0. Recently, contemporary Nietzschean scholars have advanced Nietzsche’s so-called ‘positive view of freedom.’ Some have pointed to the ‘sovereign individual,’ of section II, in the second essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, as an exemplar of this view. Another view, which has recently been revivified, has been used to claim that Nietzsche can be interpreted as a constitutivist, where power is constitutive of agency. The common element in these interpretations is their assumption of how Nietzsche is using the concepts of ‘agency’ and related terms, such as ‘responsibility,’ ‘free will,’ ‘agenthood’ and so on; for while these interpretations can accept that Nietzsche subverts these concepts’ ‘standard’ use, they are dependent on these concepts being understandable from within this ‘standard’ conceptual framework.

I will argue that this assumption is false. My argument is intended to have ramifications on most, if not all, interpretations of Nietzsche on agency, where ‘agency,’ and related terms, are understandable from within this ‘standard’ conceptual framework. I will argue that this ‘standard’ conceptual framework makes it a necessary condition of ‘agency’ that there be a distinction between intentional and unintentional action. Nietzsche’s concept of ‘agency,’ and related terms, I will argue, flouts this distinction.

Given the generality of my claim, it would be improper to target a group of authors specifically. I will, however, refer to particular authors’ works when needed to clarify the issue. So rather than the argument being motivated by particular works of authors, it is centralised around a particular problem, to which these authors succumb. I will argue that there are textual and philosophical reasons to interpret Nietzsche in this way. I first consider what a Nietzschean constitutivism might look like, and some textual evidence we can interpret him along these lines. Then, with reference to Gemes, I make a distinction between two ways one might think of ‘free will,’ where this provides two ways to think about agency, both falling under the intentional behaviour distinction. I then argue for a distinct conception of agency in Nietzsche, which flouts the intentional/unintentional behaviour distinction. I do this by paying close attention to Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) §19, where he talks about ‘willing,’ and his theory of Becoming in general. I call the resultant conception of agency and free will,
Nietzsche’s ‘negative view of freedom.’

1. Recently, Katsafanas has attributed a constitutivist view to Nietzsche. This comes amidst recent rationalist constitutivist theories, put forward (independently) by Korsgaard and Velleman. My aim here is not to provide a fully worked out account of Nietzsche’s constitutivism, nor rational constitutivism, but to highlight the latter theory’s commitments to a ‘standard’ conception of agency.

Constitutivism about action builds on the Aristotelian idea of objects, or actions, having certain functions. An internal standard is a standard something must meet to be the thing it is. For example, as a functional definition of ‘clock’ is that it is a ‘keeper of time,’ an internal standard for a clock is that it keeps time correctly. An external standard is a standard for a clock that is extraneous to its primary activity. So an external standard may be that it goes with the décor, or that it chimes every hour. Of course, a clock may keep time badly. But in this case it does not cease being a clock; rather, it is a bad clock, for it meets its functional definition badly. A good clock, on the other hand, is a clock that meets its functional definition well; that is to say, it is a good keeper of time, and thereby a good clock.

Rational constitutivism holds that the constitutive (internal) standard for being a human agent is rationality: it is insofar as one’s acts are rational that one attains agency. Following Korsgaard, let us make a distinction between acting and actions. Acting, or what might be called an act, refers to the various things we do: mere behaviours. This will include, especially, unintentional behaviour, such as (automatically) throwing one’s hand out to save a glass from smashing or the reflex-action of rising lips when an old friend enters the room. These will be things that can be represented by the locution ‘x <verbs>,’ where the act is whatever x does. An action, on the other hand, is an act-done-for-a-reason, where this reason is the teleological end-state of the act, often (but not always) associated with the phrase ‘in order to.’ So ‘x walks in order to keep fit’ and ‘x kills in order to steal money’ would both be actions; whereas ‘x walks’ and ‘x kills,’ similarly to ‘x smiles,’ are not. Importantly, acts are not things done to one, such as having one’s hair cut or one’s stumbling over a tree root; they are things one does, but not always intentionally. As actions, but not acts, are constitutive of one’s agency, it is a necessary condition for this conception of ‘agency’ to distinguish between acts and actions. Only when one undertakes actions is one’s agency exerted.

Similarly to how clocks may be better or worse, dependent on how well they meet their functional definition, one may be more or less unified as an agent, dependent on the extent to which their actions are rational. Another way to put this is just to say that the human agent is better or worse, dependent on the extent to which their actions meet the constitutive standard for being a human agent. Thus, the rational constitutivist must hold that there is a conceptual distinction between acts and actions.

2. While one would be hard-pressed to find an explicit and well-thought-out power constitutivism in Nietzsche, there are textual reasons to attribute this kind of theory to him. Similarly to rational constitutivism, if power were a constitutive standard for being a human agent then every act must aim at power. Nietzsche claims that power does play this role, in an unpublished note of November 1887-March 1888:

> Using the agreeable or disagreeable feelings of this consciousness as a measure of whether existence has value: can a crazier extravagance of vanity be imagined? For consciousness is just a means: and agreeable or disagreeable feelings are just means as well! - What is the objective yardstick of value? Only the quantum of enhanced and organised power, only what happens in everything that happens, a will to more...

This is probably the clearest view we can get from Nietzsche to the effect that he can be interpreted along constitutivist lines. In this fragment he is first, discrediting a view of value that appoints value to things which provide conscious agreeable feelings; second, proposing an alternative view, which attributes value to only
‘quantum of enhanced and organised power’; and third, claiming that this enhancement of power is constitutive of ‘everything that happens.’

It is worth noting why he discredits consciousness: because it is just a means (of communication): “[w]hat then is the purpose of consciousness generally, when it is in the main superfluous?” It is still possible, without considering the role Nietzsche attributes to consciousness, to contrast Nietzsche’s positive account of value with the one he derides. In particular, Nietzsche is saying that it is power that is essential to ‘everything that happens.’ If power is essential to everything that happens then it is also essential to all acts; consciousness merely accompanies some of these acts. So, analogously to the rational constitutivist’s use of rational action, Nietzsche thinks that aiming at power is constitutive of all acts and provides a value-standard.

This thought is not restricted to only unpublished fragments. He talks about aiming at power and its being a value-standard throughout both his published and unpublished writings. Consider:

Only where life is, there is also will: not will to life, but – so I teach you – will to power;

A living thing desires above all to vent its strength – life as such is will to power - : self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it;

[Life is will to power. . ‘Exploitation’ does not pertain to a corrupt or imperfect or primitive society: it pertains to the essence of the living thing as a fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the intrinsic will to power which is precisely the will of life;

What is good? - All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man;

What men of power and will can demand of themselves also provides a standard for what they may allow themselves.

This provides some textual support for the claim that Nietzsche thinks power is constitutive of, not only actions, but acts. If so, then it looks like Nietzsche might be employing a different concept of agency and related terms than that of the rational constitutivist.

