiment or what might be called felt concern, import, or mattering, and how these distinctive features of
emotion distinctively engage the agent in worldly activities or practices. Since felt engagement seems not to
be central to Pahl’s Hegel, I issue a call for greater clarification about how emotion qua emotion transports,
especially when mere thought and desire would seem to suffice.

My second critical point concerns whether there can be a rapprochement between what looks like two sets of
priorities in the philosophy of emotion literature and especially between what looks like two Hegels, the one of
the \textit{Phenomenology} and the one of the \textit{Encyclopedia}.

Much work on emotion stresses experience and embodiment, often Jamesian embodiment, for the reasons
noted earlier. For example, Matthew Ratcliffe, in \textit{Feelings of Being}, argues that a deep structure of world-
giving experience is a kind of Heideggerian mood that is our felt basic ontic connection to a world, where
standard emotions, like fear or shame, are experienced subsequently as in-world phenomena.\footnote{21} And Michael
Stocker, Elizabeth Hegeman, and Peter Goldie contend that the basic experiential structure of emotion is that
of felt mattering/concern/care, something not unlike Heideggerian Sorge/care. Also Jan Slaby contends that a bodily hedonic element is a crucial configurating experiential structure of emotion. But these sorts of issues are bench in Pahl’s account. To be clear, this is not to say that Pahl does not talk at all about experience and embodiment. In some sense, she does throughout the text. She says, for example,

I will traverse Hegel’s text back and forth in an attempt to bring its body to life again and again as a warm body... The complex rhythm of Hegel’s philosophical language restores thought to its body. Poetic language brings to the fore a general characteristic of texts, namely that they survive their physical vanishing in the uptake of information. Unable to decide where best to place the stress, we read over and over again and thus remain attached to the materiality of words.

Thus, what I mean is that Pahl does not delve into embodied experience in the sense of lived experience. Rather, she interprets bodies, embodiment, and experience in terms of a more abstract and impersonal materiality. So her priorities are placed on the materiality and plurality of selves and literary tropes, and this out of a reading of Hegel that is influenced by Nancy, Derrida, and recent work by Rei Terada. In terms of Hegelian influenced traditions that address emotion, my own sympathies lie with early 20th century continental thinkers, like Scheler, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty.

This raises the issue of how to think about the shared topic of emotion in spite of the divergent trajectories out of which these two approaches emerge. This is not of course the time or place to revisit the issue of “the Death of the Subject.” But I would like to register the concern that Pahl seems to tie anti-sentimentalism too closely with textualism. As I see it, anti-sentimentalism does not entail textualism of subjectivity. An alternative route out of anti-sentimentalism is the phenomenological extension of Hegel. This is not the place to make a case for phenomenology. But I think it would be helpful to note some remarks by Merleau-Ponty that reveal a type of position, or maybe a family of them, that lies between sentimentalism and textualism.

My interlocutor gets angry and I notice that he is expressing his anger by speaking aggressively, by gesticulating and shouting. But where is this anger? People will say that it is in the mind of my interlocutor. What this means is not entirely clear. For I could not imagine the malice and cruelty which I discern in my opponent’s looks separated from his gestures, speech and body. None of this takes place in some otherworldly realm, in some shrine located beyond the body of the angry man... It is in the space between him and me that it unfolds.

Here, Merleau-Ponty considers emotion, specifically anger, as a feature of inter-embodiment, and it is a far cry from a position that takes emotion to be specially ensconced in the head, heart, or brain. Again, this is not the place to defend or elaborate on phenomenology. I just wish to point out that Merleau-Ponty and others influenced by Hegel can reject sentimentalism, and potentially agree with every part of Pahl’s specific case against that position, without giving up lived subjectivity. Importantly, in rejecting the entailment from anti-sentimentalism to textualism, I do not think that Pahl’s overall case is undermined. The upshot, rather, is that her account consists of a combination of Hegelian anti-sentimentalism and an independently-defended post-Hegelian textualism.

Importantly, there is another side to this issue with deeper implications for Pahl’s project, namely the problem of two Hegels, one of which, the one from the Encyclopedia, looks a bit more like a phenomenologist than a textualist. In some classic passages of the Encyclopedia, for example §400 and 401, Hegel indicates that emotion must be understood developmentally, where the initial focus is on “unprocessed” physiology and the experience of embodiment in natural consciousness. After noting sensation as the source of what appears in consciousness and reason, Hegel states, “Let it not be enough to have principles and religion only in the head: they must also be in the heart, in the feeling.” He goes on to clarify that this must be so in part because otherwise “concrete subjectivity” cannot lay claim to the objects of thought. When what is “in the head” is also in one’s feelings, then what is in the head, as it were, becomes a “mode of my individuality,” even if the self in ques-
tion is not yet “the ego of developed consciousness” or characterized by the “freedom of rational mind-life.”