3. It is relatively unsurprising to claim that Nietzsche subverts the standard meanings of many terms, including substantially modifying the ‘standard’ conception of ‘agency’ and related terms. As I will show presently, it is largely accepted that Nietzsche provides a different conception of agency, where a “‘conception of agency’... [is] a substantive articulation and specification of an otherwise uncontested concept of agency,” This concept of agency (and related terms) keeps the intentional action/mere behaviours distinction. I will eventually make the more radical claim that Nietzsche actually challenges our very concept of agency (and related terms).

Gemes distinguishes between two notions of free will: deserts-based free will — which relates to the meritings of punishment/reward — and agency free will — which relates to what constitutes an action, as opposed to a mere behaviour. The difference between these notions of free will can be explained by concentrating on the concept of responsibility. Consider an ambiguity in responsibility. We might use it in respect to punishment/reward — ‘you were wrong to yell at those kids’ — or we might use it to signify merely that it was ‘their doing’ — ‘you yelled at those kids.’ The former relates to deserts-based free will — for it signals blame; the latter to agency free will—it was something one did. Gemes claims that Nietzsche’s notion of agency is an instance of agency free will, which marks a deviation from common conceptions of free will as deserts-based, but also keeps a distinction between intentional action and mere behaviours.
This enables one to see how the ‘standard’ conceptual framework can accommodate substantial modification of the ‘standard’ conception of ‘agency,’ and related terms. It does so, not by flouting the intentional action/mere behaviour distinction, but by a re-conceptualisation of intentional action. Pippin raises a similar worry, when he says:

We must be able to appeal to … a subject’s “intending” in order for us to be able to distinguish, say, someone volunteering for a risky mission from steel rusting or water running downhill or a bird singing. The identification of such a prior condition is, in Wittgenstein’s famous words, what would distinguish my arm going up from my raising my arm.24

The distinction Pippin is appealing to here is the distinction between intentional action and mere behaviours, as signified, especially, in the distinction between one’s arm going up from one’s raising one’s arm. I think Pippin may have over-stepped the mark by including such things as ‘steel rusting’ and ‘water running downhill,’ for these ‘events’ are not done by the things in question, even unintentionally. The bird’s singing is a better comparison, in virtue of this being something the bird does. With this amendment, it seems Pippin is concerned with the same distinction as Gemes.

Pippin accepts that “there is certainly language consistent with the anti-agent language in Nietzsche, but at the same time and more frequently language immediately in tension with it.”25 In direct opposition to this response, I will argue that the ‘language immediately in tension’ with Nietzsche’s anti-agent language has only the appearance of being in tension, for Nietzsche is subverting the concept of agency (and related terms) itself.

This raises the question of Nietzsche interpretation; for, oftentimes, which view one accepts of Nietzsche’s apparently conflicting views appears to depend on where one starts.26 As such, I may be accused of concentrating on particular parts of Nietzsche, at the expense of others, and that this unevenly sways my particular interpretation. To this end, I proffer my interpretation as a more holistic view of Nietzsche, which takes into account his process theory of Becoming. While I accept that Nietzsche thinks unification (or, at least, unification of magnanimous proportions) of the drives constitutes a freedom or agency of sorts, this is not freedom (or agency) as we mean it.

4. The prime suspects for the power centres are drives (Trieb) and/or instincts (Instinkt).27 I will follow the current trend in interpretations of Nietzsche and treat Treib and Instinkt as terminological variants.28

For Nietzsche, the human agent is a misnomer. What we call the ‘human agent’ is just a multiplicity of different drives.29 The drives both interpret and are interpreted, so interpret our self as an individual self in the world. It is through this interpretation that drives organise themselves into a more or less coherent structure.30 The proponent of Nietzschean freedom claims that agency is achieved when this multiplicity of drives accomplish unification (or, unification of magnanimous proportions).31

Drives are process, rather than goal, directed and, borrowing terminology from Freud, have both an object and an aim.32 Being particular unconscious urges, they belong to individuals and their particular motivations, but are not mere dispositions or desire-like states.33 Instead, they are physio-psychological states of agents, which attempt to fully exert their power in all their activities. For Nietzsche, there are many different drives. To take just one example: the sex drive. The sex drive has an aim, which is to procreate, and an object, which is the thing upon which the drive will exert itself in order to fulfil its aim. Fulfilling this aim will be to exert its power. Being process-directed, however, on a drive’s achieving its aim it will seek other avenues to exert its power. So drives do not have determinate aims—power is not a state—but have the aim of increasing power through a process of continually overcoming resistances to their ends.

Sometimes, Nietzsche uses agential language to describe the drives, where they adopt perspectives, interpret the world and evaluate. Nietzsche says:
Every drive is a kind of lust to rule; each one has its perspective that it would like to compel all the other drives to accept as a norm;\textsuperscript{34}

\[\text{Every drive is tyrannical: and it is as such that it tries to philosophize.}\textsuperscript{35}\]

This agential language that is attributed to drives has moved some authors to claim that drives are homunculi.\textsuperscript{36} This is \textit{prima facie} problematic insofar as the homuncular view assumes that we already have a coherent conception of selfhood, and are merely attributing this to the wrong thing (persons instead of drives). Katsafanas complains that "Nietzsche is not simply claiming that there are more selves than we think there are; instead, he is claiming that we have a mistaken conception of selfhood."\textsuperscript{37}

Katsafanas’ solution is attractive. He claims that “drives are dispositions that generate evaluative orientations.”\textsuperscript{38} He thinks the homuncular view is only appealing because of the thought that drives are isolated entities, which may or may not have agential properties. Katsafanas devises a different solution to the problem:

\[\text{We can deny that drives, considered in isolation, can reason, evaluate, and interpret, while maintaining that embodied drives—drives considered as part of a whole organism—can reason, evaluate, and interpret.}\textsuperscript{39}\]

Thus, for Katsafanas, drives generate evaluative orientations in the sense that they make certain features of situations more affectively and perceptually salient to the reflective thought of the ‘whole organism.’\textsuperscript{40} In this way, drives may affect the whole organism’s decision-making process.

Elsewhere, Katsafanas explains the different ways drives may influence behaviour: they may make certain goals appear more attractive to the agent in reflective thought, without the agent self-consciously realising this; or they may prevent an agent from realising certain ends, or certain means to their ends, when self-consciously determining what (or which) action to pursue.\textsuperscript{41} On Katsafanas’ view, therefore, the agent may be a mere ‘passive conduit for the drives,’ where the drives determine or inhibit one’s decision making.

This provides conceptual space for a more ‘active’ agent: one where there is a unification between the agent’s drives and self-conscious motives for action. This would still be an instance of the agent being motivated by their drives, but in this case there would be a ‘unification’ between the agent’s drives and self-conscious, reflective, thought. The existence of such a relation would enable one to act for a reason and thus provide the necessary conceptual space for a distinction between actions and mere behaviours, on Nietzsche’s behalf.

There is textual evidence that Nietzsche is thinking along these lines, but it is not clear that there is any room for a self-conscious, reflective agent. Nietzsche claims that drives, themselves, have no moral character, nor a sensation of pleasure or displeasure; rather, they ‘acquire’ this (to use Katsafanas’ term) ‘evaluative orientation,’ as their “second nature,” in one of two ways: “either by… enter[ing] into relations with drives already baptised good or evil or… [by being] noted as a quality of beings the people has already evaluated and determined in a moral sense.”\textsuperscript{42} So Nietzsche can say that drives affect the evaluative orientation of whole organisms; but this is not yet to say that there is an agent of self-conscious, reflective thought.

5. As the human agent is essentially drive motivated, it is in these smallest elements’ unification that one gets (at least a necessary condition for) Nietzsche’s so-called ‘positive view of freedom.’\textsuperscript{43} Unification means that these smallest elements of force must be working toward one aim. This would require a unified account of \textit{willing}.

The most obvious place to look for this is \textit{BGE} 19, which appears in the chapter \textit{On the Prejudices of Philosophers}.\textsuperscript{44} This particular section’s central concern is philosophers’ conception of the will. Here, Nietzsche is talking about “German philosophy,” influenced by Kant and pinpoints, as the target of his attack, Schopenhauer’s conception of the will as being completely known by us.\textsuperscript{45} He claims that this is only an exaggeration of a “popular prejudice” and proceeds to give an account of “the will” as “something complicated, something
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that is a unity only as a word.”

Commentators on this passage, in Clark and Dudrick and Leiter, claim that he is giving a phenomenology of willing. But the details of their accounts differ. Before considering the passage in which Nietzsche offers this phenomenology, it is worthwhile considering the place it plays in his overall argument.

The phenomenology passage is, in part, a reaction to German philosophers’ faith in “immediate certainties,” such as ‘I think.’ In the previous sections, Nietzsche casts doubt on whether ‘I think’ is an immediate certainty; in particular, he claims that the ‘I’ is only an assumption about an ‘it’ that thinks, but that even this ‘it’ is an “interpretation of the event and does not belong to the event itself.” The ‘event,’ is the deed (of thinking). Nietzsche’s point is that all there is to this ‘I think’ (or ‘it thinks’) is the deed of thinking itself. If there is nothing other than the deed of thinking itself, then there is no ‘doer’ behind the deed. He claims that positing a ‘doer’ behind the deed is a prejudice, which is petrified in our grammar.

The phenomenology passage (as does the remainder of BGE 19), thereby, offers an alternative to a unified conception of ‘the will.’ In particular, on pain of contradiction, Nietzsche cannot hold that this ‘new’ conception of ‘the will’ is an ‘immediate certainty.’ Thus, Nietzsche’s phenomenology of ‘willing’ must be understood only as a device—not an immediate certainty—to investigate the phenomena of ‘willing.’

Nietzsche, therefore, offers the phenomenology passage as something to be investigated:

[L]et us say: in willing there is, first of all, a plurality of sensations, namely the sensation of the condition we leave, the sensation of the condition towards which we go, the sensation of this ‘leaving’ and ‘going’ itself, and then also an accompanying muscular sensation which, even without our putting ‘arms and legs’ in motion, comes into play through a kind of habit as soon as we ‘will.’

Here, Nietzsche is attributing three things to ‘willing’: a plurality of sensations or feelings, thinking, and affect. This plurality of sensations or feelings includes the place in which we “leave,” where we “go,” this “leaving” and “going” itself, and a muscular sensation which occurs “without our putting ‘arms and legs’ in motion.” This thinking is the commanding thought, which puts the body in motion. But, as is true of commanders, there must be something which obeys this commanding thought. This sensation of being obeyed is the affect of ‘willing.’ So, for Nietzsche, in every instance of ‘willing’ there are, as it were, two or more sides: one that commands and the other (one or more) that obeys. In this tussle for power between the drives, Nietzsche claims, ‘we’ identify with the commanding thought. Thus, in ‘willing,’ the ‘actor’ attributes agency to herself.

In light of this, Nietzsche says the following:

He who wills adds in this way the sensations of pleasure of the successful executive agents, the serviceable ‘under-wills’ or under-souls – for our body is only a social structure composed of many souls – to his sensations of pleasure as commander. L’effet, c’est moi: what happens here is what happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth: the ruling class identifies itself with the successes of the commonwealth. In all willing it is absolutely a question of commanding and obeying, on the basis, as I have said already, of a social structure composed of many ‘souls’: on which account a philosopher should claim the right to include willing as such within the field of morality: that is, of morality understood as the theory of the relations of dominance under which the phenomenon ‘life’ arises.

Identifying with the commanding thought gives us a sensation of pleasure, Nietzsche says. But he is not appealing to a purely hedonistic justification here; rather, this pleasure is as a result of an increase in feelings of power. It gives us the sensation that it was ‘I’ that ‘willed’ the action. But Nietzsche is clear that this ‘I’ is a fiction that has been added. So, according to Nietzsche, what we think of as ‘willing’—this ‘immediate cer-
The analogy with a commonwealth is instructive. Let us stipulate that the commonwealth is some nation state, call it NATION, and note that this does not refer to a particular landmass, but to a certain community, with leaders, citizens, laws, customs, and so on. Suppose it is a well-constructed and happy commonwealth: the leaders command and the citizens obey. We attribute actions to NATION, such as NATION went to war, NATION denounced child labour, etc. According to Nietzsche, the same happens when one ‘wills’: one associates one’s actions with the commanding thought, where this commanding thought is identified as ‘I.’

The analogy can be pushed further. Consider what it is that we identify with ‘NATION.’ There is no particular thing that is NATION. Rather, NATION supervenes over the collection of leaders, citizens, laws, customs etc. Although we may still talk of ‘NATION,’ discuss its particular values, dispositions, actions, inactions, and so on, there is no entity—NATION—over and above this collection of things.

There is a problem created here, however, due to my not identifying NATION with a particular landmass. The problem is in distinguishing between unity as numerical identity, on the one hand, and unity as coherence, on the other. The problem is that if we cannot help ourselves to some kind of numerical identity, where we count the landmass as a unity, then any disputes among the constituents of NATION cannot be said to conflict in regards to this nation state, but will be merely different, disparate opinions. Analogously for the human agent: if we cannot locate the body as the unity then our many drives can no longer be said to conflict, but will be merely disparate.

This becomes extremely pertinent for Nietzsche, given his theory of Becoming. Becoming is the true antithesis of Being. It holds that the world is one of continual transition or processes. Being, on the other hand, holds that there are stable entities in the world which satisfy our concepts. Thus, the theory of Becoming forces Nietzsche to think of ‘bodies’ in terms of packets of force. Hence, talk of ‘body’ must be metaphorical, or merely a heuristic device, used to talk about what is important to us. But if this is the case then for the drives to be conflicting rather than disparate it appears that Nietzsche is assuming some unified self.