Of course, Hegel does not endorse the sentimentalist conception criticized by Pahl, for he goes on to note, famously, the dangers of solipsistic unreason in an appeal to “mere feeling.” After issuing this warning, Hegel says that the separation between the feeling subject and the object of feeling has not yet registered in the undeveloped mind or spirit. Such a registration belongs only to consciousness and so does not appear until the soul has attained to the abstract thought of its ‘I’, of its infinite being-for-self. This difference will therefore not fall to be discussed until we reach Phenomenology. Here in Anthropology we have only to consider the difference given by the content of feeling.

So, ultimately, Hegel means not to criticize feelings as such but to offer a developmental story of the layers of consciousness, the dialectics of consciousness, and the sequence of types of studies of subjective spirit.

In addition, Hegel contends that there are two general classes of feeling, one involving “corporeal affection” or “outer sensations” that become connected with “mental or spiritual inwardness,” and the other involving inner sensations that become “invested with corporeity.” Moreover, he divides the second class into inner feelings having to do with “immediate individuality,” like anger and shame, and inner feelings having to do with an “absolute universal,” like morality and religion. He also raises the issue of how corporealization is necessary for the feeling to be felt. And he says a good deal about the concept of corporealization in relation to the expulsion of sensation, as when tears expel pain.

Jason Howard, charting the development of Hegel’s account of emotion in the Encyclopedia, summarizes his findings in this way:

… Hegel distinguishes brute sensation from those emotions that develop later at the level of practical feeling. Hegel refines this taxonomy with even more precision by distinguishing emotions of self-assessment from other types. In so doing, Hegel specifies how these emotions underlie moral character and self-worth. The result … is an evaluative theory of emotion that stipulates the role emotions play in enabling subjective spirit to know itself in a way that is concrete, individuated and meaningful.

Pahl’s account of emotion does not directly engage with the foregoing aspects of Hegel’s philosophy of emotion in the Encyclopedia. So putting aside philosophy of emotion literature generally, including alternative post-Hegelian accounts, a commitment to Hegel’s account would seem to invite an effort at rapprochement between experience and embodiment, on the one hand, and socio-linguistic structures, on the other. Relatedly, there is a passage in the Encyclopedia, §401 zusatz, where Hegel speaks provocatively about the body’s corporealizations as signs but not real signs. And later he puts these on a continuum whose highest end is “articulate speech.” In fact, he notes that not just tears but poetry can expel distress. Could this offer a way to rapprochement?

In conclusion, let me note that there are surely many like me who tire of discussions focused on cases like those that start out William James’ classic article—something like, traveller meets bear, gets scared, and runs away, and not necessarily in that order. In addition, many of us are seeking theoretic resources that do more than invoke the intentionality structure of aboutness to show how emotions can get out of the head and be worldly, as it were. Especially interesting is how sociality, self-actualization, and language play a significant role in emotion’s worldliness. This is surely why Heidegger’s work has been informing philosophy of emotion recently. But perhaps we should start with Hegel, and Pahl’s account has convinced me on this.

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NOTES

1. William James, “What is an Emotion?” *Mind*, vol.9, 1884, p.188-205.
6. Another important theorist of emotion of the 19th century who has been relegated to the philosophical margins is Freud. For an illuminating treatment of 19th century theories of emotion, including Hegel’s account, see Paul Redding, *The Logic of Affect* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). I should mention, too, that I focus on Western philosophy here in my response to Pahl. There is, however, a rich set of literature on emotion in Vedic, Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist traditions.
7. Katrin Pahl, *Tropes of Transport: Hegel and Emotion* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2012). This review of her book was first presented as a paper in an author-meets-critic session at the 2013 conference of the Society for Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy. I would like to thank the panel organizer for giving me the opportunity to think through Pahl’s fascinating contribution to Hegel and emotion studies.
9. This is Pahl’s modified translation of the *Phenomenology* §312 in Pahl, *Tropes of Transport*, p.29.
11. ibid, p.31.
12. ibid, p.35.
13. ibid, p.35-49.
14. ibid, p.53-54.
15. ibid, p.72.
16. ibid, p.77.
18. Robert Pippin, *Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life* (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p.53. Pippin’s aim in that discussion is to give a general account of the transition from naturalness to mindedness. Though beyond the scope of this discussion, I should mention that his account could have been helped by work by John Russon on emotion and its relation to conveyance of determinateness in sensibility, irritability, mood, and corporeal articulation. See his excellent essay, “Emotional Subjects: Mood and Articulation in Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind,” *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol.49, no.1, issue 193 (March 2009).
19. These also seem not to be necessary, and I think the point can be made within Pahl’s own account. In order to have the lighthearted bi-level blended emotionality that Pahl favors, it seems that we need first-order emotions that get taken up in the reflexive project. The implication is that the first-order emotions do not require self-differentiation or negation. Rather the self-differentiation and negation in question consists of a manipulation of that first-order emotion.
26. Also, I work out of some Asian philosophical traditions that never had to put back together what 20th century continental thinkers claim Descartes split asunder.
29. ibid. Also John Russon’s work is illuminating here.
31. Further subdivisions are added later, for example those connected to ethical normativity as discussed in §472.