There is an apparent problem, therefore, in that Nietzsche is forced into assuming either a body or a unified self. But consideration of the following passage from The Will to Power, which seems to be talking about the boundaries of different ‘bodies,’ provides an answer:

My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space and to extend its force (— its will to power:) and to thrust back all that resists its extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement (“union”) with those of them that are sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the process goes on—

Nietzsche is using ‘force,’ here, as a terminological variant of ‘drive’ (see fn. 28). Understood in this way, one’s body is a result of one’s many drives (packets of force), rather than being something given prior to one’s many drives. Thus it is possible for Nietzsche to give a human agent’s body numerical identity, without assuming a unified self that subsists within that body. So I can agree with Nehamas when he says that “[o]n a very basic level the unity of the body provides for the identity that is necessary, but not at all sufficient, for the unity of the self.” But this should not cloak the fact that the body is not something given, but created, just as a commonwealth is created. Hence, the individual is nothing more than a multiplicity of drives.

Janaway raises the problem that Nietzsche is forced into accepting that we are already unified selves. According to Janaway, to achieve Nietzsche’s goal of a unitary self compels us to think of ourselves as unified self-conscious subjects, subjects of ‘I’ thoughts, rather than “simply be[ing] a multiplicity of drives and affects,
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as Nietzsche’s official position proclaims.” Janaway claims that this tension is irresolveable (which is not to say that Nietzsche is not aware of it). It is irresolvable, he thinks, because for one to achieve one’s ‘goal’ of becoming “master over oneself,” one is required to have self-conscious knowledge of one’s many different drives and affects and to consciously identify with as many of these as possible.

Now, Nietzsche is not going to deny that we think of ourselves as subjects of ‘I’-thoughts, and I have already said that freedom, for Nietzsche, is the unification of these many drives. However, given Nietzsche’s thoughts on consciousness—that it is merely a means—it is not evident that consciously identifying with as many of our drives and affects as possible is constitutive of Nietzschean freedom. Rather, it may only be that consciously identifying with as many of these drives and affects as possible accompanies Nietzschean freedom, but is not constitutive of it.

6. This raises the issue of our ability to self-consciously reflect on our drives. Nietzsche says the majority of the drives are invisible to us:

However far a man may go in self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the totality of drives which constitute his being.

But it is not even clear that ‘the actor’ (insofar as this denotes an ‘I’) has any input into these drives of which they are aware. Rather, the ‘actor’ is a mere spectator to the interplay between her drives. Metaphorically, we might say that she is an arena in which a struggle between these drives is played out. Perhaps the clearest view Nietzsche gives of this interplay between the drives is in Daybreak 109, where, after providing no less than six ways to combat a drive, he says the following:

That one desires to combat the vehemence of a drive at all, however, does not stand within our own power; nor does the success or failure of this method. What is clearly the case is that in this entire procedure our intellect is only the blind instrument of another drive which is a rival of the drive whose vehemence is tormenting us… While ‘we’ believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom it is one drive which is complaining about another; that is to say: for us to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of a drive presupposes the existence of another equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.

It appears clear that (at least some) human action is a result of a struggle between drives, some of which are known and others which are not. In any case, the ‘intellect,’ which seems just to be consciousness itself, is a passive bystander. But if consciousness is a mere passive bystander it is dramatically unclear how we can intentionally ‘do’ anything: all our ‘doings’ appear to be ‘mere behaviours.’

Hence, we need to assess the scope of Nietzsche’s account of ‘willing’ in BGE 19: does it relate to some acts or all of them? If it relates to only some acts then we seem to have the resources to make a distinction between intentional actions and mere behaviours. If, however, we are unable to make this distinction then we are unable to ascribe to Nietzsche a ‘positive view of freedom.’

7. Interpretations of Nietzsche’s conception of ‘the will’ seem to be done in causal terms. With reference to Leiter and Clark and Dudrick, I will argue that this is a mistake: the mistake is in conflating the commanding thought with willing, where willing, for Nietzsche, is this complex relation of commanding, obeying and the feeling of power. I will argue, in this section, for a non-causal account of ‘the will.’ In the following section I show how Nietzsche’s discussion of the error of cause and effect, in TI, The Four Great Errors, agrees with this interpretation and, with the help of the Being/Becoming distinction, provides a novel account of ‘willing.’ Interpretations of Nietzsche’s view in respect to the causal role of the will fall along a spectrum. Leiter proposes two views: the will as (token) epiphenomenal (his preferred view) and the will as secondary cause. To this
we can add a third—Clark and Dudrick’s view—the will as primary cause. The weakest view is that the will is purely epiphenomenal: it causes nothing; the strongest: will as primary cause.

Consider a claim Leiter attributes to Nietzsche: the ‘Doctrine of Types’:

Each person has a fixed psycho-physical constitution, which marks him or her as a particular ‘type’ of person. Call the relevant psycho-physical facts here ‘type facts’.

These ‘type-facts,’ Leiter tells us, are “either physiological facts about the person, or facts about the person’s unconscious drives or affects.” These ‘type-facts’ determine a person’s trajectory and are causally and explanatorily primary. This means that conscious mental states, which we identify with ‘the will,’ emerge from unconscious states—they are not self-caused, or caused by ‘the will.’ Will as secondary cause holds that while these conscious mental states are not sufficient for action, they do play a causal role. In this case, ‘the will’ is determined by one’s underlying psycho-physical constitution, but then plays a part in causing the particular action. What I am calling the will as primary cause attempts to (in some sense) re-establish willing as such to Nietzsche. This view, propounded recently by Clark and Dudrick, sees Nietzsche engaged in normative claims, rather than naturalist ones. They argue that BGE 19 seeks to “rehabilitate rather than to debunk the traditional notion of willing.” In particular, they argue that BGE 19 concerns only “a… restricted class of cases [of willing], namely, actions undertaken as the result of a deliberate decision.”

I want to propose an alternative to these accounts, which think of ‘the will’ in causal terms. The success of this account rests on how well it explains the following passage in BGE 19:

[T]he one who wills believes, in good conscience, that willing suffices for action. Since it is almost always the case that there is will only where the effect of command, and therefore obedience, and therefore action, may be expected, the appearance translates into the feeling, as if there were a necessity of effect. In short, the one who wills believes with a reasonable degree of certainty that will and action are somehow one; he attributes the success, the performance of the willing to the will itself, and consequently enjoys an increase in the feeling of power that accompanies all success.

The problem Nietzsche articulates here is that when one ‘wills’ one thinks this is enough for action. But he also implies that this does not suffice for action. Why not? Leiter suggests that Nietzsche is concerned solely with the commanding thought (as opposed to including the obeying under-wills and the feeling of power) and refers back to BGE 17, where Nietzsche argues that a thought comes when ‘it’ wants and not when ‘I’ want. This allows Leiter to say that while we identify with the commanding thought—and in virtue of this think that what we do (command) suffices for action—this is incorrect, for not even this commanding thought is our own.

Clark and Dudrick oppose this interpretation. They point out that Nietzsche’s statement that “the effect of command, and therefore obedience, and therefore action” (my italics) is most straightforwardly read as accepting that there is a relationship between commanding and action. I think they are right in saying that there is a relation here, but they equivocate on commanding as commanding and commanding as willing; they say:

The natural way to read the passage, given how Nietzsche actually wrote it, is as taking for granted that willing (commanding) causes action, and seeking to explain how we come to assume ‘that willing suffices for action.’ Calling this assumption ‘erroneous’ is not a denial that willing bears a causal relationship to action. Nietzsche denies only that willing is sufficient to produce action.

But, “‘Not at all, my dear sir!’ – So let us start again, from the beginning.” BGE 19 is opposed to what ‘we’ call ‘willing’ (meaning the ‘we’ who are uneducated by Nietzsche on the phenomenology of willing). It is opposed to this “immediate certainty” that is propounded by these “German philosophers” as “the best known thing in the world.” Rather, ‘willing,’ for Nietzsche, is a complex thing that is denoted by only one word.
This one word is not a synonym for commanding, as Clark and Dudrick (implicitly) claim; for if it were then we are merely substituting ‘commanding’ for ‘willing’ and making ‘commanding’ this “immediate certainty” and “the best known thing in the world,” as opposed to what Nietzsche says.\(^92\) ‘Willing,’ for Nietzsche, refers to the complex that is made up of the state of affairs of commanding, obeying and the feeling of power. He says “there is will only where the effect of command, and therefore obedience, and therefore action, may be expected” (first emphasis is mine). Thus, this complex state of affairs is a necessary condition for ‘willing’: the commanding thought is not identical to ‘the will.’ Furthermore, he is explicit it is not an ‘I’ that controls this commanding thought, for he says “effect of command,” which refers merely to our becoming conscious of this commanding thought.\(^93\)

The problem with the Leiter/Clark and Dudrick interpretations is that they conflate ‘willing’ with Nietzsche’s ‘commanding thought.’ Leiter is explicit in this—“In debunking the phenomenology as a reliable guide to causation, Nietzsche’s target is the commandeering thought, rather than the bodily feelings [feelings or sensations] or the meta feeling [the affect]”\(^94\)— and Clark and Dudrick follow suit. But nowhere does Nietzsche identify ‘willing’ with the ‘commanding thought.’ He says that willing, not the commanding thought, does not suffice for action.

So we need to go back to Nietzsche’s quote and determine what role ‘will’ and its cognate expressions play. As Nietzsche is addressing those with a preconception of what ‘the will’ is, every instance of ‘will’ and its cognate expressions must refer to the sensation of willing, whether this be the experience of willing, or the belief that it was an ‘I’ that did the willing (with the exception of the last—“the will, itself”—which refers to an (fictitious) entity that is ‘the will’). Remember, for Nietzsche, ‘will’ is something that is thought to be an “immediate certainty,” but is actually a complex of feelings and sensations, thoughts, and affects. So it is the appearance of a constant conjunction between this phenomenon commonly called ‘willing’ and action that one concludes “willing suffices for action.”\(^95\) But this common conception of willing, for Nietzsche, is a term that does not denote anything.

To see how ‘willing’ could be a term that does not denote anything, think about NATION again. The leaders may command the troops to go to war, but the action only follows if the troops obey. If both these events occur then we are apt to say ‘NATION went to war.’ But this sentence—‘NATION went to war’—occludes this complex phenomenon. Rather than identifying the leaders and obeying troops with this particular action, we identify ‘NATION’ as being its own agent (notice that it cannot be reduced solely to the leaders). But, strictly, this is wrong. We might say that the truth-maker for ‘NATION went to war’ is this complex phenomenon of commanding and obeying: if we cannot make this reduction then the sentence fails to refer.\(^96\) But in making this reduction (which is needed to make ‘NATION went to war’ true) we eliminate the subject: in this case, NATION. My claim is that Nietzsche is thinking about ‘willing’ in an analogous way. For ‘willing’ to be a term that denotes something there had better be something that does the willing. But ‘x wills’ does not refer to anything in virtue of ‘x’ having no referent. This is an elimination of the unique subject of these ‘I’-thoughts. If this is right, then BGE 19 is an ‘elimination’ of a common conception of willing. The word ‘elimination’ should be placed in scare quotes, however, as Nietzsche is explicit that he is arguing for “soul as multiplicity of the subject,” not an elimination, as the “clumsy naturalists” are prone to do, “who can hardly touch ‘the soul’ without losing it.”\(^97\) His alternative is to ‘eliminate’ the concept of ‘willing’ insofar as it is an ‘I’ that does the willing. Nietzsche’s positive picture is that what we understand as ‘willing’ is really just one drive having command over another.

Thus, I take my interpretation to show that Nietzsche is thinking of the human agent as being constituted by many different drives. These drives vie for top position and are instrumental in all instances of (our becoming conscious of the phenomenon we call) ‘willing.’ Thus, there is a struggle for power going on at the micro level of existence (that of the human body). Thinking about NATION, again, this would be analogous to its being led by different parties. In each case, the leading party—or drive—attempts to fully exert its power in all instances. Just as NATION is not lead by the same (group of) individual(s) over time, Nietzsche thinks ‘willing’ is not
done by the same entity over time. So while Nietzsche holds that the constitutive standard of ‘agency’ is power, and the more unified these drives the more one’s agency is exerted, there is no unified ‘I’ that does the ‘willing,’ where ‘willing’ refers to one’s actions, rather than one’s mere behaviours. 98

8. In this section I will argue that there are philosophical reasons to attribute this kind of view to Nietzsche. The standout problem with the Leiter/Clark and Dudrick readings is that they conflate ‘willing’ with the commanding thought. The common problem is that they continue to think in causal terms. As I will argue in this section, Nietzsche eschews any relation between willing and action in respect to the will’s causal role. I will argue that to make sense of Nietzsche’s concept of agency, we need to consider his work holistically, taking into account what he says in other places, concerning cause and effect and his theory of Becoming. I put forward my positive account of Nietzsche’s conception of ‘the will,’ which I call ‘will as symptom,’ or ‘will as symptom of the effects.’

The standout problem with conflating ‘willing’ with the commanding thought is that Nietzsche is opposed to this standard conception of cause and effect itself. 99 In the chapter, The Four Great Errors, he uses the following example: Cornaro was the author of a book on his meagre diet for a long and happy life. The book’s popularity was due to the assumption that the diet was the cause of his longevity. The idea must have been something like this: I am alike Cornaro in the relevant respects, hence if I follow his particular diet I will have a long and happy life too. Nietzsche points out that this was not so. He says: “the prerequisite of long life, an extraordinarily slow metabolism, a small consumption, was the cause of his meagre diet.” 100 So it was the prerequisites for Cornaro’s longevity that caused his meagre diet, rather than the meagre diet causing his longevity. Let us put this in terms Leiter uses. Leiter claims that the problem Nietzsche is exposing is that while it was thought that one event (E1)—Conaro’s meagre diet—was the cause of a second event (E2)—Cornaro’s longevity, it was actually due to some other cause altogether—what Leiter calls a deep cause (DC), which was Cornaro’s physiological constitution. 101

This can be given both a will as epiphenomenal and will as secondary cause reading. 102

Will as Epiphenomenal: There are two distinct events ((E1) and (E2)) where one (E1) has been confused for the cause of the other (E2), but in actual fact there is an underlying ‘deep cause’ (DC), which causes them both

Will as Secondary Cause: There are two distinct events ((E1) and (E2)) where one (E1) has been confused for the cause of the other (E2), but in actual fact there is an underlying ‘deep cause’ (DC), which causes (E1), which in turn causes (E2)

Leiter proposes that there is an analogue in the case of willing. 103 In this case, (DC) is the person’s physiological constitution, (E1) is the experience of willing and (E2) is the relevant action. This can be put in diagram form like so (where ‘→’ denotes a causal relation):

Will as Epiphenomenal: DC → (E1 ∧ E2)
Will as Secondary Cause: DC → E1 → E2

In the Will as Epiphenomenal case there is no causal relation between (E1) and (E2); in the Will as Secondary Cause case there is such a relation. Leiter admits this much:

The Cornaro example itself most plausibly suggests the Will as Secondary Cause (surely the slender diet makes a causal contribution to the long life), yet the passage with which we began, from Daybreak [§124: see fn. 74], suggests the Will as Epiphenomenal instead: if the ‘I will’ is really analogous to the person ‘who steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its room, and
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then says: “I will that the sun shall rise” (D 124), then there is no causal link between the experience of willing and the resulting action, just as there is no causal link between the person who wills the sun to rise and the rising of the sun.¹⁰⁴

This highlights a genuine ambiguity in Nietzsche’s work. Leiter rests his case on ‘interpretive charity,’ where what is charitable is dependent on (current) empirical research.¹⁰⁵ But there are reasons to be wary of this principle, as used here; for even supposing this interpretation is somewhat vindicated by current best science, this research is over a century post-Nietzsche, meaning that any intention Nietzsche had in writing what he did cannot be attributed to him from the perspective of 21st century empirical science.¹⁰⁶ This provides reason to think that if there is ambiguity this ambiguity ought to be kept.

In light of this, I provide an alternative interpretation, which comes about through paying adequate attention to the Being/Becoming distinction, something many current commentators have failed to do.¹⁰⁷ My preferred interpretation—‘will as symptom’—eschews all causal terms. In short, it argues for the idea that what we understand as ‘the will’ is only a symptom of the effects. This view holds that ‘the will,’ or ‘willing’ is only ‘known’ to us by its (perceived) ‘effects.’

The idea is quite easy to explain conceptually, but harder to understand when applied to ‘the will’ and harder still if we cannot help ourselves to causal terms in attempting to explain it. This is okay, though, if we can help ourselves to Nietzsche’s demarcation between explaining and understanding in BGE 21.¹⁰⁸ To explain something is to uncover the deep truth about it—to discern what it is. Understanding, on the other hand, is our ability to comprehend the world and make it accessible and intelligible to us and others (including communication, social cohesion, etc.).¹⁰⁹

Used in the sense of understanding, we might say that the diet is ‘caused’ by the way Cornaro is. In this case, I am using ‘caused’ as a ‘mere concept.’ But in the sense of explanation there are neither causes nor effects. Nietzsche says “[t]here are neither causes nor effects. Linguistically we do not know how to rid ourselves of them. But that does not matter. If I think of the muscle apart from its ‘effects,’ I negate it—”¹¹⁰ A clear example of this is a bolt of lightning. The bolt of lightning just is its effects, it is the flash across the sky;¹¹¹,¹¹² our assertion ‘there’s a bolt of lightning’ does not refer to something else that causes this flash across the sky.¹¹³

The same reasoning can be applied to Cornaro and his physiological constitution. We might say that Cornaro’s physiological constitution cannot be thought of independently of its ‘effects,’ that is, his meagre diet and longevity. In the sense of explanation, for Nietzsche, Cornaro’s physiological constitution just is its ‘effects.’ So while we might say that Cornaro’s physiological constitution is the ‘deep cause’ of his diet, linguistics deceives us of the true relation in this instance. Just as the lightning bolt is identical to its effects, so is Cornaro’s physiological constitution identical to his meagre diet and longevity. So in the sense of explanation there is no deep cause either. Citing Cornaro’s meagre diet and longevity as the effects of his physiological constitution is only a way for us to make the deep cause comprehensible.

We can apply this to ‘the will’ to get a diagrammatic formulation of ‘will as symptom.’ In this case, we get the following pictorial demonstration of what is really going on, where what’s in the parentheses (E₁ ∧ E₂… ∧ Eₙ) is a way to make the deep cause (DC) comprehensible to us:

Will as Symptom: DC (E₁ ∧ E₂… ∧ Eₙ)

Notice that there are no causal terms; (DC) is explained in virtue of its effects, which is a limitation of language, rather than what there is. So, just as a bolt of lightning is nothing more than its effects (the flash across the sky), the deep cause is nothing more than its effects—that is, E₁, E₂… ∧ Eₙ. Our understanding provokes us to understand this in causal terms (either in terms of Will as Epiphenomenal or Will as Secondary Cause), but this is not the true nature of the relation.
This is consistent with a theory of *Becoming*. According to the theory of *Becoming* there are no things, no causes, no purposes or aims. Everything is fluid. We need to create concepts in order to live, however, so we are forced, in some sense, to confer *Being* onto existence, even though this is essentially a falsifying of the world. We can devise a scheme to do this: first, pinpoint what it is we want to explain then, second, list the effects. For example, determining Cornaro’s physiological constitution is done by placing (DC) on the left-hand of the equals sign.

However, one might point out, this is not to explain ‘the will,’ but to explain (DC). The reason Leiter thinks that explaining (DC) is to explain ‘the will’ is because he is thinking in causal terms. But mine is a non-causal account of ‘the will.’ Consider an analogy. What we experience as heat is in actuality mean molecular kinetic energy. This is not a causal relation, it is a relation of constitution. The mean molecular kinetic energy constitutes what it is to be heat. Similarly, for Nietzsche, there is no thing that is ‘the will,’ which causes things to happen. Rather, what we identify as ‘the will’ (the effects we associate with ‘the will’) stands in a constitution relationship with the struggle for power between drives. This means, for Nietzsche, every attempt at defining ‘the will’ is a human construct. He says that we can only know of something by its effect(s) on us: “[a] ‘thing’ is the sum of its effects, synthetically united by a concept, an image.” So our ‘definition’ of ‘the will’ is determined by its effects. Or, more perspicuously, what we classify as ‘the will’ is known only by the effects we associate with ‘the will.’ Determining what ‘the will’ is, for Nietzsche, would be to place this on the left-hand side of the equals sign. But in all cases this is to impose *Being* onto existence, something that is not actually there. What we understand as ‘willing’ must be explained as a symptom of the complex phenomena of commanding, obeying and a feeling of power. This does not use any causal terms—which is to see the world as a world of *Being*—but is fluid and consistent with a world of *Becoming*.

9. My account of Will as Symptom provides a third alternative to Gemes’ notions of deserts-based and agency free will. Consider a further ambiguity in ‘responsibility.’ It may refer to one’s doings, in the sense of agency free will, rather than a mere behaviour, or we may understand it as merely something done by them. Acts that fall under the former may not fall under the latter: upsetting the milk on purpose (in order to gain attention, perhaps) will be one’s doing and something done by one, whereas upsetting the milk as an accidental feature of saving the red cordial from staining the floor will not be one’s doing, but will be something done by one. Nietzsche’s view of Will as Symptom provides support for this latter view. On this reading, it is not as if we do anything; rather, it is the achievement of our individual drives that things are done by us. It is only an interpretation of these drives as working in unification that allows us to infer agency. But there is no agency in the sense of agency free will (the kind of agency understandable from the ‘standard’ conceptual framework); rather, everything we do is a result of a struggle between our drives, including unintentional behaviour. This is an elimination of the distinction between actions and mere behaviours, where all acts are mere behaviours: consciousness merely accompanies some of these acts.

This is why unity is such an achievement for Nietzsche. But we must be careful to not think of ‘unity’ as having conceptual relations with terms such as agency, free will, responsibility and action, understandable from the ‘standard’ conceptual framework. Doing so would be to make a conceptual mistake; for there is no ‘doer’ behind the many ‘deeds.’ Achievement, for Nietzsche, is merely a piece of fate and no more; achievement is merely our many ‘mere behaviours,’ which we take to resemble a coherent whole.

10. I have given a close reading of *BGE* 19, which, I have argued, provides a negative view of freedom. I have argued that by understanding what Nietzsche refers to as ‘willing’ —the entirety of the commanding thought, obeying under-wills and the feeling of power, and not just the commanding thought—we get a picture whereby it turns out that there is nothing in particular that does the willing; rather, what we think of as ‘willing’ is merely a symptom of the effects.
I have argued that there are two notions of ‘agency’ in play. One notion of agency has conceptual relations with such things as responsibility (in the sense of at least agency free will), action, free will, and so on, as understood from the ‘standard’ conceptual framework. But, I have argued, there are philosophical reasons to think that Nietzsche is using ‘agency’ (and related terms) in a way that does not have these conceptual relations. This second sense of agency includes, especially, things done by one. In fact, given Nietzsche’s view of Will as Symptom, it turns out that all activities fall into this latter category. This is not just a different conception of agency, but a different concept. Thus, on the ‘standard’ understanding of ‘agency,’ freedom or agency is unattainable. This is Nietzsche’s ‘negative view of freedom.’

This provides an awkward dilemma for contemporary interpretations, which make use of Nietzsche’s so-called ‘sovereign individual’ or Nietzsche’s ‘positive view of freedom’: either Nietzsche argues for a type of agency which is unknowable from the ‘standard’ conceptual framework, or the ‘sovereign individual’ is not his ideal of freedom. I have argued for the former lemma in this paper, which means that the conclusion can stand independently of whether or not the sovereign individual is Nietzsche’s ideal of freedom. If I am right, however, and Nietzsche employs a notion of ‘will’ as Will as Symptom, then if the ‘sovereign individual’ is Nietzsche’s ideal of freedom, he is far from ‘free’—at least, understood from the ‘standard’ conceptual framework.
NOTES


17. Ibid., 193-94, §259.


23. Ibid., 322-23.


25. Ibid., 374.

26. While this remark is a little ‘off the cuff’, it is no less true thereby, compare:

Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books, than he already knows … Whoever thought he had understood something of me, had made up something out of me after his own image—not uncommonly an antithesis to me; for example, an “idealist”—and whoever had understood nothing of me, denied that I need be considered at all (Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Genealogy of Morals,” in *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 261., Why I write such good books, §1)

To explain how a philosopher’s most remote metaphysical assertions have actually been arrived at, it is always well (and wise) to ask oneself first: what morality does this (does he -) aim at? (Beyond Good and Evil, 37-38, §6)

27. The German word ‘Trieb’ (and its cognate expressions) is generally translated as ‘drive,’ but in some instances is translated as ‘instinct,’ such as ‘Lebens-Grundtriebe’ as ‘life-instinct’ and ‘Selbsterhaltungs-Trieb’ as ‘self-preservation instinct’
(GS 349). The German word for ‘instinct’ is ‘Instinkt.’


Subjects, Nietzsche tells us, are irreducible multiplicities. The disposition that composes them is itself made up of microdispositions—what Nietzsche variously calls “drives” (Trieb), “desires” (Begierden), “instincts” (Instinkte), “powers” (Mächte), “forces” (Kräfte), “impulses” (Reize, Impulse), “passions” (Leidenschaften), “feelings” (Gefühlen), “affects” (Affekte), pathos (Pathos), and so on. Starting from the premise that there are, first and foremost, actions, becomings, and appearances, Nietzsche posits “affects” as the interior states that help to explain and predict these actions, becomings, and appearances [my italics].


29. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 43-44., §1; cf. The Will to Power, 270-71., §490


31. See, for example, Gemes, “Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy and the Sovereign Individual; Janaway, “Autonomy, Affect, and the Self in Nietzsche’s Project of Genealogy.”


34. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 267., §48; Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, 139.§7[60]

35. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 37-38., §6

36. For references, see Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,” 729-31.

37. Ibid., 731.

38. Ibid., 745.

39. Ibid., 744.

40. Ibid., 470ff.

41. Agency and the Foundations of Ethics: Nietzschean Constitutivism., see Ch. 5


44. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 47-49., §19

45. Ibid., 41-43., §1; cf. The Gay Science, 91-92., §127

46. Beyond Good and Evil, 47-49., §19


48. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 45-47., §16-17

49. Ibid., 47., §17

50. The Will to Power, 44-46., §1, 13

51. Beyond Good and Evil, 49-50., §20

52. Ibid., 45., §15; ‘Sensualism therefore is at least a regulative hypothesis, certainly a heuristic principle’

53. Ibid., 47-49., §19

54. French for ‘I am the effect.’
55. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 47-49., §19
56. Clark and Dudrick, “Nietzsche on the Will: An Analysis of Bge 19.”, esp., 259-260. Clark and Dudrick go to some pains in attempting to explain what Nietzsche means here, claiming that “Nietzsche takes willing to be essentially connected to values” (p. 260), where ‘willing’ is restricted to “actions undertaken as the result of a deliberate decision” (p. 250). But this seems wholly off-track. (See sections 7-9 for further details).

When Nietzsche talks about ‘the relations of dominance’ he seems to be referring to his preferred morality, as he tells us in an unpublished note: “My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not at an individualistic morality. The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd—but not reach out beyond it: the leaders of the herd require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do the independent, or the ‘beasts of prey,’ etc.” (Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 162., §287).

58. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 47., §17
60. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 312., §581
61. Ibid., 285, 330., §526 & §616
62. Ibid., 339-40., §636
63. Nietzsche: *Life as Literature*, 181.
65. Ibid., 219-22.
68. Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, “‘Twilight of the Idols,’” in *Twilight of the Idols / the Anti-Christ* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1990), 60., The Four Great Errors, §3: “[t]he will no longer moves anything, consequently no longer explains anything – it merely accompanies events, it can also be absent.”
69. *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, 71-72., §115
70. Ibid., 74-76., §119
71. The third personal pronoun ‘they’ is used (instead of ‘it’) as it appears to make more grammatical sense than using ‘it’ (or, ‘it is’ instead of ‘they are’). But this is only because of the implicit gender-neutrality of ‘the actor’, rather than being the neuter gender. However, even using ‘it’ presupposes too much. (See *Beyond Good and Evil*, 47., §17.: “the ‘it’ contains an interpretation of the process, and does not belong to the process itself.”)
73. Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, 64-65., §109
74. Ibid., 77., §124: Nietzsche has a clearer articulation of the relevant point about human agency: “What is willing! – We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its room, and then says: ‘I will that the sun shall rise’… But, all laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any differently whenever we employ the expression: ‘I will’?”
75. Brian Leiter, “The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche,” ed. Christopher Janaway (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). “Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical,” *Philosophical Perspectives* 3(1999): 109-10. Note that Leiter’s view has changed from his earlier one, where he says that these mental states are type epiphenomenal. McLaughlin has a good discussion on the difference between token and type epiphenomena. Basically, if conscious mental states are type epiphenomenal then they emerge from unconscious states—they are not self-caused, or
caused by ‘the will’—but once caused, they can enter into the total causal story of any particular action. So they are not causal *qua* mental, but in virtue of an underlying physical type. If conscious mental states are *token*-epiphenomenal then they cannot cause anything.

76. “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will,” 123.
79. We can happily put ‘Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Types’ in terminology closer to Nietzsche’s. Understand ‘Nietzsche’s Doctrine of Types’ as appealing to the instincts and drives that constitute the human agent. For Nietzsche, the human agent is *nothing other than* these instincts and drives. Leiter claims that a person’s type facts help to determine their life trajectory, but how their life actually turns out will be determined by these type facts *and* their particular life circumstance(s). So if two people had the exact same type facts but different life circumstances, then they would lead different lives; same circumstances and same type facts means identical lives. In Nietzsche’s terminology: if two people *were* the exact same instincts and drives but their life circumstances differed, then they would lead different lives; same circumstances and same instincts and drives means identical lives.

81. See Katsafanas, “Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology,” 752, n. 41. The view stated here leads to two ambiguities. First, these conscious mental states may be either bi- or uni-directional, where the former says that conscious mental states can influence one’s actions (see, e.g., “Nietzsche’s Theory of Mind: Consciousness and Conceptualization,” *European Journal of Philosophy* 13, no. 1 (2005).), and the latter says that conscious mental states do not cause anything (cf. Brian Leiter, “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* 7, no. 7 (2007): 5, n. 9.). The second is that one’s psycho-physical constitution either *influences* one’s conscious mental states, *or determines* them. These factors change only the possibilities along the spectrum and do not threaten anything I say in the main text.
84. Ibid., 250.
85. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 47-49., §19
86. Leiter, “Nietzsche’s Theory of the Will,” 112.
87. This opens up the genuine ambiguity between will as epiphenomenal and will as secondary cause, for it states that the will is not one’s own, but is silent on whether it plays any role in the causal chain leading up to action.
89. Ibid., 261.
91. I am repeating myself here, but the situation *requires* its repetition.
93. Cf. Ibid., 47., §17: ‘a thought comes when “it” wants, not when “I” want.’
95. Cf. Nietzsche, *Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, 77., §121
96. Cf. the ongoing debate about non-referring terms.
98. The following passage, from Nietzsche’s later notebooks, agrees with this reading insofar as the epiphenomenalism of consciousness:

> Everything which enters consciousness is the last link in a chain, a closure. It is just an illusion that one thought is the immediate cause of another thought. The events which are actually connected are played out below our consciousness: the series and sequences of feelings, thoughts, etc., that appear are symptoms of what actually happens! - Below every thought lies an affect. Every thought, every feeling, every will is *not born* of one particular drive but is a *total state*, a whole surface of the whole consciousness, and results from how the power of *all* the drives that constitute us is fixed at that moment - thus, the power of the drive that dominates just now as well as of the drives obeying or resisting it. The next thought is a sign of how the total power situation has now shifted again. (Nietzsche, *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 60., §1[61])

100. Nietzsche, “Twilight of the Idols,” 58., ‘The Four Great Errors, §1
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
106. Ibid., 12-15. See Leiter for references to 21st century empirical science.
107. Rowe, “Nietzsche’s ‘Anti-Naturalism’ in ‘the Four Great Errors’.”
108. The passage is this:

One ought not to make ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ into material things, as natural scientists do (and those who, like them, naturalize in their thinking – ), in accordance with the prevailing mechanistic stupidity which has the cause press and push until it ‘produces an effect’: one ought to employ ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ only as pure concepts, that is to say as conventional fictions for the purpose of designation, mutual understanding, not explanation (Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 50-52., §21)

109. For support of this position in later (unpublished) texts, see WTP 551 (March-June 1888): ‘[t]here is no such thing as “cause”; some cases in which it seemed to be given us, and in which we have projected it out of ourselves in order to understand an event, have been shown to be self-deceptions’ (my italics) (see also, WTP 569 (Spring-Fall 1887), 624 (1883-1888), 664 (1883-1888), 671 (1883-1888)).
111. Ibid., 288-89, 94., §531, §548
113. ‘Bolt of lightning’, for example, does not refer to ‘atmospheric pressure.’
115. The Will to Power, 274-75, 81, 85.,§505-506, §518, §52; Beyond Good and Evil, 115-16., §19; The Gay Science, 166-69., §354
116. Nietzsche, Writings from the Late Notebooks, 60., §1[61]
117. Cf. Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, 185-86.
118. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, 295-97., §551